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ABSTRACT 
Every state is known by the rights that it maintains. Our meth )(1 of 
judging its character lies, above all in the contribution that it makes to 
the substance of man's happiness. 
'Human Rights' is a twentieth century term for what had been 
traditionally known as "Natural Rights" or in a more appcaHng pfrasc. 
the "Rights of Man". The notion of "Rights of Man" and other such 
concepts of human rights are as old as Humanity. These rights ot men 
had a place almost in all the ancient societies of the world, though they 
were not referred to by that name. It is a general belief that the concept 
of human rights is Western and that the origin of the concept of hi man 
rights in world history found its expression in the 'Magna Carta" of 
1215 followed by the Petition of Rights of 1628, the Bill of Rights of 
1688, the Amerian Bill of Rights of 1791 and the French Declaration of 
the Rights ofMan of 1789. 
Prior to the use of the term "Human Rights", such rights were typi( ally 
called the Rights of Man or Natural Rights. Eleanor Roosevelt suggested 
the change of name from "Rights of Man" to "Human Rights" in 1 )47. 
This term has since been universally accepted, beginning with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which the General Assembly 
had passed on 10^ '' December 1948. 
Human beings are rational. By virtue of being human, they possess 
certain basic and inalienable rights, commonly known as human rights. 
They become operative with their birth. Human rights, being the 
birthright, are therefore inherent in ail human beings irrespective o iheir 
caste, creed, religion, sex and nationality. Human rights art also 
sometimes referred to as fundamental rights, 'basic rights', "iniicrent 
rights', 'natural rights' and 'birth rights'. 'Human rights" is a generic 
term, which embraces 'civil rights', civil liberties, and 'social, eco lomic 
and cultural rights'. The idea of human rights is bound up with the idea 
of human dignity. Thus all those rights, which are essential f )r the 
maintenance of human dignity, are called human rights. These rights are 
essential for all individuals as they are consonant with their freedom and 
dignity and are conducive to their physical, moral, social and spiritual 
welfare. Human rights include those areas of individual or ;itoup-
freedom that are immune from Governmental interference becajse ol 
their basic contribution to human dignity or welfare and are subiect to 
Governmental guarantee, protection or promotion. 
India being the largest democracy and signatory to many international 
conventions and covenants should give special importance to iunnan 
rights but ironically the record of human rights in India is net \'er\ 
satisfactory and encouraging as many people are subjected to 
exploitation, injustice, physical torture, and violence. Mass of the aeople 
are illiterate, under-privileged and are unaware of the law or e.en of 
their legal rights, unacquainted with the niceties of procedure in\olved. 
and too impoverished to engage lawyers, file papers and been heav\ 
expenditure on dilatory litigation. 
In India, the concept of human rights received constitutional blessings in 
its different parts. It must be said to the credit of India thai within a short 
span of time, it had in its new Constitution, adopted most of the 
principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Riuhts as an i iteijrai 
part of constitutional obligations. Keeping in view the constitutional 
commitment set forth in Part-Ill (Fundamental Rights) and P.iit-lV 
(Directive Principles of State Policy) and the commitment tovvards 
human rights, the court in India developed Public Interest Liti,;^ ation 
(PIL) as a special device to come to grip with the problems of 
contemporary society and ensuring that not civil and political rights 
alone but economic and social rights are also necessary for surviva . 
The judiciary is being envisaged not as a redressal forum for elite class 
in the society. Instead, it is seen and perceived as a forum for n ising. 
redressing and articulating the problems of the have-nots, the deprived, 
the oppressed and the downtrodden, women and the children 
environmental groups, victims of bureaucratic exploitation and the 
abuse of power and position by persons holding high public office.. The 
courts have become a forum for the representation, articulatio i and 
protection of the basic human rights of the people who on accoant ol 
their social and economic disabilities can not approach the court tor the 
enforcement of their fundamental rights. 
The Supreme Court stands at the top of the hierarchy of the i:ourts 
constituted under the Constitution. It is the final arbiter as t) the 
upholding of the federal principle, the validity of a law or exe^utixe 
action and as to the enforcement of fundamental rights of the citzens. 
The Supreme Court of India being the highest court of the land snapes 
the destiny of millions of Indians by exercising the various jurisdii:tions 
vested in it by the Constitution. Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Ayvcv had 
predicted with great vision, way back in 1949 that "the future evo ution 
of the Indian Constitution will thus depend to a large extent upc n the 
Supreme Court and the direction given to it by that court." An important 
issue that has assumed significance in recent times has been the ac tMst 
role played by the Indian judiciary especially the Supreme Court. Over 
the period of last six decades, the apex court has transformed fro n the 
role of 'interpreter of law' to the role of 'maker of laws'. The 
performance of the Supreme Court-led higher judiciary in India has 
been uneven. In the fifties and sixties, the judiciary was confronted with 
many issues involving the validity of agrarian reforms introduced ly the 
Parliament and the state legislatures. Many a legislation were struck 
down as unconstitutional on the ground of violation of the fundaiaental 
right to property guaranteed in Part III. Probably the back ground of the 
judges sitting in the Supreme Court at that time which showed that most 
of them were foreign educated, hailing from the families holdini large 
tracts of land and that some of them were from the tradition il and 
conseiA/ative families, had influenced the judicial behaviour in 1950's 
and 1960's. As regards the 1970's, inspite of the historical judgment in 
Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala\ the Supreme Court could not 
continue the momentum it built upon the 'basic structure' spirit. !n fact 
up till the epoch making judgment of the Supreme Court in AUuiekn 
Gandhi v. Union of India,' there were no activist traits on the part of the 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has come into its own, as ar; 
institution only in the 1980's. The court demonstrated that it can be as 
active as any other judiciary in the world. The court commenjcd its 
dynamic role in safeguarding and protecting the fundamental rights of 
the citizens and in putting an effective check on the other Ivvo on^ans of 
the state viz; the Executive and the Legislature only in the 1980's. It has 
become possible, solely due to the dynamism and willinuness o ' a few 
' AIR 1973 SC 1461 
-AIR 1978 SC597. 
judges like Justice Krishna Iyer, Justice Chandracliud, Justice Bhai wati. 
Justice Chinnappa Reddy and Justice Kartzu. This list is only illust ati\ e 
in nature. As a result, the Supreme Court has become increasingly 
people-oriented in its post emergency phase. The new batch of juages 
representing the second generation Indians of free India, and claiming to 
possess a power to participate in the community welfare through their 
own philosophies and ideologies made a vast distinction and prompted 
the judiciary in India, to acquire a new shape and face. 
Family is a basic and universal unit of human society. It performs 
functions that are necessary for the continuity, integration and 
development of social life. In most traditional societies family las 
been the unit of social, cultural, religious, economic and political 
activities and organizations. In modern industrial societies, the fan ily 
performs primarily the functions of reproduction, socialization ; nd 
provision of emotional satisfaction. A family is a domestic group of 
people, or a number of domestic groups, typically aftlliated by birth or 
maiTiage, or by comparable legal relationships including adoption. 
There are a number of variations in the basic family structure. 
Throughout history, families have been central to human society a 
key indicator of a society's well-being is the health of its families, for 
this reason, as stated in Article 16(3) of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, "The (family is the) natural and fundamental grojp 
unit of society and is enthled to protection by society and the State." 
The family is the basic social unit for the expression of love betwe-.Mi 
man and woman and the creation and rising of children. The fami!) 
tames the wilder impulses of men to the responsibilities of fatherhood 
enables young women to blossom as mothers, and cultivates morali> 
in children. Moral virtues, empathy, and good human relationship. are 
learned in the family. An important indicator of the social value of the 
family is the capacity for strengthening the link between general ons. 
The procreative and educative dimensions of the family constituie an 
indisputable economic factor which must be recognized as such. The 
family is the "basic community of society". The public autho -iiies 
must therefore protect it, because it comes before the State anc any 
political organization. 
India is a multi-linguistic, multi -cultural and multi-rehgious s ate ot 
more than a billion people, of which almost half comprise femaks The 
principles of fairness and equity are enshrined in the Constitution of 
India, that unequivocally mandates gender equality. Such equality truK 
in fact and deed is imperative for the development of India, For nv 
country if it is to prosper can afford to underutilize or suppress lalf its 
human resources that women represent. Discrimination and v olencc 
against women do not just victimize the individual women, but do 
indeed hold back whole sections of society. Guaranteeing n:^hts to 
women is an investment in making the whole nation stronger and selt-
reliant. In India, it is particularly the Personal law that prii cipally 
governs the lives of women, though to many, the exact dimension and 
how it controls the lives of each one of us may not be very clear. Smiply 
stated. Personal law is the set of rules which govern the behavior of 
individuals vis a vis their family i.e. spouse, parents, children etc. It has 
been widely observed that the rights that women ha\e under personal 
law are often usurped. Though the law provides for a judicial procedure 
to enforce the law by way of courts as well as the penalty for violating 
the law, women being socially and economically subservient ai e either 
unaware or unable to enforce these legal rights through courts. Most 
common people are apprehensive and reluctant to approach the court 
because the language of the law is difficult and the procedure often 
extremely complicated, for example, if two people are faced with the 
same legal problem, depending on where they reside, their religicn etc.. 
the court of jurisdiction and remedy available to them may be different. 
Women in India though common in need and circumstance are c ivided 
by caste, religion, social and regional customs. Hence, even a "ter 6(' 
years of Independence, issues fundamental to all women such as, 
maintenance, custody, physical and mental security in marriage, fur and 
equal divorce entitlements, continue to elude them. Womei face 
multiple hurdles in getting legal redress of their problems. These 
problems arise not only as a result of different laws go\ erning >;vomen 
but also from the fact that there is no common court having jurisdiction 
over women's issues. As a result women have to run to different forums 
to seek each relief separately. For example, Hindu women are governed 
by The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for divorce. The Hindu Adoption and 
Maintenance Act, 1956 for maintenance. The Guardians and Wards Act. 
1890 for custody, and The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 for inheritance; 
Muslims are governed by The Muslim Personal Law (Shariai) 
Application Act, 1937 and The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights 
on Divorce) Act, 1986 Christian women are governed by tht Indian 
Divorce Act, 1869, Parsis are governed by The Parsi Mairiage and 
Divorce Act, 1936. Each of these Acts vests jurisdiction in a different 
court. This multiplicity of litigation increases the physical and financial 
burden of litigation manifold. Above all, there is the problem of 
ignorance of the law. Most women and many service providers 
including doctors, social workers and often lawyers are not aware ol the 
specific scope and extent of the legal rights of women both undt-r the 
statute and judicial precedent. The inability of women to access jiistice 
through the legal system is magnified by the fact that most womtn are 
not economically independent and lack the financial capacity to contest 
a legal battle. Even socially, women are mostly restricted within the 
sphere of family and home, and live outside the legal system. Ther^tore. 
when women face issues of domestic violence and the family support 
structure breaks down they find themselves vulnerable and remec iless. 
It is this socio-economic vulnerability that encourages discrimiration 
and violence against women. 
The woman in Independent India has come to acquire a better status in 
the society than ever before in any period of India's history. Wi h the 
march of time and progress since Independence, the woman has 
gradually come to acquire considerable emancipation from the 
complexes and ills with which she had been suffering for long. Tc day's 
woman has come to have better acceptability and respectability, better 
status of equality with men, better rights and privileges, better 
opportunities and avenues, in all the spheres of national life- social, 
economic and political. In the emancipation and liberation of woman, in 
the recognition of her legitimate place in the family and the society, m 
the recognition and protection of her interests, rights and privilege >. and 
in the gradual enhancement of her status, the law has played grea role 
as an instrument of change. 
The nature of this research is unique in post-independent India as it 
attempts first time to analyze the role of judiciary in the protection of 
human rights in constitutional law and family laws. A great number of 
cases decided by the courts since 1950 recognize, uphold, prote-Jt or 
restrict rights and interests of women and lay down principles whic i are 
legally enforceable. These decisions throw a flood of light on the status 
of women and are immensely usefiil in understanding the tme scope of 
legal protection. 
The universe of this study is confined to the cases decided by the 
Supreme Court and High Courts. We have left out all such cases \/hich 
have been decided merely on facts and, generally speaking, do n^t lay 
down any principle of general application. Such cases also have been 
excluded which merely follow an established line of precedents and 
hardly pretend to lay down a new principle in any appreciable mi nner. 
Where there are several cases declaring the same principle the latest in 
point of time is taken up for inclusion. No claim is made to mate the 
present study exhaustive as no work of this kind could ever claim lo be. 
It is essentially selective in nature and coverage, though every effort has 
been made to give it as wide a coverage as could be possible. 
Objective of the study: 
1. To study historically the evolution of the basic internctional 
human rights law. 
2. To analyze the human rights provisions of basic human rights 
documents. 
3. To study the historical foundations of human rights in India. 
4. To examine various provisions relating to human rights in the 
Indian Constitution. 
5. To evaluate the role of Indian Judiciaiy and the Nat onal 
Human Rights Commission for the protection of human ri;dits. 
6. The evolution, growth and advent of Public Interest Litig ition 
in India and the role of the Supreme Court thereof. Its 
contribution in specific areas of constitutional law. 
7. The judicial approach to Article 21 of the Constitutior and 
expansion of the horizons of the life and personal liberty 
thereunder. 
8. To discuss and analyze the concepts of Human Rights. Juijicial 
activism and Judicial review. 
9. To evaluate and assess the role of judiciary in the specific area 
of Constitutional law. 
10. To evaluate and assess the role of judiciary in the specific; area 
of Family laws of four communities viz.. Hindu, Muslim. 
Christian and Parsis. 
11. To assess the judicial activism, its extent and impact en the 
development of specific areas of constitutional law vhich 
include the expanding scope of the right to life, pe sonal 
liberty, minority rights, constitutional remedies and I'ubHc 
Interest Litigation. 
12. To assess the judicial activism, its extent and impact or the 
development of specific areas of family laws the ma.iriage, 
divorce and maintenance of Hindu, Muslim, Christiai and 
Parsis. 
Methodology: 
To complete this research project the doctrinal research methodclogy 
followed in this study is not uni-dimensional. It is rather a blend of the 
historical, theoretical and practical aspects of human rights. A historical 
approach has been followed for the study of the origin and development 
of human rights in the world scenario as well as in India. In anaKzmg 
the judicial behaviour of the Supreme Court and the State High Courts 
as well as the role and function of the National Human R ghls 
Commission, the methodology adopted is analytical. The study inviTves 
reference to a plethora of cases to ascertain the dicta laid down therein, 
hence empirical method has been followed. On the whole, the worl las 
been mainly library based and doctrinal in nature with traits of histcrical 
and analytical methodology. This doctrinal work has been in the forr o\' 
critical surveys of judicial decisions or of the constitutional provis ens. 
These surveys or analysis have been conducted by studying the 
decisions rendered by the Supreme Court and dilTerent High Courts 
considering their brief facts, questions involved, principles laid down, 
the relief given to the parties, the short term impact of the judgment and 
its long term impact. The main purpose and object of this study, ts to 
assess the long term impact of the decisions given by the Supreme t ourt 
of India and their contribution in bringing about a legal and social 
change within the parameters of the Constitution of India. 
Scheme of the study: 
To facilitate the research venture, the researcher classifies this scudv 
"Protection of Human Rights through Judicial Activism in Post-
independent India: Evaluative Study in Selected Area of Constitutional 
I I 
Law and Family Relations" into four parts apart from Introduction. 
Conclusion and Suggestions. 
The concept and meaning of Human Rights, different approach^^s to 
Human Rights and their analysis, Evolution of Human Rights, U lited 
Nations Mechanism for protection and promotion of Human Rights. 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Human Rights in Inciian 
Perspectives and National Human Rights Commission have been 
discussed in part first of this study. 
A detailed treatment has been given under the caption of conceptual 
Analysis of Judicial Activism which constitutes Part second o " our 
study. It includes meaning and Evolution of Judicial Activism, Analysis 
of different approaches. Judicial Review, Development of Judicial 
Activism, Expansion of Human Rights with reference to Article 21 ol' 
the Constitution and Analysis for emergence for Public Interest 
Litigation (PIL) in India. 
Part third projects the judicial activism in the area of Constitutiona i^ aw 
wherein expansion has taken place through judicial activism in the 
following areas; 1) Equality Rights, 2) Liberty Rights, 3) Minority 
Rights and 4) Right to Constitutional Remedies. 
The part fourth entitled to the judicial activism in the area of family law 
wherein expansion has taken place through judicial activism in se ected 
areas viz.. Marriage, Divorce and Maintenance under the Hindu Law. 
Muslim Law, Christian Law and Parsi Law. 
Under the caption conclusion and suggestions, the academic exercise 
and research venture has pinpointed the outcome of the study alongwith 
the solution which the researcher finds appropriate within the 
framework of this study. 
Conclusion: 
Conclusively speaking the outcome of the study in the humble 
estimation of researcher provides that human rights jurisprudenct.- had 
occupied a place of prime importance in ancient India's rich legacv of 
historical tradition and culture. The political thinkers and philosophers 
have expressed concern over securing human rights and fundanienla! 
freedoms for all human beings every where since the very early tines of 
Vedic age. The "Rigveda," which is regarded as the oldest dociment. 
declares that all human beings are equal and they are all brothers. 1 he 
"Atharvaveda" advocates equal rights of all human beings over i atural 
resources like air, food and water, like wise right to happiness, r ght to 
education, right to practice any religion, right to social security, r ght to 
get fair treatment and protection etc have been accepted and emphasized 
in various Vedic and post Vedic ancient Indian literatures. It is revealed 
that society in Vedic period was well structured, highly organized ano 
committed to human rights. In Buddhism the humanitarian feelings arc-
equally present. Its tenets teach kindness to all creatures. The basic 
tenets of Buddhism are non-violence, non-hatred, and friendliness lo all. 
The Bible gives Ten Commandments which enshrine human rights 
issues. Similarly, the Quran also shows equal concern for human beings 
as well as their rights. 
This study provides that the human rights have been synthesized in the 
Constitution of India by the preambular promises, the fundamental 
rights, the directive principles of state policy, the fundamental ducies and 
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other constitutional and institutional framework, though they art not 
referred to by that name. Most of the rights enumerated in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Jivil 
and Political Rights have also found a place in the Indian Constiti tion. 
The Indian Constitution aims at the establishment of a welfare State. 
Part IV of the Constitution consists of a number of directives to the State 
in the form of the Directive Principles of State Policy. The Supreme 
Court of India has made immense contribution through its activisr. m 
transforming many of the directive principles into fundamental r ghls. 
thus making them justiciable in a court of law. In a way, what the couiis 
cannot do certain things directly, they have tried to get them clone 
indirectly. 
The outcome of this study reveals that the evolution of judicial aciiv ism 
in India delayed as Indian judiciary is a late-starter in that direction. A 
wide variety of factors have promoted the judiciary in the modern 
world, to deviate from their traditional role. The reasons for ji dicial 
activism include near collapse of a responsible government, press ire on 
the judiciary to step in aid of the people, judicial enthusia-;m to 
participate in social reform and change, legislative vacuum left open, the 
constitutional scheme, the final authority to make a binding declaaition. 
the role of judiciary as the guardian of the Constitution and of the 
fundamental rights of the citizens and more importantly the trusi and 
confidence of the people reposed in the judiciary. The judiciary is one oi 
the major protectors of human rights in India. Through its ^ ariou^ 
historic pronouncements the Supreme Court of India has recogni:'ed the 
Tundamental Rights' as "Natural Rights or Human Rights". As legards 
the role of the judiciary in the Constitution, it has been found tiat the 
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judiciary is playing an active role. The days of the judiciaiy mtreK 
finding or declaring the law, have fast disappeared in our country. The 
judges of the day not only find or declare the law which is considered as 
the traditional function of the courts, but they also make the law. The 
judicial lawmaking has become an incontrovertible and undisputed 
reality. 
The study reveals that Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees equality 
before the law and equal protection under the law. It has ">cen 
interpreted as a prohibition against unreasonable classification, i he 
equality guarantee does not require that the law treat all individuals 
exactly the same. Rather, it allows the State to make classificatK>ns. 
However, this power of classification must be exercised on reasonable 
grounds. The Supreme Court has expressly adopted a similarly situated 
approach to equality rights under Article 14. The principles adoptd by 
the court are premised on a formal model of equality. The focus cf the 
analysis is on the question of sameness on determining whether the 
persons among whom the denial of equality is alleged are the san e, or 
whether the classification is based on reasonable differences. 
This study analyzes that the expression 'Life or Personal Libeny' in 
Article 21 has been given a broad and liberal inteipretation bv the 
Supreme Court of India. The tenn "personal liberty" covers a wide 
gamut of rights, which are contained in the International Covenant on 
Civil, and Political Rights, which are available to the citizens of India 
despite the fact that they are not specifically mentioned in the 
Constitution. The immense contribution the judicial activism cf the 
Supreme Court of India has made to the specific areas in constituional 
law and for their development is almost unparalleled in any tyoe of 
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Constitution. The expansion of the scope of life and personal ioertx 
under Article 21, the advent of Public Interest Litigation, and the 
changing facet of judicially unenforceable directive principles are a 
few examples in the said direction. The court has achieved it: most 
fruitful and beneficial activism in personal liberty cases. Thanks to the 
judicial activism of the Supreme Court "life" today means "not merely 
animal existence or continued drudgery through life but the finer yraces 
of human civilization which makes the life worth living". The Court's 
progressive attitude in interpretation of the 'life' and 'personal liberty" 
has led to the establishment of the principle that the right to ecuahty 
including the right against arbitrariness and discrimination under /vrticle 
14 and the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 are 
inteiTclated, intertwined with each other and that they cannot be a))plied 
in isolation with other rights. 
The study establishes that in the educational context under Article 29 
and 30 of the Indian Constitution the Court produced contTcting 
decisions, stemming from an internal debate between the plirahst 
approach emphasizing minorities' right to administer their educaiionai 
institutions and the assimilations approach emphasizing public in eresl 
in requiring educational institutions to conform to general educaiionai 
standards. Additionally, the Court has often been concerned with false 
attempts by different educational institutions to unlawfully s^ .-cure 
minority protection. The result was a collection of confused and 
contradictory decisions affording wide-ranging protections to minorit\ 
religions to create and administer their educational institutions. Wh le at 
the same time upholding strong regulatory state control over minontx 
education. The courts, however, seem to have been persuaded b\ 
ih 
practical compulsion rather than be swayed away by a feeling of 
faithfulness to the spirit. 
This research venture reveals that "Public Interest Litigation" s an 
institutional innovation of the Supreme Court of India. The Supreme 
Court has played a vital role in the institutionalization of this 'tool' by 
liberalizing the rigid rule of "locus standi" in affording constitu ionai 
remedies under Article 32 and Article 226 of the Constitution, /^riicle 
32 of the Constitution which confers the writ jurisdiction o i the 
Supreme Court, to enforce the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part 
III of the Constitution; is a unique provision in that, right to enforce the 
fundamental right of citizens itself has been recognized is a 
fundamental right under Article 32 of the Constitution. The chmging 
needs of the society, the constitutional obligation of the Supreme Court. 
the high expectations the people have, from the apex court, aiul the 
willingness of the court to participate in the social refonn and social 
building process, have compelled the court to become an active 
institution, particularly in the 1980's and thereafter. Therefore it vouki 
not be an exaggeration to state that the range of judicial review powei 
exercised by the Indian Supreme Court is the widest in the entire world. 
This study establishes that under the Hindu Law in one set of cases, the 
courts have held that wornen are different than men; that won en art-
weaker and in need of protection. This difference is used to v riualK 
disentitle women to any claim to equality. In upholding legislation, this 
approach cannot distinguish between differential treatmei t thai 
disadvantages and differential treatment that advantages. It can not. in 
other words, distinguish between legislation that further contritutes to 
women's subordination, and legislation that attempts of correct or 
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compensate for that subordination. Rather, any and all differential 
treatment can be justified on the basis that women are essentially and 
biologically different. In the second set of cases, the courts have held 
that for the purposes of legislation, women and men are the same, and 
therefore must be treated the same in law. The sameness approach has 
been used to uphold legislation that treats women and men the same, 
and to strike down legislation that treats women differently. Hov ever, 
in striking down the legislation, this approach cannot distingu sn as 
between differential treatment that disadvantages and differential 
treatment that advantages. Like the protectionist approach, there is no 
distinction between protectionist legislation that discriminates against 
women, and corrective legislation that attempts to compensate tor past 
discrimination. In comparison to the protectionist approach, the 
sameness approach would strike down both protectionist and corective 
legislation. 
This study reveals that under the Muslim Law full equality of se:ves can 
hardly be possible in a legal system which permits polygamy and a 
social system which tolerates it. The only personal law, whicn has 
remained impervious to the changing trend from polygamy to 
monogamy, is Muslim law. The solution of standard contracts fails to 
provide a substantive relief to the first wife with children. As the second 
marriage is not invalidated, the position of the husband is not 
prejudicially affected but for the financial implications arising oi t of the 
step. The deterrence of the criminal sanction when a person intends to 
contract a second marriage is absent. While the desirability of reform in 
Muslim Law is generally acknowledged, the government has taken no 
steps towards changing the law on the view that public opinio i in the 
IH 
Muslim community did not favour a change. This view can nc t be 
reconciled with the declaration of ignoring the interest of Muslim 
women is a denial of social justice. The right of equality, like the right 
of free speech, is an individual right. 
This study reveals that the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 200 has 
completely transfoiTned the original Act, and the grounds for 
matrimonial relief have been brought almost at par with the S| ecial 
Marriage Act and the Hindu Marriage Act. The statutory position now 
as regards cruelty is that a marriage may be dissolved if the respo idem 
'has treated the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reaso uible 
apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it would be harm ul or 
injurious for the petitioner to live with the respondent. The 1 uliaii 
Divorce Act, 1869, which was so antiquated and not in tune \viih 
changing times, has now undergone revolutionary changes with the 
enactment the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001. It has renioved 
the gender based discrimination within the Act, as also the harsh 
provisions for matrimonial reliefs. The grounds for dissolution of 
marriage for the husband and wife have been brought almost at par. 
Besides, the grounds have been liberalized. Thus conversion ( f the 
defendant to another religion, inter alia, has also been incorporated as a 
ground for dissolution of marriage. This ground is available to bo'b the 
spouses. Under this Act, prior to the Indian Divorce (Amendmen ) Act 
2001, there was no provision for divorce by mutual consent Hie 
amended Act has brought about significant changes in the Ch istian 
divorce law. Divorce by mutual consent has also been introduced by 
inserting a new section lOA. It is pertinent to note that under this 
t^ ) 
provision, the minimum period of separate living prescribed is two 
years, as against one year in other personal laws. 
This study provides that under the Parsi Marriage and Divorce y\ct. 
1936 prior to 1988, cruelty was only a ground for judicial separation, 
and cruelty was explained as such behaviour 'as to render it i i the 
judgment of the court improper to compel him or her to live with the 
respondent'. After the amendment of 1988, cruelty has been incoip( rated 
as a ground for judicial separation as well as for divorce, provided that in 
every suit for divorce on this ground, it would be the couil's discretion 
whether to grant divorce or judicial separation. Under the Parsi aw. a 
divorce can be obtained on the ground, inter alia, that the defendaat has 
ceased to be a Parsi by conversion to another religion, provided thai 
the divorce petition is filed within two years after the plaintiff Cc me ol 
know of the fact. It is significant to note that prior to the 19S8 
amendment, the provision was simpliciter that the 'defendant has ceased 
to be a Parsi'. The words 'by conversion to another religion' havi been 
added in 1988. Thus, it is not enough that the defendant shouM have 
given up his faith; it is also required that he should have acquired 
another faith. Divorce by mutual consent was also incoiporated in the 
Act by this amendment. It is significant to note that the Parsi Act does 
not provide for any interregnum between the filing of the petition and 
the second motion. Thus, without any time lag, the court may grant the 
decree after verifying the averments in the petition, and also that the 
consent of either parties was not obtained by force or fraud, "bus, a 
would imply that if there was no force or fraud when the petition vas 
jointly filed, there cannot be any withdrawal unilaterally 
:t) 
It is pinpointed by the researcher that constitutional challenges to family 
laws on the ground of sex discrimination have met with vei^-m xed 
results. In some cases, the have held that laws which treat wo nen 
differently than men are discriminatory and thus, in violation of the 
equality guarantees. Indeed, some cases recognize that the 
discriminatory treatment is based on sexist attitudes and practices which 
reinforce women's subordination. The approach adopted by those couiis 
is one of formal equality and sameness-women and men are the same. 
and thus ought to be treating the same in law. However, other cases favc 
rejected the challenges to family laws. These cases, though ilso 
adopting a formal model of equality, emphasize the differences between 
women and men, and thus, preclude interrogation of subslaniive 
inequalities. 
This research venture establishes that in our society litigation in respect 
of any matter concerning the family, whether divorce, maintenance md 
alimony or custody, trial of juvenile offenders or any oiher 
matrimonial cause are viewed in terms of failure or success of legal 
action but as a social therapeutic problem, it should not be viewed as 
a prestigious dispute in which parties and their counsels are engazed 
in winning or defeating, but as a societal problem needing resolution. 
The amicable settlement of family conflict requires spei iai 
procedures designed to help people in conflict and in trouble, lo 
reconcile their differences, and where necessary to obtain 
professional assistance. Family disputes need to be seen with a 
humanitarian approach and hence attempts should be made to reconc ile 
the differences so as to not disrupt the family structure. 
This study reveals that for the Indian Judiciary, dealing with the oases o\^ 
divorce is a big challenge because of the social and economic issues 
involved and the need to render social justice through timelv 
dispensation of court cases, so that people can return to norma cy and 
leave behind their past, in a country where usually nothing is sc easily 
forgotten, especially if it is something as important as marriage. IVien and 
women without any limitations due to race, colour, caste or religicn have 
the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equa right.-
as to maiTiage, during mamage and at its dissolution. Therefore it ma\ 
be concluded that the family is the natural and fundamental group nut ol 
society and is entitled to protection by society and the state. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Every state is known by the rights that it maintains. Our method of 
judging its character lies, above all in the contribution that it makes to 
the substance of man's happiness. 
'Human Rights' is a twentieth century term for what had been 
traditionally known as "Natural Rights" or in a more appealing phrase. 
the "Rights of Man". The notion of "Rights of Man" and othe • such 
concepts of human rights are as old as Humanity. "These rights of men 
had a place almost in all the ancient societies of the world, though they 
were not referred to by that name".^ The Virginian Declaration of Rights 
of 1776, other similar Constitutional enactments in the same year, the 
Constitution of New York and of New Georgia of 1777 and that of 
Massachusetts of 1780, the Declaration of Independence of 1776, the 
Bill of Rights in the form of the first ten amendments to the Constitution 
of America and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 
adopted in 1789 by the French National Assembly and prefixed to the 
Constitution of 1793 and 1795 expressly acknowledged the inherent 
rights of man.^  It is a general belief that the concept of human rights is 
Western and that the origin of the concept of human rights in world 
history found its expression in the 'Magna Carta' of 1215 followed by 
the Petition of Rights of 1628, the Bill of Rights of 1688, the Amerian 
Bill of Rights of 1791 and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man 
of 1789. 
Democracy, which entered the vocabulary of the English language in the 
sixteenth century, had its birth way back in Athens some 2500 years ago 
official respect for freedom was sanctified (in the Western heritage) by 
the 1688 English Bill of Rights. Prior to the use of the term 'Human 
Rights", such rights were typically called the Rights of Man or Natural 
Rights. Thomas Paine, who coined the expression "human rights" in his 
English translation of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
the Citizen (1789), wrote his classic book on human rights in 1792 
titled, The Rights of Man. In the same year, for the first time in recorded 
history. Mary Wollstonecraft argued for equal rights for women in her 
equally classic book A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. Eleanor 
Roosevelt suggested the change of name from "Rights of Man" to 
"Human Rights" in 1947. This term has since been universally actepted. 
beginning with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which the 
General Assembly had passed on 10* December 1948. 
Meaning of Rights 
Rights are those conditions of social life without which man canno- be at 
his best. They are essential for the full development and expression of 
his personality. A right is a claim recognized by society and enforced by 
the State. Rights are the external conditions necessary for the greatest 
possible development of the capabilities of an individual. 
Meaning of Human Rights 
Human beings are rational. By virtue of being human, they possess 
certain basic and inalienable rights, commonly known as human rights. 
They become operative with their birth. Human rights, being the 
birthright, are therefore inherent in all human beings iiTespective of heir 
caste, creed, religion, sex and nationality. Human rights are also 
sometimes refeiTcd to as fundamental rights, 'basic rights', 'inherent 
rights', 'natural rights' and 'birth rights'. 'Human rights' is a generic 
term, which embraces 'civil rights', civil liberties, and 'social, economic 
and cultural rights'. The idea of human rights is bound up with tne idea 
of human dignity. Thus all those rights, which are essential for the 
maintenance of human dignity, are called human rights. These rights are 
essential for all individuals as they are consonant with their freedom and 
dignity and are conducive to their physical, moral, social and s]:)iritual 
welfare. Human rights include those areas of individual or group-
freedom that are immune from Governmental interference beccuse of 
their basic contribution to human dignity or welfare and are subject t(^  
Governmental guarantee, protection or promotion. 
D.D. Basu defines human rights as "those minimum rights, which every 
individual must have against the State or other public authority by \ irtue 
of his being a member of human family, irrespective of any other 
consideration". 
Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer writes: 
Human rights are those irreducible minima, which 
belong to every member of the human race when pitted 
against the State or other public authorities or group or 
gangs and other oppressive communities. Being a 
member of the human family, he has the right to be 
treated as human, once he takes birth or is alive in the 
womb with a potential title to personhood/ 
India being the largest democracy and signatory to many international 
conventions and covenants should give special importance to human 
rights but ironically the record of human rights in India is not very 
satisfactory and encouraging as many people are subjected to 
exploitation, injustice, physical torture, and violence. Mass of the people 
are illiterate, under-privileged and are unaware of the law or evi.^ n of 
their legal rights, unacquainted with the niceties of procedure invoked. 
and too impoverished to engage lawyers, file papers and been hea\ y 
expenditure on dilatory litigation. Briefly speaking, ignorance and 
poverty are twins and social backwardness a third close associate. Those 
misfortunes intercept the advantage, which the law confers en the 
disadvantaged. Socio-economic legislation confers benefits on v omen 
and children on the working class, and others weaker sections, bu; these 
groups are unable to draw the intended dividends, owing to the lack of 
understanding of their rights and of financial stamina to assert then. 
In India, the concept of human rights received constitutional blessngs in 
its different parts. It must be said to the credit of India that within a short 
span of time, it had in its new Constitution, adopted most of the 
principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as an integral 
part of constitutional obligations. Keeping in view the constitutional 
commitment set forth in Part-Ill (Fundamental Rights) and Part-lV 
(Directive Principles of State Policy) and the commitment towards 
human rights, the court in India developed Public Interest Lit gation 
(PIL) as a special device to come to grip with the problems of 
contemporary society and ensuring that not civil and political rights 
alone but economic and social rights are also necessary for sui-vival. 
The judiciary is being envisaged not as a redressal forum for elite class 
in the society. Instead, it is seen and perceived as a forum for laising, 
redressing and articulating the problems of the have-nots, the deprived, 
the oppressed and the downtrodden, women and the ciildren 
environmental groups, victims of bureaucratic exploitation aid the 
abuse of power and position by persons holding high public officers. The 
courts have become a forum for the representation, articulation and 
protection of the basic human rights of the people who on account of 
their social and economic disabilities can not approach the court lor the 
enforcement of their fundamental rights. 
The Indian Constitution, the fundamental law of the land had been 
drafted with the four-fold objective of securing justice, liberty, equality 
and fraternity to all the Indian citizens. The Constitution has allocated 
different powers and functions to the three organs of the State viz., 
Legislature, Executive and Judiciary. These organs play an important 
role in the achievement of the said objective. Traditionallv. the 
Legislature makes the law, the Executive implements the same and the 
Judiciary adjudicates and interprets the law. The judiciary in India, 
especially the higher judiciary has been assigned a vital role in \arious 
areas like upholding the federal principle, interpretation of the laws 
made by respective legislatures, testing the validity of such la\\/s and 
more importantly in protecting the fundamental rights of the citizens 
The Supreme Court stands at the top of the hierarchy of the courts 
constituted under the Constitution. It is the final arbiter as to the 
upholding of the federal principle, the validity of a law or executive 
action and as to the enforcement of fundamental rights of the citizens. 
In a welfare state like India, the judiciary especially the apex court 
plays an important role. Apart from performing its traditional fianctions 
like upholding the federal principle and interpreting the laws made, the 
court also exercises the power of judicial review to decide the validity 
of the executive or legislative actions of the state. The Supreme Court 
of India being the highest court of the land shapes the destiny of 
millions of Indians by exercising the various jurisdictions vested in it 
by the Constitution. Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar had predicted with 
great vision, way back in 1949 that "the future evolution of the Indian 
Constitution will thus depend to a large extent upon the Supreme (:ourt 
and the direction given to it by that court." An important issue that has 
assumed significance in recent times has been the activist role played 
by the Indian judiciary especially the Supreme Court. The expression 
"judicial activism" has eluded a precise definition as it means different 
things to different people. It might mean dynamism to judges, judicial 
creativity to some, judicial legislation to some others and it may be an 
effort to bring "social revolution" through the judiciary. The Indian 
Constitution has come into force on 26th January in 1950. The Supreme 
Court of India was established under this Constitution and its existence 
coincides with that of the Constitution itself. Ever since its inception, 
the Supreme Court has been playing a vital role in the lives of the 
citizens as (he highest court of the land, as an umpire in upholding the 
federal principle implicit in the Constitution and last but not the least in 
protecting the fundamental rights of the citizens guaranteed by Part 111 
of the Constitution. Over the period of last six decades, the apex court 
has transformed from the role of'interpreter of law' to the role of'naker 
of laws'. The performance of the Supreme Court-led higher judiciary in 
India has been uneven. In the fifties and sixdes, the judiciary was 
confronted with many issues involving the validity of agrarian reforms 
introduced by the Parliament and the state legislatures. Many 
legislation were struck down as unconstitutional on the ground of 
violation of the fundamental right to property guaranteed in Part III. 
Probably the back ground of the judges sitting in the Supreme Court at 
that time which showed that most of them were foreign educated, 
hailing from the famihes holding large tracts of land and that seme of 
them were from the traditional and conservative families, had 
influenced the judicial behaviour in 1950's and 1960's. As regards the 
1970's, inspite of the historical judgment in Keshavananda Bhariii v. 
State of Kerala , the Supreme Court could not continue the momentum 
it built upon the 'basic structure' spirit. In fact up till the epoch m;iking 
judgment of the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 
there were no activist traits on the part of the Supreme Court The 
Supreme Court has come into its own, as an institution only in the 
1980's. The court demonstrated that it can be as active as any other 
judiciary in the world. The court commenced its dynamic rcle in 
safeguarding and protecting the fundamental rights of the citizens and 
in putting an effective check on the other two organs of the state viz; 
the Executive and the Legislature only in the 1980's. It has become 
possible, solely due to the dynamism and willingness of a few jadges 
like Justice Krishna Iyer, Justice Chandrachud, Justice Bhagwati, 
Justice Chinnappa Reddy and Justice Kartzu. This list is only 
illustrative in nature. As a result, the Supreme Court has btcome 
increasingly people-oriented in its post emergency phase. The new 
batch of judges representing the second generation Indians of free 
India, and claiming to possess a power to participate in the community 
welfare through their own philosophies and ideologies made a vast 
distinction and prompted the judiciary in India, to acquire a new shape 
and face. 
"All Human Rights for All", was the mandate of the Uni\'ersal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted by the United Nations 
on 10"" December, 1948 nearly 60 years ago. After India attained 
independence, the people of India gave to themselves a new 
Constitution, containing fundamental rights, which incorporated all the 
human rights, mentioned in the UDHR. The language of human rights 
carries great rhetorical force of uncertain practical significance. In other 
words, the meaning and scope of each right has to be clarified, the 
content and location of any co-relative duties to which it gives rist; must 
be spelt out, and the permissible range of exceptions and limitations 
specified. 
Family is a basic and universal unit of human society. It performs 
functions that are necessary for the continuity, integration and 
development of social life. In most traditional societies famil} has 
been the unit of social, cultural, religious, economic and political 
activities and organizations. In modern industrial societies, the family 
performs primarily the fianctions of reproduction, social izatior and 
provision of emotional satisfaction. A family is a domestic grojp of 
people, or a number of domestic groups, typically affiliated by bi 1h or 
marriage, or by comparable legal relationships including ado]")tion. 
There are a number of variations in the basic family structure. 
Throughout history, families have been central to human society; a 
key indicator of a society's well-being is the health of its families. For 
this reason, as stated in Article 16(3) of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, "The (family is the) natural and fundamental group 
unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State." 
The family is the basic social unit for the expression of love between 
man and woman and the creation and rising of children. The lamily 
tames the wilder impulses of men to the responsibilities of fathei hood, 
enables young women to blossom as mothers, and cultivates morality 
in children. Moral virtues, empathy, and good human relationships are 
learned in the family. An important indicator of the social value of the 
family is the capacity for strengthening the link between generations. 
The procreative and educative dimensions of the family constitute an 
indisputable economic factor which must be recognized as such The 
family is the "basic community of society". The public authorities 
must therefore protect it, because it comes before the State and any 
political organization. This essential protection has been the object of 
law. Law is the key centralizing institution possessed by modern 
societies. Law is increasingly being called upon as a tool to address 
the post-conflict situation and facilitate societal changes. It is 
increasingly assumed that law can and should play a central roe in 
both the resolution of and progression from conflicts. The reasons put 
forward for this increasing role of law include the (growing) 
interrelationship between public order and legal order, and the 
expanding reach of law due to global forces: the human rights dictum 
is a global norm due indeed to globalization. It is assumed that the 
goals of the post-conflict society are synonymous with the capacities 
and reach of the institution of law. 
India is a multi-linguistic, multi -cultural and multi-religious staie of 
more than a billion people, of which almost half comprise females. The 
principles of fairness and equity are enshrined in the Constitution of 
India, that unequivocally mandates gender equality. Such equality -
truly in fact and deed is imperative for the development of India, for no 
country if it is to prosper can afford to underutilize or suppress half its 
human resources that women represent. Discrimination and violence 
against women do not just victimize the individual women, but do 
indeed hold back whole sections of society. Guaranteeing rights to 
women is an investment in making the whole nation stronger and self-
reliant. In India, it is particularly the Personal law that prircipally 
governs the lives of women, though to many, the exact dimension and 
how it controls the lives of each one of us may not be very clear. Simply 
stated, Personal law is the set of rules which govern the behavior of 
individuals vis a vis their family i.e. spouse, parents, children etc. As 
often seen, law by itself is no deterrent against crime. In fact it is the 
attitude of society in general and the individual in particular that 
determines the effectiveness of any legal system. Thus, laws are nothing 
but codified social behaviour, so in order to make the law effective there 
is equally a back-up requirement for social education and social 
transformation. As a matter of fact, conditioned by the old historical and 
patriarchal social baggage even the provisions of personal law often 
betray a certain underlying bias that tends to treat women as it they 
essentially were the property of a man and that all her entitlements are 
not a function of her right but a function of her status as the property of 
the male vis a vis whom her rights are sought to be enforced. It has been 
widely observed that the rights that women have under personal law are 
often usurped. Though the law provides for a judicial procedu -e to 
enforce the law by way of courts as well as the penalty for violating the 
law, women being socially and economically subservient are either 
unaware or unable to enforce these legal rights through courts. Most 
common people are apprehensive and reluctant to approach the court 
because the language of the law is difficult and the procedure eft en 
extremely complicated, for example, if two people are faced with the 
same legal problem, depending on where they reside, their religion <;tc., 
the court of jurisdiction and remedy available to them may be differem. 
Women in India though common in need and circumstance are divided 
by caste, religion, social and regional customs. Hence, even after 60 
years of Independence, issues fundamental to all women such as, 
maintenance, custody, physical and mental security in marriage, lair and 
equal divorce entitlements, continue to elude them. Women face 
multiple hurdles in getting legal redress of their problems. These 
problems arise not only as a result of different laws governing women 
but also from the fact that there is no common court having jurisdiction 
over women's issues. As a result women have to run to different forums 
to seek each relief separately. For example, Hindu women are governed 
by The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for divorce. The Hindu Adoption and 
Maintenance Act, 1956 for maintenance, The Guardians and Wards Act, 
1890 for custody, and The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 for inheritance; 
Muslims are governed by The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) 
Application Act, 1937 and The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights 
on Divorce) Act, 1986 Christian women are governed by the Indian 
Divorce Act, 1869, Parsis are governed by The Parsi Marriage and 
Divorce Act, 1936. Each of these Acts vests jurisdiction in a different 
court. This muhiplicity of litigation increases the physical and financial 
burden of litigation manifold. Above all, there is the problem of 
ignorance of the law. Most women and many service providers 
including doctors, social workers and often lawyers are not aware (>f the 
specific scope and extent of the legal rights of women both under the 
statute and judicial precedent. The inability of women to access justice 
through the legal system is magnified by the fact that most women are 
not economically independent and lack the financial capacity to contest 
a legal battle. Even socially, women are mostly restricted withiri the 
sphere of family and home, and live outside the legal system. Therefore, 
when women face issues of domestic violence and the family support 
structure breaks down they find themselves vulnerable and remt;diless. 
It is this socio-economic vulnerability that encourages discrimination 
and violence against women. 
The woman in Independent India has come to acquire a better status in 
the society than ever before in any period of India's history. With the 
march of time and progress since Independence, the woman has 
gradually come to acquire considerable emancipation from the 
complexes and ills with which she had been suffering for long. Today's 
woman has come to have better acceptability and respectability, better 
status of equality with men, better rights and privileges, better 
opportunities and avenues, in all the spheres of national life- social, 
economic and political. In the emancipation and liberation of woman, in 
the recognition of her legitimate place in the family and the society, in 
the recognition and protection of her interests, rights and privilege;-, and 
in the gradual enhancement of her status, the law has played grea role 
as an instrument of change. 
The nature of this research is unique in post-independent India as it 
attempts first time to analyze the role of judiciary in the protectic^n of 
human rights. A great number of cases decided by the courts since ' 950 
recognize, uphold, protect or restrict rights and interests of women and 
lay down principles which are legally enforceable. These decisions 
throw a flood of light on the status of women and are immensely useful 
in understanding the true scope of legal protection. 
The universe of this study is confined to the cases decided by the 
Supreme Court and High Courts. We have left out all such cases which 
have been decided merely on facts and, generally speaking, do not lay 
down any principle of general application. Such cases also have been 
excluded which merely follow an established line of precedents and 
hardly pretend to lay down a new principle in any appreciable nanner. 
Where there are several cases declaring the same principle the latest in 
point of time is taken up for inclusion. No claim is made to rriake the 
present study exhaustive as no work of this kind could ever claim to be. 
It is essentially selective in nature and coverage, though every el fort has 
been made to give it as wide a coverage as could be possible. 
Objectives of the Study: 
1. To study historically the evolution of the basic international 
human rights law. 
2. To analyze the human rights provisions of basic huma i rights 
documents. 
3. To study the historical foundations of human rights in India. 
4. To examine various provisions relating to human rights in the 
Indian Constitution. 
5. To evaluate the role of Indian Judiciary and the National Human 
Rights Commission for the protection of human rights. 
6. The evolution, growth and advent of Public Interest Litigation in 
India and the role of the Supreme Court thereon. Its contribution 
in specific areas of constitutional law. 
7. The judicial approach to Article 21 of the Constitution and 
expansion of the horizons of the life and personal liberty 
thereunder. 
8. To discuss and analyze the concepts of Human Rights, Judicial 
activism and Judicial review. 
9. To evaluate and assess the role of judiciary in the specific area 
of Constitutional law. 
10. To evaluate and assess the role of judiciary in the specific area 
of Family laws of four communities viz., Hindu, Muslim, 
Christian and Parsis. 
11. To assess the judicial activism, its extent and impact on the 
development of specific areas of constitutional law which 
include the expanding scope of the right to life, personal liberty, 
minority rights, constitutional remedies and Public mterest 
Litigation. 
12. To assess the judicial activism, its extent and impact on the 
development of specific areas of family laws the marriage, 
divorce and maintenance of Hindu, Muslim, Christian and 
Parsis. 
Hypothesis of the study: 
This study has been undertaken to put the test of following Hypothesis: 
1. The judiciary in modem times not only declares law but also 
makes the law. Thus, the role of the court has changec from 
merely interpreter of law to maker of law. 
2. Judicial Activism of the Supreme Court is nothing bat the 
conscious exercise by judges of the power of judicial review to 
meet the changing needs of time. 
3. Judicial Activism is a result of the failure or indifference on the 
part of the two political organs of the State namely the 
legislature and the Executive, to discharge their constitational 
responsibilities assigned under the Constitution. 
4. Along with the Legislature and the Executive, the Judicial 
Branch of the State by its judicial activism, has contributed 
more for the development of specific areas in the constitutional 
law and family law. 
5. The judicial activism has been primarily instrumental n the 
Supreme Court of India becoming the Supreme Cou t for 
Indians. 
6. The judicial activism of the Supreme Court is not only 
defensible but it may also be indispensable to the Indian System 
of Government and Constitutionalism. 
7. In modern times human rights are regarded as the most 
important rights. 
8. The United Nations provide a good background for the 
development of human rights. 
9. Human rights are found in the ancient Indian thought. 
10. The Indian Constitution itself contains ample provisions fo" the 
protection of human rights. 
11. The protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 and the Constitution 
of National Human Rights Commission encourage protection of 
human rights. However, NHRC is a weak body that suffers from 
inherent weaknesses. 
12. The judiciary in India lias expanded the scope of Article 21 of 
the Constitution. 
13. The Supreme Court is the most important protector of human 
rights in India. 
Methodology: 
To complete this research project the doctrinal research methodology 
followed in this study is not uni-dimensional. It is rather a blend of the 
historical, theoretical and practical aspects of human rights. A historical 
approach has been followed for the study of the origin and development 
of human rights in the world scenario as well as in India. In analyzing 
the judicial behaviour of the Supreme Court and the State High Courts 
as well as the role and function of the National Human Rights 
Commission, the methodology adopted is analytical. The study involves 
reference to a plethora of cases to ascertain the dicta laid down therein, 
hence empirical method has been followed. On the whole, the work has 
been mainly library based and doctrinal in nature with traits of historical 
and analytical methodology. This doctrinal work has been in the form of 
critical surveys of judicial decisions or of the constitutional provisions. 
These surveys or analysis have been conducted by studying the 
decisions rendered by the Supreme Court and different High Courts and 
considering their brief facts, questions involved, principles laid down, 
the relief given to the parties, the short term impact of the judgment and 
its long term impact. The main purpose and object of this study, is to 
assess the long term impact of the decisions given by the Supreme court 
of India and their contribution in bringing about a legal and social 
change within the parameters of the Constitution of India. 
Sources of Information: 
To accomplish this research venture, the researcher had to uti ize the 
pieces of information from primary and secondary sources. 
Primary sources: 
1. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
2. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Righis 
3. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and (Xiltural 
Rights 
4. The Constitution of India 
5. The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 
6. The decisions and judgments of the Supreme Court and State 
High Courts. 
Secondary sources: 
1. Published works on human rights 
2. Reports of newspapers and journals 
3. Lectures by eminent jurists 
4. Publications of the United Nations and the UNESCO 
Scheme of the Study: 
To facilitate the research venture, the researcher classifies this study 
"Protection of Human Rights through Judicial Activism in Post-
Independent India: Evaluative Study in Selected Area of Constitutional 
Law and Family Relations" into four parts apart from Introduction, 
Conclusion and Suggestions. 
The concept and meaning of Human Rights, different approaches to 
Human Rights and their analysis, Evolution of Human Rights, United 
Nations Mechanism for protection and promotion of Human Rights. 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Human Rights in Indian 
Perspectives and National Human Rights Commission hav(^  been 
discussed in part first of this study. 
A detailed treatment has been given under the caption of conceptual 
Analysis of Judicial Activism which constitutes Part second of our 
study. It includes meaning and Evolution of Judicial Activism, Analysis 
of different approaches, Judicial Review, Development of Judicial 
Activism, Expansion of Human Rights with reference to Article 21 of 
the Constitution and Analysis for emergence for Public 1 iterest 
Litigation (PIL) in India. 
Part third projects the judicial activism in the area of Constitutional Law 
wherein expansion has taken place through judicial activism n the 
following areas: 1) Equality Rights, 2) Liberty Rights, 3) Minority 
Rights and 4) Right to Constitutional Remedies. 
The part fourth entitled to the judicial activism in the area of family law 
wherein expansion has taken place through judicial activism in selected 
areas viz.. Marriage, Divorce and Maintenance under the Hindu Law, 
Muslim Law, Christian Law and Parsi Law. 
Under the caption conclusion and suggestions the academic exercise and 
research venture have pin-pointed the outcome of the study alongwith 
the solution which the researcher finds appropriate within the 
framework of this study. 
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PART-i 
Conceptual Analysis of 
Human Rights 
CHAPTER! 
CONCEPT OF HUMAN RICiHTS 
Recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equ 
al and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. 
I. MEANING OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
Human Rights are integral to the concept of justice. Justice means 
fairness. Dealing fairly to a person is justice. There is upholding of right 
if there is justice. For humanness, justice is essential. The denial of 
justice is the denial of human rights. Human Rights uphold the dignity 
and status of the persons. Human Rights mean the affirmation of a 
dignified life to each individual. It involves love, mercy, humanness and 
just relationship. Human rights look for the sustenance of each person in 
dignity, it demands the holistic development of persons and community. 
Human rights are the rights which all human beings possess by virtue of 
human condifions. They are generally called 'Fundamental Rights' or 
'Natural Rights' or 'the Rights of Man'. Human rights are fundamental 
in the sense that they are not denied in any circumstance, thus they are 
not dependent upon grant or permission of the state or government and 
can not be withdrawn by the authorities. Human rights are not only 
rights rather they are the ideals based on the demand of humanity 
regarding dignity, respect, justice, freedom and protection. Thus they 
should be enjoyed by every member of human society Avithout 
discrimination of caste, creed, race, gender, religion, nationality or other 
status. Human rights are inalienable rights as these rights belong to them 
because of the very existence, they became operative with their birth. 
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These rights are essential for all the individuals as they are consonant 
with their freedom and dignity and are conducive to physical, moral, 
social, and spiritual welfare. They are also necessary as they provide 
suitable conditions for the material and moral uplift of the people. 
It is difficult to define the expression human rights mainly because of 
difference in cultural background, legal systems, ideology and 
economic, social and political conditions of different states. However, it 
can be said that the idea of human rights bound us with the idea of 
human dignity. Thus, all those rights which are essential for the 
maintenance of human dignity may be called human rights. D.D. Basu 
defines human rights as those minimum rights which every individual 
must have against the state or other public authority by virtue of his 
being a member of human family, irrespective of any other 
consideration. Rights being immunities denote that there is a guarantee 
that certain things can not or ought not to be done to a person against his 
will. According to this concept human beings by virtue of their 
humanity, ought to be protected against unjust and degrading treatment. 
In other words, human rights are exemptions from the operation of 
arbitrary power. An individual can seek human rights only in an 
organized community i.e., state, or in other words, where the civil social 
order exists. No one can imagine to invoke them in a state of anarchy 
where there is hardly any just power to which a citizen can appeal 
against the isolation of rights. Thus, the principal of the protection of 
human rights is derived from the concept of man as a person and his 
relationship with an organized society, which can not be separated from 
universal human nature. 
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In the words of Subhash C. Kashyap, "The fundamental norm governing 
the concept of human rights is that of the respect for human personaHty 
and its absolute worth. Human rights may be said to be those 
fundamental rights to which every man or woman inhabiting any part of 
the world should be deemed entitled merely by virtue of having been 
bom a human being"? 
Youcef Bouandel argued that, most schools suggest that the term human 
rights is generally taken to mean a twentieth century name for natural 
rights. ^ 
J. Donnely said that "Human Rights are those held imply by virtue of 
being a person. To have a human rights one need not be or do anything 
special, other than to be bom as human being". According to Donnely, 
"rights encompass at least two concepts. On the one hand, rights "efer to 
moral righteousness. On the other hand, rights may refer to entitlements 
as in the claim I have a right to". This second sense of entitlement 
distinguishes rights, as human or otherwise.^ Human rights are 
entitlements for everybody. He distinguishes between political and 
moral rights and concludes that human rights are political one. 
Maurice Coronation, on the other hand, claims that human rights are 
moral rights. He said "Human rights are a form of moral rights and they 
differ from other moral rights in being the rights of all people at all 
times and in all situations. According to him legal rights do not 
constitute human rights because they are limited in scope, either they 
deal with a person and a privileged group or with people under a given 
jurisdiction. He identified three types of moral rights: (a) moral rights of 
one person only, (b) moral rights of any one in a particular situation and 
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(c) moral rights of all people in all situations. Human rights to C-anston 
fall in the moral rights category. 
Macfarlane also considers human rights as moral rights. According to 
him human rights are those moral rights which are owned by each man 
and woman solely by reason of being a human bemg. 
In the view of Alan Gewirth, human rights are a species of moral rights: 
they are moral rights because firstly in human rights all persons are 
equal simply because they are human and secondly they are justified on 
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certain valid moral principles, on the contrary, R.J., Vincent argued 
human rights are founded in the human nature. He said, "they are rights 
that every one has, and everyone equally by virtue of their very 
humanity. They are grounded in our appeal to human nature."' 
Some human rights thinkers interpret human rights as the essential 
conditions required for the development of human dignity and 
personality and for the happiness of individual. The material and moral 
upliftment of the people can only be possible in the presence of human 
rights. In this light A.A. Said says, 'human rights are concerned with 
dignity of the individual, the level of self-esteem that secures personal 
identity and promotes human community.'"^ 
All the above definitions talk about the nature and significance of 
human rights. But M. Freedon has highlighted a more practical a])proach 
of human rights. In his opinion, a human right is a conceptual device, 
expressed in linguistic form that assigns priority to certain human or 
social attributes regarded as essential to the adequate functionmg of 
human being; that is intended to serve as a protective capsule for those 
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attributes and that appeals for a deliberate action to ensure such a 
protection, 11 
It is now proved that there is no precise and universally agreed 
definition of human rights, but Edward lawson's definition can be 
considered as the most comprehensive and appealing. He, in the 
'Encyclopedia of Human Rights', says, 'human rights are the 
universally accepted principles and rules that support morality and that 
make it possible for each member of the human family to realize his or 
her fiall potential and to live life in an atmosphere of freedom, justice 
and peace.' 
What are Human Rights? It is the most controversial question in the 
debate on human rights. Agreement among scholars has yei to be 
reached on what human rights are. Human rights are the product of a 
evolutionary process. Different philosophies and circumstances have 
added new rights to the original list of human rights. There are, 
broadly, three categories of human rights. First, the civil and political 
rights which most scholars refer to as the 'first generation of human 
rights'. These rights were first developed in the Liberal traditions and 
are considered to be 'the original set of human rights'. Second the 
economic, social and cultural rights, which have come to be known as 
the 'second generation of human rights.' These rights were first 
highlighted by Marx and his followers. Third, a group of new rights, 
which is called 'third generation of human rights' started their claim to 
be included in the human rights only after the emergence of third 
world/developing countries. Now, we will first focus on the 
controversies involved in the first two categories of rights. Whether 
human rights should include both generations of rights or just the first 
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is a question which has created a lot of controversy. Some human right 
theorists like Maurice Cranston and R. S. Downie have argued that 
human right should be limited to civil and political rights and should 
not include economic or welfare rights and social rights. Cranston 
argues that the second generation cannot possibly be accepted as 
human rights and its inclusion hinders the protection of the traditional 
human rights. He has developed three fold tests upon which the 
authenticity of human rights is judged. These criteria are: practicability, 
paramount importance and universality. First, he argues that the 
economic and social rights are not practicable since they require 
resources that are beyond the capacities of states to provide. By contrast, 
he holds that the traditional rights to life and liberty requires only 
forbearance from action on the part of state and thus are practicable. 
Second, in his view, only the rights to life and liberty are of paramount 
importance. Third, he claims that human rights are universal. The 
first generation rights like rights to life and liberty, can be universally 
protected but the socio-economic rights differ from society to society 
since their fulfillment depend upon adequate resources.'^ It is held 
generally by the liberal thinkers that economic and social rights require 
the state to provide positive benefits and this would lead to increased 
state action and inevitable interference with an individual's liberty. 
Because of the above fact the second generation rights is not included 
in the human rights. 
Human rights theorists like Alan Gewirth, Richard Wasserstom, Henry 
Shue, and many others consider the socio-economic and cultural rights 
as human rights. Gewirth and Wasserstom argue for the right to well-
being as a human right, where such well-being includes economic or 
welfare consideration. Similarly, Henry Shue, Raymond Plant, Harry 
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Lesser and Peter Taylor-Gooby argue for subsistence or for survival as a 
basic human right.'"^ This view believes that the second generation rights 
are as important for human beings as the first generation. Gould argues 
for a conception of human rights that emphasis both economic rights and 
civil and political rights and see them in relation to each other. 
According to her, the protection of civil and political rights requires 
the realization of social and economic rights. Freedom from the socio-
economic exploitation and domination should be recognized as a right 
and that is necessary for the realization of civil and political righis. She 
claimed that the right to life includes right to subsistence and 
healthcare, in addition to security.'^ She advocates that the most 
important human right is the right to have positive freedom or right to 
self-development that includes both generations of rights. 
This controversy has been ended with the collapse of communism and 
the end of 'cold war'. In the last few decades we observe the 
recognition of both sets of rights in all societies whether it is liberal 
democratic or socialist system. The universal declaration of human 
rights contains both civil and political rights and economic, social and 
cultural rights. The American Secretary of State (Cyrus Vance) in his 
address on human rights policy (1977) mentioned three categories of 
rights that come under human rights. First, the right to be free from 
governmental violation of the integrity of the person. Second, tiie right 
to the fulfillment of such vital needs as food, shelter, health care and 
education. Third, the right to enjoy civil and political liberties.'^ In the 
similar manner almost all the contemporary human rights thinkers agree 
on the fact that human rights include the right of both generations. 
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Now, we will switch over to the 'third generation' of human rights 
which Karal Vasak calls the right to solidarity. It refers to certain 
rights which were not mentioned either in the liberal or Marxist tradition 
or in the UN declaration. These rights emerged due to mainly two 
reasons; first the independence of the third world countries and second, 
the newly recognized threats to the entire mankind. Karal Vasak included 
four rights in this category. He writes: 
"Third generation rights include the right to 
development, the right to a healthy and ecologically 
balanced environment, the right to peace, and the right to 
ownership of the common heritage of mankind". 
The right to development and ownership of the common heritage of 
mankind could be identified with the demands of third world, while the 
other two rights are of a general character and of a genuine importance 
to everybody in the world. The question of inclusion of the rights of the 
third generation into the concept of human rights has created more 
ambiguity surrounding the concept. They are not included in the human 
rights, as it is argued, because these rights refer to something vague and 
ambiguous. Marks stresses that the rights of new generation are too 
vague to be justifiable and are no more than slogans.''^ But on the other 
hand, there are strong arguments in favour of their inclusion into the 
human rights. These rights, it is argued, are pre-conditions or related to 
the most basic right i.e. the 'right to life'. In Gould's view the right to 
peace and right to live in a clean environment are also included into 
'nght to life'. Therefore, the third generation of rights can be 
considered as inalienable human rights. They have definitely widened 
the scope of human rights. 
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In the present days, rights have been claimed to things that we-e not 
generally claimed as right in the earlier days. Changes in moral and 
political thinking have affected people's ideas about the content of 
human rights. Peter Jones argues that the idea of natural or human 
rights has remained constant; all that has changed is people's thmking 
about what individuals have natural or human rights to.^' An attempt 
will be made to find out the special characteristics of human rights by 
which they can be distinguished from the traditional rights. We will also 
discuss and clarify some of the issues surrounding the concept of tiuman 
rights. First, human rights are universal. They are moral rigiits for 
everybody wherever they are. The entire mankind enjoys it and for that 
people do not require any qualification to enjoy them. But there is a great 
debate on its universality. Economic and social rights, in the opinion of 
Cranston and others, are not universal on many grounds which v e have 
already discussed. But scholars like Macfarlane argue that the 
enjoyment of both socio-economic rights and civil and political rights 
requires resources and positive action of the state." The traditional 
division of rights into two categories is no longer relevant and it is 
argued all human rights are universal in nature. Practicability is another 
important issue related to the concept of human rights. Accordmg to 
Cranston, these rights can be a part of human rights which can be 
exercised. Social and economic rights, to him, are not practicable, 
therefore are not human rights. But Macfarlane rejected Cranston's 
argument and concluded that practicability is an issue with all human 
rights not only with economic and social rights. He argues that the 
enjoyment of civil and political rights requires qualified judges, the 
training of the police and the military forces, for which resources are 
needed.^ ^ 
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According to Cranston human rights include those rights which ire of 
paramount importance. In his opinion civil and political rights are more 
important than social and economic rights and therefore are human 
rights.^ "^  But this argument is questioned. It is very difficult to judge 
whether one set of rights is more important than the other. The 
satisfaction of one set of rights depends upon other. It can be said that 
within the civil and political rights for instance, the right to life is 
more important than the denial of freedom of speech. Boundel observes 
that the importance of something can be very flexible. The degree of 
importance may vary from person to person and from society to society. 
Therefore, cannot be concluded that one human right is more important 
than another. The division of rights into different groups and giving 
priority to one set of rights over another, goes against the basic purpose 
of human rights, i.e. the all round development of the people. Robertson 
and Merrills believe in the indivisibility of human rights." '^ The idea of 
indivisibility is clearly understood if we look at the recently developed 
'right to development' which includes both sets of rights. The 
traditional division of rights into 'negative' and 'positive' has lost its 
ground in the doctrine of human rights. A new approach is developed in 
the human rights tradition which considers all rights whether civil and 
political or social and economic as positive rights. Gould has advocated 
that the 'right to life' as generally held is a negative right because it 
contains the right not to be killed. But she believes that the right to life 
includes other benefit rights, the right to the means of subsistence; the 
right to peace and the right against avoidable environmental harm or 
risk.^^ 
Human Rights, being essential for all round development of the 
personality of the individual in the society, be necessarily protected and 
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be made available to all the individuals. Perhaps the most important 
challenge to man kind to day is no that all people should be aware of the 
various 'rights' with we have because we are "all bom free find e(4ual in 
the dignity and rights", should act toward one another spirit of 
brotherhood. 
II. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO HUMAN RIGHTS 
David argues that philosophical approaches of Human Rights are 
inherently controversial. Human Rights law presents the conclusions of 
certain arguments. Human Rights approaches provide the arguments. He 
suggests that human rights law and practice should be evaluated, not by 
ideal standards, but by real possibilities. The various approaches to human 
rights are noted below: 
Natural Law Theory 
Natural law theory has underpinnings in Sophocles and Aristotle, but it 
was first elaborated by the Stoics of the Greek Hellenistic period and 
later of the Roman period. Natural law, they believed, embodied those 
elementary principles of justice which were right reason that is in 
accordance with nature, unalterable and eternal. Mediaeval Christian 
philosophers, such as Thomas Aquinas, put great stress on natural 
law, as conferring certain immutable rights upon individuals as part 
of the law of God. But there were critical limitations in the mediaeval 
concepts which recognized slavery and serfdom, thus excluding central 
Ideas of freedom and equality. As feudalism declined, modem secular 
theories of natural law arose, particularly as enunciated b\' Hugo 
Grotius and Samuel von Pufendorf Grotius defined natural law as a 
'dictate of right reason'; that is, an act, according to whether it is or is not 
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in conformity with rational nature, has in it a quality of moral necessity 
or moral baseness. Grotius, it should be noted, was also a father of 
modem international law. This theory, of course, has immense 
importance for the status and legitimacy of human rights as part of a 
system of international law. Natural law theory led to natural rights 
theory, the theory most closely associated with modem human rights. 
The chief exponent of this theory was John Locke. Locke imagined the 
existence of human beings in a state of nature. In that state, men and 
women were in a state of freedom, able to determine their actions and 
also in a state of equality in the sense that no one was subjected to the 
will or authority of another. Natural rights theory makes an important 
contribution to human rights. It affords an appeal from the realities of 
naked power to a higher authority which is asserted, for the protection of 
human rights. It identifies with human freedom and equality from 
which other human rights easily flow. And it provides properties of 
security and support for a human rights system, both domestically and 
internationally.^^ 
Positivism Theory 
John Stuart Mill claimed that rights are founded on utility. Karl von 
Savigny in Germany and Sir Henry Maine in England claimed that 
rights are a function of cultural variables. Under positivist theory, the 
source of human rights is to be found only in the enactments of a 
system of law with sanctions attached to it. Views on what the law 
'ought' to be having no place in law and are cognitively worthless. If the 
state's processes can be brought to bear in the protection of human 
rights, it becomes easier to focus upon the specific implementation 
which is necessary for the protection of particular rights. Indeed, 
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positivist thinkers such as Bentham and Austin were often n the 
vanguard of those who sought to bring about reform in the lav. The 
human rights treaties adopted by the United Nations reflect a positive 
set of rights that is rules developed by the sovereign states themselves 
and then made part of a system of international law. While many states 
may differ on the theoretical basis of these rules, the rules themselves 
remain to provide a legal grounding for human rights protection. C>n the 
other hand, in theory, positivism tends to undermine an intemaiional 
basis for human rights because of the emphasis positivists place on 
the supremacy of national sovereignty without accepting the 
restraining influence of an inherent right above the state. Furthermore, 
by emphasizing the role of the nation-state as the source of law, the 
positivist approach produces the view that the individual has no status 
in international law, 
Marxism Approach 
Contrasted with natural law is Marxist theory, an approach which is 
also concerned with the nature of human beings. Marx regarded the law 
of nature approach to human rights as idealistic and a historical. He saw 
nothing natural or inalienable about human rights. He regarded the 
notion of individual rights as a bourgeois illusion. Concepts such as 
law, justice, morality, democracy, freedom and so on were considered 
as historical categories, whose content is determined by the material 
conditions and the social circumstances of a people. As the conditions 
of life change, so the content of notions and ideas may change. Only 
rights which are granted by the state exist, and their exercise is 
contingent on the fulfillment of obligations to society and to the state. 
On an international level, Marxist theory has proved incompatible \^  ith 
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a functioning universal system of human rights. The prior claims of a 
communist society do not recognize overruling by international norms. 
Be that as it may, the influence of Marxism on human rights concepts 
has declined, as Marxism itself has ironically become a historical 
category with lessening philosophical impact. 
The Sociological Approach 
Natural and social sciences developed and began to increase 
understanding about people and their cultures, their conflicts and their 
interests. Anthropology, psychology and other disciplines lem their 
insights. This approach, insofar as it relates to human rights, sometimes 
directs attention to the questions of institutional development; 
sometimes focuses on specific problems of pubhc policy which have a 
bearing on human rights; sometimes aims at classifying behavioural 
dimensions of law and society. In a human rights context, the approach 
is useful in that it identifies the empirical components of a human rights 
system in the context of the social process. In many ways this approach 
can be said to build on William James's pragmatic principle that the 
essence of good is simply to satisfy demand. This approach also was 
related to the development in twentieth century society of increased 
demands for a variety of wants beyond classical civil and political 
liberties: such matters as help for the unemployed, the handicappe<J, the 
underprivileged, minorities and other elements of society. Pound pointed 
out that, during the nineteenth century, the history of the law was 
written largely as a record of an increasing recognition of individual 
rights. The approach of Pound and his progeny usefully enlarges our 
understanding of the scope of human rights and their correlation with 
demands. He makes us 'result-minded, cause-minded and process-
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minded'.^ ^ A descriptive science in the social human rights field is 
helpfiil but not enough to satisfy the need of goal identification. 
Rights Based on Natural Rights Theory 
In variant forms, modem human rights core theories seem to be 
settling for concepts of natural necessity, that is, necessity in the sense 
of prescribing a minimum definition of what it means to be human in 
any morally tolerable form of society. It views human life as 
encompassing certain freedom and sensibilities without which the 
designation 'human' would not make sense. To use a linguistic 
metaphor, humanity has a grammatical form of which certain basic 
human rights are a necessary part. To be sure, there is a certain aspect 
of vindication to many of the new individualist theories. They can be 
viewed as saying that if we adopt certain human rights (freedom of 
thought, equality) as norms, we can produce a certain kind of society; 
and, if one finds that kind of society desirable, one should ado]:)t the 
norms and call them absolute principles. The renaissance of qualified or 
modified natural rights or core theories has had a seminal influence on 
conventional international human rights norms. A reflection ot that 
influence is found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights itself, 
which begins with the following concept: 'Whereas recognition of the 
inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of 
the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
worid'.^' 
Rights Based on the Value of Utility Theory 
Generally, it may be described as holding that actions and ether 
objects of moral assessment are justified only if their consequences 
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have more intrinsic value than alternative actions. Classic 
utilitarianism, the most explored branch of this school, is a moral 
theory that judges the Tightness of actions which affect outcomes in 
terms of securing the greatest happiness to all concerned, leremy 
Bentham, who expounded classical utilitarianism, believed that every 
human decision was motivated by some calculation of pleasure and 
pain. He thought that every political decision should be made on the 
same calculation that is to maximize the net produce of pleasure over 
pain. Hence, both governments and the limits of governments were to 
be judged not by reference to abstract individual rights but in terms of 
what tends to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number. 
Utilitarian philosophy thus leaves liberty and rights vulnerable to 
contingencies and therefore at risk.^ ^ In Ronald Dworkin's felicitous 
phrase, rights must be 'trumps' over countervailing utilitarian 
calculations. 
Rights Based on Justice Theory 
The monumental thesis of modern philosophy is John Rawls's A theory 
of Justice. 'Justice is the first virtue of social institutions; says Rawls. 
Human rights, of course, are an end of justice; consequently, the role of 
justice is crucial to understanding human rights. No theory of human 
rights for a domestic or international order in modern society can be 
advanced today without considering Rawls's thesis, and we discuss 
this theory here more than any other contemporary ones. Principles of 
justice, according to Rawls, provide a way of assigning rights and 
duties in the basic institutions of society. Rawls's thesis is that each 
person possesses 'an inviolability founded on justice' which even the 
welfare of society as a whole cannot override. 'Justice denies that the loss 
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of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by 
others. Therefore, in a just society the liberties of equal citizenstiip are 
settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject to political 
bargaining or to the calculus of social interests. Rawls's system thus 
allows us to derive universal principles of justice (morality) acceptable 
to all rational human beings. Rawls claims that, if the contractors in the 
original position are rational and act in a condition of disinterestedness 
or ignorance of their own status and prospects, they will choose two 
principles of justice. 
Rawls's First Principle is that 'each person is to have an equal right to 
the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatibie with 
a similar system of liberty for all' 
Rawls's Second Principle deals with distributive justice. It holds that 
'Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so they are both (a) 
to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with a just 
savings principle and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all 
under condition of fair equality of opportunity'. 
Rawls's overriding principle of justice requires that all citizens share 
these liberties equally, as indeed international law provides. Rawls 
holds that a condition of distributive justice is fair equality of 
opportunity. Opportunity, stated as a principle of non-discrimination, is 
easy to put into legal precept and, in fact, international human rights 
covenants and many domestic constitutions provide that there should 
be no discrimination by virtue of sex, race, religion or national origin. If 
Rawls's moral principles produce justice for individuals in a domestic 
state that is a long step towards gaining the domestic state's 
endorsement of and adherence to international human rights 
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principles. In this regard, the international world order is no greater 
than the sum of its state parts. Hence, if the Rawlsian moral schemata 
contribute to a realization of domestic justice by the various state parts, 
the prescriptions of international human rights will invariaoly be 
served. Rawls's theory is obviously comforting for the constmct of 
constitutional democracy as well as for the concept of the universality of 
human rights. 
Rights Based on Reaction to Injustice Theory 
Professor Edmund Cahn's theory of justice appeals to human rights 
activists. Cahn asserts that, although there may be universal £ priori 
truths concerning justice from which rights or norms may be deduced, it 
is better to approach justice from its negative rather than its affirmative 
side.^ ^ In other words, it is much easier to identify injustice from 
experience and observation than it is to identify justice. Therefore, he 
concludes, justice is the active process of remedying or preventing 
what arouses the sense of injustice. Such an approach obviously will 
find a response in human rights advocates anxious to focus public 
attention on the injustice of the wide variety of egregious human rights 
abuses which remain prevalent. Here we need an overall structure of 
the type presented by moral philosophers such as Rawls, Ackerman or 
Gewirth. Still, Cahn's insight is useful; in the end it may well be that 
we will secure only those rights for which we are aroused to fighl. 
Rights Based on Dignity Theory 
A number of human rights theorists have tried to construct a 
comprehensive system of human rights based on a value-policy 
oriented approach founded on the protection of human digniiy.^ ^ A 
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secular exposition of that theory is best presented by McDougal, Lass 
well and Chen, who proceed on the premise that demands for human 
rights are demands for wide sharing in all the values upon which liuman 
rights depend and for effective participation in all community \alue 
processes. The interdependent values, which can all fall under the rubric 
of human dignity, are the demands relating to (1) respect, (2) power, (3) 
enlightenment, (4) well-being, (5) health, (6) skill, (7) affection, and (8) 
rectitude. The ultimate goal, as they see it, is a world community in 
which a democratic distribution of values is encouraged and promoted, 
all available resources are utilized to the maximum, and the protection 
of human dignity is regarded as a paramount objective of social policy. 
Rights Based on Equality of Respect and Concern Theory 
Ronald Dworkin, offers a promismg reconciliation theory between 
natural rights and utilitarian theories. Dworkin proceeds from the 
postulate of political morality; that is, that governments must treat all 
their citizens with equal concern and respect. In the absence of such a 
premise, there is a lack of a basis for any valid discourse on rights and 
claims. He believes that the state may exercise wide interventionist 
functions in order to advance social welfare. Dworkin believes that a 
right to liberty in general is too vague to be meaningful. However, 
certain specific liberties, such as freedom of speech, freedom of 
worship, rights of association and personal and sexual relations, do 
require special protection against government interference. Liberties to 
be protected against such external preferences must be given a 
preferred status. By doing so, we can protect the fundamental right of 
citizens to equal concern and respect because we prohibit 'decisions 
that seem, antecedently, likely to have been reached by virtue of the 
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external components of the preferences democracy reveals'. Dworkin 
(like Rawls, but in a different way) has minimized the tension between 
liberty and equality. 
Theory Based on Cultural Relativism 
The universalist (foundationalist, individualist) thesis is that human 
rights are universal, reflecting the autonomous, individual nature of 
the human being. Cultural relativists, in their most aggressive conceptual 
stance,""^  argue that there are no human rights absolutes, triat the 
principles which we may use for judging behaviour are relative.' to the 
society in which we are raised, that there is infinite cultural variability 
and that all cultures are morally equal or valid. Put into a philosophical 
calculus, the relativist says, 'Truth is just for a time or place' identified 
by the standards of one's cultural peers."" Relativism thus shifts the 
touchstones by which to measure the worth of human rights practice. 
To suggest that flindamental rights may be overridden or adjusted in the 
light of cultural practices is to challenge the underlying moral 
jusdfication of a universal system of human rights. A universal moral 
philosophy affirms principles which protect universal, individual 
human rights of liberty, freedom, equality and justice everywhere, 
giving them a non-transient, non-legal foundation. We can all cite 
examples of repressive rulers who seek to rationalize repressive 
practices by claiming that the culture of their society accepts those 
practices over universalist international human rights prescriptions, and 
that to criticize their society's human rights practices is to mipose 
Western cultural imperialism over their local culture. Thus cultural 
relafivist arguments are used to justify limitations on speech, 
subjugation of women, female genital mutilation, amputation of limbs 
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and other cruel punishment, arbitrary use of power, and other 
violations of international human rights conventions. It is no \vonder 
that the doctrine that human rights are contingent on cultural practice 
has been called the 'gift of cultural relativists to tyrants' cultural 
relativism? It is that cultures manifest so wide and diverse a range of 
preferences, motivations and evaluations that no human rights 
principles can be said to be self-evident and recognized in all times and 
all places. 
John Finnis points out. 
"All human societies' show a concern for the value of 
human life in none is the killing of other human beings 
permitted without some fairly definite justification. In all 
societies there is some prohibition of incest, some 
opposition to boundless promiscuity and to rape, some 
favour for stability and permanence in sexual relations. 
All human societies display a concern for truth all 
societies display a favour for the values of co-operation, 
of common over individual good, of obligation between 
individuals, and of justice within groups. All know 
friendship. All have some conception ofmeum and tuum, 
title or property, and of reciprocity. All display a 
concern for powers or principles which are to be 
respected as superhuman; in one form or another, 
religion is universal.' 
One, therefore, should not have to probe deeply to conclude that there 
is a universal cultural receptivity to such fundamental rights as freedom 
from torture, slavery and arbitrary execution, due process of law and 
freedom to travel. Further, there are many examples of peoples of like 
cultures living virtually side by side, where one state condemns human 
rights abuses and a counterpart state creates abuses. Thus most liuman 
rights abuses are not legitimately identified with the authentic culture 
of any society, only with authoritarian rulers of that society.^^ 
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Jacob Raz grounds rights in interests which are themselves grounded in 
values. Richard Rorty argues that human rights activists should rely, 
not on reason and theory, but on passion and the courage of their 
convictions. Other theorists produce other rationales. It is still an 
open question among some theorists whether, at the end of the day, 
individualists and relativists will recommend the same policies but on 
different moral grounds. While such reconciliation may not satisfy 
the universalist thesis, human rights proponents should take 
comfort from the moral compulsion a good person feels to combat evil 
and to vindicate human rights. If enough feel that moral compulsion, 
the universalist goals will have then been fulfilled. 
III. ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENT APPROACHES 
Human rights must be a special kind of right. They are often contrasted 
with legal rights or civil rights that derive from the laws or customs of 
particular societies. Donnelly says that human rights are the rigtits one 
has simply because one is a human being. This is very common and very 
un-satisfactory formulation. It is not clear why one has any rights simply 
because one is a human being. Human rights may not be rights one has 
simply because one is a human being, but they are rights of exceptional 
importance, designed to protect morally valid and fundamental human 
interests, in particular against the abuse of political power. They carry 
special weight against other claims, and can be violated only for 
especially strong reasons. Ronald Dworkin has made the influential 
suggestion that rights are 'trumps', but this is misleading if it is 
interpreted to mean that rights always defeat other moral and political 
considerations. Dworkin's view was that rights 'trump' only the 
routine goals of political administration', which is a relatively weak 
41 
conception of rights.'^'* Human rights may be trumps in a sironger 
sense, in that they override more than routine pohtical policies, but it is 
not plausible to claim that they override all other considerations. Critics 
of rights discourse sometimes say that there are more important moral 
values than rights, and that appeal to rights may undermine these 
values. Rights which may be ideally superior, fail. People are likely to 
claim their rights when their enjoyment of the objects of those rights is 
threatened. Rights are safest, however, if the enjoyment of their 
objects is normal, and their exercise is rare."^ ^A principal justification 
of rights discourse is that it legitimates challenges to social order when 
that order is unjust. Where justice prevails, appeals to rights are 
unnecessary. This answers the objection that the concept of rights 
undermines social harmony. Some theorists say that unenforceable 
rights are not rights at all. One can, however, have a moral right to 
something even if that right is unenforceable. The Jews in Nazi 
Germany had many moral rights that were not enforceable. The 
recognition of moral rights that are unenforceable now may help to 
get them enforced in the future. Donnelly also makes the pomt that 
rights can exist in a hierarchy from local custom up through 
national and international law to a universalist "philosophy. Rights 
claimants will normally prefer the lowest possible level. It is usually 
easier and more effective to appeal to a local law than to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights or to the moral philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant."*^  Philosophers sometimes talk of 'rights-based' 
moralities, and human rights may seem to be an example of such a 
morality. There are good reasons, however, for rejecting this view. 
Firstly, if rights form the basis of morality, it may not be possible to 
defend rights against their critics by appeal to more fundamental values. 
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Secondly, rights ought to be balanced with other values, and it would be 
dogmatic to assume that rights are always more fundamental than other 
values. This allows us to give human rights their appropriate priority. 
We must nevertheless take account of other values if we are to give a 
plausible account of the limits of rights. The question of whether I have 
the right to insult another person's religion, for example, cannot 
reasonably be answered simply by assuming that rights always trump 
other values, for I should identify and evaluate the moral weight of the 
other values at issue. Rights are important, but they are not the whole 
of morality. We can have the right to do something that it is not right to 
do: to criticize our government unfairly, for example. We can have a 
moral duty to do something that no one has the right to insist that we do; 
for example, to give generously to humanitarian organizations. There 
may be 'a right to do wrong', and there may be a duty of benevolence, to 
which there are no corresponding rights. Everyone may have the right 
to certain freedoms, but no one has the right to a free society, since no 
one can have the obligation to provide a free society. A free society may, 
therefore, be a collective good that is not reducible to individual rights. 
There may also be individual and collective justifications for rights. The 
right to freedom of speech, for example, may be justified by the right of 
the speaker to express his or her views, the right of the audience to hear 
those views, or the collective good of a free society. Freedom of the 
press is more adequately thought of as a collective good of a free 
society than as reducible to a set of individual rights of publishers, 
editors, journalists or readers. We do not have a human right to 
everything that is good, or to everything that we need. We may need to be 
loved, and it may be good to be loved, but we do not have a human right 
to be loved, because no one has a duty to love us. The relations among 
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rights and other moral values is complex, therefore, even if it is true 
that human rights are especially important values. There is a controversy 
as to who has human-rights obligations. The orthodox view is that it is 
only, or mainly, states that have them. Why should we belie^ e that 
human rights should trump traditional values that conflict with them? 
Donnelly argues that the forces of modernization have undermined 
traditional communities and the protections that they may have given to 
their members, who now need the protection of human rights, even if 
the concept is alien to their traditional cultures. There may be merit in 
political and cultural self-determination but the concept of human rights 
sets limits to self-determination for the sake of human dignity." This 
states the human rights position well enough, but it does not provide a 
defence of human rights against those who believe that a culture that 
violates human rights in certain respects (by privileging a certain 
religion, for example) is superior to one which adheres more closely to 
the Universal Declaration. 
Donnelly, supports his 'modernization' argument with an appeal to the 
international consensus on human rights, which, he says, is based on a 
plausible and attractive theory of human nature."^ ^ There are three bases 
of human rights here: consensus; a plausible theory of human nature; 
and an attractive theory of human nature. Donnelly seems to like the 
argument from consensus because it avoids controversial philoso])hical 
theories of human nature. It is unconvincing, however, not only 
because it is not clear that a sincere consensus exists, but also 
because consensus is factual not moral, and therefore, in itself, 
justifies nothing. Donnelly implicitly recognizes this by appealiag to 
a theory of human nature that is 'plausible' and 'attractive', and 
which is based on the liberal value of autonomy.'*'^  This alternative also 
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raises problems some cultures do not value autonomy, and even 
liberals, who do generally value autonomy, disagree about its 
meaning and importance.^^Donnelly rejects the idea that human rights 
are based on human needs, because, he argues, there is no scientific 
way to establish an agreed set of human needs, and the need for dignity 
rather than needs as such is the basis of human rights. However, the 
link between human rights and 'dignity' is as problematic as the 
link with 'needs': the right to security of person, for example, 
might be based on human need or a requirement of dignity. 
Although human rights cannot be derived directly from needs, certain 
needs, such as the need for food, seem to be the basis of some human 
rights. A certain level of food may be necessary to a life of dignity, and 
this may ground the human right to food, but the human need for food 
seems also to support this right. The combined use of needs and dignity is 
implicit in the 'capabilities' theory of Martha Nussbaum. This theor>' 
attempts to articulate the basis upon which we recognize others as human 
beings across historical change and cultural difference. Ortain 
capabilities, according to this theory, are essential to the definition of 
human beings. These capabilities are derived not from a controversial 
metaphysical theory of human nature, but from historical evidence. The 
theory of human capabilities aims to be as universal as possible, crossing 
religious, cultural and philosophical gulfs, while being sensitive to histor> 
and cultural difference. What are the implications of this approach? We 
begin by recognizing that human beings are mortal, and have a general 
aversion to death, even though they may prefer death to its alternatives in 
special circumstances. They have bodies. They need at least minimal 
levels of food, drink and shelter. They begin life as needy and 
dependent babies. They experience pleasure and pain, and have a 
45 
general aversion to pain. Most experience sexual desire. They li\e in a 
natural world with which they have to maintain a satisfactory 
relationship. They play and laugh. They are separate individuals; in 
all cultures human beings are born and die as individuals, and, 
however close their relations with other human beings, they relate 
as separate individuals. The theory specifies two thresholds. The 
first is one below which life is not human. The second is one below 
which life is not good. Insofar as the theory provides for human 
autonomy, it cannot say too much about how people who have 
reached the first threshold should proceed to the second. All the 
basic capabilities are, however, distinct and fundamentally 
important. The validity of the theory of capabilities does not 
require actual universal agreement. The theory provides for a 
conception of common humanity, respect for cultural difference, 
and a basis for criticizing particular cultural practices. The theory 
is sustained by participatory dialogue among those who interpret 
its deliberately vague principles differently in response to their 
different circumstances. The theory, by treating practical r(;ason 
as a fundamental human capability, respects the value of 
autonomy. The theory is robustly anti-racist and anti-sexisi, for 
racists and sexists deny precisely the conception of common 
humanity that the theory affirms. The theory of capabilities is the 
basis for evaluating traditions, social conditions and societies by 
reference to the quality of life for each human being in the society. 
Both the theory of natural rights and the entrenchment of human 
rights in international law suggest that the content Human rigal is 
relatively fixed. However, conceptions of human rights change over 
time. Such changes can be explained by reference to changes in 
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values and in threats to nose values.^' The capabilities theory would 
distinguish between the more stable and the more dynamic 
capabilities. It may explain changes in rights less well than 
Donnelly's view that human rights are 'socially constructec' can, 
but it is better suited to evaluate such changes by reference to its 
conception of the quality of life. Donnelly suggests that human 
rights create the conditions for healthy development , but social 
constructivism' can not explain what healthy development is 
without relying on a theory such as that of capabilities. Donnelly 
admits that the constructivist theory requires a politically relevant 
philosophical anthropology to provide a substantive theory of 
human nature that would generate philosophically defensible lists 
of human rights.^^ The justification and objective of human-rights 
action, he maintains, is to make human beings truly human, which 
brings his theory even closer to the capabilities approach.^ "* The 
concept of human rights has historically been challenged oy the 
philosophy of utilitarianism. Utilitarianism rejected natural rights as 
unscientific and as subversive of social order, and proposed, as an 
alternative criterion for the legitimacy of governments, the 
principle of utility, which can be interpreted as the common good, the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number, the maximization of 
welfare, or by some similar reading. The concept of human rights, was 
revived after the Second World War as a concept better suited than 
that of utility to articulate what was wrong with Fascism. The 
problem with the utilitarian conception of maximizing happiness 
was that it did not condemn Fascism in principle, and might 
endorse it in some circumstances. However, even the new 
concept of human rights recognized the appeal of utilitarianism in 
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Article 29 of the Universal Declaration, which states that human rights 
may be limited for the purpose, among others, of the general welfare in a 
democratic society'. 
We have seen that human-rights theorists often express the relation 
between human rights and the common good in terms of Dworkin's 
idea that human rights trump the common good, but the meaning and 
justification of this formula are typically unclear. If the human rights of 
one individual should endanger the good of society, why should rights 
trump the common good? This problem is more difficult if the common 
good' can itself be analyzed in terms of human rights. Suppose that, by 
killing one person, we could use their organs to save the lives of ten? 
Those ten people have the human right to life, but human-rights 
supporters would intuitively be reluctant to kill one person to save ten. 
Doing so could be justified by what is sometimes known as 'the utili-
tarianism of rights', which says that we should maximize the 
protection of rights, but human-rights supporters are typically reluctant 
to sacrifice the human rights of one person to protect those of others. 
There is no agreement as to how such conflicts of rights should be 
resolved. Jones suggests that rule-utilitarianism might paradoxically 
come to the rescue of human-rights theory here. Rule-utilitananism 
says that we ought to live by those rules that best promote the 
common good. The rule-utilitarian reason for not violating the human 
rights of one person even to protect the human rights of others is 
that it would violate a justified rule, and rule-utilitarianism says that 
this should not be done even if, in the short run, it does more good than 
harm.^ ^ This is a plausible solution for those who believe that the 
human rights of some should never be violated to protect the human 
rights of a larger number of others, but it is not certain that we snould 
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always take this position. The underlying problem is that humar rights 
are deep values, but, even so, they may conflict with other luman 
rights, or the same human rights of other persons, or with other values. 
Donnelly's constructivism is useless in the face of such conflicis. The 
theory of Alan Gewirth offers a solution. Human rights, according to 
Gewirth, are justified because they are necessary to moral action. When 
human rights conflict, those rights that are more important to moral 
action ought to have priority over those that are less important the 
right not to starve would, for example, have priority over thf right 
to holidays with pay.^^ This theory, however, offers no resolution of 
conflicts between equally important rights. The concept of 'basic 
rights' has been adopted by some political theorists, who believe 
that the concept of universal human rights might be 'imperialistic'. 
and yet who do not wish to abandon the idea of minimal standards of 
decent governmental behaviour.^^ Shue has defined basic rigiits as 
those rights, enjoyment of which is essential to the enjoyment of all 
other rights. To secure basic rights, other rights may be violaied, if 
necessary, but basic rights may not be violated to secure other rights. 
The concept of basic rights provides some guidance in the face of 
conflict among rights. Donnelly worries also that the identification of 
basic rights may lead to the neglect of other human rights, which are, 
according to his theory necessary to a life of dignity. The concept of 
'basic rights' is, therefore, controversial, and consequently not very 
helpful in solving the problem of conflict among rights. 
Steiner argues that conflicts of rights lead to intolerable arbitrarmess, 
and that rights therefore should be 'compassable', that is, only a theory of 
rights that avoids conflicts is rational. His theory of rights, however, 
recognizes only rights to private property that exclude most of the 
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economic and social rights recognized by the UN critics complain 
that his theory would allow an intolerable trumping of basic human 
rights by property rights. There is a common view that only civil and 
political rights are genuine human rights because they require only 
inaction by governments and therefore can be fulfilled universally, 
whereas economic and social rights depend on specific not universal 
institutions (such as a welfare state), and are too expensive for some 
governments to afford. Democratic theory asks who ought to rule, and 
answers 'the people'. Human rights theory asks how rulers ought to 
behave, and answers that they ought to respect the human rights of every 
individual. Democracy is a collective concept, and democratic 
governments can violate the human rights of individuals. The concept of 
human rights is designed to limit the power of governments, and, insofar 
as it subjects governments to popular control, it has a democratic charac-
ter. But human rights limit the legitimate power of all governments, 
including democratic governments. Human rights are consequently often 
protected by entrenching them in constitutions. 
Waldron has made a rights-based critique of the constitutional 
entrenchment of rights. He argues that if the value of human rights derives 
from the dignity of individuals, the outcome of democratic participation by 
such individuals should have priority over the judgments of course. '^ Dahl 
argues, similarly, that the people are the best judges of what is good for 
them, and are, therefore, the safest guardians of their rights. Democracy 
is, in this sense, prior to rights.^*^ Dworkin, however, makes a distinction 
between majoritarian and egalitarian democracy. Majoritarian democracy 
permits the 'tyranny of the majority', and is a defective form of 
democracy, since it denies the equality of all citizens. Egalitarian 
democracy recognizes the equality of all citizens, and therefore 
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entrenches their rights in a constitution to protect therr from 
violation by majorities. Most actual democracies entrust the 
protection of basic rights to independent courts. However, neither 
courts nor elected legislatures guarantee the defense of iiuman 
rights or democracy. Some theorists argue that a strongly 
supportive political culture is a better safeguard for human rights 
and democracy than specific institutions. 
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CHAPTER-2 
EVOLUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
I. ORIGIN OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
The concept of human rights is as old as the human civiHzatioii. The 
question of human rights was inherent in some forms or others in 
different 'religious' texts. All societies and cultures have developed 
some conception of rights and duties for their members. The cone ept of 
human rights is not entirely western in origin. It is a ciystallizalion of 
values that are the common heritage of man kind. As Mar\ Ann 
Glendon points out, the Universal Declaration of human rights did not 
suddenly drop from heaven engraved on tables but rather was a 
milestone on a path on which humanity had already been travelling for 
countries." In fact, the language of human rights is a product of the 
European Enlightenment. But the Concepts of Human Rights are as old 
as the Indian Culture as believed by the people of India. The pclitical 
thinkers and philosophers have expressed concern over securing human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all human beings every whert since 
the very early times of Vedic age.^ The Indian thinkers are of the view 
that it is not justified to limit the origin of the concept of human rights to 
only western civilization what the west has discovered today in the field 
of human rights has been an accepted principle of India's rich legacy of 
historical tradition and culture since immemorial which is evidenced by 
the declarations made in the Vedas.^ 
The "Rigveda," which is regarded as the oldest document, declares that 
all human beings are equal and they are all brothers. The "Atharvaveda" 
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advocates equal rights of all human beings over natural resources like 
air, food and water, like wise right to happiness, right to education, right 
to practice any religion, right to social security, right to get fair 
treatment and protection etc have been accepted and emphasized in 
various Vedic and post Vedic ancient Indian literatures. The Rigveda 
(Mandala-5, Sukta-60, Mantra-5) says "No one is superior or inferior, 
All are brothers. All should strive for the interest of all and should 
progress collectively." Manu describes the Raj Dharama of king as "Just 
as the mother earth gives equal support to all the living beings, a king 
should give support to all without any discrimination." (Manuix-31). 
Manu further commands the king as "The highest duty of a king is to 
protect his people. The king, who receives the prescribed taxes (fn^m his 
subjects) and protects them alone, acts according to Dharma." Kautilya 
beautifully sumps up the entire concept of welfare state: "The happiness 
of the king lies in the happiness of his subjects, in their welfare, his 
welfare whatever pleases himself the king shall not consider as good, 
whatever pleases his subject the king shall consider as good. He 
disapproved the theory of absolutism of king and subordinated him to 
the law and duties. Arthashastra not only affirmed and elaborated the 
civil and legal rights first formulated by Manu but also added a number 
of economic rights. He categorically ordained that the king shall provide 
the orphan, the aged, the infirm, the afflicted and helpless with 
Maintenance, he shall also provide subsistence to the helpless expectant 
mothers and also to the children they give birth to." It is revealed that 
society in Vedic period was well structured, highly organized and 
committed to human rights. 
In Buddhism the humanitarian feelings are equally present. Its tenets 
teach kindness to all creatures. The basic tenets of Buddhism art non-
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violence, non-hatred, and friendliness to all. Buddha rejected the caste 
system for it was based upon inequality and treated some individuals as 
morally superior purely on grounds of birth.'* One of the most significant 
contributions of Buddhism was the introduction and spread of secular 
education -Education for all. 
The Bible gives ten commandments which enshrine human rights issues. 
They are as follows: 
Thou Shalt not kill 
Thou Shalt not commit adultery 
Thou Shall not steal 
Thou Shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbors. 
Thou Shalt not covet thy neighbour's house, thou Shalt not co\ et thy 
neighbour's wife, nor his servant nor his maid-servant, nor his ex, nor 
his ass, nor anything that is thy neighbour's. 
Similarly, the Quran also shows equal concern for human beings as well 
as their rights. The following paragraph clearly highlights its concern: 
The society thus organized 
Must live under laws 
That would guide their every day life— 
Based on external principles 
Of righteousness and fair dealings Cleanliness and sobriety, 
Honesty and helpfulness, one to another— yet shaped 
Into concrete forms, to-suit 
Times and circumstances. 
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And the varying needs 
Of average men and women; 
The food to be clean and wholesome; 
Blood feuds to be abolished; 
The rights and duties of heirs 
To be recognized after death, not in a spirit of Formalism, 
But to help the weak and the needy 
And check all selfish wrongdoing; 
The courage to fight in defence 
Of right, to be defined; 
The Pilgrimage to be sanctified 
As a symbol of unity; 
Charity and help to the poor 
To be organized; unseemingly riot and drink and gambling 
To be banished; orphans to be protected; 
Marriage, divorce and widowhood 
To be regulated; and the rights of women. 
Apt to be trampled under foot. 
Now clearly affirmed. 
Despite these religio-political instructions human society could not 
attain justice for all. It was ridden with conflicts and more often was 
divided on the lines of religion, nationalism, caste, race, colour, sex, etc. 
One dominant community or group did not treat another weakened 
community or group as equal. The domination process was more often 
based on the assumption of 'natural superiority' over others and thought 
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to be divine ordained. Those who practiced their 'superiority over 
others, they 'beheved' in it and those who were dominated, they simply 
obeyed. This state of human society did not permit the idea of oneness 
of human society as it is visuaUzed today. This visualization came as an 
international concern. However, the international concern was preceded 
by important individual concerns. Davidson clearly underlines this 
process: 
International concern with human rights is a 
phenomenon of comparatively recent origin. Although it 
is possible to point to a number of treatises or 
international agreements affecting humanitarian issues 
before the second World War, it is only with the entry: 
into force of the United Nations Charter in 1945, that is 
possible to speak of advent of systematic human rights 
protection within the international system. Nonetheless, if 
is clear that the international protection of human rights 
has its antecedents in domestic efforts to secure legal 
protection for individuals against the arbitrary excesses 
of state power. Such domestic attempts have a long and 
dignified history, and are intimately connected with 
revolutionary activity directed towards the establishment 
of constitutional systems based on democratic legitimacy 
and the rule of law. Even today, the protection of human 
rights at both the national and international level is 
intimately connected, if not symbiotic. All international 
instruments require states' domestic and constitutional 
systems to provide adequate redress for those whose 
rights have been violated.^ 
One important aspect of human rights is the position of state vs. 
individuals. A state is supposed to protect individuals, and is not 
expected to be partisan in its approach. But in practice what happens is 
that state more often than not uses its organized might against any 
dissenting voice either expressed by an individual or a group of 
individuals. Since state still represents the interest of the powerful 
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section of society, it often suppresses individuals and groups which may 
not accept the state's power. Hence protection of individuals and groups 
against state suppression was and is an important issue. From this 
premise emanated other human right issues. The greatest landmarks in 
human rights history are not many. However, in due course of 
development of democratic values and realization of peoples' organized 
power, the embryo of human rights was sown in certain charters and 
declarations by the states. We present them here briefly to trace the 
evolutionary process of the revolutionary concept: 'human rights'. 
The Magna Carta 
Magna Carta is often cited as one of the early documents upholding 
'human rights' in crude forms. This opinion however, has been 
contradicted. Davidson says: 
While Magna Carta (1215) is often erroneously seen as the origins of 
the liberties of English citizens (it was in reality, simply a compromise 
on the distribution of powers between King John and his nobles, the 
language of which later assumed the wider significance which is 
attributed to it today), it was not until the Bill of Rights (1689) that mles 
directed towards the protection of individuals rights or liberties 
emerged. But even this development must be seen in context. The Bill 
of Rights, which is described in its long title as 'An Act Declaring the 
Rights and liberties of the Subject and setting the Succession of the 
Crown,' was the outcome of the seventeenth centui7 struggle of 
Parliament against the arbitrary rule of the Stuart monarchs. 
In Marxist analysis, the glorious revolution of 1688 and the Bill of 
Rights which institutionalized it, was a bourgeois revolution; it smiply 
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confirmed the ascendancy of the gentry and merchant class o^er the 
monarchy.'' There are some elements of truth in the above observations. 
But the important fact that lies in the Magna Carta is that it was for the 
first time the absolute power of a monarchy was curtailed. The earlier 
unbridled right of the monarch was also questioned which further paved 
the way for democratic governance. Hence, the historical importance-of 
the Magna Carta could not be belittled by the historians of ^uman 
rights. The following articles are the glimpses of nascent expressions 
that embodies human right issues: 
1. The English shall be first and shall have her rights entire and her 
liberties inviolate we have also granted to all freemen of our 
kingdom, for us and our heirs forever, all the liberties herein 
underwritten, to be had and held by them and their heirs of lus and 
our heirs. 
2. A freeman shall be amerced for a small offence only according to the 
degree of the offence; and for a grave offence he shall be amerced 
according to the gravity of the offence, saving his containment. 
3. No freeman shall be arrested, or detained in prison, or deprived of 
his freehold, or outlawed, or banished, or in any way molested; and 
we will not set forth against him nor send against him, unless by the 
lawful judgment of his peers and by the law of the land. 
4. To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny or delay right or 
justice. 
5. All merchants may safely and securely go away from England, come 
to England, stay in and go through England, by land or by water, for 
buying and selling under right. 
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6. No one shall be arrested or imprisoned upon the appeal of a vomen, 
for the death of any other than her husband 
7. Wherefore it is our will, and we firmly enjoin, that the I'nglish 
Church be free, and that the men in our kingdom have and hold all 
the aforesaid liberties, rights, any concessions, well and peaceably, 
freely and quietly, fully and wholly, for themselves and their heirs, 
of us and our heirs, in all respects and in all places forever as 
aforesaid. 
During this period a number of philosophers and social thinkers 
discussed human rights issues in different situations and circumsiances. 
All of them overtly or covertly raised the issues of human rights, i hough 
in relation to state and its sovereignty. In human society's evolutit:)n and 
development process one of the phases has remained most important. 
The phase was the period when 'socialism' was the philosophy of human 
society's governance. Earlier, the talk of equality, justice, peace and 
fraternity, was rather euphemistic because the fundamental question i.e., 
the production process and distribution of products was missing from 
the discourse. The whole perspective of human rights question took 
dramatic reversal when Pierre-Joseph Poudhon, Karl Marx and Frederic 
Engels incisively analyzed the causes of violation of human rights. 
Discussing threadbare they questioned the role of property and t:apital 
and how it was used to exploit a section, albeit, the largest section, the 
workers by a small section of society who happened to own the means 
of production. Poudhon Writes: 
If I were asked to answer the following question: What is 
slavery? 1 should answer in one word, It is murder; mv 
meaning would be understood at once. No extended 
argument would be required to show that the power to 
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take from a man his thought, his will, his personality, is a 
power of life and death; and that to enslave a man is to 
kill him. Why then, to this other question: What is 
property? May I not likewise answer? It is robbery, 
without the certainty of being misunderstood; the second 
proposition being no other than a transformation of the 
first?^ 
The most strident voice for equality and thereby establishing human 
rights has been expressed by Karl Marx. He says: 
All emancipation is a reduction of the human world and 
relationship to man himself Political emancipation is the 
reduction of man, on the one hand, to a member of civil 
society, to an egoistic, independent individual, and, on 
the other hand, to a citizen, a juridical person. 
Only when the real, individual re-absorbs in himself the abstract citizen, 
and as an individual human being has become a specis-being in his 
everyday life, in his particular work, and in his particular situatior, only 
when man has recognized and organized his forces propress" as social 
forces, consequently no longer separates social power from himself in 
the shape of political power, only then human emancipation have been 
accomplished. Marx has not only enunciated the fundamentals of 
emancipation of human beings, but he has also pointed out what 
strategy should be adopted in order to achieve the emancipation. In the 
Communist Manifesto he says: 
We have seen that the first step in the revolution by the working class 
is to raise the proletariat to the proposition of ruling class, to establish 
democracy. 
To achieve this Marx proposes the following measures which 'will of 
course be different in different countries:' 
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1. Abolition of property in land and application of all rents of land to 
public purposes. 
2. A heavy progressive or graduated income tax. 
3. Centralization of the means of communication and transport in the 
hands of the state. 
4. Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the 
state; the bringing into cultivation of waste lands, and improvement 
of the soil generally in accordance with a common plan. 
5. Equal obligation of all to work. Establishment of Industrial armies, 
especially for agriculture. 
6. Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual 
abolition of the distinction between town and country, by a nore 
equitable distribution of the population over country. 
7. Free education for all children in public school. Abolition of child 
factory labour in the present form. Combination of education with 
industrial production etc. 
The Declaration of Independence: 1776 
North America adopted the declaration of Independence on July 4, 
1776. This declaration consists of a number of human rights issues 
which contributed to the continuum of human right struggle. We hold 
the truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they 
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights that 
among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to 
secure these rights, government is instituted among men, deriving iheir 
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just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any form 
of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the 
people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, 
laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in 
such form, as to them shall seem most likely to affect their Safety and 
Happiness. 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen 
French Revolution in 1789 was an epochal event. In 1789 the National 
Assembly of France adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
Citizen on 26 August, 1789 as a preamble to the new constitution that 
it was framing for France. This Declaration was truly international in 
its appeal and inspired revolutionary and democratic movements in 
almost every country of Europe and in Central and South America and 
later, in Asia and Africa. The Assembly consequently recognizes and 
declares, in the presence and under the auspices of the Supreme Being, 
the following rights of man and the citizen. 
1. Men are bom and remain free and equal in rights. Social 
distinctions may be based only on common utility. 
2. The aim of all political association is to preserve the natural and 
imprescriptibly rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, 
security and resistance to oppression. 
3. Liberty consists in the ability to do whatever does not hann 
another; hence the exercise of the natural rights of each man has 
no limits except those which assure to other members of society 
the enjoyment of the same rights. These limits can only be 
determined by law. 
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4. Law may rightfully prohibit only those actions which are 
injurious to society. No hindrance should be put in the way of 
anything not prohibited by law, nor may any man be forceo to do 
what the law does not require. 
5. Law is the expression of the general will. All citizens have the 
right to take part, in person or by their representatives, in its 
formation. It must be the same for all whether it protects or 
penalizes. All citizens being equal in its eyes are equally 
admissible to all public dignities, offices and employments, 
according to their capacity and with no other distinction than that 
of their virtues and talents. 
6. No man may be indicted, an-ested or detained except, in cases 
determined by law and according to the forms which t has 
prescribed. Those who instigate, expedite, execute or cause to be 
executed arbitrary orders should be punished; but any citizen 
summoned or seized by virtue of the law should obey instantly, 
and renders himself guilty by resistance. 
7. Only stricdy necessary punishments may be established b\' law, 
and no one may be punished except by virtue of a law established 
and promulgated before the time of the offence, and legally put 
into force. 
8. Every man being presumed innocent until judged guilty, \^ it is 
deemed indispensable to keep him under arrest, all rigor not 
necessary to secure his person should be severely repressed by 
law. 
9. Free communication of thought and opinion is one of the most 
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precious rights of the man. Every citizen may therefore speak, 
write and print freely, on his own responsibility for abuse of this 
liberty in cases determined by law. 
10. Society in which guarantee of rights is not assured (3r the 
separation of powers not determined has no constitution. 
11.Property being an invincible and sacred right, no one may be 
deprived of it except for an obvious requirement of public 
necessity, certified by law, and then on condition of a just 
compensation in advance. 
Declaration of the Rights of Working and Exploited People 
Another important event which has a far reaching implication for tiuman 
rights is the October Revolution which took place in 1917. The 
Declaration consists of a number of decrees pertaining to peace and 
rights of the people of the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republic 
(USSR).Setting as its fundamental task the destruction of any 
exploitation of man by man, the complete abolition of the division of 
society into classes, the merciless suppression of the exploiteis, the 
establishment of a socialist organization of society and the victoiy of 
socialism in all countries, the Constituent Assembly further resolves: 
1. In order to realize the socialization of the land, private property in 
land is abolished and the entire land reserve is declared the 
general property of the people and is handed over to the workers 
without any purchase, on the principle of equalized use of the 
land. All forests, minerals and waters of general state 
significance, all livestock and machinery, all estates and 
agricultural enterprises are declared national property. 
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2. The Soviet law on workers control and on the Supreme Economic 
Council is confirmed for the purpose of assuring the powei of the 
workers over the exploiters, as a first step towards the complete 
passing of the factories, mines, railroads and other means of 
production and transportation into the possession of the Soviet 
Workers and Peasants Republic. 
3. General liability to labour service is introduced for the purjDOse of 
destroying the parasite classes of society and for the organization 
of economic life. 
The concept of human rights is as old as the human civilization. The 
struggle for recognition of some basic rights of individuals against 
political, social, economic and cultural oppression, injustice and 
inequalities has been an integral part of the histoi"y of all human 
societies. The recognition that every individual is entitled to enjoy 
certain basic rights merely by worth of being born in human species has 
evolved through this struggle. In this context the Indian values regarding 
human rights, perhaps, have the oldest pedigree. The evolution and 
development of the concept of human rights reflects on the long journey, 
which it has traveled to take its present shape. Through its roots may be 
traced in ancient Indian and western scriptures yet the modem concept 
of human rights is the product of liberal political thought ol' post 
seventeenth century. The Magna Carta,, American Declaration of 
Independence (1776), Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizens (1789) 
and Declaration of the Rights of working and Exploited People (1917) 
influenced the principles of human rights and liberties. 
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II. DEVELOPMENTAL ANALYSIS OF HUMAN RIGHT S 
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the founding fathers of 
sociology-Marx, Weber and Durkheim-were impressed by the massive 
social changes introduced by modem industrial capitalism, and sought 
to understand the larger historical forces that had brought them about. 
Individuals and their supposed natural rights dropped out of the picture. 
They were all in a sense neo-Aristotelians, seeing society as a natural 
entity to be understood scientifically, and not as an artificial creation to 
be shaped by ethical principles. Sociology superseded philosophy. The 
science of society replaced the rights of man. Rights survived in the US 
Constitution, and thinkers such as de Tocqueville, J. S. Mill and Weber 
worried about individual freedom in the age of large-scale, impersonal 
organization. However, udlitarianism generally replaced natural rights 
as the basis of movements for social reform.'° The working-class and 
socialist movements nevertheless played a vital role in the struggle for 
economic and social rights. However, when the Covenant of the I eague 
of Nations was adopted in 1919 at the end of the First World War, it 
made no mention of the rights of man. It took the horrors of Nazism to 
revive the concept of the Rights of Man as human rights. 
The present day human rights movement is the result of the experiences 
of the World War II. During the War shocking crimes were committed 
against the humanity and there was a total suppression of fundamental 
human rights. Nazi leaders of Germany had established a regime of 
complete lawlessness and tyranny. They had barbarously legated human 
values and dignity within their territories under their occupation. It was 
at that time realized that the restoration of the freedoms and rights to the 
people is one of the essenfial conditions for the establishment of 
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international peace and security. This conviction was reflected in the 
proclamation issued by the president Franklin D. Roosevelt on January 
6, 1941 which came to be known as 'Four Freedoms'. These he listed as 
freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want and 
freedom from fear. In the message he declared: "Freedom means the 
supremacy of human rights everywhere. Our support goes to those who 
struggle to gain these rights or keep them. "The efforts for the creation 
of an international organization, in order to establish peace, were being 
made even when the World War II was in progress. A numoer of 
conferences and meetings were held before the United Natio is, an 
international organization, was established in 1945. Many declarations 
adopted by the conferences laid down the importance of human rights. 
The Joint Declaration issued by the President Franklin D. Roosevelt of 
the United States and the Prime Minister Winston Churchill of the 
United Kingdom on August 14, 1941 in a document known as the 
Atlantic Charter, cherished the hope for a peace which will afford 
assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in 
freedom from fear and want'^. The Declaration of the United Nations 
signed on January 1, 1942 at Washington confirmed the principles of 
the Atlantic Charter when it proclaimed that the protection of human 
rights in all countries was to be one of the results, which was desired to 
be obtained from the victory over the Axis. Dumbarton Oaks proposals 
contained only a brief reference to the promotion of human rights as one 
of the activities to be performed by the proposed General Assembly, 
and, under its authority, the Economic and Social Council''. 
The United Nations and the Human-Rights Revival 
Since the General Assembly of the United Nations proclaimed its 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 10 December 1948, the 
concept of human rights has become one of the most potent in 
contemporary politics. In historical perspective, this fact is astonishing. 
A concept not long ago dis-credited has made a remarkable revival, and 
a concept widely perceived as Western has become global. The period 
from the French Revolution to the Second World War was the dark, age 
of the concept of human rights. International concern with what we now 
call human-rights issues had been shown intermittently in modem 
history in the can paigns against the slave trade and slavery, and in those 
for humanitarian laws of war, the protection of minorities and the 
emancipation of women.'"^ International concern with human rights 
between the two world wars was limited mainly to some work of the 
International Labour Organization on workers' rights and certain 
provisions in the treaties of the League of Nations for the protecoon of 
minorities, although the latter applied only to a few countries. "^  The 
immediate cause of the human-rights revival, however, was the growing 
knowledge of Nazi atrocities in the Second World War. The allied 
governments asserted in the declaration by the United Nations on 1, 
January 1942 that victory was essential 'to preserve human rights and 
justice.'^ The language of human rights seemed much more appropriate. 
After the war, the United Nations Organization was set up to establish a 
new world order in accordance with the principles upon which the war 
had been fought. The UN's San Francisco conference of 1945 included a 
number of human-rights provisions in the UN Charter. The preamble to 
the charter declares that one of the chief aims of the organization is 'to 
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of 
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations 
large and small.' Article 1 States that one of the principal purposes of the 
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UN is 'to achieve international co-operation in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. 
Article 55 provides that the UN shall promote 'universal respect f3r, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.' Article 56 tells us that 
all members of the UN pledge themselves to take joint and separate 
action in co-operation with the UN for the achievement of the purposes 
set forth in Article 55. Article 68 required the Economic and Social 
Council to set up commissions for the promotion of human righis, and 
on this basis the council set up the Human Rights Commission that was 
to draft the Universal Declaration. Article 62 said that the council may 
make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect f )r and 
observance of, human rights and this was the basis on which it 
recommended to the General Assembly that it adopt and proclaim the 
declaration.'^ 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
The General Assembly adopted the declaration on 10.December 1948, 
with forty-eight states. The Universal Declaration was intended to 
prevent a repetition of atrocities of the kind that the Nazis had 
committed. This is expressed particularly in the second paragraph of the 
preamble, which states that 'disregard and contempt for human rights 
have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of 
mankind.' The Human Rights Commission, aware of the religious, 
philosophical and ideological diversity of UN members, displayed no 
interest in the philosophical foundations of human rights. Nevertheless, 
given that Nazism violated human rights in theory and practice, the 
adoption of the concept of human rights by the UN in opposition to 
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Nazi ideology clearly implied the commitment to some kind of neo-
Lockean political theory. The substitution of the term 'natural rights' by 
that of 'human rights' may have been to eliminate the contrcversial 
philosophical implications of grounding rights in nature. The 
declaration set aside the traditional, but controversial, foundation of 
natural rights, without putting any new foundation in its place. However 
influential the concept of human rights may be, and however appealing 
it may be to many people, it is philosophically ungrounded.' The 
declaration was not intended to impose legal obligations on states but, 
rather, to set out goals for which states were expected to strive. "It was 
the first declaration of moral and political principles that could make a 
prima fade plausible claim to universality. Whatever its philosophical 
limitations, the declaration has had great legal and political influence. 
Before the Second World War there was almost no international law of 
human rights. There are now approximately 200 international legal 
human-rights instruments, of which sixty-five acknowledge the 
Universal Declaration as a source of authority. The declaration s also 
the source of an international movement, and of numerous national 
movements, of political activists who struggle against oppression, 
injustice and exploitation by reference to this document.""^ 
Article 1 announces that all human beings are bom free and equal in 
dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience, and 
should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. Article .2 says 
that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in the 
declaration 'without distinction of any kind, such as race, coloui, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social cngin, 
property, birth or other status. Article 2 is elaborated by Article 7, ^vhich 
states that all are equal before the law and are entitled to equal 
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protection of the law without any discrimination. Articles 3-5 deal with 
what are sometimes called 'personal integrity rights'. Article 3 restates 
the classic rights to life, liberty and security of person. Article 4 forbids 
slavery, servitude and the slave trade. Article 5 forbids torture and cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Articles 6-12 deal with 
legal rights. These provisions are not controversial in general, although 
their particular applications may be, but the balance between legal 
rights, on the one hand, and social and economic rights, on tht; other 
hand, has been criticized for being excessively influenced by the 
Western history of rights as legal protections for private indi\ iduals 
against the state rather than as positive contributions to the ife of 
dignity. Article 14 says that everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy 
in other countries asylum from persecution. Article 16 states that men 
and women of full age have the right to marry and to found a family 
without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion. They are 
entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its 
dissolution. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full 
consent of the intending spouses. Article 16 (3) asserts that the family 'is 
the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society and the state. Article 17 of the declaration states 
that everyone has the right to own property alone and in association 
with others, and that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. 
Article 18 says that everyone has the right to 'freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion' and 'to manifest his religion or behef in 
teaching, practice, worship and observance. Article 19, says that 
everyone has the right to freedom of expression. Article 22 says that 
everyone has the right to the economic, social and cultural rights 
indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his 
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personality, 'through national effort and international co-operation' and 
'in accordance with the organization and resources of each state'. Article 
25 states that everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for 
the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, 
clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and 
the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, 
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond 
his control. Article 22 makes the realization of economic, social and 
cultural rights dependent on the resources of each state, whereas Article 
25 does not. Article 27 says that everyone has the right 'to particioate in 
the cultural life of the community'. Article 29, paragraph 1, of the 
Universal Declaration states that everyone 'has duties to the community 
in which alone the free and full development of his personality is 
possible.' Paragraph 2 allows the limitation of human rights in order to 
secure the rights of others and to meet 'the just requirements of 
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society'. 
Donnelly holds that the Universal Declaration entails a relatively 
specific set of institutions, namely, the liberal-democratic \^elfare 
state. The Universal Declaration is a manifesto, and not a philosophical 
treatise or a social policy for the world. It was written for a popular 
audience in relatively simple terms, and it is therefore necessarily 
oversimplified as a guide to policy-making. The declaration should be 
judged by clarifying and evaluating its underlying principles, and by 
investigating its empirical impact. 
The Cold War 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is only a declaration. It 
makes no provision for its implementation. It allocates rights to 
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everyone. It says little about who is obliged to do what to ensure that 
these rights are respected. In 1948 the UN was committed to state 
sovereignty and human rights. It could not decide what was to be done if 
sovereign states violated human rights. At that time virtually all 
governments said that the declaration was not legally binding. No 
human-rights violations, except slavery, genocide and gross abuses of 
the rights of aliens, were illegal under international law. The UN 
established a Commission on Human Rights, but it was composed of the 
representatives of governments, and NGOs had limited access to it. The 
commission's mandate was confined largely to drafting treaties and 
other legal texts. In 1947 the Economic and Social Council declared that 
the commission had no authority to respond to human-rights violations 
in any way. From 1948 until the late 1960s the ability of the UN or the 
'international community' to take effective action to protect human rights 
was extremely limited.^ '^ The cold war reinforced the reluctance of states 
after 1948 to submit to the international regulation of human rights, and, 
consequently, notwithstanding the Universal Declaration, human rights 
returned to the margins of international politics in the 1950s. The two 
main cold-war protagonists, the USA and the USSR, used the concept of 
human rights to score propaganda points off each other, while directly or 
indirectly participating in the gross violation of human rights. Plans to 
introduce binding human-rights treaties were delayed until the mid-
1960s.In the 1960s the world-wide decolonization movement created 
many new member-states of the UN, with new issues for the human-
rights agenda: anti-racism, decolonization and the right to self-
determination. The Convention on the Elimination of all Fonns of 
Racial Discrimination was adopted by the General Assembly in 1965. 
The arrival of new states at the UN, therefore, injected a new activism, 
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although it was.very selective: South Africa, Israel and Chile received 
particular attention. As UN human-rights activism grew, so human-
rights politics threatened the universality of the concept in practice. In 
1966 the General Assembly asked the Economic and Social Council and 
the Commission on Human Rights 'to give urgent consideration to ways 
and means of improving the capacity of the United Nations to put a stop 
to violations of human rights wherever they might occur.' This led to the 
adoption of two new procedures. In 1967, Resolution 1235 of the 
Economic and Social Council authorized the commission to discuss 
human-rights violations in particular countries. In 1970 Resolution 1503 
of the council established a procedure by which situations that appeared 
to reveal 'a. consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of 
human rights' could be pursued with the governments concerned in 
private. The post-colonial states had wanted the commission to deal with 
racism. The communist states thought that this would embarrass the 
"West. The West did not want to appear to condone racism, but oid not 
want racism to dominate international human-rights debates. Thus cold-
war and third-world politics generated new procedures and wider 
powers for the UN Human Rights Commission. The 1235 procedure is 
an advance in the implementation of UN human-rights standards, but it 
works unevenly and remains marginal to the world's human-rights 
problems.'^The 1503 procedure enables individuals to petition the UN 
about human-rights violations, but offers them no redress. The 
commission names countries that it has considered, and may therefore 
put some pressure on governments by publicity. 1503 has had little 
impact on situations of gross human-rights violations.'^In 1966 two 
international treaties-the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
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Rights- were opened for signature and ratification. They enter i^d into 
force in 1976, when the necessary thirty-five ratifications had been 
received. The 1966 covenants leave out the right to property, but include 
the right to self-determination. The Universal Declaration and the two 
covenants, together known as the International Bill of Rights, constitute 
the core of international human-rights law. By August 2001 more than 
140, or slightly more than three-quarters of the 190 UN states, had 
ratified the two covenants.^^ The Human Rights Committee was 
established in 1976. It consists of independent experts whose task is to 
monitor compliance with the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
The states that are parties to the covenant are obliged to submit -eports 
on what they have done to implement the rights in the covenant. The 
committee can also receive complaints from states under the covenant 
and complaints from individuals under its optional protoco . The 
committee has jurisdiction only over states that are parties to the 
covenant, but most states are now parties. Co-operation with the 
committee by states is variable, but the committee has brought about 
legislative changes in some countries, and can contribute to human-
rights improvements through discussion, debate and advice. In a few 
cases, individual complainants have benefited from a decision of the 
committee.'^The UN adopted the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women in 1979, the Convention against Torture 
in 1984, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989 New 
'thematic' procedures evolved. A Working Group on Enforced or 
Involuntary Disappearances was established in 1980 in response to 
events in Argentina and Chile. Developments in the UN were 
overshadowed by the impact of the cold war, which was 
overwhelmingly adverse for human rights. The communist states were 
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gross violators of human rights, and the Western powers, led by the 
USA, supported regimes around the world that committed grave human-
rights violations. Ironically, the instability of the cold-war 'balance of 
power' created an opening for human-rights progress. In the early 1970s 
the communist bloc sought agreements with the West on security and 
economic matters. The West demanded human-rights guarantees in 
return. In 1973 the Conference on Security and Co-operation in liurope 
(CSCE) was convened, later to become the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). This led to the Helsinki Firal Act 
of 1975, in which the communist states accepted a range of human-
rights commitments. In the following years, Helsinki-based human-
rights NGOs were established in the USSR, but were severely 
persecuted. In 1977 the human-rights group Charter 77 was set up in 
Czechoslovakia. The short-term, practical effects of these events 
appeared slight, but they increased the intensity of international debates 
about human rights, and such groups played a role in the dismantling of 
the Communist system in Eastern Europe.^^ The admission to the JN of 
a large number of poor, non-Western states introduced a new emphasis 
on economic rights into international debate. In 1974 a number o'texts 
concerning the so-called New International Economic Order were 
approved. These texts sought to draw attention away from human-rights 
violations in individual states to the structural causes of human-rights 
violations in global economic inequality. This third-world approach to 
human rights led to a controversial conceptual development: the so-
called third generation of human rights. According to this new thinking, 
civil and political rights were the first generation of 'liberty' rights; 
economic and social rights were the second generation of 'equality' 
rights; and there was now a need for a third generation of 'solidarity' 
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rights. These were the rights to development, peace, a heahhy 
environment and self-determination. In 1986 the General Assembly 
adopted a Declaration on the Right to Development. In the 1980s and 
early 1990s the theme of 'cultural relativism' became more salient in 
UN debates about human rights. In 1984 the Islamic Republic of Iran 
proposed that certain concepts in the Universal Declaration should be 
revised, and announced that Iran would not recognize the validity of any 
international principles that were contrary to Islam. In the run-up to the 
UN World Conference on Human Rights that was held in Vienna in 
1993 there was much talk of a conflict between 'Asian valuts' and 
human rights. 
After The Cold War 
Although the end of the cold war brought some immediate human-rights 
improvements, such as the establishment of civil and political rights in 
former communist societies, the new world order produced complex 
human-rights patterns. Both the General Assembly and the Human 
Rights Commission became more active. The UN goals of peace-
keeping and human-rights protection became increasingly combined. In 
Haiti and Liberia, the UN became involved in monitoring respect for 
human rights as part of political settlements. In Namibia and Cambodia, 
the UN had a more comprehensive role in protecting human rights in the 
context of overall political reorganization. The establishment of 
international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and following 
the genocide in Rwanda were further innovations by the UN, which also 
agreed to set up a general international criminal tribunal. It remains to 
be seen whether this combination of law and politics is successful, or 
whether, as some critics fear, the law may undermine the chances of 
81 
political settlement.^° The UN also acts to mitigate the effects of liuman-
rights violations through the High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR). Although UNHCR does extremely valuable work, it acts 
typically after gross human-rights violations have taken place. The 
Vienna conference of 1993 reaffirmed the universality, indivisibility and 
interdependence of human rights. It also emphasized the special 
vulnerability of certain groups -such as women, children, minorities, 
indigenous populations, handicapped persons, migrant workers and 
refugees - and opened the way for the appointment of a High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. At the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, there is concern that globalization' is a threat to human rights. 
Concern for globalization has shifted the human-rights agenda 
somewhat in favour of economic and social rights, and has raised 
questions about the human-rights obligations of non-state actors, such as 
multinational corporations. Ironically, after the apparent victory of 
capitalism over communism, anti-capitalist protest has once again 
become part of international politics. Another human-rights problem 
associated with globalization is that of the increasing numbers of 
asylum-seekers and the reluctance of the governments into whose 
jurisdiction they flee to respect their rights in full. 
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CHAPrER-3 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNITED NA1 IONS 
United Nation's Mechanism for the Protection of Human Rights 
The human rights machinery may be perceived in narrow and broad 
sense. First, this notion embraces organs and procedures dealing 
explicitly and directly with human rights in the framework of the United 
Nations. This category includes: 
1. Intergovernmental organs established on the basis of the Charter 
of the United Nations. The General Assembly, the Security 
Council, The Economic and social Council, and the Commission 
on Human rights. The Commission on the Status of women and 
the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice also 
address human rights issues within their respective mandates; 
2. Bodies established by human rights treaties; 
3. Reporting communications and investigating procedures 
established by policy making organs and treaty based bodies 
4. The parts of the United Nations secretariat responsible for human 
rights activities, especially the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. The Division for the 
Advancement of Women and the Centre for International Crime 
Prevention have also human rights responsibilities. The office of 
the High commissioner for Human Rights and the Division for the 
Advancement of Women adopt joint work plans. 
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In the broad sense, the notion human rights machinery also includes 
those organs and procedures which have been established witnin the 
United Nations specialized agencies and programmes and deal, inter 
alia, with human rights or with specific aspects of human rights. Such 
organs and procedures exist in the framework of the international labour 
organization, UNESCO, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refiigees, UNICEF, the United Nations Development Programme, and 
the United Nations Congresses on the Prevention of Crime and 
Treatment of Offenders. 
Policy Making Bodies: 
The General Assembly 
While the General Assembly has an overall competence to deal v/ith all 
the matters covered by the charter of the United Nation' human rights 
issues are subject primarily to debate in its Third Committee (Social 
Humanitarian and Cultural Committee). The auxiliary bodies of the 
General Assembly frequently deal with human rights thus contributing 
to development in this area. Matters considered by the General 
Assembly may be categorized in the following groups: 
1. Substantive human rights, issues; 
2. 'Human rights situations' (this notion is used by the United 
Nations bodies to refer to situations of alleged human rights 
violations on a large scale); 
3. Draft conventions or declarations, and 
4. Organizational matters. 
The resolutions of the General Assembly reflect not on]\ the 
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assessments of this body but also most frequently include 
recommendations for further action by the international community as a 
whole, and specifically by governments, components of the United 
Nations system, and non-governmental organizations and the wider civil 
society. 
The Security Council 
Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations confers on the Security 
Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security. Human rights issues were usually refeiTed to as 
humanitarian problems. The situation gradually changed in the 1990s. 
The human rights abuses have been recognized as one of the root causes 
of contemporary armed conflicts and at the same time, the protection of 
human rights as one of essential elements of peace- making and peace-
building. Today, Security Council decisions frequently address human 
rights issues in the context of peace and secunty." Peace accords 
supported by the Security Council contain references to human rights. It 
has become a rule that the Security Council, when establishing a peace 
operation includes a human rights component in it Reports of the 
Secretary General to the Security Council Contain human rights related 
analysis and recommendations. The Security Council has also requested 
reports of the Office of the High Commissioner of human rights when 
human rights violations posed a threat to peace and security. 
The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
Pursuant to Article 62, para 2, of the Charter of the United Nations, the 
promotion and protection of human rights are among the main art.-as of 
the mandate of ECOSOC.^ In this framework, ECOSOC makes 
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recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for and 
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all: prepares 
draft conventions to be submitted to the General Assembly and 
convenes international conferences on subjects within its competence. 
ECOSOC is also the main United Nations coordinating organ in the 
economic and social field. Under Article 68 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, ECOSOC has set up commissions in the economic and social 
fields. Two of them have been established to deal with matters falling in 
the area of human rights -namely, The Commission on Human Rights 
and the Commission on the Status of Women.In addition to these two 
bodies, other functional commissions of the ECOSOC are also relevant 
to the human rights area in particular Commission on Crime Pre\ ention 
and Criminal Justice, Commission on Sustainable Development and 
Commission for Social Development. The office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights is developing cooperatior with 
ECOSOC regional economic commissions. ECOSOC made an 
important contribution to the development of procedures for ciealing 
with human rights matters in the Commission on Human Rights and the 
Commission on the Status of Women. For instance, subsequent 
ECOSOC resolutions have marked the history of the communications 
procedures, which provide the framework for how the commission on 
Human Rights deals with alleged human rights violations. 
The Commission on Human Rights 
The commission on Human Rights was created in 1946'^  with the initial 
task of preparing the draft of the International Bill of Rights. Its profile 
has developed to one of a fully intergovernmental body which gives the 
commission an important standing in international relations, although it 
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also has its political costs. The Commission submits prooosals. 
recommendations and reports to ECOSOC, helping it coordinate United 
Nations activities in the field of human rights.^ Looking at the 
Commission's legacy, one can see the merit of the observation made by 
the High Commissioner for Human rights that: 'the Commission on 
Human Rights has been the central architect of the work of the United 
Nations in the field of human rights'.^ The work of the Commission is 
basically framed by the Rules of Procedure of the Functional 
Commissions of the Economic and social Council.^ During the 1990s 
the Commission on Human Rights made considerable efforts to reform 
its organization and methods of work. The world conference on Human 
Rights forcibly stressed the need for a continuing adaptation of the 
United Nations human rights machinery to the cuiTcnt and future 
needs.^The commission holds its annual six-week long sessions between 
mid-March and the end of April.^ They are attended by goveminental 
delegations of up to 50 members.From its very establishment, the 
Commission on Human Rights has been the main United Nations body 
drafting international human rights standards and related procedural 
norms. Whether it is a draft human rights treaty or a draft declaration, 
the product of the Commission is forwarded through ECOSOC to the 
General Assembly for final adoption. In the opinion of the Working 
Group on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Mechanisms of the 
Commission on Human Rights, standard-setting will continue to be one 
of the central functions of the Commission on Human Rights. Making 
the standard-setting process more effective and, in particular, shorter 
would be a major contribution to the promotion and protection of human 
rights and to the position of the Commission in general. 
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Country Situations: 
If a human rights situation in a country is on the Commission's agenda, 
or a member or group of members is expected to propose tliat the 
Commission take action on a country situation, the delegation of the 
country concerned may, in fact, take one of the following positions: 
1. Join the consultations and subsequently agree or disagree w ith the 
negotiated position of the Commission; 
2. refuse to participate in the consultation process which does not 
exclude its public statements; 
3. object to the consideration of the human rights situation in its 
country through a formal 'no action motion', which must be ^ oted 
immediately. 
It is widely said that the debates on country situations are highly 
politicized, but it is nevertheless the Commission's responsibility to 
react impartially to serious human rights violations. 
The Commission's system: 
In carrying out its mandate, the Commission benefits from the input by 
its bodies and procedures that have now developed into quite a 
sophisticated system. ECOSOC empowered the Commission on Muman 
Rights to establish two Sub-Commissions: the Sub-Commission on 
Freedom of Information and of the Press and the Sub-Commission on 
the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities The 
Commission on Human Rights may also establish working groups 
which meet intersessionally. The objective of such working groups is to 
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draft human rights treaties or declarations concerning human rights 
standards, to analyze substantive issues or deal with organizational 
matters. At present, the following working groups support the 
Commission: the Working Group on the Right to Developmeat; the 
Working Group on Guidelines on Structural Adjustment Programmers 
and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Working Group on a 
draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; 
and the Working Group on Situations established under item '^(b) to 
examine human rights situations referred to the Commission by the 
Working Group on Communications. The working groups drafting 
human rights instruments usually meet once a year for two weeks. An 
essential tool of the Commission on Human Rights constitutes its 
special mechanisms established to monitor the implementation of 
specific human rights standards. They include, among other;-, two 
Working Groups: on Arbitrary Detention and on Enforced, or 
Involuntary, Disappearances. The effective functioning o'^  the 
Commission is a legitimate concern for all of its participants, and more 
importantly for all those who rely on it." The Commission has pr(ivided 
the institutional framework for drafting most of the human rights tieaties 
and international declarations developing human rights standards, 
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenants on Human Rights. The Commission has 
elaborated major strategies and procedures for the promotion and 
protection of human rights. Debates in the Commission have contributed 
to the broadening of the United Nations agenda concerning human 
rights. Finally, it has been the Commission that has responded to major 
human rights violations in different regions of the world and has 
provided a platform for victims and their advocates to address the 
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international community. Many representatives of international and 
regional organizations, and a remarkable number of actively 
participating non-governmental organizations,'^ also give evidence of 
the role played by this organ. The reform of the Commission in the 
follow-up to the World Conference on Human Rights session proves 
that the Commission can mobilize its potential to reflect on its own 
work. The Commission on Human Rights is a vital part of the 
Organization, with a glorious history... People all over the world look to 
it for protection of their rights and for help to win for themseh es the 
better standards of life in larger freedom referred to in the Preamble to 
the Charter. I strongly urge Member States to keep in mind the tme 
purpose of the Commission, and to seek ways of making it more 
effective. They must realize that, if they allow elections and debates to 
the dictated by political considerations, or by block positions, rather than 
by genuine efforts to strengthen human rights throughout the world, the 
credibility and usefulness of the Commission will inevitably be 
eroded.'^ 
The Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights 
This Sub-Commission, formerly known as the Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, was created 
in 1947 as a relatively small body of 12 members who were to 
undertake studies, particularly in the light of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, and to make recommendations to the Commission on 
Human Rights concerning the prevention of discrimination of an> kind 
relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms and the protection 
of racial, national, religious and linguistic minorities'. It was also 
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expected to perform other functions entrusted to it by ECOSOC and the 
Commission on Human Rights.'"* The Sub-Commission now has 26 
members who have the same number of ahemates and who are elected 
for a period of four years based on the principle of an equitable 
geographical representation.'^ At present, seven experts come from 
Africa, five from Asia, five from Latin America and the Caribbean, 
three from Eastern Europe and six from Western European and other 
states.The legacy of the Sub-Commission is widely respected. It 
includes numerous drafts, studies, and proposals submitted to the Com-
mission on Human Rights for further action. The findings and ideas 
elaborated by the Sub-Commission have frequently stimulated not only 
the Commission to take acfion, but also other parts of the United 
Nations human rights programme. The Sub-Commission's contribution 
to the drafting of all the most important human rights standards is 
unquestionable. Finally it has developed into an important component 
of the international monitoring of the implementation of human i ights, 
especially within the '1503 procedure'. 
The Commission on the Status of Women 
The Commission on the Status of Women was established in 194() with 
the status as the other functional commissions ofECOSOC." The initial 
number of 15 members has been gradually increased to 45.'^ 
Commission members are elected for a term of four years and represent 
member states. The Commission's composition is based on the principle 
of equitable geographical distribution. The Commission's mandate 
includes the preparation of recommendations and reports to ECOSOC 
on the promotion of women's rights in the political, economic, civil, 
social and educational fields. In 1987, ECOSOC decided to specify 
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further this mandate by including the promotion of the objectives of 
equahty, development and peace, the monitoring of the implemeniation 
of measures aimed at the advancement of women, and the evaluation of 
the progress made at the international, regional and domestic levels in 
this regard.'^ Consideration of confidential and non-confidential 
communications concerning violations of the status of women also 
constitutes a part of the Commission's mandate. The Commission is the 
main forum within the United Nations system, which elaborates and 
implements programmes concerning the human rights and equal status 
of women. Its sessions are attended not only by governments, but also 
by representatives of United Nations agencies and programmes, 
regional organizations and non-governmental organizations. The 
Commission adopts its own resolutions and drafts to be considered by 
ECOSOC. It is also a catalyst for the coordination of efforts made by 
various organizations to develop the protection of women and facilitate 
their advancement. 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
During the preparatory process to the World Conference on Human 
Rights between 1991 and 1993, in the convenient political climate of the 
end of the Cold War, Amnesty International re-introduced the idea of a 
High Commissioner for Human Rights." '^ However, it soon turned out 
that doubts and fears accompanying the concept of the new institution 
from the moment it was first proposed in 1948 had not disappeared, and 
the debate appeared again to be highly controversial. Nevertheless the 
World Conference managed to recommend to the General Assembly 
that, when examining the report of the Conference at its 48th session, it 
begin, as a matter of priority, consideration of the question of the 
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establishment of a High Commissioner for Human Rights for the 
promotion and protection of all human rights.' In early October 1993, 
the Third Committee of the General Assembly established an open-
ended working Group to discuss the ways and methods of 
implementation of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. 
The General Assembly created the post of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights on 20 December 1993, by resolution 48/141.^^ Th(; seat 
of the High Commissioner is located in Geneva. By giving consensus 
support to the creation of this new institution, the international 
community has empowered it with a strong moral and political 
legitimation. The High Commissioner is appointed by the United 
Nations Secretary General, subject to approval by the General 
Assembly. The High Commissioner is expected to be a person of high 
moral standing and personal integrity and shall possess expertise, 
including in the field of human rights, and the general knowledge and 
understanding of diverse cultures necessary for impartial, objective, 
non-selective and effective performance of the duties.^^ The term of 
office is four years and the incumbent may be re-appointed once only. In 
accordance with resolufion 48/141, the High Commissioner shall 
function within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other international instruments 
of human rights and international law, including the obligations, within 
this framework, to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
domestic jurisdiction of states to promote the universal respect for and 
observance of all human rights, in recognizing that, in the framework of 
the purposes and, principles of the Charter, the promotion and protection 
of all human rights is a legitimate concern of the international 
community. The High Commissioner's close association with the main 
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United Nation organs relevant to human rights is also reflected m the 
competence to make recommendations to the competent bodies oi" the 
United Nations system in the field of human rights with a view to 
improving the promotion and protection of all human rights'."^ 
Resolution 48/141 provides for the High Commissioner's specific 
responsibilities^^ which may be categorized as follows: 
• Promotion and protection of human rights: 
- Promodng and protecdng the effective enjoyment by all of all 
civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights, 
- Promoting protecting the realization of the right to 
development; 
- Enhancing international cooperation for the promotion and 
protection of all human rights; 
- Providing advisory services and technical and financial 
assistance with a view to supporting acdons and programmes 
in the field of human rights; 
• Reaction to situations challenging human rights: 
- Playing an acfive role in removing the current obstacles and in 
meeting the challenges to the full realization of all human 
rights and in preventing the continuation of human rights 
violations throughout the world; 
- Engaging in a dialogue with all governments with a view to 
securing respect for all human rights; 
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Co-ordination and adaptation to the existing needs of the United 
Nations system of human rights protection. 
- Co-coordinating activities for the promotion and protection of 
human rights throughout the United Nations system; 
- Co-coordinating relevant United Nations education and public 
information programmes in the field of human rights; 
- Strengthening the United Nations machinery in the field of 
human rights with a view to improving its efficiency and 
effectiveness; 
Treaty Monitoring Bodies 
The implementation of the six core human rights treaties is monitored 
by special bodies established for that purpose. These are: 
• The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) 
for the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR); 
• The Human Rights Committee (HRC) for the 1966 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); 
• The Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) for the 1965 International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) 
• The Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) for the 1979 International Convention. 
• The Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(ICEDAW); the Committee against Torture (CAT) for the 1984 
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International Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment and Punishment (ICAT); the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC) for the 1989 International Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (ICRC). 
Since 1945 the United Nation has done a lot of 'standard-seiting', 
institution-building and human rights promotion. The capacity of the 
United Nation to implement its own standards is still modest, however. 
The concept of state sovereignty and the realities of international power 
politics still make the implementation of human rights standards uneven, 
and generally weak. It is difficult to evaluate the success of Lnited 
Nation human rights project. Its achievements have clearly been limited, 
but it may be that the combined effect of United Nation agencies. 
Government policies and NGOs have improved the human-rights 
situations in many countries. The United Nation carried out a human-
rights revolution in world politics. The United Nation human-right 
system is a 'regime': that is, a set of norms and institutions that is 
accepted by stats as binding. The United Nation human-right regime is 
based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in realit} the 
concept of state sovereignty remains strong, and implementation of 
human-rights standards is uneven and some times disastrously 
ineffective. The international human-rights regime is political, not 
philosophical. It responds pragmatically to circumstances, and 
consequently operates inconstantly. The United Nation is a club of 
states, represented by governmental leaders, and not withstanding iheir 
conflicts of interest and ideology, they have a common interest in 
mutual accommodation. While the legal institutions of the United 
Nation may be more impartial, they are procedurally restricted and 
diplomatically cautions. 
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CHAP1ER-4 
HUMAN RIGHTS: INDIAN PERSPECTIVE 
I. HUMAN RIGHTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF 
INDIAN CONSTITUTION 
The Constitution gives a practical shape to this vision by safeguarding 
values through its chapters on Fundamental Rights and the Directive 
Principles of State Policy. The entire human rights jurisprudence of 
India is founded on these two chapters. That jurisprudence has also been 
deeply influenced, through constitutional interpretation, by the 
international human rights norms first set out by the United Nations in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. That was. of 
course, a remarkable document drafted at a remarkable moment in 
human history. It was followed by the framing, in 1966, of two 
covenants-the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
There have also been a growing number of international instruments 
aimed at the protection of human rights regionally, such as the 
European-Convention on Human Rights (1950), the American 
Convention on Human Rights (1969) and the African Charter on Human 
Rights and People's Rights (1981). In addition, recent decades have seen 
the promulgation of a plethora of thematic human rights and 
humanitarian law documents, such as the International Labour 
Conventions, the Four Geneva Conventions, the Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, the Genocide Convention and the Conveniion 
relating to the Status of Refugees. The United Nations has also set up 
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several mechanisms, including a Commission on Human Rights, o give 
practical effect to many of these instruments. It is in this coniext of 
continuing international concern for human rights, that the Indian 
Judiciary has examined the contents of fundamental rights laid down in 
Part III of the Constitution, and the Directive Principles of State Policy 
laid down in Part IV, to promote a jurisprudence based on human rights 
for the people of the sub-continent. The fundamental rights have been 
made justifiable, with the right to move the court for the enforcement of 
these rights itself being made a fundamental right. These two pails lay 
down the basic constitutional values and the ultimate social goals of the 
nation. Although the Directive Principles of State Policy are largely 
exhortative, spelling out the ultimate social goals which should be 
achieved through the economic and political processes, the courts have 
interpreted the provisions guaranteeing fundamental rights in the light of 
the norms laid down in those Principles, and thus attempted to give a 
concrete shape to the vision of our founding fathers. In much the same 
way, the courts have interpreted these rights harmoniously with the 
norms laid down in international human rights instrument'. 
Equality Jurisprudence 
The first and foremost right which has been made justiciable under Part 
III of the Constitution of India is the right to equality before the lav^  and 
the equal protection of laws within the territory of India." For a society 
which was for several centuries hierarchical and rigidly structured, with 
a preordained place in the social pyramid for every group (whether 
based on caste, religion, vocation or sex), equality is a relatively new 
value. It entails a complete rethinking of traditional or feudal values. 
Entailing also a restructuring of society on egalitarian principles, the 
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constitutional draftsmen and the people of India, made a conscious 
decision to establish such an egalitarian social order. H M Seervai, a 
great constitutional scholar, has described liberty and equality as words 
of passion and power. It is, therefore, not surprising that ci very 
substantial portion of litigation coming before the courts relies upon the 
right to equality in one form or another. The doctrine of equality is one 
of the most difficult doctrines to apply to real life situations. The courts 
have constantly struggled to put it to devise suitable tests to see when 
the equality clause is violated. The fact remains that no two human-
beings are equal in all respects. People have unequal abilities, unequal 
qualifications and unequal mental equipment. The courts have therefore 
evolved some principles on the basis of which the requirements of 
equality and non-discrimination can be tested. These principles, first laid 
down in 1958 in Dalmia's case^, are as follows: 
1. Discrimination, whether under substantive law or procedural law, 
would be unconstitutional. 
2. It is permissible to classify individuals into different groups on 
the basis of certain criteria which are relevant to the set of facts 
requiring differenfiafion. Members who are similariy situated in 
the given set of facts must be treated similarly. However, one can 
have legislation which makes a distinction between members 
belonging to different, i.e. non-homogenous, classes. 
3. Permissible classification for this purpose must be based on two 
criteria: 
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I. It must be founded on 'intelligible differentia' which 
distinguish persons or things that are grouped together from 
others who are left out of the group; and 
II. Such differentia must have a rational nexus with the object sought 
to be achieved by the statute in question. 
To give an obvious example, all mentally handicapped people can be 
classified as one group, if legislation is proposed giving them certain 
special rights or protection, such as, where special facilities are to be 
provided for the blind in an examination. But such classification is not 
always, easy to formulate or implement. For example, in Air India v. 
Nergesh Meerza and others,^ where different conditions of service were 
prescribed for air-hostesses and for their male counterparts, il was 
argued that there was no discrimination and no violation of the equality 
clause because the air-hostesses had been classified as one group on the 
basis of their gender, which was a relevant basis for differentiation. This 
was sex-based classification and not discrimination on the ground of 
sex, a contention which was upheld by the Supreme Court; even though 
it is difficult to discern any dividing line between sex-based 
adverse differentiation and discrimination on the grounds of sex. The 
court did, however, strike down some of the service conditions of the 
air-hostesses on the grounds that they were unreasonable. In the case of 
Miss C. B. Muthamma v. Union of India and others,^ discriminatory 
service conditions in the foreign service, requiring female employees to 
obtain government permission before marriage and denying a maixied 
woman the right to be employed, were struck down as discriminatory. 
The protective arm of the Supreme Court has been extended to working 
women by laying down guidelines to prevent sexual harassment as in 
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the case of Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan and others. In Apparel Export 
Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra/ the court considered sexual 
harassment as a violation of the fundamental right to gender equality, 
and the right to life and liberty. In E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu 
and others/ the Supreme Court looked upon Article 14 as a guarantee 
against arbitrary action-equality being antithetical to arbitrariness. Since 
then, Article 14 has been invoked in a wide range of cases, as it negates 
arbitrary action.^ These include cases relating to service matters; cases 
challenging executive action; cases dealing with grant of contracts by 
the government; cases with rules of admission to educational 
institutions, with imposition of tax and with exemptions from taxation. 
The categories are never closed. A number of cases in the receni past 
have been fought on the doctrine of equal pay for equal work The 
courts have had the difficult task of ascertaining what is to be 
considered as equal work. Even the same work, when done by people 
who are qualified differently, may be qualitatively different. A diploma 
holder who does engineering work will not be able, for example, to 
bring to his work the same knowledge as a degree holder. The courts 
have, therefore, upheld difference in pay based on educational 
qualifications. In the case of women employees, the doctrine of equal 
pay for equal work has given rise to some tricky situations. C)ften 
women employees in a corporation do work which is substantially 
similar, but not identical, to that done by their male counterparts. On the 
grounds of this slight difference, they are frequently given lesser pay. A 
typical example concerns agriculture, where men do the work of 
ploughing while the women do the work of planting seeds. Although 
their hours of work are the same, the men who are hired for the work are 
paid a higher wage than the women on the ground that the womer do 
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different work. The courts will have to decide to what extent the jobs 
are similar and whether the lower pay is justified by less work or less 
strenuous work, or whether it is discriminatory. It is not always aa easy 
question to decide.'° 
DISCRETIONARY POWERS 
Discretionary powers have often come up for scrutiny before the c:ourts 
and some recent cases have attracted much public attention. The 
exercise of this power has been tested on the basic principle of whether 
it amounts to an untrammeled power to choose between all available 
options or whether it is a power which should be exercised on the basis 
of certain relevant factors. A number of executive decisions relating to 
awarding of contracts, allotment of houses and so on, have been 
challenged under Article H.Articles 15, 16 and 17 of the Constitution, 
spell out some specific aspects of the right to equality. Article 5(1) 
provides that the state shall not discriminate against any citizen on 
grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of taem. 
However, there are two exceptions to this provision-first, that it will not 
prevent the state from making any special provisions for women and 
children. Second, that it will not prevent the state from making any 
special provisions for the advancement of socially or educationally 
backward classes of citizens or for the scheduled castes and scheduled 
tribes." 
Article 16 provides for equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters 
relating to employment under the state. It provides that no citizen shall, 
on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, or 
residence, be ineligible for, or be discriminated against, in respect of 
any employment or office under the state. Once again, there are certain 
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exceptions. For example, there can be reservation of posts in favour of 
such backward classes of citizens that are, in the opinion of the state, 
not adequately represented in the public sector. By an amendment of 
Article 16, it has now been provided that reservations can be made even 
in matters of promotion, where in the opinion of the state, the scheduled 
castes or tribes are not adequately represented in the service in question. 
Article 17 provides for the abolition of untouchability. Articles 15 and 
16 have a direct nexus with the customs and traditions and social norms 
prevailing in the country. The provision, under Article 15(2i, for 
example, of non-discrimination in the use of wells, tanks, bathing 
ghats^^ etc are intended to combat the customary practice of excluding 
persons belonging to scheduled castes from using such facilities The 
same is true of access to shops, public restaurants and hotels. It is 
necessary to remember that equality is a relatively new virtue, vhich 
most traditions and customs have tended to ignore. The patriarchal 
family set-up also gave males predominant authority over all the family 
members. Traditionally, Indian women have tended to occupy an 
inferior standing in society. They have traditionally been denied the 
benefits of formal education and freedom of choice. There is, by and 
large, still a marked gender bias within the family and within society. 
The constitutional values which are now propounded are, therefore, 
somewhat different from, and in many ways antagonistic to, the 
traditional thinking and customs still practiced in society. 
The difficulties in establishing an egalitarian society should noi be 
underestimated. Some comfort can be drawn and lessons learnt from the 
history of other nations that have faced similar problems. Even the 
American Declaration of Independence made no mention of equality 
whether it was equality-between the whites and the slaves, or between 
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men and women. Undoubtedly, the Declaration of Independence was a 
remarkable document for the year 1776 and it has rightly inspired 
Constitution-makers all over the world including in India. But it needs 
to be remembered that it took a Civil War and the 14th Amendment 
before the words 'nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty 
or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws' came to be incorporated 
in the United States Constitution. The ideal of equality does not always 
find easy acceptance, especially in a country which has traditionally had 
a hierarchy of castes and has treated different groups of people 
differently. That is why Article 15 carves out exceptions to protect 
women and children and to provide special measures for the scheduled 
castes, scheduled tribes and the socially backward classes. But wnat is 
the permissible extent of such special provisions? The question has 
repeatedly arisen in the context of reservation of seats in educational 
institutions and under Article 16 reservation of jobs and promotions. 
Article 335 of the Constitution expressly provides that the claim of 
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes should be considered consistently 
with the maintenance of efficiency of administration while making 
appointments to the public services, but reservations under Article 15 do 
not ordinarily come within the ambit of Article 335. The Supreme Court 
has, from M.R. Balaji and others v. The State of Mysore and others '' to 
Indira Sawhney v. Union of India and others'^ and, more recently, in Dr. 
Preeti Srivastava and others v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and 
others -held that reservations under Articlel5 must be reasonable and 
cannot override national interests. Generally, reservations beyond 50 per 
cent have been held as arbitrary and unreasonable and as contrary to 
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overriding national interests, as have reservations at the highest 
educational levels or for a single post at the top. 
MINORITY RIGHTS 
There is one more complication which arises in promoting equality. 
India is a nation of diverse minorities whose culture and traditions need 
to be protected. Articles 29 and 30, which deal with cultural and 
educational rights, guarantee to minorities having a distinct language, 
script or culture of their own, the right to conserve the same. Ailicle 30 
provides that all minorities, whether based-on religion or language, shall 
have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their 
choice. These rights can, at times, clash with the equality clause. In fact, 
most countries which have traditions and culture dating back o older 
times face this problem: how does one create an egalitarian and modern 
society and also preserve what is valuable in one's culture? The task of 
deciding what constitutes the essence of culture and tradition is not an 
enviable one. What is it that is valuable, which gives the country its 
cultural identity and its social integrity? Which gives its minorities their 
distinctive culture and their distinctive character? What is it that should 
be protected and can be changed in consonance with other constitutional 
values? These are the major issues facing India today. The challenge is 
to ensure that the minorities preserve their cultural identity and at the 
same time be part of the mainstream of national life; that discriminatory 
laws and harmfiil customs and practices are not shielded in the guise of 
'culture' or 'tradition'. It is unfortunate that in the rhetoric of emotions, 
rational debate on this issue has become almost impossible. India also 
faces a major problem concerning its socially and educaiionally 
backward classes of citizens. The United States was faced with a similar 
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problem in dealing with slaves who were freed after the Civil War. 
There are, obviously, two different ways in which a socially 
discriminated backward group can be helped, so that it can participate 
on a footing of equality with others. One is the path of reservation. 
Those who are not in a position to compete with the more advanced 
sections of society on account of social discrimination are assured of 
employment and education through reservations so that the future 
generations within that group may overcome the handicap which the 
present generation has inherited. This policy has the obvious advantage 
of rendering direct help to the backward people in the areas where they 
need help. It also, unfortunately, has some disadvantages. Reliance on 
support for too long tends to make the backward classes dependent on 
such support. There is no motivation for self-help. Thus, this policy can, 
in the long run, prove self-defeating. One may end up, not with a proper 
integration of the former backward groups into the mainstream, but with 
a greater divide separating the backward classes from the rest of the 
society. This pitfall must be avoided. The other path-which was chosen 
by the United States—is the path of affirmative action; where although 
no specific reservations are made for the backward classes, a conscious 
attempt is made to give them preference in employment or education 
opportunities. This policy is more difficult to monitor. The ultimate goal 
of both policies is to ensure that the handicaps under which the 
backward classes suffer are removed, so that they are able to participate 
in the life of the nation without any undue or special disadvantages, and 
on the same footing as others. This is a major challenge facing policy-
makers under the equality clause—a challenge which they are expected 
to meet through the political processes established under the 
Constitution. It would, however, be naive to presume that the political 
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of both policies is to ensure that the handicaps under which the 
backward classes suffer are removed, so that they are able to participate 
in the life of the nation without any undue or special disadvantages, and 
on the same footing as others. This is a major challenge facing policy-
makers under the equality clause—a challenge which they are expected 
to meet through the political processes established under the 
Constitution. It would, however, be naive to presume that the political 
process will lead to integration. Unless properly controlled, the political 
process is more likely to lead to disintegration and accentuation of 
differences. 
HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 
Apart from the 'equality' jurisprudence, an important focus of the 
Supreme Court of India has been on human rights jurisprudence 
centered around Article 21. This article provides that no person shall be 
deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure 
established by law. Personal, liberty under Article 21 has been construed 
as covering a wide array of rights that go to constitute a life lived in 
freedom and with dignity. In the case Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union 
of India and others,^^ the court ordered the release of bonded iabour. 
Bhagwati, J said: 
'The right to live with human dignity enshrined in Article 
21 derives its life breath from the Directive Principles of 
State Policy and particularly Clauses (e) and (f) of 
Article 39 and Articles 41 and 42 and at least, therefore. 
it must include the protection of the health and strength 
of workers, men and women, cmd of the tender age of 
children against abuse, opportunities and facilities for 
children to develop in a healthy manner and in 
conditions of freedom and dignity. These are the 
minimum requirements which must exist in order to 
enable a person to live with human dignity....' 
In Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi 
and others, life and personal liberty were held to cover not jusi bare 
existence but a life with dignity. The right to receive medical help in 
police custody was upheld in the case of Supreme Court Legal Aid 
Committee v. State of Bihar and others. ^^ The expanding concepts of 
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life and liberty have embraced some unusual rights, including: tbe right 
19 to receive instant medical aid in case of injury; the right to receive free 
.20 
education up to the age of 14; or the right of the workers in the 
21 
asbestos industry to receive healthcare. Of course, there are obvious 
dangers in crying to cover too much under Article 21. This article gives 
an enforceable and justiciable right, a right which the administration can 
be compelled to honour or whose violation can be stopped by a court's 
order. Therefore, it is essential that the right which is protected is 
capable of being protected by a judicial order. Otherwise, a mere 
pronouncement by the court on a right which is not readily justiciable or 
enforceable, will result in trivialization of the court's pronouncement. It 
may even promote the habit of ignoring judicial orders. This may sound 
a litde orthodox, but the judiciary essentially performs a vital but 
practical task of monitoring the functioning of the Constitution and the 
legal machinery. The court has made some very moving and 
monumental pronouncements, but it is essentially an enforcer of 
people's rights; and this role should not be diluted in the process of 
pursuing other broader goals.The requirement of'procedure established 
by law' under Article 21, has also been transformed by judicial 
mterpretation. In A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, the court upheld 
the detention without trial of Mr. Gopalan, a communist, holding that 
'procedure established by law' meant law as enacted by Parliament or 
the State Legislature. The court declined to examine the righteousness 
of the procedure and whether it accorded with the principles of natural 
justice. But three decades later, in Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of 
India and others, the court rejected this interpretation and held that the 
procedure which can deprive a person of his life or liberty under Article 
21 must be a right, just and a fair procedure, and not an arbitrary or 
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oppressive procedure. The teleological meaning given to the word 
'procedure' in Article 21 has thus converted the procedure into due 
process which can stand the test of fairness and reasonableness. As a 
result, many procedures prescribed by statutes have been tested on the 
touchstone of Article 21. For example, in Kartar Singh v. State of 
Punjab^^ the court examined the validity of several sections of the 
Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act in the light of 
Article 21.At times, the procedural clause has been given a more 
substantive meaning. For example, in Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot v. 
State of Maharashtra^^ free legal service to the poor was held to be an 
essential element of a reasonable, just and a fair procedure. The court, in 
fact, followed the footsteps of Gideon v. Wainright^' the celebrated 
United States decision of the Wan^en Court. In Khatri v. the Siate of 
Bihar^^ free legal aid was held necessary not merely at the trial, but also 
before the examining Magistrate; and at the time of remand. The rght to 
a speedy trial was spelt out from Article 21 in Hussainara Khatoon v. 
the State of Bihar and in the State of Maharashtra v. Ravi Kant 
Patil^^ the handcuffing and parading of under trial prisoners was held to 
violate Article 21. In Francis/^ Articles 14 and 21 were used to spell 
out the right of a detenu to consult a lawyer of his choice. In Kharak 
Singh V. the State ofUP,^^ Article 21 was held as prohibiting any form 
of physical mutilation or deliberate inflicting or pain or suffering. 
The human rights jurisprudence of the court covers enforcement of the 
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Articles 19 to 30 of the 
Constitution. These freedoms guarantee to the people a way of life free 
from repression and unreasonable restraints, a right to lead one's life 
according to one's choice and consistent with the rights of others. The 
right of minorities under Article 30 to establish and administer 
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educational institutions of their choice has received a wide interpretation 
to cover not just the conservation of language, script or culture of the 
minorities but also the right to create institutions of their choice whether 
religious or secular. The court has also held that the administrative 
autonomy of a minority institution cannot be taken away. A minority 
has the right not just to establish, but also to administer, educational 
institutions of its choice. The various aspects of human rights are 
deeply ingrained in the Constitution of India. However, it is to the credit 
of the Supreme Court of India that they have adopted an activist 
approach in matters of protecting and enforcing human rights norms and 
over the years evolved several judicial techniques such as public 
interest litigation' to effectuate remedial justice. India is a party to the 
major International Human Rights Instruments, viz., Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Pc>litical 
Rights, International Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, etc. The Supreme Court has in innumerable cases 
relied upon the Articles of International Conventions to reach its 
judgments. Today, human rights jurisprudence in India has a 
constitutional status and sweep, thanks to Article 21 so that this Magna 
Carta may well toll the knell of human bondage beyond civilized limits. 
In our era of human rights, the Indian judiciary through creative 
interpretation has evolved the protection of human dignity rights. 
II. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 
India has played the most significant role in the promotion of the cause 
of Human Rights. With the attainment of Independence, a declaration of 
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rights, the most elaborate in the world, was incorporated in the new 
Constitution. India has made the most sincere efforts for the protection 
and promotion of human rights the world over and is the greatest 
champion of Human rights in the Third World. India has nctt only 
incorporated an elaborate Bill of Rights in her Constitution but also 
efforts have been made to translate these into reality. India has 
incorporated the most elaborate Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 in 
its Constitution, the spirit of providing for human rights pervaded the 
minds of the founding fathers of the Indian Constitution as much as it 
did the minds of the makers of UDHR, 1948. In other wortls, the 
framing of the Constitution of India had started about two years before 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted. However, 
every Article of the Universal Declaration is reflected in the Indian 
Constitution, which was adopted by India's Constituent Assembly on 
26* November 1949, incorporated in the laws of the countiy. The Indian 
Constitution bears the impact of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the Supreme Court of India has recognized this. While 
referring to the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the 
Constitution, Sikri, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in Kesavanand 
Bharati v. State ofKerela^"^ observed: 
/ am unable to hold these provisions how that right are 
not natural or inalienable rights. As a matter of fact, 
India was a party to the Universal Declaration of Rights. 
And that Declaration describes some fundamental rights 
as inalienable " 
The Supreme Court has also recognized the interpretative value of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in case of Kishore Chand v. 
State of H.P. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not 
define the term "Human rights," It refers to them as "the equat and 
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inalienable right of all members of the human family. The framers of the 
Indian Constitution were influenced by the concept of human rights and 
guaranteed most of the human rights contains in the Universal 
Declaration. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights contained 
civil and political as well as economic, social and cultural rights. While 
civil and political rights have been incorporated in part III of Indian 
Constitution, economic, social and cultural rights have been 
incorporated in Part IV of the Constitution. The following chart is given 
below to indicate the human rights which have been incorporated in the 
Indian Constitution and Law: 
Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights 
Article 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Declaration of Human 
Rights 
All men are bom free 
and are equal in 
dignity and in their 
rights. 
No Discrimination on the 
ground of race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, 
birth. 
Right to life 
No slavery 
No torture, cruelty, 
Constitution of India 
Article 
No. 
14 
15 
21 
23 
21 
Provisions of the Indian 
Constitution and Law 
The State shall not deny to any 
person equality before ihe law or 
the equal protection of rhe laws 
within the territory of India. 
The State shall not discriminate 
against any citizen on grounds 
only of religion, race, caste, sex, 
place of birth or any of them. 
No person shall be deprived of 
his life or personal liberty except 
according to procedure 
established by law. 
Traffic in human beings and 
beggar and other forms of forced 
labour are prohibited and any 
contravention of this provision 
shall be an offence punishable in 
accordance with law. 
State of Maharashtra v Ravikant 
16 
6. 
7. 
8. 
inhuman or Degrading 
treatment. 
Right to recognition 
evarywhere as a person 
before the law. 
EquaUty before law 
Right to Effective 
remedy 
14&21 
14 
32 
226 
S. Patil (1991) 2 s e c 373. 
Handcuffing and parading of 
under trial prisoner was held 
violative of rights under Article 
21. 
3 s e c 161 and (1991) 4 SCC 
177. Right to live with human 
dignity held to be enslirined in 
Article 21. 
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India 
(1978) 1 SCC 248. The 
expression "personal liberty" 
under Art. 21 is a phrase of wide 
amplitude and cover a \ ariety of 
rights which go to constitute 
personal liberty of man including 
right to safety of his person. 
1. The rights to move the 
Supreme Court by appropriate 
proceedings for the 
enforcement of ihe rights 
conferred by part 111 of the 
Constitution is guaranteed. 
2. Supreme Court snail issue 
directions or orders or writs, 
including writs in the nature 
of habeas corpus, mandamus, 
prohibition, quo warranto and 
certiorari whichever may be 
appropriate, for the 
enforcement of any of the 
rights conferred by this Part. 
Notwithstanding anything in 
Article 32, every High Court shall 
have power, throughout the 
17 
9. 
10. 
Arbitrary arrest and 
detention 
Public hearing and fair 
trial 
22 
39A 
territories in relation to which it 
exercises jurisdiction, to issue to 
any person or authorit>, including 
in appropriate cases, any 
Government within those 
territories directions orders or 
writs, including writs in the 
nature of habeas corpus, 
mandamus, prohibition, 
quowarranto and certiorari, or any 
of them, for the enforcement of 
any of the rights conferred by 
Part III and for any other purpose. 
1. No person who is anested shall 
be detained in custody without 
being informed, as soon as may 
be, of the grounds for such arrest 
nor shall he be denied the right to 
consult, and to be defended by. a 
legal practitioner of his choice. 
2. Every person who is arrested 
and detained in custody shall be 
produced before the nearest 
magistrate within a period of 
twenty-four hours of such arrest 
excluding the time necessary for 
the journey from the place of 
arrest to the coun of the 
magistrate and no such person 
shall be detained in custody 
"beyond the said period without 
the authority of a magistrate 
The State Shall secure that the 
operation of the legal system 
promotes justice, on a basis of 
equal opportunity, and shall, in 
particular, provide free legal aid. 
by suitable legislation or schemes 
or any other way, to ensure that 
opportunities for securing justice 
are not denied to any citizen by 
reason of economic or other 
disabilities. '• 
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11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
Presumption of 
innocence and 
Criminal Law until 
prove guilty in public 
trial .No retrospective 
declaration of 
offence nor 
retrospective objective 
of higher sentence 
by retrospective 
amendments 
Privacy, family, home 
correspondence, 
reputation, protection of 
law against 
interference or of 
force. 
(i) Freedom of 
Movement and 
Residence 
ii) Rights live and return 
to county. 
Rights to Religion 
(i) Right to Nationality 
20 
19. 
25 
5 
The principle of common Law. 
the Doctrine of Rule of Law, 
Presumption of innocence till 
guilt is established. 
(1) No person shall be convicted 
of any offence except for 
violation of the law in Ibrce at the 
time of the commissioi of the act 
charged as an offence, nor be 
subjected to a penalty greater 
than that which might have been 
inflicted under the law in force at 
the time of the commission of the 
offence. 
Each one is conversed m the law 
enacted by Parliament and is 
protected. 
(d). To move freely throughout 
the territory of India, 
(e). To reside and settle in any 
part of the territory of India. 
Provisions of the Passp<)rt Act. 
All persons are equally entitled to 
freedom of con-science and free 
profession, practice and 
propagation of religion. 
At the commencement of this 
Constitution, every person who 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
(ii) Change of 
Nationality. 
Marriage and Family 
Property 
Freedom of thought and 
conscience 
Freedom of 
infomiation and 
expression 
Peaceful assembly and 
association 
9 
10 
300A 
25(1) 
19(a) 
19b) 
has his domicile in the territory of 
India and (a) who was born in the 
territory of India; or (b) either of 
whose parents was born in the 
territory of India; or (c) who has 
been ordinarily resident in the 
territory of India for not less than 
five years immediately preceding 
such commencement, shall be a 
citizen of India. 
No person shall be a citizen of 
India by virtue of Article 5 or be 
deemed to be a citizen of India is 
virtue of Article 6 or Article 8. if 
he has voluntarily acquired the 
citizenship of any foreign state. 
Every person who is deemed to 
be a citizen of India under any of 
the forgoing provisions of this 
Part shall, subject to the 
provisions of any law that may be 
made by Parliament, continue to 
be such citizen. 
Covered by suitable legislation 
applicable to people of different 
religions. 
Persons not be deprived 
of property save by 
authority of law. 
All persons are equally entitled to 
freedom of con-science and the 
right freely to profess, practice 
and propagate religion. 
All citizens shall have-
the right to speech and 
expression. 
All citizens shall have the right to 
assemble peaceably and without 
arms. 
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21. 
22. 
(i) Democracy 
(i) Right to work 
(ii) Right to equal pay 
(iii) Remuneration 
keeping human dignity 
19c) 
325 
41 
39(a) 
43 
To fonn associations or unions. 
There shall be one general 
electoral role for every territorial 
constituency for election to either 
House of Parliament or to the 
House or either House of the 
Legislature of a State and no 
person shall be ineligible for 
inclusion in any such roll or claim 
to be included in any electoral 
roll for any such constituency on 
grounds only of religion, race, 
caste, sex or any of them. 
The State shall, within the limits 
of its economic capacity and 
development, make effective 
provision for securing ihe right to 
work, to education and to public 
assistance in case of 
unemployment, old age, sickness 
and disablement and in other 
cases of undeserved want. 
The State shall, in particular, 
direct its policy towards 
securing-that the citizens men 
and women equality, have the 
right to an adequate 
means of livelihood 
The State shall endeavour to 
secure, by suitable legislation or 
economic organization or in any 
other way, to all workers, 
agriculture, industrial or 
otherwise, work, a living wage, 
conditions of work ensuring a 
decent standard of life and full 
employment of leisure and social 
and cultural opportunities and, in 
particular, the State shall 
endeavour to promote cottage 
23. 
24. 
(ii) 
25. 
26. 
(iv) Right to from and 
join unions 
Rights to rest, reasonable 
working hours 
(i) Standard of Hving 
adequate for heahh and 
well-being. 
Motherhood and 
children 
Right to education 
(i) Free participation in 
19(1) 
43 
47 
39(f) 
42 
45. 
51A(f) 
industries on an individual or 
cooperative basis in rural areas, 
(C) 
The State shall regarded the 
raising of the level of nutrition 
and the standard of living of its 
people and the improvement of 
public health as among its 
primary duties and, in particular. 
the State shall endeavour to bring 
about prohibition of the 
consumption except for medicinal 
purpose of intoxicating drinks 
and of drugs which are injurious 
to health. 
The state shall in particular, direct 
its policy towards securing-that 
children are given opportunities 
and facilities to develop in a 
healthy mamier and in conditions 
of freedom and dignity and that 
childhood and youth are protected 
against exploitation and against 
moral and material abandonment. 
The state shall make prvwision for 
securing just and humane 
conditions of work and for 
maternity relief 
The state shall endeavour to 
provide within a period of ten 
years from the commencement of 
this Condition. For free 
compulsory education for all 
children until they complete the 
age of fourteen years. 
To value and preserve the rich 
7 0 
27. 
28. 
cultural life 
(ii) Protection of 
moral material 
interest 
Social and international 
order 
Duties 
38 
51 
51A 
heritage of our composite culture. 
That State shall endea\ our to (a) 
promote international peace and 
security; (b) maintain just and 
honourable relations between 
nations; (c) foster respect for 
international law and treaty 
obligations in the dealings of 
organized people with one 
another; and (d) encourage 
settlement of iniemational 
disputes by arbitration. 
It shall be duty of ever} citizen of 
India-(a) to abide by the 
Constitution and respect its ideals 
and institutions, the National Flag 
and the National Anthem: (b) to 
cherish and follow noble ideas 
which inspired our national 
struggle for freedom; (c) to 
uphold and protect the 
sovereignty, unity and integrity of 
India; (d) to defend the country 
and render national service when 
called open to do so; (e) to 
promote harmony and the spirit of 
common brotherhood amongst all 
the people of India transcending 
religious, Linguistic and regional 
or sectional diversities; to 
renounce practices derogatory to 
the dignity of women; (t) to value 
and preserve the rich heritage of 
our composite culture: (g) to 
protect and improve the natural 
environment including forests, 
lakes, rivers and wild life, and to 
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have compassion lor living 
creatures; (h) develop tiie 
scientific temper, humanism and 
the sprit of inquiry and refonn; (i) 
to safeguard public property and 
to adjure violence; and (j) o^ 
strive towards excellence in all 
spheres of individual and 
collective activity so that the 
nation constantly rises to higher 
levels of endeavour and 
achievement. 
The above chart shows that many of the civil and political rights 
enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights also find 
mention in Part III of the Constitution as fundamental rights. However, 
there are certain rights which are contained in the Universal Declaration 
but have not been expressly mentioned in the Constitution. These rights 
are: (i) Right to be not subjected to torture, or to cruel, inhuman 
treatment or punishment (Article 5); (ii) Right to recognition 
everywhere as a person before the law (Article 6); (iii) Right to full 
equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial 
tribunal (Article 10); (iv) Right to be presumed innocent until found 
guilty according to law in a public trial [Article 11 (i)]; (v) Right to 
privacy (Article 12); (vi) Right to leave any country, including his own. 
and to return to his country [Article 13 (2)]; (vii) Right to nationality 
[Article 15 (1)]; (viii) Right to marry and found a family [Article 16 
(1)]; (ix) Right to take part in the government of one's country [yVrticle 
21 (l)].The most of the economic, social and cultural rights proclaimed 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have been incorporated in 
Part IV of the Indian Constitution. However, the Constitution of India is 
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conspicuous by absence of express mention of certain rights proclaimed 
in the Universal Declaration such as right to special care and assistance 
to mothers and children and some social protection for all children, 
whether bom in or out of wedlock [Article 25 (2)]; Parents' right to 
choose the kind of education for their children [Article 26 (3)]; Right of 
everyone to freely participate in the cultural life of the community to 
enjoy arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits [Article 
27 (1)]; and right of everyone to the protection of the morale and 
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic 
production of which he is the author [Article 27 (2)].As we have seen 
earlier in the case of fundamental rights, so also in respect of the above 
rights absence of express mention does not mean that these rights have 
not been incorporated in Indian Constitution. As a matter of fact, the 
above rights are either subsumed in the existing rights or are part thereof 
or have been expressed in a little different wording and having a little 
different scope. For example, Article 39 (f) charges the State to direct its 
policy towards securing "that children are given opportunities and 
facility to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and 
dignities and that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation 
and against moral and material abandonment. Similarly, Article 42 
makes "provision for just and humane conditions of work and maternity 
relief Article 47 provides for the "Duty of the State to raise the level of 
nutrition and standard of living and to improve public health". So far as 
human rights concerning economic, social and cultural aspects are 
concerned, the fact remains that Directive Principle of State Policy 
contained in Part IV of the Constitution are definitely much more 
exhaustive than the Universal Declaration. There are a number of 
principles and rights contained in Part IV of the Constitution which do 
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not find mention in the Universal Declaration. Such rights and priaciples 
are; The ownership and control of the material resources of the 
community to be so distributed as best to subserve the common good 
[Article 39 (b)]; Operation of economic system not to result in the 
concentration of wealth and means of production to the common 
detriment [Article 39 (c}]; Equal Justice and free legal aid [Article 39-
A]; Organization of village panchayats (Article 40); Participation of 
workers in management industries (Article 43-A); Uniform Civil Code 
(Article 44); Promotion of educational and economic interests of 
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other weaker sections (Article 
46), Protection, improvement and safeguarding of forests (Article 48-A) 
etc. As the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter and the 
Universal Declaration were influenced by the historical background 
especially the large scale violations of human rights and atrocities 
perpetrated during the Second World War, so also the concept of human 
rights in the form of Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles were 
influenced by the historical background and the conditions that 
prevailed in the sub-continent of India before the adoption of the 
Constitution. Yet another feature of the Universal Declaration which 
deserves mention here is the emphasis on everyone's duties to the 
community in which alone the free and full development is possible. 
This provision is contained in Article 29 (1) of the Universal 
Declaration and is a welcome feature because liberty is a social contract 
if a person wants to enjoy his rights in the community he will have to 
respect the rights of others. Indian Constitution when adopted in 1949, 
and came into force in 1950 was conspicuous by absence of any mention 
of duties. This was a great lacuna which was sought to be rectified later 
on. The Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 which came 
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into effect on 3-1-1977 inserted a new Part viz. Part IV-A entitled 
"Fundamental Duties" comprising of only one Article viz. Article 51-A. 
Because of the belated insertion and the position given to it under the 
Constitution, so far it has failed to make the desired effect. Nevertheless, 
the Fundamental Duties mentioned in clauses (a) to (j) of Article 51-A 
are more varied and exhaustive than the one mentioned in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. 
III. PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION (PIL) 
The development of public interest litigation as a method of enforcing 
human rights has lent new rfelevance to the Indian Supreme Court's 
ftinctioning in the sphere of human rights. Public interest litigation has 
been fashioned by the Indian courts in the context of the violation of the 
human rights of those people who are unable, for various reasons, to 
move the courts for a redressal of their wrongs. Such groups can be the 
poor, economically disadvantaged, or those socially disadvantaged or 
handicapped including women, who are unable to move the court or 
who cannot afford the cost of legal services. Often these groups do not 
know how to set the system of justice in motion. The courts have been 
moved by others—whether they are social workers, journalists, law 
teachers or social welfare organizations, for the benefit of such 
disadvantaged groups. Public interest litigation was thus permitted to 
secure the release of bonded labourers, for the welfare of inmates of 
special institutions like mental asylums; for securing the rights of 
undertrials and other prisoners; and even of destitute children, and so 
on. Procedural requirements have also been relaxed when required. One 
of the first cases of public interest litigation, Hussainara Khatoon and 
others v. Home Secretary, State of BihaP^ Arose out of two articles 
127 
published in a newspaper highlighting the plight of undertrial prisoners 
languishing in various jails in the State of Bihar for long periods for no 
reason other than their inability to furnish the money demanded for 
release on bail. This led a Supreme Court lawyer to knock at the doors 
of the court through a petition for habeas corpus. The court promptly 
ordered the release of over 40,000 undertrials on personal bonds or, in 
some cases, no bonds at all. Such public interest litigation has been 
permitted on behalf of slum dwellers in Olga Tellis and others v. 
Bombay Municipal Corporation and others' a case filed at the instance 
of a journalist, construction workers in Peoples Union for Democratic 
Rights V. Union of India and others' mmates of state-run protective 
home for girls, in Dr. Upendra Baxi and others v. State of U.P. and 
others.^^ It has even been permitted at the instance of a prisoner who 
complained through a post card to the Supreme Court of ill-treatment 
meted out to another prisoner.'^ ^In consequence, the courts are receiving 
a large number of letters from people who have grievances of one sort 
or another. All the High Courts and the Supreme Court now have 
public grievance cells which examine these letters to see whether 
judicial intervention is required in any of the cases. There is no doubt 
that a lot of work has been generated before the overcrowded courts on 
account of the opening up of this new avenue of judicial redress. Like 
all such innovations, public interest litigation has advantages and 
disadvantages. A lot of care and caution have to be exercised in 
entertaining petitions and in ensuring that the facility is not misused far 
ulterior ends. Even so, public Interest litigation has seemed to suddenly 
make the courts relevant to the life of ordinary people. It has enabled 
some genuine grievances to be redressed through a legal process rather 
than in an extra-judicial manner. Public interest litigation has now been 
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extended to oversee proper investigation of crimes, especially 
corruption cases against the executive, to monitor the proper 
flinctioning of political institutions and for the protection of the 
environment. The latter, in particular, forms a major part of such 
litigation. This kind of litigation has also forced the courts to devise 
new kinds of relief For example, in cases relating to the stopping of 
harmful practices which violate human rights such as bonded labour, 
child labour or the sale of young girls for prostitution, the courts have 
had to resort to giving detailed administrative directions. Quite often 
these have to be given on an on-going basis to ensure that the orders are 
complied with by the administration. Sometimes, the court appoints a 
monitoring committee or nominates an organization to supervise the 
implementation of its directions. Of course, the task is easier when the 
administration cooperates. That is why at times, the whole process is 
described as non-adversary jurisdiction. Sometimes, new fact-finding 
mechanisms have been devised. Obviously, there are possibiliiies of 
misuse of the procedure. The courts have, therefore, to be vigilant so 
that persons motivated by extraneous considerations do not abuse the 
process of the court. But public interest litigation remains, if properly 
used, a very effective way of securing the human rights of socially 
disadvantaged and economically handicapped persons. 
Public interest litigation is a strategic arm of the legal aid movement 
intending to bring justice within the reach of the poor masses. It is 
different than the traditional litigation which is essentially of an 
adversary character involving a dispute between two litigation parties, 
i.e., one making , a claim or seeking relief against the other and that 
other opposing such claim or resisting such relief^' It is brought before 
the court not for the purpose of enforcing the right of one individual 
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against another as happens in the case of ordinary litigation, but is 
intended to promote and vindicate public interest which demands that 
violations of constitutional or legal rights of large number of people 
who are poor, ignorant or in a socially or economically disadvantage 
position should not go unnoticed or un-redressed."*^ Public interest 
litigation thus secures distributive justice to the poor, illiterate and the 
weaker segments of the society. Those who cannot move the courts of 
their own, an action is initiated on their behalf by a public spirited 
individual or group of individuals. The strict rule of locus standi, i.e. a 
person aggrieved only can initiate the action is relaxed in the case of 
public interest litigation.''^ It has become though recently an important 
instrument of distributive justice to the majority of Indian population 
who are poor and ignorant of their rights, and thus unable tc have 
recourse to the courts of law for the redressal of the wrongs perpetrated 
upon them.'*'^  These days the developing jurisprudence of social and 
economic right encapsulates freedom from indigency, ignorance and 
discrimination as well as the right to healthy environment, to social 
security and to protection from financial, commercial, corporate or even 
governmental oppressions and frauds.'*^ The conferment of these rights 
on individuals and groups and imposition of public duties on the state 
and other public authorities for taking positive action often generates 
situations of conflict where a single human action can be beneficial or 
prejudicial to large group of people. This makes the traditional scheme 
of litigation, which is merely a two party affair, entirely inadequate to 
modem needs. Thus, emerges the jurisprudence of public interest 
litigation whose aim is to remedy the wrongs committed towards the 
public at large or a determinate section of the public by the state or any 
of its surrogate or agencies. The only way out to redress and prevent the 
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breach of public duties is through pubHc interest litigation, it will 
constitute a sufficient check on the misuse and abuse of power by public 
bodies and authorities. It is a matter of common knowledge that failure 
to perform a public duty often promotes disrespect for the rule of law 
and leads to corruption and inefficiency. The new social and collective 
rights and difftise interests created for the benefit of the deprived 
sections of the humanity will thus become meaningless and ineffectual. 
In such circumstances, it would be better, if any member of the public 
should have the right to maintain an action for the redressal of a public 
wrong or public injury. The risk of legal action against the state or a 
public authority by any citizen, it is submitted, will induce the state or 
its surrogate agency to act with greater responsibility and care, thereby 
improving the administration of justice. Therefore, it is absolutely 
essential that the rule of law must save the people from lawless street 
and bring them before courts of law. Public interest litigation secures an 
access to justice and upholds the rule of law. In the Judge's case,'^'' the 
petitioners were mostly practicing advocates; they challenged the 
validity of a circular issued by the Law Minister dealing with transfers 
of High Court Judges including the grant of short term extensions 
alleging that these were directly subversive of judicial independence 
which was a basic feature of the Indian Constitution. Petitioners also 
contended that in upholding the independence of judiciary not merely 
the sitting judges, but also lawyers practicing in various High Courts in 
the country were keenly interested because in the task of administration 
of justice the role of lawyers and judges were complementary tc each 
other and practicing lawyers as a class were an integral component of 
justice machinery and thus were vitally interested in the maintenance of 
a fearless and independent judiciary to ensure a fair and fearless justice 
to the litigants. Accepting the plea, Bhagwati, J. remarked: 
The petitioners have a vital interest in the independence 
of the judiciary and if an unconstitutional or illegal 
action is taken by the State or any public authority which 
has the effect of impairing the independence of judiciary, 
the petitioners would certainly be interested challenging 
the constitutionality or legality of such action. 
The learned judge further observed; 
The circular letter, on the averments made in the writ 
petition, did not cause any specific legal injury to an 
individual or to a determinate class or group of 
individuals, but it caused public injury by prejudicially 
affecting the independence of the judiciary. The 
petitioners being lawyers had sufficient interest to 
challenge the constitutionality of the circular letter and 
they were, therefore, entitled to file the writ petition as 
public interest litigation. 
In Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union,'* the question before the court 
for consideration was whether the workers working in a government 
company could challenge the sale of certain old machinery by the 
management through a writ petition filed under Article 32. The court 
dismissed the petition on two grounds, first, it was doubtful if any of the 
fundamental rights of the workmen was infringed by the impugned sale 
so as to justify a petition under Article 32. Secondly, the court did not 
find the sale to be unjust, unfair or malafide. On the maintainability of 
the writ petition, however, the court made certain observations, which 
has a bearing on the aspect of workers locus standi, i.e., interest in filing 
the petifion. Chandrachud, C.J, speaking on behalf of himself, Fazal Ali 
and A.D. Koshal, J.J. observed: 
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Maintainability of a writ petition which is correlated to 
the existence and violation of a fundamental right is not 
always to be confused with the locus to bring a 
proceeding under Article 32. These two matters often 
mingle and coalesce with the result that it becomes 
difficult to consider them in water-tight compartments. 
The question whether a person has the locus to file a 
proceeding depends mostly and often on whether he 
possesses a legal right and that right is violated. 
The Chief Justice further observed: 
But, in an appropriate case, it may become necessary in 
the changing awareness of legal rights and social 
obligations to take a broader view of the question of 
locus to initiate a proceeding, be it under Article 226 or 
under Article 32 of the Constitution. If public property is 
dissipated, it would require a strong argument to 
convince the Court that representative segment of the 
public or at least a section of the public which directly 
interested and affected would have no right to complain 
of the infraction of public duties and obligations. Public 
enterprises are owned by the people and those who run 
them are accountable to the people. The accountability of 
the public sector to the Parliament is ineffective because 
the Parliamentary control of public enterprises is 
"diffuse and haphazard." We are not too sure if we would 
have refused relief to the workers if we had found that the 
sale was unjust, unfair or malafide. 
Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer was more emphatic in laying down the exact 
norms of sufficient interest criterion. The learned judge remarked: 
If a citizen is no more than a wayfarer or officious 
intervener without any interest or concern beyond that 
belongs to any one of the 660 million people of this 
country, the door of the court will not be ajar for him. 
But he belongs to an organisation which has special 
interest in the subject-matter, if he has some concern 
deeper than that of a busybody, he cannot be told off at 
the gates although whether the issue raised by him is 
52 justifiable may still remain to be considered.' 
A worker clearly has an interest in the industry, if he brings an action 
regarding an alleged wrongdoing by the board of management lie will 
have standing to do so under Article 226. Article 43A oi the 
Constitution confers, in principle partnership status to workers in 
industry. He cannot be kept away on technical considerations if he seeks 
to remedy wrongs committed in the management of public sector. In 
addition to sufficient interest theory, this judgment also affirmed that for 
invoking the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is not necessary to 
show the breach of a fundamental right. Breach of a legal right will be 
sufficient to initiate the public interest proceedings. What is sufficient 
interest to give standing to a member of the public would have- to be 
determined by the court in each individual case. No hard and fast rule 
can be laid down in this regard. The matter is to be left to the discretion 
of the court. The reason is that in a modem complex society wiiich is 
seeking to bring transformation of its social and economic structure and 
tiying to distribute justice by creating a new category of social, 
collective, diffuse rights and interests and imposing new categories of 
public duties on the state and other authorities infinite number of 
situations are bound to arise which cannot be imprisoned in a 
Procrustean formula. The judge who has the correct social perspective 
and possesses a constitutional wavelength will be able to decide, 
whether a member of the public moving the court in a particular case 
has sufficient interest to initiate the action,^ ^ Schwartz and Wade has 
rightly noted: 
Restrictive rules about standing are in general inimical 
to a healthy system of administrative law. If a plaintiff 
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with a good case is turned away, merely because he is 
not sufficiently affected personally, that means that some 
government agency is left free to violate the law, and that 
is contrary to the public interest. Litigants are unlikely to 
expend their time and money unless they have some real 
interest at stake. In the rare cases where they wish to sue 
merely out of public spirit why should they be 
discouraged. 
In People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, one of the 
questions involved was whether it was necessary to show a breach of a 
fundamental right before invoking the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
under public interest litigation. The court answered the question in the 
negative, but observed what is a breach of flindamental right must be 
looked at from a broader perspective. Let us see what the court meant by 
the term broader perspective and for this it is necessary to look into the 
facts in brief For the constmction of Asiad Games complex, the Union 
of India, Delhi Development Authority and Delhi Administration 
entrusted the construction work to several contractors. The contractors 
engaged the contract labour through Jamadars, who brought the labour 
from different parts of the country to the construction site. The People's 
Union for Democratic Rights alleged that the norms laid down in the 
Minimum Wages Act, 1948; The Equal Remuneration Act, 1976: 
Employment of Children Act, 1938, as well as Article 24 of the 
Constitution were not observed by construction authorities towaids the 
workers. The violation of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) 
Act, 1970 and Inter-State Migrant Workers (Regulation of Employment 
and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979 was also alleged. The Union of 
India and other authorities in their reply affidavit denied the violation of 
any of the aforesaid laws. However, the Union of India did admit that 
Jamadars were probably making some deductions out of the wages paid 
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to the workers. As to the employment of children below the age of 14. 
Union of India and other authorities asserted that the Employment of 
Children Act, 1938 was not applicable to the construction workers. 
Court expressed its disgust over the fact that though India was a party to 
Convention No. 59 adopted by I.L.O., the Union and the state 
governments had not extended the Act to the construction work which 
was a hazardous occupation. However, the court relied on Article 24 
which prohibits the employment of children below the age of 14 years in 
any factory or mine or in any other hazardous employment and held the 
employment of children below 14 to be violative of Article 24. As to the 
violation of the provisions of the Inter-State Migrant Workmen 
(Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 19'79, the 
Union of India asserted that since the Rules under the Act were not 
finalized, the Act was not enforceable in Delhi. The court observed that 
though the Rules had not been finalized, nonetheless, those provisions 
of the Act whose enforcement did not require framing of the Rules were 
certainly enforceable. Regarding the violation of Equal Remuneration 
Act, 1976, the court observed that it was in effect and substance a 
complaint of breach of equality clause of Article 14. Similarly, for the 
non-observance of the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation 
and Abolition) Act, 1970 and Inter-State Migrant Workers (Regulation 
of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979, the court 
observed that it was in effect and substance a complain relating to 
violafion of Article 21. Article 21 guarantees the right to life and 
personal liberty, it is now well established that right to life is not 
confined merely to physical existence, but includes within its ambit the 
right to live with human dignity, and the state would not deprive anyone 
of this right because no procedure by which such deprivation might be 
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In Sheela Barse v. Union of India"^ a letter written by a freelance 
journalist, Sheela Barse, complaining against the withdrawal of 
permission to interview the prisoners earlier given by the authorities was 
taken up by the supreme court as a writ petition under article32. The 
letter raised an important question of freedom of information. Article 21 
as interpreted by the courts had brought in significant humanization of 
the treatment of prisoners. Ranganath Misra J therefore, observed. "^  
Indisputably intervention of the court has been possible 
on account of petitions and protests lodged from jails: 
news items published in the press. 
Interviews of prisoners by pressmen as well as by public-sjiirited 
citizens would remove secrecy in such matters. Right to public access or 
to information was a sina qua non-of the rule of law. The petitioner's 
right to interview was, therefore, conceded. However, according to the 
court such right to interview must be subject to reasonable restric tions. 
According to the court "most of the manuals provide restrictions which 
are reasonable". The court held that tape-recording "should be subject 
to special permission of the appropriate authority". The conditions 
required for an interview would be: (i) that the person to be interviewed 
was willing to be interviewed and (ii) that the right to interview was 
subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by the jail Manual. 
In Kehar Singh v. Delhi Administration''" the response of Oza J is 
interesting:^^ 
It is very clear that Article 21 contemplates procedure 
established by law and in my opinion the procedure 
established by lay was on the day the Constitution was 
adopted and therefore it is not so easy to contend that by 
amending the Criminal Procedure Code the effects of the 
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procedure established by law indicated in Article 21 
could be taken away. 
He, supplemented this opinion with the recent trend of supreme Court's 
decision insisting that the procedure must be fair and just. He held that 
the procedure estabhshed by lay in article 21 "is as provided in section 
327" and that what was contemplated in both these provisions "was 
made available to the accused in this case". 
Kishen v. Orissa^ presented the court with yet another opportunity to 
demonstrate its willingness to play effectively the role of the poor man's 
court assumed by it in 1982. This case arose out of the letters wriiten to 
the Chief Justice of India about the exploitation of the poor by the rich 
landlords in the drought-hit district's of Kalahandi and Koraput, the 
distress sale of labour and paddy, and in some cases, of children also. 
These letters stated further that because of the Orissa Government's 
negligence there were starvation deaths also. In the face of these facts, 
the court's contention that there "is no reason not to accejit the 
Statements made on behalf of the State of Orissa" crate serious 
misgivings. The telecast of the prime Mininster's visit to Kalahandi 
showing the admission of a poor woman that she had sold her daughter 
convincingly demonstrates that the Court had adopted an amazingly 
simplistic approach to the problem of drought, poverty, hunger and 
starvation. 
Kishen shows with cruel clarity that Bhagwati J's belief that the court 
can play this role with the help of new lawyering is simply no true. 
What is need is a new kind of judging that seeks to bring relief to the 
man out in the cold with the same speed and efficiency with which the 
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bail application of a rich man was heard during a holiday in a judge's 
house. 
In P. Katara v. Union oflndia/^ the Supreme Court has brought home 
to the medical profession their constitutional obligations to an injured 
person brought to a medical professional for treatment. The petitioner 
had brought to the court's notice a newspaper report that the doctors of a 
hospital had reftised to treat a profusely bleeding victim of an 
automobile accident and advised that the injured person be taken to a 
named hospital 20 kilometers away as it was authorized to liandle 
medico-legal cases. And before the injured person could be taken o that 
hospital he died. Ranganath Misra J (as the then was) pointed out that 
the court had explained with emphatic clarity in several cases that the 
Constitution had imposed an obligation on the state to preserve life. So 
he said that each and every doctor was duty-bound to extend medical 
assistance with due expertise for protecting life. He pointed out that the 
doctor's obligation being total absolute and paramount, the procedural 
laws and zonal regulation and classifications impeding the discharge of 
this obligation must give way and that the respondent should take steps 
to bring this decision to the knowledge of each and every doctor. 
In a concurring opinion Oza J tried to allay the apprehensions of the 
doctors that treatment of a medico-legal case would expose them to the 
hazards and hardships that witnesses in a criminal case usually faced in 
police stations and courts. He expressed the hope that the limits of law 
and the courts of law would not unnecessarily drag the doctors to Dolice 
station and courts and make them wait and waste their time and that they 
would show them due-respect. He, however, made it clear that the 
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apprehensions of the doctors should not prevent them from discharging 
their duties to the injured patients. 
In State of Maharashtra v. M.N. Mardikar^^ a pohce inspector was 
accused of having raped a woman and on that ground a departmental 
enquiry had been held which confirmed his involvement in the alleged 
act of rape. He was, therefore, dismissed from service. The High Court 
quashed his dismissal on the ground that the woman, whom he was 
alleged to have raped was a woman of easy virtue. The Supreme Court 
on appeal held that a Woman even of so-called easy virtue was entitled 
to protect herself from sexual assault. This was part of her personal 
liberty which included her right to privacy. 
Neera Mathur v. LIC was an important decision in which the Supreme 
Court reasserted the inviolability of privacy which was an important 
aspect of personal liberty. A female applicant had been selected for a job 
by LIC. She joined and then proceeded on maternity leave. On her 
joining service after her confinement, she was served with a notice of 
termination of service. The High Court dismissed her petition and she 
went in appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, it was argued 
on behalf of LIC that she had given false information in the declaration 
which a female applicant was required to make before a medical officer. 
The declaration sought information regarding the regularity or otherwise 
of the menstrual cycle, the last date of menstruation, whether she was 
pregnant etc. The Supreme Court held that such information, which 
required disclosure of private matters of the woman's life, could not be 
asked for. Such probes into her personal matters constituted a violation 
of her right to privacy which was part of her right to personal liberty. 
The court, therefore, quashed the termination and orderec her 
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reinstatement. This decision is not only a milestone in the development 
of the constitutional law of personal liberty but also in the law relating 
to gender justice. 
In M/s Ider Puri General Stores v. IndiaJ'^ the Jammu and Kashmir 
High Court made another valuable contribution to the jurisprudence on 
Article 21 by holding that it was the duty of the state to protect li fe and 
liberty of the citizens and where due to communal riots a certain 
community suffered losses of life and property, and an expert committee 
appointed by the government estimated the extent of such loss, the 
government must pay compensation to the victims. R.P. Sethi J 
observed that the right to livelihood was included within the right to life 
guaranteed by Article 21. Where people had been deprived of sources of 
livelihood of riots, the state must restore to them that right. 
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In Mohini Jain v. Karnataka, the Supreme Court speaking through 
Kuldip Singh J. had held that the right to education was part o\^ the 
fundamental right to life and personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21. 
This sudden elevation of the right to education to the high constitutional 
pedestal was bound to trigger a controversy. Some private educational 
institutions, which run medical and engineering colleges, challenged the 
correctness of that proposition and the mater came before a larger Bench 
consisting of Jeevan Reddy, Pandian, Mohan, Sharma and Bharucha JJ. 
In Unni Krishnan v. State ofAndhra Pradesh!'^ 
Jeevan Reddi J, speaking on behalf of Pandian J. and himself, agreed 
with the dicta of Mohini Jain that the right to education flowed directly 
from the right to life guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. 
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The judge observed: 
The right to education which is implicit in the right to life 
and personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 must be 
construed in the light of the directive principles in Part 
IV of the Constitution... The three Articles 45, 46 and 41 
are designed to achieve the said goal among others. It is 
in the light of these Articles that the content and 
parameters of right to education have to be determined. 
Right to education, understood in the context of Articles 
45 and 41 means (a) every child/citizen of this country 
has a right to free education until he completes the age of 
fourteen years and (b) after a child/citizen completes 14 
years, his right to education is circumscribed by the 
limits of the economic capacity of the State and its 
development. 
The court, therefore, declared that "a child (citizen) has a fundamental 
right to free education upto the age of 14 years." " Beyond 14 yeas, the 
right to education was subject to the limits of the economic capacity of 
the state. The judge conceded that "the limits of economic capaciiy are, 
ordinarily speaking, matters within the subjective satisfaction of the 
State."^^ 
In most notable cases reported on personal liberty is of Gian Kaiir v. 
State of Punjab^^ which has overruled P. Rathinam,*^ '^ and Maruti 
Shripati Dubal.^^ The question before the Constitution bench^'' in Gian 
Kaur was regarding the constitutional validity of Section 306, IPC. But 
since the appellants in this case had based their arguments an P. 
Rathinam in which a bench of two judges of the Supreme Court had 
declared section 309 of IPC as unconstitutional being violative of article 
21 of the Constitution, the court considered the question of validit> of P. 
Rathinam as well as of section 309. it was also urged by the appellants 
that since "right to die" is included in article 21 as held in P. Rath mam, 
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abetting the commission of suicide by another is merely assisting in the 
enforcement of the fundamental right under article 21; and, therefore. 
section 306 of IPC penalizing the assisted suicide is also violaiive of 
article 21 of the Constitution. 
The Supreme Court considered the case law on the point and rightly 
observed: 
When a man commits suicide he has to undertake certain 
positive overt act and the genesis of those acts cannot be 
traced to, or be included within the protection of the 
"right to life " under Article 21. The significant aspect of 
"sanctity of life" is also not to be overlooked. Article 21 
is a provision guaranteeing protection of life and 
personal liberty and by no stretch of imagination can 
"extinction of life" be read to be included in "protection 
of life". Whatever may be the philosophy of permitting a 
person to extinguish his life by committing suicide, we 
find it difficult to construe Article 21 to include within it 
the "right to die" as a part of fundamental right 
guaranteed therein. 
It was further observed: ' 
"Right to life" is a natural right embodied in Article 21 
but suicide is an unnatural termination or extinction of 
life and, therefore, incompatible and consistent with the 
concept of "right to life"...we find no similarity in the 
nature of the other rights, such as the right to "freedom 
of speech" etc., to provide a comparable basis to hold 
that "right to life " also includes the "right to die ". 
Thus, "right to die" if any, is inherently inconsistent with the "right to 
life". The Supreme Court also rightly repelled the argument that the Law 
Commission in its 42"'' Report in 1971 had recommended the deletion of 
section 309 of the IPC from the statute. The court in this regard rightly 
pointed out that desirability of retaining section 309 in the statute is a 
different matter but that cannot be a reason by itself to declare s»xtion 
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309 unconstitutional unless it is held to be violative of any specific 
provision in the Constitution.*^^ Accordingly, the court upheld the 
Constitutional validity of sections 306 and 309 of the IPC. 
In Pachim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State of W.B., in the context 
of availability of facilities in government hospitals for treatment of 
persons sustaining serious injuries. In this case, the petitioner no. 2 (who 
was a member of petitioner no. 1 Samiti) sustained serious head injuries 
and brain haemorrhage due to fall off a train. He was not admitted in 
various state-run hospitals in the Calcutta city because of the non-
availability of bed and ultimately got treatment as indoor patient in a 
private hospital. The court held that the denial of medical assistance to 
the petitioner by the state hospital amounted to violation of his right to 
life under Article 21. it was further held that the government is duty-
bound to provide timely medical assistance to persons in serious 
condition and the medical facility cannot be denied by government 
hospitals to such patients on the ground of non-availability of a bed.'^ "* 
The court after directing various remedial measures which are re(]iiired 
to be taken in this regard observed:^^ 
It is no doubt true that financial resources are needed for 
providing these facilities. But at the same time it cannot 
be ignored that it is the constitutional obligation of the 
State to provide adequate medical services to the people. 
Whatever is necessary for this purpose has to be 
done...the State cannot avoid its Constitutional 
obligation in that regard on account of financial 
constraints. 
The court also expected the state to take appropriate action against those 
medical officers who were responsible for the lapse resulting in denial 
of immediate medical aid to the petitioner.'^'' 
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India is a welfare state and in a welfare state, it is the primary duty of 
the government to secure welfare of the people. Thus, providing proper 
medical facilities for the people is an essential part of the obligation 
undertaken by the government in a welfare state. The government 
should discharge this obligation on a priority basis because the 
preservation of human life is of paramount importance. 
In yet another important case of Common Cause v. Union of India, a 
public interest litigation highlighted the serious deficiencies and 
shortcomings in the matter of collection, storage and supply ol blood 
through different blood centres operating in the country. Accordingly, 
directions were issued by the Supreme Court for establisheing a national 
Council of Blood Transfusion as well as state councils as societies 
registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 provided for their 
programmes and activities, licensing of blood banks, elimination of 
system of professional donors within two years and strengthening of 
machinery for enforcement of provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics 
Act, 1940 and Rules. The court also directed that the union government 
should consider the advisability of enacting a separate legislation for 
regulating the collection, processing, storage, distribution and 
transportation of blood and the operation of the blood banks in the 
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country. 
Phoolan Devi v. State of M.P.,^ ^ raised an important question of law 
before the Supreme Court i.e., what is the effect of terms and conditions 
offered by the Government of Madhya Pradesh (MP) to the petitioner 
for surrender including the assurance that she would be released from 
custody after eight years and that she would be tried in the courts m MP 
only even for the crimes alleged to have been committed in the Stale of 
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Uttar Pradesh (U.P.) The petitioner also claimed that the Government of 
MP had assured her that death penalty would not be imposed on her in 
any case. On that basis the petitioner claimed that the custody of eleven 
years already undergone by her was sufficient to satisfy the requirement 
and all the prosecutions pending against her in the courts in U.P. should 
be quashed. The Supreme Court rightly held that the question of the 
content and effect of the terms and conditions of surrender alleged by 
the petitioner has to be raised and decided in the criminal cases pending 
against the petitioner. The same cannot be raised on the basis of an 
omnibus statement of the petitioner under article 32 of the Constitution. 
The court also clarified that long continuance of prosecution/trial by 
itself is not enough to quash the same. It has to be ascertained in each 
case as a question of fact whether the state alone or the petitioner also 
was responsible for the delay in completion of trial. However, the court 
directed that the petitioner was entitled to be released at that time 
because she had already undergone the sentence awarded in the only 
case against her in the State of MP unless by order made by any 
competent court she was required to be taken into custody. 
In Delhi Domestic Working Women's Forum v. Union of India,"'^ ' 
public interest litigation was filed to espouse the pathetic plight of four 
domestic servants who were raped by seven army personnel in a running 
train while traveling from Ranchi to Delhi in Muri Express. 
Notwithstanding the occurrence of such barbaric assault on the person 
and dignity of women neither the central government nor the state 
government bestowed any serious attention as to the need for provision 
of rehabilitatory and compensatory justice for women. 
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effected could ever be regarded as just, reasonable and fair/^' since this 
statute is nothing, but the recognition of this aspect of the fundamental 
right to life, any violation of any of the provisions of the Act is in effect 
a violation of this fundamental right. Upholding the breach of Minimum 
Wages Act, 1948, the court observed that the statute was nothing, but an 
effort to implement the fundamental right contained in Article 23(1) 
which prohibits traffic in human beings, beggar and other forms of 
forced labour, Bhagwati, J., held that the payment of wages less than the 
minimum wage was a violative of Article 23(1) and amounted to forced 
labour. This case amply demonstrates that whenever there is a violation 
of social legislation, a petition can be filed in the Supreme Court for its 
enforcement. The strict rule that relief under Article 32 is available only 
if there is breach of a fundamental right does not apply in case of public 
interest litigation. In the words of Professor Diwan: "a public interest 
petition will lie in the Supreme Court whenever there is a breach of any 
social legislation, since social legislations are passed to ensure 
fijndamental rights for the weaker sections of society the rights which 
are usually denied to them a writ petition will also like whenever there is 
a breach of any law which is passed in pursuance of any Directive 
principle of state policy since the Directive Principles are as much 
fundamental part of the Constitution as are the Fundamental Rights.^ '^  
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS AND NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
COMMISSION 
The attempt to protect, through judicial decisions, the basic human 
rights, the fundamental rights as well as the Directive Principles of State 
Policy (reflecting social, economic and cultural rights) leads us to the 
fundamental question, should a separate and independent National 
'iXf7 
Human Rights Commission be established or not? If established, would 
it not undermine the judicial process through which the rights have got 
fool protection?^^ In favour of National Human Rights Commission 
Justice T.K. Thommen observed that the National Commission on 
Human Rights is, in many respects, intended to be an ombudsman to 
oversee the enforcement of laws and effective protection of human 
rights. It is the primary responsibility of the legislature to address itself 
to be enactment of effective laws; it is the responsibility of the executive 
to implement laws promptly and Justly; it is the function of an 
independent judiciary to administer justice, according to law. The power 
of the proposed commission are intended to be so wide as to oversee the 
functioning of the organs of the state, not with a view to interfering with 
their constitutionally assigned functions, but to highlighting before them 
the passing problems endangering human rights in order that the 
Commission, which the people of this country have given into 
themselves to safeguard a true democratic system of administration, 
becomes a meaningful instrument of justice and equity and an 
invigorating force of carry the nation forward. The people of this 
country, rich or poor, literate or illiterate, forward or backward, demand 
justice being done to them without fear or favour. The commission is 
not a court. Its function is to be the watchdog of human rights. Its 
procedure is not expected to be adversarial or accusatorial. It must not 
allow itself to be bogged down by procedural formalities. With a view 
to strengthen the process of the protection of human rights in India, the 
Government of India decided to set up at national level an autonomous 
National Human Rights system. On 14'^  May 1993 the Protection of 
Human Rights Bill was introduced. But on 29"" September 1993, the 
President of India, under Article 123 of the Constitution promulgated an 
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ordinance for setting up a National Human Rights Commission to 
inquire into the complaints of violations of human rights against the 
public servants in every part of the country. The Union Parliament 
promptly passed it. This paved the way for the setting of a National 
Human Rights Commission. It is a fully autonomous body; its 
autonomy derived out of the method of appointment of the members, 
their fixity of tenure, and statutory guarantees thereto, the status they 
have been accorded; the manner in which the staff responsible to the 
commission would be appointed and would conduct themselves; as also 
the autonomy it enjoys in terms of its financial powers. Accordingly the 
NHRC started its fiinctioning with its first chair person justice Ranga 
Nath Mishra on 12* October 1993. NHRC is a fully independent body 
and based on two important pillars namely autonomy and transparency. 
It has been vested with the powers of quasi-judicial in nature Fact-
finding is the core of human rights activity which has been effectively 
used by this invesdgatory body. The status of the Commission is not 
confined with its status only rather it has its constitutional validity under 
the Commission of Inquiry Act 1952. The status of the commission is 
also defined in International Law particularly in Paris Principle of 1991 
and many international workshops on National institutions for the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. There was wide spread 
feeling among the general public and the intelligentsia in particular, that 
with a democratic Constitution granting Fundamental Rights 
enforceable by the courts and provision for periodical elections on 
universal adult franchise, there was no need for an institutional 
mechanism for monitoring and safeguarding human rights. By setting 
up the Commission like NHRC, India has fulfilled not only the 
objectives as enumerated in the Preamble of the Constitufion of India 
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but also the provisions of Article 51 as mentioned in the Part-IV of the 
Constitution. The basic approach of the Commission, namely its 
determination to come to grips as early as possible, with gravest areas of 
human rights violation has encouraged people to protect their human 
rights through the Commission.^^ Immediately after the Commission 
was set up, it issued directives to all state governments to ensure that 
incidents of custodial deaths or rape must reported to the Commission 
within 24 hours by the District Magistrate/ Superintendent of Police, 
failing which the Commission would presume that their was an attempt 
to suppress the incidents. Following these instructions a number of 
reports have been received from different states in respect of deaths 
which have occurred in police or judicial custody. These reports are 
studied by the Commission and action recommended against officers 
found, prima facie, guilty. One very significant development in this 
connection has been a higher level of awareness among officials along 
with reports of the commission on incidents of custodial deaths.''" 
Nevertheless, 15 years after it was established, the NHRC has received 
popular recognition as indispensable institution of governance due to its 
sincere and spontaneous efforts to maintain the standards of integrity, 
efficiency and probity and to ensure accountability and transparency in 
its fiinctioning. Consequently, it now enjoys great moral authority and 
the responses to its recommendations by the concerned agencies of 
central and state governments are overwhelming. By and large, the 
commission's recommendations for the grant of immediate interim relief 
to the victims or the members of their families have been adhered to by 
the concerned governments or authorities, although this is not always so 
in case of its recommendations for departmental or criminal actions. The 
National Human Rights Commission prepares and submits annual report 
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to the Central Government about the position of human rights in the 
country. From the past years reports it is clear that it has been 
successfully working from the date of its inception. The NHRC has 
already received more than four lakhs complaints from various parts of 
the country. These complaints covered almost all the aspects of the 
violations of human rights including excesses by armed forces and 
police, custodial deaths and rape, torture child labour and bonded 
labour, disappearances, dowry deaths and indignity to women, the rights 
of the disadvantaged sections of society especially of SCs and STs, 
conditions relating to jails, violence in areas of insurgency and 
terrorism, spherical problems of minority communities and 
environmental issue affecting the right to life and dignity and reasonable 
health. The commission either dismissed or disposed of complaints 
according the provisions as prescribed by the law and the Protection of 
Human Rights Act. During the years 1993-2010 (seventeen years), the 
NHRC has made great progress in effectively enforcing human rights. It 
has made many accomplishments and made many significant 
recommendations for changes in the laws as well as the Protection of 
Human Rights Act, 1993. Here some cases are mentioned as examples 
to know how, NHRC has been handling the cases since its inception. 
Alleged amputation of male organ of Shri Jugtaram in police 
custody in Barmer, Rajasthan 
On the basis of a press report that appeared in a newspaper dated 10 
February 1994 and captioned "cops cutoff man's penis", the Commission 
took cognizance of the incident suo motu and called for a report fr^ft 
the Government of Rajasthan. The State Government sent a prelimmary 
report stating that one A.S.I, and one constable had been arrested in 
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^ ' ' ' 
connection with the incident. Simultaneously, they along with one sub-
Inspector and two other constables had been placed under suspension. It 
was further indicated that investigation of the matter had been taken 
over by CBI on 19 February 1994 and that, for better medical care, the 
victim had been sent to SMS Hospital, Jaipur where he was undergoing 
medical treatment in a plastic surgery ward. On perusing the report, the 
Commission on 15 March 1994 directed CBI to complete the 
investigation within 3 months and submit its report to the Commission 
soon thereafter. The Commission also directed CBI to keep it informed 
of the progress of the matter from time to time. The investigation has 
since been completed and a charge sheet has been submitted. 
A college Lecture becomes a victim of police Brutality: Kerala (Case 
166/11/98-99) 
The Commission took suo-motu cognizance of an instance of police 
brutality, published in the Hindustan Times on 3 September 1998, under 
the heading police brutality again in Kerala. The report stated that a 
college lecture was beaten mercilessly by the police as he had dared to 
question the fare demanded by the drive of an auto rickshaw lie had 
taken while visiting Kozhikode. The Commission issued notices to the 
Chief Secretary and DGP, Government of Kerala. According to the 
report submitted by the Commissioner of Police, the deeds of the 
concerned police officials were confirmed. On the basis of this factual 
confirmation, the government had suspended the culprits (2 sub-
inspectors, 1 ASI, 1 Head Constable, 3 police constables) and an enquiry 
was ordered against them. 
Compensation for illegal detention - complaint from Shri Ranbir 
Yadav: Uttar Pradesh 
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The Commission took cognizance of a telegraphic complaint received 
from Shri Inderjit Yadav alleging that his brother Shri Rambir Yadav 
was forcibly taken away by the police on 23 April 1996 from their milk 
dairy located at Lai Kuan, District Ghaziabad and illegally detained 
until 27 April 1996, purportedly for questioning him in regard to the 
murder of a Captain Rajpal. In pursuance of the Commission's 
directions, the Investigation Division called for a report from SSP 
Ghaziabad, The report stated that Rambir Yadav was called to the 
Police Station on 27 April 1996, in connection with a case and allowed 
to go the same day. When the police version was communicatee to the 
complainant, he contradicted it and reiterated the allegation, saying that 
his brother was picked upon 23 April and released on 27 April 1996 
after obtaining his signature on a blank paper. Under these 
circumstances, the Commission directed its Investigation Division to 
undertake a spot inquiry. On the basis of the report of its Investigation 
Division the Commission was convinced that this was a case of illegal 
detention and was a compensatable case. As such, the Commission 
recommended payment of compensation of Rs. 10,000/- to the victim 
and also directed Inspector General of Police, Meerut to inquire into the 
matter for fixing the responsibility of officers for the illegal detention. 
IGP, Meerut inquired into the matter and departmental action has been 
taken against the two guilty police officials; liberty was sought from the 
Commission to recover the amount of the compensation from the guilty 
police officials. 
Killing of four persons in a fake encounter by police, U.P. (Case no. 
12235/24/98-99) 
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Shri Panna Lai Yadav, a resident of Village Daulatiya, District Varanasi, 
Uttar Pradesh, First by means of a telegram dated 19 October 19^ )8 then 
through a longer complaint, alleged that his son Om Prakash and three 
others had been killed by the police in a fake encounter on 17 October 
1998. The Commission found the police version unconvincing and 
therefore, ordered its own Investigation wing to look into the matter. 
The Commission has since been informed by the Government of Uttar 
Pradesh that the State CID has finalized its enquiry and has sought the 
State Government approval for the prosecution of 34 police officials 
involved in the case. In addition, department action is also being taken 
against 42 police personnel found guilty of various acts of commission 
and omission in the matter. 
Alleged rape in custody by an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Delhi 
police 
In July 1994, pursuant to its circular of 14 December 1993. the 
Commission received a report from the Dy. Commissioner of Police, 
South District. New Delhi, in regard to a custodial rape by an ASI of the 
Delhi Police force. The Commission, on perusal of the report from the 
Government of NCTD, and also the report of the PUDR, directed the 
Government of NCTD to explain as to why the woman was detained at 
the police station for the night, how it was that there was no supporting 
entry for her detention at the police station for investigation, particularly 
at night. The Commission took serious objection to the persistence of 
such practices, notwithstanding the decision of the Supreme Court given 
some 15 years ago in the case of Nandini Satpathi v. State ofOrissa. 
Sexual Exploitation of Woman: Rajasthan (Case No. 685/20/97-98) 
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The Commission received an anonymous complaint alleging that a 24 
years old woman had been forcibly detained and was being sexually 
abused by certain persons at Jaipur for the last 2-3 years. According to 
the complaint, the woman had a young child and was in a pitiable 
condition and the culprits were planning to force her into prostitution. 
The Commission took cognizance of the anonymous complaint. Not 
satisfied with the report, the Commission deputed its investigation team 
for an on-the spot inquiry. The Commission considered the report of its 
investigation team and noted that the law had been set in motion. 
Further taking note of the travails of the Victimized woman as well as 
the trauma that she has undergone, the commission recommended that 
the Government of Rajasthan accord her appropriate assistance inter 
alia by providing her suitable employment. 
Rape of a Minor Dalit Girl by Protectors of Law- Uttar Pradesh 
Case No. 9133/24/98-99 
Shir Chandradhas Maurya, a member of Samta Sainik Dal and resident 
of District Bulandshahr, Uttar Pradesh in a complaint to the commission 
alleged the kidnapping, rape and suicide of a 15 year old dalit girl ABC 
(name withheld to protect identity). As the complaint related to a grave 
violation of human rights of a dalit girls, the commission took 
cognizance of this matter on a priority basis and issued notice to SSP 
Bulandshahr calling for a report. Upon perusing the report, the 
Commission held that SHO Dibai and In-charge, Fire Station, Dibai has 
not conducted themselves in a manner befitting their office and 
responsibilities and that they had not only shown a lack of sensitivity in 
a matter of grave importance, namely the protection of a dalit girl 
subjected to sexual assault, but had been thoroughly negligent in not 
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taking cognizance of the complaint lodged by ABC. On a consideration 
of all the facts and circumstances of the case, the commission 
recommended to the Government of Uttar Pradesh that: 
While initiating disciplinary proceedings for major 
penalty against the concerned SHO and Fire Station 
Officer, they may be placed under suspension with 
immediate effect; it entrust the investigation of the case 
to the State CID in order to ascertain further the role of 
these two officers, as also that of another Constable, who 
was alleged to have aided and abetted in the kidnapping 
and rape of ABC. 
Pursuant to the Commission's recommendations, the State Government 
started a disciplinary inquiry and an inquiry by the state Clf). The 
compensation was also sanctioned. 
Education of Children of Sex Workers: Delhi Case No. 16754/96-
97/NHRC 
The Commission was of the considered view that the breacli was 
inconsequential. Having regard to the circumstances, the commission 
held that MCD, being a local authority and an arm of the State, had a 
duty to implement the programmes of education and health care of the 
children of sex workers. 
Death of workers in silicon factories of Madhya Pradesh case No. 
7894/96-97/NHRC 
Having regard to the provisions of the Indian Constitution as well as to 
the International Human Rights instruments with regard to the right to 
life. The Commission gave the following directions to the state for 
compliance in future: 
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1. To ensure the establishing of BHEL machinery in the factories to 
prevent dust pollution and to ensure that pollution free air is 
provided to workers. 
2. Periodic inspection on a monthly basis, by the Labour Department 
and reports made to the State Human Rights Commission for 
monitoring. 
3. Widows and Children of deceased workers to be taken care of by 
the factory owner by providing assistance. 
4. To ensure that child labour is prevented by the following 
methods. 
5. Establishing schools at the cost of factory owners, with assistance 
from the State for the education of workers children. 
6. The provision of periodic payments for their educaticn and 
insurance coverage at the cost of factory owners. 
7. The position of mid-day meals and clothing to dependent children 
or children of deceased workers. 
Killing of 7 Dalits by Upper Castes: Karnataka (Case No. 628/10/99-
2000). 
The Commission received complaints from a number of organizations 
concerning the killing of 7 Dalits in Karnataka on 11 March 2000 by 
persons belonging to the upper castes. They requested a probe by the 
Commission and called for the granting of compensation to the victims. 
The Commission, in its proceedings dated 19 December 2000 held that 
the failure of the Government of Karnataka to protect Dalits was, m this 
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instance, beyond doubt. It therefore issued a show causes notice to the 
Government asking as to why immediate interim rehef u/s 18 (3) of the 
Act be not awarded to the next-of-kin of the deceased. 
NHRC's Initiative Results in the Release of Bonded Labourers: 
Haryana (Case No.513/7/98-99). 
The commission received a complaint from Prof. Sheoraj Singh, 
General Secretary of the Bonded Labour Liberation Front, Delhi 
alleging that 20 persons including men, women and children were being 
kept as bonded labourers in a stone quarry in Gurgaon, Haryana. 
According to the complaint, though the Sub Divisional Magistrate of the 
area had visited the site and admitted that minimum wages were not 
being paid to the labourers, he had refused to issue release certificates to 
them. The Commission expressed its appreciation of the role of the 
officers who were involved in the release of the bonded labourers and 
the subsequent effort to rehabilitate them. 
Killing of 29 bus passengers in peren Sub-Division: Nagaland. 
The Commission felt that ex-gratia payment of Rs. 10,000/- sanctioned 
to each of the families of the deceased was not adequate, and 
recommended to the State Government that it enhance the quantum of 
ex-gratia relief from 10,000/- to Rs. 50,000/- to the families of the 29 
persons killed in the incident and make the payment accordingly. The 
State Government of Nagaland intimated that the amounts of ex-gratia 
payments of Rs. 50,000/- each to the next to kin of 28 victims have since 
been made on 1.4.1998. 
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Killing of 35 Members of Sikh Community in Anantnag District of 
Jammu & Kashmir by Militants. (Case No. 206/9/1999-2000) 
The Commission took suo motu cognizance of a newspaper report in 
The Times of India dated 22 March 2000 in respect of the kiUing of 35 
persons of the Sikh community in Anantnag District, Jammu & Kashmir 
by mihtants. A subsequent report submitted by the Director General of 
PoHce, Jammu & Kashmir indicated that a case had been registered in 
respect of the killing of the 35 Sikhs and that investigation was in 
progress. The report fiarther indicated that, of the twenty accused 
persons identified in connection with the killing of 35 Sikhs, (i were 
killed in subsequent encounters; 2 were further detained uncer the 
Public Safety Act and 12 were absconding. A chargesheet had been filed 
in the case on 13 November 2000. The report stated that three Pakistan 
nationals belonging to Lashkar-e-Toiba had confessed their invoh ement 
in the killings. The State Government had made adequate security 
arrangements for the protection of villagers residing in vulnerable areas 
and provided an ex-gratia payment of Rs. 1 lakh to the next of kin of the 
deceased and Rs. 75,000 to those permanently disabled The 
Commission had directed the State Government to furnish a report on 
the action taken on the findings and recommendations of the Justice Shri 
S.R.Pandian Commission, as well as to furnish a progress in respect of 
the case before CJM Anantnag in respect of the killings of 5 persons on 
5 March 2000, allegedly in a fake encounter. 
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Killing of 15 villagers by naxalities in Chhattisgarh 
After observing the contents of the news report, the Commission said 
that if the contents are true, there is a serious issue of violation of human 
rights. 
Police firing on students in Meghalaya 
The Meghalaya Government has informed the Commission that an 
amount of Rs. 5 lakh each had been paid as a special assistance to the 
family of those killed in police firing in Tura and Williamnagar districts 
of the State on 30 September 2005. After going through the report of the 
State Government, the Commission held that in view of the appropriate 
action taken by the state Government with respect to the ex-gratia 
compensation, no fiirther intervention is called for. 
The asks Chief Secretary, Delhi Government for Factual report on 
55 Child Labours. 
The Commission has asked to the Chief Secretary, Delhi Government 
for a factual report on 55 Child labours who were rescued from 
embroidery units in South Delhi. The Commission, after observii\g the 
contents of the report, said if found true it raises the issue of bonded 
Child Labour, which is worst affront to human dignity and constitutes 
an offence under the Bonded Labour Act. Taking note that the children 
were lodged at the Ashraya Kendra in the capital, the Commission 
ftirther said that the matter could not be stopped at mere lodging the 
rescued children in the Kendra. The Commission said that the news 
reports should be sent to Chief Secretaiy, Delhi Government, 
Commissioner Police, Delhi, Labour Secretary, Delhi Governmeni, for 
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factual report in four weeks. It also asked the Delhi Government to 
inform the Commission the rescued children. 
NHRC orders compensation to the next of kin of 45 more persons in 
the Punjab Mass Cremation Case. 
The national Human Rights Commission has directed the Punjab 
Government to pay Compensation to the next of kin of 45 more persons 
who died in police custody in its anti-terror drive during 1984-1994. 
Accordingly the Commission has directed the State of Punjab to pay 
compensation of Rs. 2.5 Lakhs each to the next of kin of 45 deceased, 
with this, the Commission was so far provided compensation to 194 
people. 
NHRC calls for report from UP Government regarding Meerut Fire 
Tragedy 
Taking suo motu cognizance of reports in the print and electronic 
media of the fire tragedy in Victoria Park in Meerut, Utter Pradesh on 
10 April 2006, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) has 
called for a report from the Chief Secretary and DGP, Uttar Pradesh. 
NHRC recommends post-quake measures to Centre and State 
Government. 
The NHRC made a series of recommendations to the Home Ministry, 
Government of India and the Jammu and Kashmir government on post-
quake measures. The recommendations are based on a report by its 
three-member team, which had toured the quake-affected areas of the 
J&K including Tangdhar and other parts of J&K has been devastated 
following an earthquake on the morning of October 2005. Some of the 
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key recommendations made by the NHRC to the Governments at the 
Centre and the State of J&K are: 
• Ensure equitable distribution of rehef in kind. 
• Consider having centralized collection and distribution centers at 
various place in the affected areas where relief material could be 
received from NGOs, civil society and other private agencies. 
• Take steps to ensure that building material for repairing damaged 
property or restoring destroyed is available at the affected j)laces. 
• Where tents are not available, temporary shelter with all essential 
amenities be provided to the local population. 
• Consider feasibility of construction houses in the affected areas 
with pre-fabricated building material. 
Prepare computerized list of orphaned children, widows and 
young girls. 
Prepare computerized list of dead and missing person to enable 
relief to next of kin. 
NHRC takes suo motu cognisance of students' death in police firing 
in Meghalaya 
The Commission has taken suo motu cognizance on the basis of a media 
report of the killing of students in police firing in Meghalaya on 30 
September 2005. The news report published in a national daily on 1 
October 2005 reported that at least 11 students were killed and nearly 
90 wounded when police opened fire to quell thousands of student 
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protestors who had taken to the streets in Tura and William Nagar 
districts of Meghalaya. The Chief Secretary, Maghalaya has been asked 
to give his comments. 
Other measures taken by NHRC to Prevent Human Rights 
Violation, NHRC Chairperson Calls on State machinery to be 
sensitive to human rights issues 
Dr. Justice A.S Anand, chairperson, National Human Rights 
Commission (NHRC) has expressed concern of NHRC to the chief 
Secretaries and Directors General of Police towards human rights 
sensitivity. Speaking at the meeting of the Chief Secretaries and 
Directors General of Police held in New Delhi on 17 March 2006, he 
stressed that unless they show sensitivity, this sentiment can not be 
expected to percolate to the lower levels. Pointing out to the diminishing 
level of sensitivity shown by some of the state machinery cind the 
absence of promptness in addressing human rights concerns. Justice 
Anand stressed that sensitivity towards human rights issues is imjwrtant. 
He stated that the purpose of holding this meeting is not to fmd faults 
but to appreciate and understand each other's point of view. In his 
address Justice Anand highlighted that the Commission has been 
receiving complaints of cases of alleged human rights violations. The 
number of complaints has steadily increased over the years ever since its 
inception. The Commission is consistently attempting to develop a 
culture of human rights in the Country, the NHRC strongly advocates 
that enjoy civil and political rights, economic, social, cultural rights 
cannot be put on the backbumer, he said. He requested the- Chief 
Secretaries and Directors General of police to give proper importance to 
Economic, Social, Cultural Rights. On the conditions of jails. Justice Y. 
3 J 
Bhaskar Rao, Member, NHRC highlighted the need foT State 
Governments to be factually correct in their reports to the Commission. 
He also observed that there was a need for filing of charge sheets in time 
as per the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Sheela Barse case, The 
case of a ninety-year-old under trial languishing in a jail in Chhatiisgarh, 
underscored the need for urgent attention to the problems in jails. Shri 
PC. Sharma, Member, NHRC mentioned the need for proper planning to 
ensure that additional facilities, which are provided for the inmates, are 
not at the cost of increased congestion. Shri R.S Kalha, Member, NHRC 
in his remarks outlined the changes taking place globally and its impact 
on the domestic situation of a country. He cautioned all administrators 
on the need to reckon with international safeguards that are available 
and being increasingly invoked by citizens in their quest for justice. 
Protest on Proposed reservation in higher education 
The National Human Rights Commission has recommended to the 
Government that it should get examined the issue of resenation 
thoroughly. Reacting to the media reports that showed some of the 
students and doctors on hunger strike being removed for medical care 
during the agitation, the Commission said that the Government should 
ensure that fairness and justice is not denied to any section or class of 
the society. Describing the reservation issue as a complex one, the 
Commission felt that Government should also ensure a balance and 
orderly development of all sections and classes of society while 
implementing its policy. 
The ongoing case studies reveal the achievement of NHRC since its 
inception. It has proved that it is a unique statutory body and has 
performed its duties according to the norms fixed by the Protection of 
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Human Rights Act. By disposing the different cases of human rights 
violation of divergent nature, it has compelled the cynics to think 
otherwise and change their attitude towards the NHRC which they had 
developed initially. In some cases the NHRC has taken a bold stand to 
defend human rights and created havoc among the agencies where 
human rights violation is rampant. It is seen that within the seventeen 
years of its existence, it has proved its excellence where it has got co-
operation. Hence it can be concluded that no organization like National 
Human Rights Commission can flourish in the environment of human 
rights violation if it does not get a congenial atmosphere of co-operation 
and awareness. 
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PART-II 
Conceptual Analysis of 
judicial Actiuism 
CHAPTER! 
CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
I. MEANING OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
It is a term used to describe the assertiveness of judicial power. The 
extreme model of judicial activism is of a court, so intrusive and 
ubiquitous that it virtually dominates the institutions of government. It 
has often been described as judicial supremacy, judicial absolutism, 
judicial legislation and judicial policy making etc. Judges and Lawyers 
think that judicial activism is an extension of judicial review and not an 
extra-ordinary power conferred on the court. However, for outsiders and 
laymen it means encroachment of the court in the field of Legislative 
and executive powers. At the outset, it has to be stated that there is no 
precise definition of judicial activism accepted by one and all. However, 
there is a widely accepted notion that it is related to problems and 
processes of political development of a country. In other words, judicial 
activism deals with the political role played by the judiciary, like the 
other two branches of the State viz, the legislature and the executive. An 
eminent Indian jurist defines judicial activism in the following words: 
"Judicial activism is that way of exercising judicial power which seeks 
fiindamental re-codification of power relations among the dominant 
institutions of State, manned by members of the ruling classes".' 
The same authority goes on to add that judicial activism is the use of 
judicial power to articulate and enforce counter-ideologies, initiates 
significant re-codificafions of power relations within the institutions of 
governance.^ 
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An analysis of the above attempt by Upendra Baxi to define judicial 
activism shows that activism of the judiciary pertains to the political 
role played by it, like the other two political branches. The justification 
for the judicial activism comes from the near collapse of responsible 
government and the pressures on the judiciary to step in aid which 
forced the judiciary to respond and to make political or policy-making 
judgments.^ "Judicial Activism" and 'judicial restraint' are the terms 
used to describe the assertiveness of judicial power. The user of these 
terms presumes to locate the relative assertiveness of particular courts 
or individual judges between two theoretical extremes. The 
Encyclopedia of the American Constitution'* states that the uses of 
'judicial activism' and 'judicial restraint', are not entirely uniform. Often 
the terms are employed non-committally i.e., merely as descriptive 
short hand to identify some court or judges as more activist or more 
restrained than some other, or more than the same court formally 
appeared to be. In this sense, the usage is neither commendatory nor 
condemnatory. Both these, expressions viz., judicial activism and 
judicial restraint are used from the angle of the personal or professional 
view of the "right role" of the court. Accordingly, the courts may be 
condemned or commended for straying from or for conforming to that 
"right role". In U.S.A., in more than two centuries of judicial re\'iew, 
superintended by more than one hundred justices who have served on 
the Supreme Court and who have interpreted a constitution highly 
ambiguous, in much of its text, consistency has not been institutional 
but personal. Individual judges have maintained strongly diverse 
notions of the "proper" or "right" judicial role.^ 
In U.S., the concept of judicial activism has often been used as 
synonymous with "Judicial absolutism" "judicial supremacy", "judicial 
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anarchy" and "judicial imperialism". Always judicial activism has been 
used as an antonym of "judicial restraint", also popularly known as 
judicial conservatism". According to Americans activism means the 
propensity of federal judges mainly but not always on the Supreme 
Court, to intervene in the governing process as to substitute their 
judgment for that of federal and state political officers.^ Activism is 
considered to be an ascriptive term. Generally, judges are evaluated as 
activists by various social groups in terms of their interests, ideologies 
and values. As Baxi explained in his erudite style, to answer a question 
as to who is an "activist" judge is rather difficult, since the labels 
"activist" and its opposite the "restraintivist", are used by those who 
specialise in judging the judges. There appears to be atleast five 
identifiable groups of people who judge the judges. 
First, the scientific judges of judges viz., those including law teachers, 
social scientists and investigative journalists. 
Second, the "managerial" judges of judges which group includes the 
top echelons of bureaucracy and the supreme executive (Prime 
Minister), for the management of acts like appointment and transfer of 
judges etc. 
Third, the lawyers some of whom feel that it is their professional duty 
to judge the judges and some others who felt that it is their exclusive 
right to do so. 
Fourth, the so-called "victims" of use of judicial power, who include 
police, prison officials, custodial officials, administrative authorities, 
corporations, universities and landlords etc., and Fifth, the 
"beneficiaries" of use of judicial power eg. Civil services, students, 
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trade unions, pensioners, prisoners, labour, and taxpayers, etc. 
These various groups differ in their conceptions of "activism'. Thus 
when one group considers an action of the judiciary to be active, the 
same may be considered as inactive by the other groups. It is humanly 
impossible for any court or judge to satisfy all the groups mentioned 
above, simultaneously and this is the precise reason as to why there 
cannot be any uniformity of judicial activism. The main reason for this 
unavoidable conclusion is the fact that there are many competing rights 
and conflicting interests of various sections of the society, which 
become the subject matter of judicial scrutiny every time. 
The foregoing discussion makes it clear that the expression, "judicial 
activism" has eluded a definition as an abstract concept. It is incapable 
of formulation by definition only. It means different things to different 
people. Some admit that it means the dynamism of judges, some other 
people consider it a judicial creativity and some other people might 
consider it as bringing 'social or cultural' revolution through the 
judiciary. However the use of revolution to describe a judicial function 
appears to be improper. The Indian Judicial activism is wider, broader 
and more varied compared to the American concept of judicial activism. 
The probable justification or such a wide scope is the constitutional 
scheme envisaged by the fundamental law of the land. Thus, apart from 
exercising the power of judicial review in an expansive manner to assert 
itself more, in the interest of constitutionalism, the Indian Supreme 
Court has exercised even more and wider powers. The court exercises 
the power to do anything or to give any direction to render complete 
justice.^ The court has assumed to itself the Power to determine the 
validity of even a constitutional Amendment effected under Article 368, 
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in the aftermath of Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala. Probably, 
no court in the world under any form of constitutional government 
exercises this power. This itself can be cited as the best example of 
judicial activism in India. Another example of judicial acti\ism is 
exercise of judicial power to give certain directions to certain political 
leaders who held high positions and bureaucrats, to compensate the 
State, for abusing the discretionary powers vested in them. This kind of 
directions asking the political leaders and bureaucrats to pay exemplai^ 
damages to the State, is totally unheard of and unprecedented an> where 
m the world."^ It may be noticed that this power has been assumed by 
the Court itself; and it does not exist either in the Constitution or in any 
statute. 
The Supreme Court has refused to exercise its advisory jurisdiction 
under Article 143 of the Constitution in the matter of "Ayodhya" 
controversy.^^ Such a refusal itself is an example of judicial activism, 
exhibited in that area probably for the first time in India. Similarly, the 
court has exercised its power and jurisdiction under Article 129 of the 
Constitution, to punish for contempt of judiciary. What is remarkable is 
the fact that the court has exercised this extraordinary power, to punish 
an alleged contemnor who allegedly committed contempt of a High 
Court and not the Supreme Court itself However in Supreme Court 
Bar Association v. Union of India J'^ a Constitution Bench of the 
Supreme Court; overruled the above decision, and kept the question 
open. 
The Supreme Court has broadened the scope of 'Locus standi' in the 
matter of enforcement of fundamental rights of the citizens, by ushering 
in a new era of "public interest litigation", starting with the early 
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eighties. The credit for this welcome development goes to a few 
individual judges of the Supreme Court like Justice P.N. Bhagwati, 
Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer Justice Kuldip Singh, Justice A.S. Anand and 
Justice Kartzu. The courts have assumed to themselves the roles of 
monitor's and 'Supervisors' in certain investigations involving the 
political bigwigs in certain scandals. The best illustration is the way the 
Patna High Court has ordered the Central Bureau of Investigation 
(C.B.I,), a crime investigation agency of the Central Government, to 
report directly to the High Court, in the Scam which became popular as 
"fodder scam" allegedly involving the then Chief Minister of Bihar, 
Laloo Prasad Yadav. Further, the Supreme Court has assumed to itself 
the supremacy and primacy in the matter of appointment and transfer of 
the Supreme Court and the High Court judges.'"^ However, in \iew of 
the controversy regarding the recommendation of certain names for the 
appointment of judges of High Court and Supreme Court, by former 
Chief Justice M.M. Punchhi, the President has referred the matter to the 
Supreme Court under Article 143 of the Constitution and a nine-Judges 
bench of the Supreme Court has modified its earlier stand that the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court alone has primacy in recommending such 
names. In its advisory opinion given in October 1998, the Supreme 
Court has widened the scope of "consultation" under Article 124 by 
interpreting that the Chief Justice should consult instead of two senior 
most judges, four senior judges before making such recommendation. 
Thus the Supreme Court retains initiative in the matter appointing High 
Court and Supreme Court judges.'^ 
Another most conspicuous constitutional area where the Supreme Court 
has exhibited judicial activism is the way the court has interpreted the 
Directive principles of State policy contained in part IV of the 
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Constitution, which are non-justiciable, as justiciable in the garb of 
fundamental rights. The Court has stretched itself too far \vhen it 
directed the Union of India to enact a Uniform Civil Code'^' within a 
time bound period. It is altogether a different matter that the Court had 
withdrawn its direction subsequently by declaring that the earlier 
direction was only an "obiter dicta". 
As has been already explained in the preceding paragraphs, there is no 
precise definition that has been agreed on 'judicial activism' either by a 
court or by any jurist. There has been a discernible failure on the part of 
every concerned quarter to give a comprehensive definition of this 
concept. However, what every one seems to agree upon is the relation 
between the judicial power and judicial activism, obviously the judiciary 
under any type of Consfitudon can play an active role, when it performs 
one or many or all of the following functions. 
1) While interpreting the meaning and scope of a statutory provision or 
the statute itself made by a competent legislature. 
2) While maintaining the balance between a federation and its federating 
units or among the units per se. 
3) While upholding the Supremacy of the Constitution when such a 
question has been brought before it (in an adversarial system of 
justice) 
4) While protecting the fiindamental rights and fi^eedoms of the citizens 
and others, if they are guaranteed by a written Constitution. 
5) While dealing with institutional conflicts viz the conflicts between the 
legislature, executive and judiciary ; and 
6) While interpreting the Constitution itself with due regard to the 
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intention of the framers of the Constitution etc. 
In all the above cases, the judiciary in a constitutional democracy can 
play an active role through the means of judicial review. However the 
judiciary can also refuse to entertain a question when brought or 
referred to it, either for adjudication or for its opinion. In such a case, 
the judiciary can assert its power of such refusal on grounds like lack of 
jurisdiction or doctrine of political questions. The manner, degree and 
level of activism may vary depending on the limitations imposed by the 
constitution and other factors which include the comparative strengths 
and stability of the other two organs of the State and the willingness of 
the judiciary on the whole to play a political role in a changing society. 
The judiciary especially the Supreme Court has started playing an 
activist role occasionally from Golaknath v. Punjab, ' and consistently 
from Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala,' the active decisions of 
the Supreme Court never came in the way of the Parliament to pursue 
the objectives the Government wanted to pursue. There seems to be a 
full endorsement of the view that the traditional function of the Court is 
to patrol the constitutional boundaries of the other branches (the 
legislature especially) and of the States and keep them within their 
prescribed limits. The purpose of an independent and active judiciary is 
to ensure that the limited and Supreme Constitution remained so. ° As 
Roscoe Pound says the real foe of absolutism is law. It presupposes a 
life measured by reason, a legal order measured by reason, and a 
judicial process carried on by applying a reasoned technique to 
experience developed by reason and reason tested by experience.^' It is 
that juristic realism and reasoned technique that result in the judicial 
activism though its parameters are different under different constitutions 
in the world. 
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II. EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
It is very difficult to trace the origin of judicial activism in India. Since 
the judiciary has come to be recognized as an independent and separate 
organ of the Government under the Government of India Act, 1935 and 
subsequently under the Constitution of India, it would be prudent to 
scan the period subsequent to 1935 for tracing the origin. However, 
there are a few instances even prior to that period, where certain selected 
judges of High Courts established under the Indian High Courts Act, 
1861 exhibited certain flashes of judicial activism. Way back in 1893, 
Justice Mahmood of the Allahabad High Court delivered a dissenting 
judgment which sowed the seed for judicial activism in India. In that 
case which dealt with an undertrial who could not afford to engage a 
lawyer, Justice Mahmood held that the pre-condition of the case being 
"heard" would be fulfilled only when somebody speaks." The concept 
of judicial activism can be seen to be reflecting from the trends 
exemplified by some decisions and orders of the Supreme Court. They 
are as under: 
(1) The judiciary since 1973 claims the power to nullify on substantive 
grounds, even an amendment made to the Constitution by the 
amending body if it changes "the basic structure or framework of 
the Constitution." This concept of judicial control over the 
Constitution has been evolved by and known to courts in India 
only.^ ^ 
(2) The undoubted privileges of the Legislature even in respect of their 
internal proceedings have been brought under the purview of 
judicial review.^ "^  
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(3) Power of Judicial review as exercised by the Supreme Court and 
the High Courts has been recognized by those courts to be an 
unalterable "basic structure of the Constitution". 
(4) Eighteen High Courts, with the Supreme Court at the apex, correct 
the entire gamut of the country's administration. 
(5) The concept, of state for the purpose of enforcement of 
fundamental rights has been widened by successive judgments of 
the Supreme Court so as to include all public, quasi-public 
authorities. 
(6) The courts have broadened the scope of "Locus standi in the Public 
Interest litigation matters, in the early eighties. 
(7) The Supreme Court has often resorted to judicial legislation by 
virtue of its powers under Article 141 to fill the void created by the 
so-called legislative vacuum.^ '^ 
A thorough analysis of the above list of examples of judicial 
assertiveness (behaviour) makes it amply clear that it would be very 
difficult to trace the origin of judicial activism in Independent India. A 
perusal of the catena of decisions rendered by the India judiciary after 
1950 especially by the Supreme Court compels any researcher to 
believe that there have been flashes of judicial activism before the 
1980's and there has been a consistency the pattern after the 1980's. 
However there has been uniformity in all the areas and jurisdictions of 
the Supreme Court in exercise of a greater judicial power. The amount 
of activism varied in different areas like interpreting the constitute 
guarding the fundamental rights of the citizens, expansion scope of 
"Locus Standi" in Public Interest Litigation, Omnipresenc judicial 
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review, expansion of horizons of Article 21, and construct of certain 
directive principles as fundamental rights. At the outset, it may be stated 
that, it is difficult to predict any definite pattern, in the behaviour of the 
Supreme Court before the 1980's. As Rajeev Dhawan rightly points out, 
while riot totally neglecting the unformulated indigenous pressures, the 
court has been mechanical in its approach to the problem on which it 
was called upon to adjudicate.^^ The Supreme Court had rarely 
exhibited any activist tendency before the eighties, more precisely 
before the emergency of 1975. There has been an overwhelming 
opinion in India that, the judiciary during the 1940's and 1950's was 
used by the elite section of the society to get their vested interest served, 
of course within the legal frame work. The laws generally favoured the 
landed-class and the talk of agrarian reforms remained a political 
rhetoric. The circumstances forced the judges to favour the land-lords, 
and that forced the judiciary to take a "not-so-progressive" outlook."*^ 
The most opportune time to establish a people-friendly judiciary was 
lost during 1950's. One important point to be noted in this context is 
that the legal machinery consisting of judges, lawyers and prosecutors 
came from the same stock, i.e. same caste, class, attitude and 
orientation. This was one of the major factors for the judiciaiy not 
adopting or taking a very progressive approach. Infact certain 
constitutional experts went on to the extent of calling the Supreme 
Court before the eighfies as a "rich man's court".^ ^ The main grouse of 
the protagonists of the aforementioned view seems to be that in the 
1950's the Supreme Court turned to "economic activism" to protect 
'status quo'that led to judicial passivism in respect of civil and political 
rights of the citizens.^° 
An analysis of the following decisions pertaining to agrarian reforms 
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and right to property would be necessary to understand the judicial 
behaviour before the 1980's. In State of Bihar v. Kameshwar, ' the 
Supreme Court Constitution Bench was asked to determine the validity 
of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, The Madhya Pradesh Abolition 
of Proprietary Rights (Estates Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 and 
the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. 
These enactments aimed at abolishing Zamindaries and other 
proprietary estates and tenures in the three states, so as to eliminate 
intermediaries by means of compulsory acquisition of their rights and 
interest, and to bring the 'raiyats' and other occupants of lands in those 
areas into direct relation with the Government. The Supreme Court had 
declared these laws to be valid. What is surpnsmg is the fact that, 
Patanjali Shastri, C. J. declared that, "the objections based on the lack 
of a public purpose and the failure to provide for payment of just 
compensation are barred under Article 31 (4) and also devoid of merits, 
thus it becomes unnecessary to consider, what is a public purpose and 
whether the acquisition authorized by the impugned statutes subserves 
any public purpose. Nor is it necessary to examine whether the scheme 
of compensation provided by the statutes is so illusory as to leave the 
expropriated owners without any real compensation for loss of their 
property".^^ This was a classic case of a judiciary unwilling to confront 
a legislature which passed a law contrary to existing fundamental rights 
namely the right to property. It is a fine example of judicial passivism 
of the Supreme Court of 1950's. In Vajmvelu v. Spl. Dy. Collector,^"^ the 
Supreme Court held that a differentiation in the rates of compensation 
in a law for compulsory acquisition of private property between one 
public purpose and another, has no relation to the object of the Act, 
impugned in that case. In Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala,^' a 
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Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court dealt with the vahdity of the 
Kerala Agrarian Reforms Act, 1961. The Court, by majority struck 
down the entire Act on the ground that "there is no reason why when 
two persons are deprived of their property, one richer than the other, 
they should be paid at different rates when the property of which they 
are deprived is of the same kind and differs only in extent". Thus the 
court declared that the discrimination in the matter of payment of 
compensation, to the different land owners based on the extent of land 
they held was violative of Article 14 and that the impugned provisions 
were unconstitutional and that they would render the entire Act 
unconstitutional. The one case, which stands apart from other cases, in 
the matter of judicial activism is L.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab/^ a 
11 judges Special Bench of the Supreme Court, was called upon to 
determine the constitutional validity of the Constitution (Seventeenth 
Amendment), Act, 1964, in the instant case. The court by a majority of 
6:5 gave a very bold decision which had far reaching consequences in 
the coming years. Before discussing the ratio of the judgment, it would 
be necessary to advert to the facts of the case briefly. The Constitution 
(Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964 had amended Article 31A of the 
Constitution and included two enactments viz the Punjab Security of 
Land Tenures Act, 1953 and the Mysore Land Reforms Act, 1962, in 
the 9th schedule to the Constitution and had placed them beyond attack. 
Article 31-A deals with saving of laws providing for acquisition of 
estates etc. even though they are inconsistent with or take away any of 
the rights conferred by Article 14, 19 or 31 . " The Court by majority 
speaking through Subaa Rao C.J. declared that: 
(i) Constitutional Amendment is a legislative process. 
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(ii) Amendment is law within the meaning of Article 13 of the 
Constitution and, 
T O 
(iii) Parliament has no power from the date of the decision to amend 
any of the provisions of part- III of the Constitution so as to take 
away or abridge the fundamental rights enshrined therein etc. 
The most noticeable aspect of this judgment is that this decision had 
secured "paramountcy of fundamental rights" in the Constitution 
domain and established the principle that even the extra-ordinary 
process of Constitutional Amendment would be subject to the judicial 
review on the ground of violation of fundamental rights, guaranteed in 
Part III of the Constitution. The decision is also important because it 
has laid down the doctrine of "prospective overruling" for the first time 
in Indian Constitutional Jurisprudence. This doctrine explains that any 
amendment that violated the fundamental rights would be valid for all 
the past purposes i.e. before Golaknath and that it would be invalid only 
prospectively. Chief Justice Subba Rao exhibited a very rare, judicial 
activism in the instant case to enable the fundamental rights to attain 
supremacy in the Indian Constitution and in the process had overruled 
two long outstanding judgments on that topic viz. Sankariprasad v. 
Union of India,^^ and Sajjan Singh.'*^ While overruling the 
aforementioned earlier judgments, the learned Chief Justice Subaa Rao 
observed: 
"While ordinarily this court will be reluctant to reverse 
its previous decision, it is the duty in the Constitutional 
field to correct itself as early as possible, for otherwise 
the future progress of the country and the happiness of 
the people will be at stake (we are) convinced that the 
decision in Sankari Prasad's case, 1952 SCR 39 = (AIR 
1951 SC 458) is wrong, it is pre-eminently a typical error 
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case where this court should overrule it. The longer it 
holds the field the greater will be the scope for erosion of 
fundamental rights. As it contains the seeds of 
destruction of the cherished rights of the people, the 
sooner it is overruled the better for the country". 
The above observations amply demonstrate a shift in the behaviour of 
the Supreme Court, from its earlier decisions and it marks a watershed 
in the history of the Supreme Court's judicial activism. 
In R.C. Cooper v. Union of India^^ popularly known as the Bank's 
Nationalization case, a 11-judges special Bench of the Supreme Court, 
was called upon to decide the validity of the Banking Companies 
(Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Ordinance, 1969 and its 
modified version namely the Banking Companies (Acquisition and 
Transfer of Undertakings) Act of 1969. These two laws were 
challenged by the petitioner, who was a shareholder as well as a 
director in some of the nationalized banks. He assailed their validity on 
the ground that they impair his rights guaranteed under Article 14, 19 
and 31 of the Constitution. The Court speaking through Justice J.C. 
Shah for majority declared that the impugned Act was invalid as it 
made hostile discrimination against the 14 banks proposed to be 
nationalized, in that it prohibited them from carrying on banking 
business, whereas the other Banks,-Indian and Foreign were permitted 
to carry on banking business. The Court further declared that the Act 
also violated the guarantee of compensation under Article 31 (2) in that 
it provided for giving certain amounts determined according to 
principles which were not relevant in the determination of 
compensation of the undertaking of the named banks. The Court for the 
first time declared that "the validity of the "law" which authorizes 
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deprivation of property and "a law" which authorizes compulsory 
acquisition of property for a public purpose must be adjudged by the 
application of the same tests". 
In Keshavananda Bharati v. State ofKemla,'^^ popularly known as ''the 
Fundamental Rights case", a 13-judges Bench of the Supreme Court 
dealt with the validity of the Constitution 24th Amendment, 25th 
Amendment and the 29"" Amendment. The Constitution 24th 
Amendment Act, 1971 was passed to get over the decision of the 
Supreme Court in GolakMath's case'^ ^ in so far as it was held that (i) the 
'law' under Article 13 (2) includes a Constitution Amendment and (ii) 
Article 368 of the Constitution is related only to the procedure to amend 
the Constitution but did not confer on the Parliament any power to do 
so. The 24"' Amendment expressly empowered the Parliament to amend 
any provisions of the Constitution including those relating to 
Fundamental Rights and further made Article 13 of the Constitution 
inapplicable to an amendment of the Constitution under Article 368 
In Frag Ice and Oil Mills v. Union of India'' the Supreme Couit 7-
judges Bench was asked to determine the extent of immunity granted to 
certain Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule to the 
Constitution on the ground of violation of fundamental rights. It may be 
noted that under Article 31 -B of the Constitution, which was inserted 
by the Constitution (1st Amendment) "Act, 1951, none of the Acts and 
Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule shall be deemed to be void 
on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any 
of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution. 
Answering in the negative, the Special Bench, by majority of 6:1 held 
that, the upholding of laws by the application of the theory of derivative 
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immunity is foreign to the scheme of our Constitution and that 
accordingly orders and notifications issued under the Acts and 
Regulations specified in the Ninth schedule must meet the challenge 
that they offend the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the 
Constitution. The Court emphatically declared that the immunity 
enjoyed by the Parent Act by reason of it being placed in the Ninth 
Schedule cannot propria vigors be extended to an offspring of the Act 
like a price control order issued under the authority of the Act. This 
judgment is a silver lining in the establishment of the principle that the 
executive orders cannot be placed beyond the reach of the judiciary 
under the disguise of derivative immunity. Right to life and personal 
liberty is the most important fundamental right guaranteed in Part III of 
the Constitution. The Supreme Court has been encountered witli the 
task of interpretation of various terms used under Article 21 of the 
Constitution, many a times Article 21 of the Constitution reads as 
under: 
"No person shall be deprived of his life or personal 
liberty except according to procedure established by 
law" 
The Court has been called upon to interpret the meaning of "life", 
"personal liberty", "procedures established" and "law" as they appear 
under Article 21 of the Constitution. It is pertinent to see that till 1978 
i.e. till the landmark decision of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India.'^' 
The Supreme Court had interpreted the above terms very narrowh'. In 
order to ascertain the judicial behavior, it becomes imperative to 
analyse the case law at random on Article 21 upto the year 1978. 
In A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madrasf^ the first case decided by the 
Supreme Court of India involving the interpretation of right to life ajid 
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personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution, the 
apex court was called upon to determine the constitutional validity of 
the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. A special bench of the court 
consisting of 6 judges held by majority that the Preventive Detention 
Act, 1950 minus its Section 14 was "intra vires" the Constitution and 
valid. The court has dealt with at great length, the scope of "right to 
freedom" and "Personal Liberty" as used in Articles 19 and 21 of the 
Constitution respectively, among other important Constitutional issues. 
Even though this landmark judgment dealt with many other aspects, for 
the, purpose of the present discussion it would be sufficient to mention 
in brief, the summary as regards Article 21 of the Constitution. 
(i) Article 19 and 21 are not complementary to each other. 
(ii) Personal Liberty under Article 21 means liberty of the body and 
immunity from illegal arrest, detention or physical coercion. 
(iii) 'Law' means only the state-made law. 
(iv) 'Article 21' strikes at only the procedure and not the 'law' even 
if it is illegal. In other words Article 21 incorporates only the 
procedural due process but not the substantive due process. 
This narrow interpretation by the Supreme Court has prevented the 
judiciary in India for 28 long years from giving a liberal meaning and 
scope to the right to 'life and personal liberty" under Article 21 in 
particular and to the fundamental rights in general.^ There was 
absolutely no judicial activism or liberalism in the instant case and there 
was only an absolute restraint exercised by the judiciary. It may be seen 
that between 1950 and 1978 i.e. A.K. Gopalan and Maneka Gandhi, the 
Supreme Court has given very few liberal decisions which expanded the 
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scope of life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution, 
thanks to the lack of will power on the part of the Supreme Court to 
assert itself in expanding a liberal fundamental rights jurisprudence. 
Some of these decisions may be discussed, at random in this context. 
Again, the meaning and scope of 'personal liberty' came up pointedly 
for consideration in Kharak Singh v. State of UP. In that case validity 
of the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations which without any statutory 
basis, authorized the police to keep under surveillance persons whose 
names were recorded in the "history sheet" maintained by police in 
respect of persons who are or are likely to become habitual criminals. In 
this context 'Surveillance' as defined in the impugned regulation 
included secret picketing of the house, domiciliary visits at night, 
periodical enquiries about the person and an eye on his movemems etc, 
The petitioner alleged that this regulation violated his fundamental right 
to movement in Article 19 (1) (d) and personal liberty in Article 2 . For 
determining the claim of the petitioner, the Court, apart from defining 
the scope of Article I9(l)(d), had to define the scope of'personal liberty' 
in Article 21 also. A 6-judges Special Bench of the Supreme Court by 
majority rejected the argument of the State Government that 'personal 
liberty' was confined to freedom from physical restraint or freedom from 
confinement within the bounds of a prison and held that "personal 
liberty" used in the article as a compendious term to include within itself 
all the varieties of rights which go to make up the 'personal liberties' of 
the man other than those dealt within the several Clauses of Article 
19(1). Raja Gopala Ayyangar, J declared that^ *^  the word 'life' in Arficle 
21 means not merely the right to the confinuance of a person's animal 
existence, but a right to the possession of each of his organs - his arms 
and legs etc. The learned judge speaking for himself and other 3 judges 
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declared that an unauthorized intrusion into a person's home and the 
disturbance caused to him thereby, is violative of Article 21. The 
majority declared that Regulation 236(b), which authorized 'domiciliary 
visits' was unconstitutional on the aforementioned ground. Justice Koka 
Subb Rao (as he then was) for himself and Shah, J gave a separate but 
concurrent judgment to the same effect on the ground that "the right to 
personal liberty takes in it not only a right to be free from restrictions 
placed on his movements, but also free from encroachments, on his 
private life", and defined the right of personal liberty in Article 21 as a 
right of an individual to be free from restrictions or encroachmeats on 
his person, whether those restrictions or encroachments are directly 
imposed or indirectly brought about by calculated measures. 
It may be noticed in this context, that for the first time in the history of 
its existence, the Supreme Court had departed from the rigid 
interpretation it gave to Article 21, in the case of A.K. Gopalan and 
made an attempt to broaden the ambit of'personal liberty' under Article 
21, short of saying that 'right to privacy is a fundamental right' under 
Article 21 of the Constitution. However in Govind v. State ofM.P./' 
the same court contemplated a right to privacy, included among others, 
in the right to personal liberty but upheld regulations similar to the one 
invalidated in Kharak Singh, because the regulations had statutory 
basis. In Re, Under Article 143, Constitution,^' a 7-judges Special 
Bench of the Supreme Court dealt with an apparent conflict between 
the privileges of a legislature under Article 194 of the Constitution and 
the fundamental rights of the citizen under Article 19 and 21 etc. In the 
instant case, one Keshav Singh, who allegedly printed and published a 
pamphlet containing a disrespectful letter to the speaker of the Uttar 
Pradesh Assembly, was committed to prison on the directions of the 
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speaker, on the ground that Keshav Singh committed contempt of the 
Legislature. However, a petition was filed before the High Court on 
behalf of the alleged contemnor under Article 226 on the ground that 
his detention was illegal. The Division Bench which heard the petition 
ordered the release of the petitioner on bail. On receiving the 
information of release order, the Assembly passed a resolution that the 
two judges of the High Court, Keshav Singh and his advocate had 
committed contempt of the House and ordered that the two judges and 
the advocate be brought before the Assembly. This case assumed great 
Constitutional significance as it involved an apparent conflict between 
the privileges of legislature on one side and the fundamental riglits and 
freedoms of the citizens who are not members of legislature on the 
other. The Supreme Court by a majority of 6:1 speaking through Chief 
Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar held that it was not competent for the 
legislative Assembly of U.P. to direct the production of the two. 
Hon'ble judges and the Advocate before it in custody. Even though the 
court directly did not declare that there was a conflict between the 
legislative privileges and immunities, and fundamental rights of 
citizens, the very opinion of the court reflects an activism on the part of 
the judiciary. For the first time, the Court held though indirectly that, in 
case of fundamental rights and legislative privileges conflict, the 
former shall prevail. This course of action was not taken by the 
Supreme Court hitherto and that is the precise reason why this case 
becomes one of those rare cases before 1980's that witnessed the 
activism of the Supreme Court. 
In Satwant Singh v. A.P.O., New Delhi,^^ a Constitution Bench of the 
Supreme Court, had enlarged the scope of "personal liberty" under 
Article 21, so as to include the right to travel abroad. The majority 
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declared that the right to travel abroad is a fundamental right and that 
since there was no law regulating or depriving a person of such a right, 
refusal to give passport or withdrawal of one given violates Articles 21 
and 14 of the Constitution. This judgment is important because, it was 
one of the earliest instances when the Supreme Court admitted that 
"personal liberty" under Article 21 has a wider amplitude than the 
liberty of the person (body) as interpreted in A.K. Gopalan, ADM 
Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla/'^ is another famous but controversial 
judgment, given by the Supreme Court before 1980. In this case the 
presidential order dated 27th June, 1975 under CI. (1) of Article 359 
which provided that no person has locus standi to move writ petition 
under Article 226 before a High Court for "habeas corpus " or any other 
writ or order or direction to enforce any right to personal liberty of a 
person detained under MISA on the grounds that the order of detention 
is illegal or malafide, was challenged. In other words, the Presidential 
order deprived 'locus standi' to a person to move writ petition 
challenging legality of detention under the Maintenance of Internal 
Security Act, 1971.^ ^ The Instant judgment was the result of a series of 
appeals against judgments of the High Courts of Allahabad, Bombay, 
Delhi, Kamataka, M.P., Punjab and Rajasthan, which held that 
notwithstanding the continuance of emergency and the presidential 
order suspending the enforcement of fundamental rights conferred by 
Articles 14, 21 and 22, the High Courts can examine whether an order 
of detention is in accordance with the provisions of the MISA. The 
High Courts also held that inspite of suspension of enforcement of 
fundamental rights, conferred by Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution, 
a person's right to freedom from arrest or detention except in 
accordance with law can be enforced only where such arrest and 
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detention are not in accordance with those provisions of the statute. A 
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court by majority of 4:1 upheld the 
presidential order and legitimized the suspension of the writ of "habeas 
corpus" during the period of emergency on the basis of higher claims of 
national security. Khanna, J. gave a dissenting opinion emphasizing the 
role of "rule of law" as the accepted norm of all civilized societies, and 
observed that it would not cease to be such unless it's negation has 
been brought about by the statute. The learned judge observed:^*' 
"Even in the absence of Article 21 in the Constitution, the 
State has got no power to deprive a person of his life or 
liberty without the authority of law without such "sanctity 
of life and liberty the distinction between a lawless 
society and one governed by laws would cease to have 
any meaning." 
In his summary of conclusions,^'' the learned judge declared that: 
(i) Article 21 cannot be considered to be the sole repository oi' the 
right to life and personal liberty; 
(ii) Even in the absence of Article 21, the State cannot deprive a 
person of his life or personal liberty without the authority of law; 
and 
(iii) The learned judge, went on to hold that, when the right to move 
any court for enforcement of Article 21 is suspended, it would 
have the effect of dispensing with the necessity of prescribing 
procedure for the exercise of substantive power to deprive a 
person of his life or personal liberty, it cannot have the effect of 
permitting an authority to deprive a person of his life or personal 
liberty without the existence of such substantive power. 
The dissenting opinion of Justice Khanna has been hailed as a 
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humanitarian and correct decision by the jurists." For its sheer 
straightforwardness and foresight, the decision can be described as a 
bold decision in the advent of emergency and the talk of committed 
judiciary. The judicial activism of the sole Judge Khanna who gave a 
dissenting judgment resulted in negative the majority decision by the 
44'^  Amendment of the Constitution as well as subsequent judicial 
interpretation. As a resuh of this bold decision and judicial activism of 
Justice Khanna, now the enforcement of Article 20 and 21 cannot be 
suspended in any situation and even the proclamation of National 
Emergency also cannot affect their enforcement, under Article 359 of 
the Constitution. 
If there is one Judgment of the Supreme Court which revolutionized the 
interpretation of Article 21 which guarantees the right to life and 
personal liberty, it is Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India.'^ Ihis 
judgment has woken the Indian judiciary from the deep slumber, as 
regards the life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the 
Constitution. In the instant case, the petitioner, Mrs, Maneka Gandhi's 
passport was impounded by the Union of India in "Public interest' by 
an order dated July 2, 1977. The Government of India declined to 
furnish the reasons for its decision "in the interest of the general 
public". Thereupon she filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the 
Constitution before Supreme Court to challenge the order. It was held 
by the Supreme Court 7-Judges Bench that it could not be said that a 
good enough reason had been shown to exist for impounding .he 
passport of the petitioner. The majority view of the Bench delivered by 
Bhagwati, J (as, he then was) for himself, Untwalia J^*^  and Murtaza 
Fazal Ali, j , speaks of the most important contribution made by the 
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judiciary for the development of constitutional jurisprudence relating to 
the "life and personal liberty" under Article 21 of the Constitution. The 
majority dealt with, at great detail (i) the meaning and content of 
personal liberty in Article 21 (ii) the Inter relationship between Articles 
14, 19 and 21 (iii) the extent of territory, to which freedom of speech 
and expression is confined (iv) whether the right to go abroad is 
covered by Articles 19(l)(a) or (g) and (v) the application of the 
doctrine of natural justice, to administrative action etc., among the 
other issues. A brief summary of the conclusions arrived ly the 
majority would throw light on the extent of activism present in the 
judicial interpretation. The following priceless statements were made 
by Justice Bhagwati, which have had a short term as well as a long 
term impact on the life and personal liberty of any person in India, 
(i) The expression "Personal liberty" in Article 21 is of the \\idest 
amplitude and it covers a variety of rights which go to constitute 
the personal liberty of man, and some of them have been raised 
to the status of distinct fiindamental rights given protection under 
Article 19. '^ 
(ii) The procedure (in Article 21) cannot be arbitrary, unfair and 
unreasonable.^^ 
(iii) Article 21 does not exclude Article 19 and that even if there is a 
law prescribing a procedure for depriving a person of 'personal 
liberty' such law in so far it abridges or takes away any 
fundamental rights under Article 19 would have to meet the 
challenge of that article.^^ If a law depriving a person of'personal 
liberty and prescribing a procedure for that purpose within the 
meaning of Article 21 has to stand the test of one or more of the 
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fundamental rights conferred under Article 19 which ma}' be 
applicable in a given situation, ex hypothesi it must also be liable 
to be tested with reference to Article 14. 
(iv) Freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(l)(a) 
is exercisable not only in India but also outside 65 
Thus the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi overruled the 28 year old 
decision in A.K. Gopalan as regards the interpretation of Article 21 and 
more particularly the meaning of "life", "personal liberty" and the 
procedure as they appear in the right to life and personal liberty. Due to 
the liberal interpretation of this precious fundamental right, a new era of 
humanitarian jurisprudence came to be recognized, so much so that 
Article 21 has become the only means through which many fundamental 
rights emanated. These rights include the right to live with basic human 
dignity, right to livelihood, right to go abroad, right to minimum wages, 
right to education, Right to privacy and even the right to die. This list is 
only illustrative and not exhaustive. All this became possible, solely due 
to the positive change in the judicial behavior of the Supreme Court, in 
"Maneka Gandhi". For the aforementioned reasons, it can be 
undoubtedly claimed that Maneka Gandhi was one of those highly 
activist decisions of the Supreme Court before the advent of a regular 
activist tendency. 
III. DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
Judicial activism had gone several stages of developments. For the 
purpose of this study, the judicial activism will be discussed in relation 
to Article 21 of Indian Constitution under three different phases viz. the 
period of no judicial emphasis on Human Rights, the period of judicial 
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emphasis on human rights and the doctrine of basic structure and the 
period when the Supreme Court started reading new Human Rights 
from the provisions of fundamental rights under the Constitution. 
The period of not giving judicial emphasis on Human Rights: 
The most important case among the cases in this era is A.K. 
Gopalan Case.^^ In this case A.K. Gopalan, a communist, was preventiv 
ely detained by the government. He challenged the validity cf his 
detention under the Preventive Detention Act IV on the ground tliat he 
had been deprived of his liberty in an unlawful manner. It was argued on 
his behalf that Article 21 of the Constitution should be liberally 
interpreted like the due process clause in the 14* amendment of 
American Constitution and nobody should be deprived of his liberty 
without providing reasonable opportunity of hearing to him before 
taking any adverse action against him. And he applied under Article 32 
of the Constitution for a writ of habeas corpus and his release from 
detention. It was argued that the term "procedure established by law" 
under Article 21 of the Constitution should be interpreted as only 
proper, reasonable and fair procedure as it is the position in the USA. 
But the judiciary rejected this argument and gave a narrow interpretation 
to the term 'procedure established by law'. And by a majority vote the 
Supreme Court held that procedure established by law means any 
procedure which has been laid down by competent legislature whether 
proper or improper. But the dissenting opinion of the Justice Fazal Ali 
was quite enlightening as he interpreted the words 'procedure 
established by law' quite liberally. The Supreme Court will not enquire 
into the reasonableness or the wisdom of the procedure. In this case, the 
Supreme Court gave narrow and literal interpretation to the concept of 
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life and personal liberty under Article 21. The Apex Court accepted any 
law if it is legislated by legislature. It was not concerned to take care of 
the arbitrary and illegal actions of the state and the executive rattier it 
gave protection to the state and the executive. During this period, the 
right to life and personal liberty was seriously eroded. This case held the 
field for almost three decades and it settled two major points.''^ First, 
Article 19, 21 and 22 were mutually exclusive and Article 19 was not to 
be applied to a law affecting personal liberty. Second, law affecting 
personal liberty could not be declared unconstitutional merely because it 
lacks natural justice or due procedure. This case had shown the lack of 
human rights commitment on the part of the apex court. It also reflects 
the positive approach of the court in the early days. Another example 
where retreat of the judiciary was observed may be observed in the dark 
period of emergency in A.D.M. Jabalpur case^^. This case shows the 
judicial passivism is also known as habeas corpus case. In this case, the 
Supreme Court by majority held that in view of the presidential order of 
1975 no person had any "locus standi" to move any petition before a 
High Court under Article 226 for a writ of habeas corpus or any other 
writ to challenge the legality of a detention order on the ground that it 
was not under or was vitiated by malafide, factual or legal or was based 
on extraneous grounds. In this case the Supreme Court failed to protect 
the fundamental rights of Indian people during emergency when the 
judicial intervention was actually needed. In this case the question arose 
whether the impugned black law known as the Maintenance of Internal 
Security Act (MISA) which took away the fundamental liberties of 
Indian people was valid? Whether fundamental rights of life and 
fundamental freedom guaranteed under the Constitution could be 
suspended during the emergency? The Supreme Courts by a majority 
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vote decided that the only rule of law during emergency was the 
emergency of law itself, and the judiciary will not inquire into the 
validity of a preventive detention even when it is made with malafide 
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motives. 
The Period of Judicial Emphasis on Human Rights and Doctrine of 
Basic Structure: 
After the year 1976, the Supreme Court started to assume its power to 
protect the fundamental rights in this period. The famous examj^ le is 
Golak Nath v. State of Punjab. The Supreme Court held that even the 
Parliament does not have any power to abridge or take away any of the 
fundamental rights from the date of decision in that case. In this case, 
the ceiling laws and land refoiTn amendments were challenged on the 
ground that they took away the fundamental right of property oi land 
owners in violation of Article 31 of the Constitution. On behalf c>f the 
government, it was argued that parliament has the power to amend any 
part of the Constitution including part III of the Constitution which 
includes fundamental rights. But the Supreme Court rejected this 
argument and held that even parliament under the amending powers can 
not take away the fundamental rights of the people. The decision of the 
Supreme Court was said to be applied from the date of decision in future 
only and this was called doctrine of prospective overruling.''' This 
decision was a landmark in the protection of fundamental rights. From 
this extreme position of denying power of amendment to the parliament, 
the apex court moved to a more power and logical position when in 
1973 in the famous case of Keshavananda Bharti^^ it accepted 
Parliament's Power to amend the Constitution but imposed the 
restriction not to disturb the basic structure of the Constitution through 
amendability. The Supreme Court proceeded and declared the 
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Constitution has basic features called basic structure, which could not be 
taken by any amendment of the legislature. In this case Swami 
Keshawananda Bharati, the Mutt Chief of Kerala challenged the validity 
of Kerala Land Reform Act, 1963 as amended in 1969 in the 24"' 
Amendment. After he was allowed he challenged also 25' and 29' 
Amendments. In his challenge, he reasoned out that Parliament should 
not be authorized to abrogate the essential features, basic elements and 
fundamental provisions of the Constitution. Such Construction must be 
held illegal and void. The Supreme Court decided the basic structure of 
the Constitution can not be touched by the legislature and fundamental 
rights under part III of the Constitution are basic structure of Indian 
Constitution and they are non-amendable. Another development of this 
period could be read from Smt. Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain'\ the 
occasion arose whether the elections of the Prime Minister could be 
placed beyond judicial review? In June 1975, the then Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi's election as a member of parliament was held to be 
vitiated by corrupt practice as per Allahabad High Court decision and 
the appeal was pending before the Supreme Court. In the meantime, 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi declared emergency to save her chair and she sent 
opposition leaders behind the bars. She managed to pass an amendment 
to the Constitution, which provided that the election of the i^ rime 
Minister as well as the Speaker of the Lower House will not be open to 
be questioned in any court of law. The Supreme Court struck down the 
impugned amendment as violative of the basic structure of the 
Constitution. This is a glorious example of judicial activism to save 
Indian democracy.^ "* Not only amendment if it infringes fundamental 
rights becomes void but also laws inconsistent with the Constitution are 
considered void. 
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The period when the judiciary started readins New Human Rishts 
from the provisions of the Constitution 
Since and after Maneka Gandhi Case a new era, a new approach on 
interpretation of the Constitution is clearly visible. The judiciary started 
to play creative role and the period became to be known as the period of 
judicial activism where the judiciary started reading new human Rights 
from the provisions of Fundamental Rights under the Constitution. 
These rights are those termed as judicially created Human Rights. The 
real judicial activism was shown in Maneka Gandhi case, which b<xame 
an instrument of social change and providing social justice to the public 
at large. In this case, the government of India impounded the passport of 
Mrs. Maneka Gandhi, under section 10(3)(c) of the Passport Act. 1967 
in public interest without providing reasonable opportunity of hearing, 
when she demanded as to why her passport was impounded the passport 
authority replied that it was done in "public interest". When she further 
insisted that what was the compelling "public interest" to impound her 
passport, the government replied that even the ground for impounding 
the passport could not be disclosed in "public interest". So she 
challenged the decision of the passport authority. The Supreme Court 
gave a liberal interpretation to Article 21 of the Constitution, which 
provided that nobody could be deprived of his life or personal liberty 
except according to the procedure established by law. The Supreme 
Court held that only by a reasonable, just and fair procedure, the 
fundamental rights of a citizen could be curtailed. Maneka Gandhi case 
shows, how liberal tendencies have influenced the Supreme Court. Since 
then, the Supreme Court has shown great sensitivity to the protection of 
human life and personal liberty and fertilized many provisions of the 
Constitution with meaning and context.^^ The Supreme Court laid down 
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a number of prepositions seeking to make Article 21 much more 
meaningful. For example:-
(a) The Court held that Article 14, 19, 21 and Article 19 and 21 are 
not mutually exclusive but are interlinked. This means a law 
prescribing a procedure for depriving a person of personal liberty 
has to meet the requirement of Article 19. The procedure 
established by law in Article 21 must answer the requirements of 
Article 14 as well. According to Justice Krishna Iyer no Article in 
part III of the Constitution is an island in itself.^ '' 
(b) The court emphasized that the expression "personal libeny" in 
Article 21 is of wide amplitude covering a variety of rights which 
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go to constitute the personal liberty of man. 
(c) The most creative aspect of Maneka Gandhi case is that 
the court gave new meaning to the expression "procedure 
established by law" in Article 21, and gave it a new orientation. 
The procedure must satisfy certain requirements in the sense 
of being unfair not being unfair or unreasonable. The Court 
has now the power to judge the fairness and justness of the 
procedure established by law to deprive a person of his 
personal liberty.^^ Justice P.N. Bhagwati said Article 21 embodies 
a Constitutional value of Supreme importance in a democratic 
society. Justice Krishna Iyer characterized Article 21 as "the 
procedural Magnacarta protective of life and liberty" and added 
the spirit of man is at the root of Article 21.^ *^  The Supreme Court 
strengthened Article 21 since, the required laws affecting personal 
liberty should also pass the test of Article 14 and Article 19 of the 
Constitution and thereby be reasonable, fair and just. The court 
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also recognized several unarticulated liberties that were implied in 
Article 21 (protection of life and personal liberty) in relation to 
Article 14 (equality before the law and equal protection of law) 
Article 19 (protection of certain rights) of the Constitution of 
India. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENT APPROACHES ON 
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
It is settled matter that the judges make law in the common law system. 
It is undoubtedly but reasonably conceded by all that judges not merely 
declare or interpret the law but they do something more, and that is, they 
make the law, create the law, discover the law and invent the law. In 
making, creating, discovering and inventing the law, it is not alone 
craftsmanship of the judge but it is the courage as well as creativ ity of 
the judge which bring him a name as a maker, or creator, or discoverer, 
or inventor of law. It is the courage of the judge who responds to the 
social-economic conditions of the society and renders social justice: it's 
the creativity of the judge who gives judicial craftsmanship to the 
legislative void or gap. Judicial activism is, after all, a segment of 
judicial process. Judicial activism as such signifies that judiciary is 
awakened to the existing realities of the socio-economic conditions of 
the society, and as such it intends to implement vigorously the social 
goals through the instrumentalities of social justice outlined in our 
Constitution as well as legislative enactments. It does so because it 
seems as the judiciary has awakened from its deep sweet slumber 
shunning the passivist role and adapting to the activist role, viz., 
adapting itself with the changing socio-economic context (rhythms of 
the society). It portrays that law is not (and it must never be) static, but it 
is (and it must always be) dynamic. As is true with the State so is with 
the Law. The State is not static but is dynamic. History affords 
testimony. There has hitherto been a constant progress-shift from the 
primitive stage to the stone age; stone age to wheel age; wheel age to 
industrial and scientific age; and now it has entered into an era of 
nuclear as well as computer age, This demonstrates the progressive 
civilization and evolution of the society from animalistic state through 
chalcolithic state through neochalcolithic state and paleolithic state to 
civilization. The indicator is that the change is the law of nature. 
Similarly, law changes with the changing mores of society. In this 
development, the judiciary plays a dynamic role. The under mentioned 
prophesy of Justice P.N. Bhagwati (as he then was) is penetrating and 
time alarming: 
We cannot allow the dead hand of the past to stifle the 
growth of the living present. Law cannot stand still; it 
must change with the changing social concepts and 
values. If the bark that protects the tree fails to grow and 
expand along with the tree, it will shed that bark and 
grow a new living bark for itself. Similarly, if the law 
fails to respond to the needs of changing society, then 
either it will stifle the growth of the society and choke its 
progress or if the society is vigorous enough, it will cast 
away the law which stands in the way of its growth. Law 
must, therefore, constantly be on the move adapting itself 
to the fast changing society and not lag behind. It must 
shake off the inhibiting legacy of its colonial past and 
assume a dynamic role in the process of social 
transformation. 
In this process we have to examine a judge's role not in what he says-
but what he really does when he pronounces the law. We have to 
evaluate the evolution of the juristic contribution with reference to the 
demands of social change. Is it the personal propensities or pre-
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dispositions of a judge which are responsible for law-making by judges 
or is it the impact of the social change which compels judiciary to adopt 
the activist role. From the point of view of legal scholars there are three 
main approaches of the judicial activism viz. (1) the Classical or 
Doctrinal Approach, (2) the Renaissance or Realistic Approach, and (3) 
the Social Justice (Judicial Activism) Approach. 
1. THE CLASSICAL OR DOCTRINAL APPROACH 
In these theories it is denied that the courts are the real authors of the 
law. It is contended that they are merely the mouthpieces which give it 
expression.^^ 
(a) Blackstone 
The role of courts in developing a legal system has been recognized. 
But, there is a serious debate regarding the limits of law-making by 
judges in the modem society. Though it is well known that common law 
was evolved by the judges through the process of interpretation of 
conflicting customs and usages, the celebrated jurist Blackstone was of 
the firm opinion that the judges do not make law but only interpret it.""' 
In the struggle between the king and the parliament in England the 
judges in the beginning played the dubious role of interpreting the law in 
a partisan spirit. The common law lawyers and jurists became suspicious 
with regard to the role of the judges and pleaded for taking away of 
discretionary powers of the judiciary. 
(b) Jeremy Bentham 
The famous British jurist Bentham was aware of the tortuous way in 
which the laws of England developed from the time of Henry II of bis 
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own time. There was in his time an urgent need of reforms and such 
massive reforms could only be brought by legislatures. Consequently, 
Bentham lost patient with judicial law-making and pleaded vehmently 
for taking away the discretionary powers of the judges by enacting clear, 
lucid and simple laws which would not create any problem of 
interpretation.^"* Jeremy Bentham, therefore, says of law in these words: 
"Law, or the Law, taken indefinitely, is an abstract and 
collective term which, when it means anything, can mean 
neither more nor less than the sum total of a number of 
individual laws taken together.' 
(c) John Austin 
The next of these theories is that of Austin, In Austin's Province there is 
no scope of judicial activism, that is, judicial law-making. He asserts 
that law is a set of propositions, and these propositions must have 
logical consistency. He views that law is made up of the Commands of 
the Sovereign. He says: 
Every positive law obtaining in any community, is a 
creative of the Sovereign or State; having been 
established immediately by the monarch or supreme 
body, as exercising legislative or judicial functions; or 
having been established immediately by a subject 
individual or body, as exercising rights or powers body 
has expressly or tacitly conferred.^^ 
Austin's this delineation in a sense may be true, that is, the State can 
inhibit its courts from following this or that rule; but it often lea\ es the 
courts free to follow what they think rights. It is, indeed, a meaningless, 
a forced as well as a coercive expression to say that one commands 
things to be done, for she has power to forbid their being done. It is 
certainly clear from this that where the judge has not received direct 
commands from the State, he does not consider he is not expected to 
consider what would please the State. His thoughts are directed to the 
question-what have other judges held? His job and role in this direction 
is thus limited. Is it not absurdity? It is not meaningless when the spark 
of truth that the law changes as language, culture, political system and 
economic structure of society evolve and transform is distorted by a 
mist of rhetoric^^? Be that as it may, Austin, indeed, defines the law as 
being the aggregate of the rules established by political superiors. 
(d) Friedrich Karl von Savigny 
Savigny, the fountainhead of the Historical School of Jurisprudence, 
very able expounded the theory on the nature of law that the couits, in 
deciding cases, are, in truth, applying what has previously existed m the 
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common consciousness of the people . Savigny proposes that law is not 
the arbitrary creation of the command of the State or the government 
officials; law is not developed by the arbitrary will of a law-giver, but an 
integral part of the "spirit of a people". He advocates "an organically 
progressive jurisprudence" which does not mean as defending the 
Common Law (for English and American lawyers) as opposed to civil 
code.^'' Reviewing Savigny's nature of law, it is evident that Savigny is 
confronted by a same difficulty as confronted Austin. The fact that the 
great bulk of the law emanates what the sovereign permits, or he 
commands; but equally the fact remains that the great bulk of the law is 
unknown to the people. How, then, can it be the product of their 
common consciousness? How it can be that of which they feel the 
necessity as law? The notion that the opinions of theywra consults are 
the developed opinions of the people, thus, seems to be groundless. 
Those who hold that jurists are mouthpieces of the popular convictions 
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in matters of law ought to have deak satisfactorily that "in the countries 
of the English Common Law, where the judges are the jurists whose 
opinions go to make up the law, there would be less absurdity in 
considering them as expressing the opinions of the people". ° 
(e) Sir Henry James Summer Maine 
Maine argues that "the key to an understanding of the evolution of law 
lies in the early forms of jural conceptions, which are to the jurists what 
the primary crusts of the earth are to the geologist. They contain, 
potentially, all the forms in which law has subsequently exhibited 
itself.'^ ' The most primitive jurisprudential stage is a legal system based 
on the judgment of kings. " Maine maintains that the judgments of kings 
do not qualify as a true law, but are mere commands because these 
judgments of kings are not connected to one another in any "orderly 
sequence".^ "^ "The second state", for Maine, "which grows out of heroic 
kingship and then supplants it, is the domain of aristocracies, when the 
office of the king is usurped by a council of chiefs. At this stage, the 
conception of law as a body of rules is bom, and with it the power of a 
juristical oligarchy whose power is founded on the clan to monopolies 
the knowledge of the laws, to have the exclusive possession of the 
principles by which quarrels are decided. Out of aristocracy in turn 
grows the epoch of Customary Law, and finally Codification".^ "^ Third 
stage may be seen in Maine's Patriarchal Theory. Herein Maine argues 
that "the state evolves out of the family. The eldest male parent is 
absolutely supreme in his household. Society is organized not as a 
collection of individuals but an aggregation of families, the Gens or 
House, and finally the Tribe. At this point, Legal fictions enter which 
permit family relations to be created artificially; this idea of artificial 
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kinship is the need for the idea of the social contract and the modem 
state.'^ ^ 
(f) H.L.A. Hart 
The limits of judicial law-making have been carefully examined by 
Professor Hart. According to him, the legislative provisions do not 
suffer from uncertainties; from contradictions. These have a core of 
meaning which remains constant and the judges can do hardly an} thing 
to change this meaning. However, he conceded that to a limited extent 
the law-making is done by judges in the penumbral areas. Professor Hail 
conceives that words are vague and ambiguous, and the vagueness of 
words can be clarified by distinguishing a core of settled meaning from 
a penumbra of border-line cases.*^ ^ But the extent of this law-making is 
insignificant. 
An overview of the above delineated theories amply demonstrates thai 
law is an abstract entity pre-existing. The whole set of positivist writers 
claimed that the judges had no discretion and depicted this as an ideal 
form for preserving the liberty of the individual. These positivist list 
significantly tell that the judiciary, too, is an important segment of the 
government which makes the law according to the changing milieus of 
the society. Thus, in these theories, it is denied that the courts are the 
real authors of the law. In these theories, it seems, it is contended that 
they are merely the mouthpieces which give it expression.^'' 
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2. THE RENAISSANCE OR REALISTIC APPROACH 
In jurisprudential thought there was a movement of general interest. 
This movement came to be known "realism". This movement while 
rejecting the view that law is an abstract entity pre-existing and waiting 
to be found by a judge, asserts that law is, in great measure, made by the 
judge.^^ Those scholars who follow this approach constitute the 
renaissance or realistic school of legal evolution. 
(a) Oliver Wendell Holmes. Jr. 
He is known to be propounder of "realism" because this jurisprudential 
thought is traced to Holmes.*^ ^ Holmes works "^ '^  have held for 
generations of scholars. Two great ideas are attributable to Holmes; viz., 
One is that "judges make law"; Second is that the law evolves to the 
"felt necessities of the time". Both ideas account for the continuing 
fascination and are, perhaps, the central paradox of jurisprudence. 
Holmes' these two ideas are associated with his two theses. One, that 
begins to answer the fiindamental question: What constitutes the Law? 
in the Path of Law: 
The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and 
nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the Law."^' 
And, the second, which is now classic, that begins The Common Law: 
The life of the law has not been logic it has been 
experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent 
moral and political theories, institutions of public policy, 
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges 
share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more 
to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by 
which men should be governed.'^^ 
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(b) Benjamin N. Cardozo 
Cardozo in his famous treatise, The Nature of The Judicial Process takes 
"judge-made law as one of the existing realities of life".'°^ In articulating 
this classic venture, Cardozo has certain basic questions relating to 
judicial process; viz., What is it that judge does when he decides a case? 
To what sources of information does he appeal for guidance?; In what 
proportions does he permit them (Sources) to contribute to the result ?; 
If a precedent is applicable, how does he reach the rule that will make a 
precedent for the future?; If he is seeking logical consistency, the 
symmetry of the legal stmcture, how far shall he seek it?; At what point 
shall the quest be halted by some discrepant custom, b\ some 
consideration of the social welfare, by his own: or the common 
standards of justice and morals? Cardozo explains these qut-sts for 
justice in understandable language, i.e., the "conscious" and 
"subconscious" processes by which a judge decides a case. The sources 
of information to which the judge appeals for guidance in shaping his 
decisions are: the method of philosophy, considerations of precedent, 
logical consistency, custom, social welfare, and standards of justice and 
morals. The judge's job—say role— becomes more rhetoric when he is 
to give coherence and direction to thought and action. And, this be does 
as "interpreter for the community of its sense of law and order i which) 
must supply omissions, correct uncertainties, and harmonize results with 
justice through a method of free decision.""^"* Courts are, after all, to 
"search for light among the social elements of every kind that are the 
living force behind the facts they deal with"."^^ The judge who is 
dynamic moulds the law by the method of welfare of society. The 
method of welfare of society calls upon the judges to say bow far 
existing rules are to be extended or restricted, they must let the welfare 
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of society fix the path, its direction and its distance.'°^ There is least 
denying the fact that "the final cause of law", Cardozo asserts, "is the 
welfare of society. The rule that misses its aim cannot permanently 
justify its existence."^^ By all standards, Cardozo's analysis of judicial 
process is a result-oriented contribution to jurisprudential theory of 
judicial law-making. Considerations of precedents, logical consistency, 
customs, social welfare and standards of justice and morals have 
immense contribution in shaping the judicial legislation. 
(c) John Chipman Gray 
Gray exhibits a theory which concedes that "rules laid down by the 
judges (courts) of a country state the present law correctly... In truth, all 
the law is judge-made law. The shape in which a statute is imposed on 
the community as a guide for conduct is that statue as interpreted by the 
courts. The courts put life into the dead words of the statute".'*'^ 
Through this theory Gray gives the definition, which he believes to be 
correct, of law: 
The law of the State or of any organized body of men is 
composed of the rules which the courts, that is, the 
judicial organs of that body, lay down for the 
determination of legal rights and duties. The difference in 
this matter between contending schools of Jurisprudence 
arise largely from not distinguishing between the law and 
the Sources of the Law."^^ 
Gray sums up his thesis this way: 
"The State exists for the protection and forwarding of 
human interests, mainly through the medium of rights 
and duties. If every member of the State know perfectly 
his own rights and duties, and the rights and duties of 
every body else, the State would need no judicial organs; 
administrative organs would, suffice. But there is no such 
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universal knowledge. To determine, in actual life, what 
are the rights and duties the judges settle, what Facts 
exist, and also lay down rules according to which they 
deduce legal consequences from facts. These rules are 
the Law". 
One thing is apparent from Gray's articulation that when State fails to 
observe, preserve and protect the human rights (State here is used in a 
broader perspective, i.e., legislative as well as executive), the task as 
well as the role of the judiciary becomes important, and as such the 
judiciary steps into observe, preserve and protect the human rights. The 
judiciary takes this step only when the State fails to perform its part, i.e., 
duties. 
(d) Arthur Linton Corbin 
Corbin in The Law and The Judge appears to build an argument that 
"the growth of the law is an evolutionary process".'" He, then, proceeds 
to distinguish between the law as applied in individual cases, which 
judges make as an act of will, and legal doctrines or rules of law which 
evolve in populations of cases. Corbin's thesis is: 
A judge's declared rules must compete for their lives with 
the rules declared by other judges and by all other 
persons. In the judicial world, as in the animal and 
vegetable world, the ultimate law is the law of the 
survival of the fittest. Do the judges make the law? 
Undoubtedly they do, so far as the litigating parties are 
concerned. As to the parties to the suit, the court of last 
resort can and does lay down the rule according to its 
will."^ 
Corbin agrees that the judges have power to make law. But he 
emphasizes that the value of the judge's law is dependent upon the role 
of the community. Whatsoever the value of Corbin's thesis, or vv^ hether 
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he moves beyond those of Holmes, Cardozo and Gray, however, 
remains an untold story. But one fact is evident that by stretch of his 
unorthodox articulations (because at that time it was then acknowledged 
fact that judge does make the law, and this fact jurisprudentially became 
orthodox as well as unparalleled) he was criticized for his this writing in 
his own times, as an enunciator of heretical proposition. 
(3) SOCIAL JUSTICE OR JUDICIAL ACTIVISM APPROACH 
In recent past, several approaches have emerged in jurisprudential 
evolution to shortening as well as jettisoning the shortcomings of the 
past or the earlier attitudes relating to judicial law-making. Toda}', it is 
the general consensus of opinion, in Anglo-American, Anglo-Sexon and 
Anglo-Indian jurisprudence, that, within certain narrow and clearly 
defined limits, new law is created by the judiciary." Stage has been set 
aright as the modem legal theory is enthralled by what the judiciary has 
been doing to the law to advance it into the twentieth century, and 
perhaps, may be into the twenty-first century. It is also discernible that, 
the Sociological Jurisprudence is influential in developing the notion of 
Social Justice (or distributive justice) in the present socio-economic 
context. It is, therefore, desirable, having this background cue, to 
examine succincdy sociological Jurisprudence; social justice (or 
distributive justice); and the influence they have on the judicial activism 
with particular reference to India. It would be interesting to note that the 
process "has been much concerned to explore the inner workings of the 
judicial system", because the judiciary has to "meet new Social 
needs"."^ 
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(a) Sociological or Functional Approach 
Roscoe Pound is the outstanding nota bene of tiiis approach. The 
purpose, mean, and end of law is "social engineering", meaning thereby 
Pound identifies the task of the lawyer as "social engineering". This way 
Pound emphasizes that "the creative role of the judiciary is in the 
forefront, as is the need for a new legal technique directed to social 
needs. The call is for a new functional approach to law"."^According to 
Pound, therefore, sociological jurisprudence should ensure that the 
making, interpretation and application of laws take account of social 
facts. To achieving this end there should be : (a) a factual study of the 
social effects of legal administration, (b) social investigaticms as 
preliminaries to legislation, (c) a consistent study of the means for 
making laws more, (d) the study, both psychological and philosophical, 
of the judicial method, (e) a sociological study of legal histoiy, (f) 
allowance for the possibility of a just, and reasonable solution of 
individual cases, (g) a ministry of justice in English-speaking countries, 
and (h) the achievement of the purposes of various laws. Therefore, to 
achieving the purposes of the legal order has to be a recognition of 
certain interests; viz., individual, public and social. "Social engineering", 
thus, aims at building as efficient a structure of society as possible, 
which requires the satisfaction of the maximum of wants with the 
minimum of friction and waste."'' Pound's pertinent call that the task of 
the lawyer as "social engineering is the beginning of an era of "social 
justice", or call it "distributive justice", that is, the means of informing 
judges, jurists and law-makers as to the social facts involved in 
legislation and in the judicial finding, shaping, and application of legal 
precepts."^ 
(b) Social or Distributive Justice Approach 
Professor Rawls' theory of justice, it seems, provide an ample guideline 
to the legislature to adopt to social change in order to aiming at social 
justice. The role on the part of the judiciary manifestly demonstrates that 
where the legislature is silent to perform its part, the judiciary may 
unhesitatingly perform that part. Succinctly stated, Rawls' Social Justice 
means: 
"Justice of the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is 
of systems of thoughts. The primary subject of justice is 
the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in 
which the major social institutions distribute 
fundamental rights and duties and determine the division 
of advantages from social co-operation ". 
Rawls main thrust or aim is to work out a theory of justice that is a 
viable alternative to the traditional, classical and intuitional conceptions 
of the "social contract," "utilitarianism" and "justice"."'^ Rawls 
exposition of a theory of justice falls in to three parts viz, "justice as 
Fairness" "distributive or compensatory justice" and "the sense of 
Justice". Rawls full statement of these just noted formulations consist of 
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the following principles. 
First, each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty 
for others. Second, social and economic inequalities are 
to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably 
expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached 
to positions and offices open to all. 
All social primary goods liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, 
and the bases of self respect are to be distributed equally unless an 
unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of 
the least favoured. 
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Rawls second principle reads thus: 
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so 
that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions 
open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity. 
These principles and priorities are fit in a society of haves, that is 
to say, a society which is economically well of or sound. 
Therefore, his theory fits in capitalistic society. 
V. JUDICIARY AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
In his much celebrated work A Grammar of Politics, L.aski 
philosophically observes: 
Every State is known by the rights that it maintains. And 
taking a creative view of rights, he further defines it as 
"those conditions of social life without which no man can 
seek, in general, to be himself at his best". 
According to Rawl, justice means fairness, rights essentially mean a 
claim of the people on the State (through constitutionally and legally 
secured provisions) for capacity endowment so as to improve their life 
chances. Rights claimed on the State has two crucial aspects—one is the 
protection from State's coercion and other seeking positive action or 
affirmative duties from the State towards creation of such conditions 
which could facilitate the realization of minimum basic human right or 
right to a dignified life. This, in other words, means a socially 
accountable state system. How is it achieved? To ensure this, the 
different theories of constitutionalism lay stress, in the first instance, on 
codifying state-society relations, and secondly, providing for an 
impartial and independent structure of jusfice delivery system.'''* 
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Structured around the ethos of democracy and good governance, the 
exercise of 'Codification' involves guaranteeing civil and political 
rights, economic, social and cultural rights, and minimum development 
rights or right to development. These three categories can best be 
described as citizenship rights (including freedom of political action), 
identity maintenance rights and developmental rights. By virtue of these 
rights being codified, they, in the realm of individual Constitution are 
referred as fundamental rights or bill of rights. 
However, a democratized access to justice as a collective right of the 
people is vitally important for actualizing and protecting human rights 
from State's apathy and attack. A progressive judiciary cannot only 
safeguard the protection and promotion of human rights, but it can also 
ensure proper executive action, and can impress upon legislature to 
initiate enabling legislation in this regard. This is done through an 
imaginative and creative interpretation of the text of the Constitution. 
Unlike the traditionalist prescription for an originalist interpretation of 
the text of law, a socially activist judiciary seeks to provide the law a 
social purpose and meaning. Law is perceived and used as instrument of 
social change and to secure to its people the justice-social, economic 
and political. Content of the law is delineated in accordance with the 
social, economic and political philosophy of the Constitution. In this 
mode of interpretation, the court does specify the positive role and 
duties of the State, individuals and groups.'^^ Rights are constructed in 
such a manner as to achieve the object of larger social good and 
individual welfare. To this end supplementary rights are also created for 
the realization of principal rights. Access to justice has another 
dimension too. The constitutional provision of right to judicial remedies 
would not serve the purpose unless justice-delivery system is simplified 
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and liberalized from unwanted originalist procedural technicalities. 
Participatory justice is the basic ethos of judicial activism. Therefore, 
rules regulating the registration of a case to its summary conclusion 
need to be simplified and liberalized. This exercise in turn develops 
and promotes three interrelated set of rights-right to a free legal aid, 
right to information, and right to a speedy trial. Judicial emphasis on 
these basic human rights of the people has led to the growth of a judicial 
aid movement, initiated on behalf of a class of people (Usually 
downtrodden, poor and underprivileged) either by a public spirited 
individual or institution. Thus, a socially accountable and responsive 
judicial system upholding the principle of democratized access to 
justice can go in a long way to humanize the face of law and deliveiy of 
justice—social, economic and political, to the people, especially those 
who on account of structured inequality, poverty and illiteracy have yet 
to enjoy their fundamental human right-the right to a dignified life.'"'^  
The Constitution of India is probably one of the best written documents 
of the world which has elaborately dealt with the dimensionality of 
human rights in two separate chapters—Part III (Fundamental Rights) 
and Part IV (Directive Pnnciples of State Policy). An integrated 
reading of two parts along with Preamble to the Constitution leads us to 
write that rights (human) have been treated not merely as legal 
entitlements or claims of the people on the State, but they are intended 
to bring about structural changes in the graded society of India. Thus 
rights are tempered with qualifying provisions of distributive justict; and 
special instruction to State to carve out its socio-economic policies in 
such a manner as to promote welfare of those segments of the society 
which have hitherto been subjected to inequality and exploitation in a 
hierarchical and feudal social order of India. Freedom with welfare 
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seems to be the essence of human rights provisions of the Indian 
Constitution.'^^ The majority of its provisions are either directly anned 
at furthering the goals of the social revolution or attempt to foster this 
revolution by establishing the conditions necessary for its achievement. 
Yet, despite the permeation of the entire Constitution by the aim of 
national renaissance, the core of the commitment to the social 
revolution lies in Parts III and IV in the Fundamental Rights and in the 
Directive Principles of State Policy (DPS).'^ *^ These are the conscience 
of the Constitution. Actualizing social justice seems to be the basic 
ethos of the Indian Constitution. 
As stated above, rights enumerated in Part-Ill are not absolute. They 
have been subjected to reasonable restriction imposed by the state for 
promoting collective good and welfare of the society and maintaining 
the public order. However, in no circumstances the State will suspend 
the minimal basic human rights. Though non-justiciable in nature, 
directives as enshrined in Part IV constitute statement on social 
revolution, which the Indian State, through appropriate legislati\e and 
administrative measures should strive to achieve.'^' They are 
nevertheless fiindamental in the governance of the country. Directives 
as laid down in Part-IV, as a matter of fact, supplement the Charter of 
human rights in Part-Ill of the Constitution. The Supreme Court of India 
in recent decades has taken into account the various provisions of DPSP 
to ensure 'justice as fairness' and to construct and expand the horizons 
of human rights. Before going deep into details of the role of judiciary 
in this regard, it is desirable to briefly enumerate the rights (both 
justiciable and non-justiciable) as laid down in Part-Ill and Part I\ . The 
fundamental rights have been divided into six broad categories The 
category I consists of different equality rights, securing the people 
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equality before law or the equal protection of laws, prohibiting 
discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex place of biilh, but 
permitting the protective discrimination for securing distributive justice 
and advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of 
citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, ensuring 
equality of opportunity in matters of employment or appointment in the 
jobs under the State, but allowing for reservation of jobs tor the 
backward class of people, abolished untouchability and titles. Category 
II (Right to Freedom) guaranteed with reasonable restricticn the 
freedom of speech and expression, assembly, associations or unions, 
movement, residence, and occupations, protects the people in respect of 
conviction for offences ensures that no person shall be deprived of his 
life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by 
law, protects people against arrest and detention in certain cases with 
qualifying attributes of human rights to the arrested or detained persons 
for self-defence or to be defended by the lawyer of his choice anc right 
to be informed of grounds for detention, etc. The category III consisting 
of two Articles constitutes rights against exploitation and thereby 
prohibits traffic in human beings and forced labour and protects by 
prohibiting the employment of children below the age of fourteen years 
in factories, etc. The category IV consists of right to freedom of 
conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion.''"^ 
But again it is subject to state-intervention on various secular grounds. 
Articles 29 and 30 constitute category V dealing exclusively witti the 
cultural and educational rights of minorities, and category VI consists of 
right to judicial remedies. On the other hand, DPSP broadly caters to the 
welfare and developmental rights of the people. This includes-equal 
justice and free aid, right to work, to education and to public assistance 
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in certain cases like unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, 
provision for just and human conditions of work and maternity relief. 
right to living wages, free and compulsory education for all children 
until they complete the age of fourteen years, promotion of education 
and economic interest of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and 
other weaker sections of the society, right to minimum standard of 
public health and nutrition, and right to hazards-free environment' . 
Most of these rights are in the form of duties of the State and hence 
enjoins upon it to initiate such material measures which can ensure the 
people the right to a dignified life. However the most significant aspect 
of constitutionalism and human rights is the exclusive and nevei to be 
denied the right to constitutional remedies under Articles 32 and 226. 
That a person whose rights have been violated has right to directly 
approach the High Courts and the Supreme Court for judicial 
rectification, redressal of grievances and enforcement of fundamental 
rights. The courts do so by issuing orders, writs or direction including 
writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo wairento, 
prohibition and certiorari.'^ "^ By virtue of this Article, the Supreme 
Court of India has expanded the ambit of judicial review to include 
review of all those state measures which either violate the fundamental 
rights or are violative of the basic structure of the Constitution and 
review of legislative measures and administrative decisions, the writ 
jurisdiction has been quite creatively and imaginatively used to give 
shape to judicial activism through innovation of public interest litigation 
(PIL) or social interest litigation (SIL) cases, especially since 1980.'^ ^ 
Thus, the court has now done away with 'orthodox bar of locus sicindi', 
and it can be approached even by a letter (named by Upendra Baxi as 
epistolary jurisdiction), which can be treated by the court as writ 
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petition. This practice has now been put on a sound jurisprudential 
foundation. Further, even the news item pubHshed in the newspapers 
can be treated as a writ by the court.'^^ The court has gone funher to 
innovate the new practice of fact-finding. It can ascertain facts through 
an independently constituted commission. A wholesome impact of 
procedural simplification has been on the growth of large number of 
social cases in the High Courts and Supreme Court of India. Public 
spirited individuals and institutions are seeking judicial intervention not 
only to protect human rights of the people, but are also seeking 
directions from the court on the matters of public importance such as 
liberalization and humanization of criminal judicial system, 
environment and natural resources, education, gender justice, 
reservation issues, consumer issues, corruption, etc.'^'' 
The contents of judicial pronouncements (excluding procedural issues 
involved therein) broadly cover the entitlement, protection and 
promotion of the rights of the affected individual, social classes, and 
groups related to this is the creation of'normative regime of rights', and 
providing for the material relief in the form of compensation, care and 
welfare by the State. In other words, it means laying down the p(«itive 
duties or affirmative action by the State.'^^ Thus, justice is not complete 
by simply freeing the bonded labourers from bondage, but the state is 
required to rehabilitate them and to provide them with the basic 
necessities of life. Providing the vocational training along with 
compensation to the industrial prisoners of the infamous Bhagalpur 
blinding case was ordered by the Supreme Court.'^^ Similarly, if right to 
health is the basic human right of the people, it is now duty of the State 
to suppress the sale of spurious drugs and to supply the qualitative drugs 
at reasonable prices. These instances do only prove that justice with 
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welfare seems to be the basic ethos of judiciary (and judicial aciivism) 
especially since 1980s.''^ *^  The object of justice with welfare has been 
achieved through a creative interpretation of the Constitution. The 
pertinent question here is-What kind of approach does the Indian 
judiciary has been following in about last three decades? To explicate 
an answer, it is worthwhile to briefly discuss the three distinct traditions 
or methods of judicial interpretation.'^' The first method is that of 
judges treating a written text, as ex-cathedra, i.e., faithfully fof owing 
the constitutional text without entrenching into the ethos, spirit and 
philosophy of the Constitution. This method has been referred as 
'bureaucratic tradition', inherently limited, narrow and too mechanically 
legalistic to serve the object of law, i.e., to deliver an integrated 
perspective of the Constitution, law and social change. In the second 
tradition, judges reduce the judicial functionality simply to restrict the 
state and its agency to act only within an authoritatively assigned 
jurisdiction.'"*^ To do so, the judges take an originalist view of the 
Constitution. But they fail to acknowledge the fact that a "Constitution 
is a totally different kind of enactment than, an ordinary statute. It is an 
organic instrument defining and regulating the power structure and 
power relafionships. It embodies the hopes and aspirations ol' the 
people. It protects certain basic values and it sets out certain objectives 
and goals. It cannot, therefore, be interpreted like any ordinary 
statute." It must be interpreted creatively and imaginatively with a 
view to advancing the constitutional values and spelling out and 
strengthening the basic human rights of the large masses of people in 
the country. From this perception follows the social justice approach to 
the interpretation of the constitufional law. In this approach, the text of 
the Constitution is provided with a contextualist reference to the basic 
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philosophy of the Constitution. The primary concern of this approach is 
the protection and promotion of human rights of the people with overall 
emphasis on the construction of the meanings of laws in such a manner 
as to ensure the deprived a right to dignified life.' During recent 
decades, Indian judiciary has taken recourse to this approach. And 
social justice has been perceived as 'capacity endowment' especially of 
those who on account of social inequality and material disadvantages 
have suffered the most with the Preamble to the Constitution. In the 
backdrop, the provisions of Chapter III and IV have been construed to 
serve as means to the most important fundamental right—the right to 
dignified life.''^ ^ This has been provided the widest possible expression 
by the Supreme Court of India. To cite a few: in Francis Cora lie Mullin 
V. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi (1981), Bandhiia Mukti 
Morcha v. Union of India (1984). It is around the substantivisation of 
social justice and providing content to the compendious expression of 
right to life that in the last three decades the Supreme Court of India has 
constructed many supplementary rights in addition to those included in 
Part-Ill.''*^ In expanding the scope of enumerated rights the court has 
enunciated the theory of emanation has constituted the following 
unremunerated rights as fundamental rights— t^he right to literacy and 
primary and secondary education, the right to health, the right to food, 
drinking water and integrity of environment, the right to a minimum 
wage, the right to compensation for torture, cruel, degrading and the 
unusual punishment or treatment, the right to speedy trial (including the 
right to free legal aid), the right to enforce accountability of total 
institutions, i.e., juvenile homes, women's protection homes, psychiatric 
care institutions, prisons and the right to gender justice, the collective 
right of the Indian people against immunity from corruption in high 
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places.''*'' 
From the above discussion, it can be fairly concluded that the judiciary 
in India through the innovation of PIL (or SIL) and broadened view of 
social justice has gone much ahead in structuring, expanding, protecting 
and promoting the human rights. However, there is another aspect of 
judicial activism as well. From the vast ranges of PIL cases, 't also 
appears that many a time court is approached for such decisions which 
could have otherwise been routinely and normally performed by the 
other organs of the State.'"*^ For example, monitoring of C.B.I, iuquii-y 
by the court in many cases of corruption in higher places. It is now on 
the instance of court that 15-years old vehicles causing pollution on 
Delhi roads have to a joint where a balance between the principles of 
equality and justice is lost. Thus, the court intervenes to strike a balance 
and restrict the reservation to 50 per cent under Article 16 (4) of the 
Constitution. Such instances do only refer to a systemic crisis in the 
governance of the country. Other two organs of the State are not 
performing its assigned role, functions and duties up to the expected 
levels of accountability and satisfaction. Thus, we have a situation in 
which judicial activism permeates almost every aspect of governance.''*'^  
The various aspects of human rights are deeply ingrained in the 
Constitution of India. However, it is to the credit of the Supreme Court 
of India that they have adopted an activist approach in matters of 
protecting and enforcing human rights norms and over the xears 
evolved several judicial techniques such as 'public interest litigation' to 
effectuate remedial justice. India is a party to the major International 
Human Rights Instruments viz. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International 
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Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimmation 
etc. The Supreme Court has in innumerable cases relied upon the 
Articles of International Conventions to reach its judgments. Today, 
human rights jurisprudence in India has a constitutional status and 
sweep, thanks to Article 21 so that this Magna Carta may well toil the 
knell of human bondage beyond civilized limits. In our era of human 
rights, the Indian judiciary through creative interpretation has evolved 
the protection of human dignity rights. 
VI. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
Judicial review denotes the power of the higher judiciary to test the 
validity of any law passed by a legislature or any executive action taken 
by a government. Judicial review, in its most widely accepted meaning 
is the power of courts to consider the constitutionality of acts of other 
organs of government when the issue of constitutionality is gennane to 
the disposition of law suits properly pending before the courts. This 
power to consider constitutionality in appropriate cases includes the 
courts authority to refuse to enforce, and in effect invalidate, 
governmental acts they find to be unconstitutional.'^' 
However, it is generally believed that the power of judicial review of the 
Supreme Court of India is traceable to Article 13(1) & (2) and Article 32 
(1) and of the High Court under Article 226. Article 13 which appears in 
part III of the Constitution, dealing with the fundamental rights provides 
in clauses (1) and (2) as follows: 
(1) All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the 
commencement of this Constitution in so far as they are 
inconsistent with the provision of this part, shall, to the extent of 
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such inconsistency, be void. 
(2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges 
the rights conferred by this part and any law made in 
contravention of this clause, to the extent of the contravention, be 
void. 
Article 32 clause (1) provides the right to move the Supreme Court by 
appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights confeired by 
this part is guaranteed. Article 226 clause (1) confers on the different 
High Courts the power to enforce "any of the rights conferred by part HI 
and for any other purpose". 
It can be seen from the above provisions that the judicial review of the 
Supreme Court is confined to declaring as unconstitutional and null and 
void, the laws made by the Parliament and the State Legislatures if they 
have taken away or abridged any of the fundamental rights confeired by 
Part-Ill of the Constitution. There is no other express provision 
conferring similar power on the Supreme Court with regard to 
legislation contravening provisions of the Constitution other than those 
contained in Part-Ill. On the other hand. Article 226 confers on the High 
Courts the power to strike down laws contravening not only the 
provisions of the Part-Ill but also "for any other purpose" Thus the High 
Court's power of judicial review extends not only to Part-Ill but also to 
the rest of the Constitutional provisions. The necessary consequence of 
the above position would be that the Supreme Court's power of judicial 
review in the exercise of its original jurisdiction under Article 32 is 
confined to part III whereas in its appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme 
Court can exercise this power over the entire Constitution. It may 
however be argued that the power of judicial review of the Supreme 
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Court comprehending the entire Constitution is to be traced to its 
inherent power as the highest court of the land under a written 
Constitution establishing a federal polity. Whether the 
unconstitutionality of legislation arises out of the lack of competence on 
the part of the legislature or because of contravention or violation of 
fundamental rights, the resultant invalidity is the same. Similarly the 
unconstitutionality of legislation is same whether it contravenes the 
provisions of Part III which are specially protected by Article 13, 32 and 
226 or whether it contravenes the rest of the provisions of the 
Constitution which are not so specially protected with regard to 
Supreme Court. Hence to trace the power of judicial review of the 
Supreme Court only to Articles 13 and 32 would be an incomplete 
exercise. Thus, Articles 13 and 32 do not exhaust the power of judicial 
review of the Supreme Court and at beat, these two provisions signify 
and symbolize the great importance that the Founding Fathers attached 
to the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part-Ill. 
The Indian Constitution, like other written Constitutions, follows the 
concept of "Separation of powers" between the three sovereign organs 
of the Constitution. The doctrine of separation of powers stated in its 
rigid form means that each of the organ of the Constitution, namely, 
executive, legislature and judiciary should operate in its own sphere and 
there should be no overlapping between their functioning. The Indian 
Constitution has not recognized the doctrine of separation of powers in 
its absolute form but the functions of the different organs have been 
clearly differentiated and consequently it can very well be said thai our 
Constitution does not contemplate assumption, by one organ of the 
functions that essentially belongs to another'^^ Though the Constitution 
has adopted the parliamentary form of government, where the dividing 
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line between the legislature and the executive becomes thin, the theory 
of separation of powers is still valid'^^ Even though the Constitution of 
India does not accept strict separation of powers, it provides for an 
independent judiciary with extensive jurisdiction over the acts of the 
legislature and the executive'^'^. Independent judiciary is the most 
essential attribute of rule of law and is indispensable to sustain 
democracy. Independence and integrity of the judiciary in a democratic 
system of government is of the highest importance and interest not only 
to the judges but also to the people at large who seek judicial ledress 
against perceived legal injury or executive excess. Judicial review is the 
basic structure, independent judiciary is the cardinal feature, and an 
assurance of faith enshrined in the Constitution. The need for 
independent and impartial judiciary is the command of the Constitution 
and call of the people. The subordinate judiciary is a complement to 
constitutional courts as part of the constitutional scheme and plays a 
vital part in dispensation of justice. Thus, subordinate courts are integral 
part of the judiciary under the Constitution'^^. 
In Ajay Gandhi v. B.Singh'^^ the Supreme Court extended the "theory 
of independence" to Tribunals performing judicial functions. The court 
observed: 
"The functions of the Tribunal being judicial in nature, 
the public have a major stake in its functioning, for 
effective and orderly administration of justice. A 
Tribunal should, as far as possible, have a judicial 
autonomy. The relevant provisions have conferred a 
statutory power upon the president to constitute Benches. 
The appellate Tribunal is a National Tribunal. The 
President, subject to delegation of powers senior Vice-
President or the Vice-President, exercises the 
administrative control over the members thereof. The 
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benches are to he constituted only by the President. No 
other authority is empowered to do so. Keeping in view 
the fact that the independence of the Tribunal is essential 
for maintaining its independence, any power which may 
be conferred upon the executive authority must proved to 
be in the interest of imparting justice. We are of the view 
that this long-standing practice should be allowed to 
prevail over the stand of the respondents herein. 
However, we are of the opinion that by reason thereof, 
the President cannot be said to have an unguided, 
unfettered and unlimited jurisdiction as the same may be 
flawed with great consequences". 
Broadly speaking, judicial review in India comprises of three aspects: 
judicial review of legislative action, judicial review of judicial decisions 
and judicial review of administrative action. The judges of the superior 
courts have been entrusted with the task of upholding the Constitution 
and to this end, have been conferred the power to interpret it. It is they 
who have to ensure that the balance of power envisaged by the 
Constitution is maintained and that the legislature and the executive do 
not, in the discharge of functions, transgress constitutional 
limitations . Thus, judicial review is a highly complex and developing 
subject. It has its roots long back and its scope and extent varies from 
case to case. It is considered to be the basic feature of the Constitution. 
The court in its exercise of its power of judicial review would zealously 
guard the human rights, fundamental rights and the citizens' rights of 
life and liberty as also many non-statutory powers of governinental 
bodies as regards their control over property and assets of various kinds, 
which could be expended on building, hospitals, roads and the like, or 
overseas aid, or compensating victims of crime'^^ 
In Union of India v. K.M.Shankarappa^^ the Supreme Court held that 
the provision for revision by Central Government of decisions of the 
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Appellant Tribunal under Section 6(1) of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 
is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court observed: 
"The Government has chosen to establish a quasi-
judicial body which has been given the powers, inter alia, 
to decide the effect of the film on the public. Once a 
quasi-judicial body like the Appellate Tribunal gives its 
decision, that decision would be final and binding so far 
as the executive and the government is concerned. To 
permit the executive to review or revise that decision 
would amount to interference with the exercise of judicial 
functions by a quasi-judicial board. It would amount to 
subjecting the decision of a quasi-judicial body to the 
scrutiny of the executive. Under the Indian Constitution, 
the executives have to obey the judicial orders. Thus, 
Section 6(2) is a travesty of the rule of law, which is one 
of the basic structures of the Constitution. The legislature 
may, in certain cases, nullijy a judicial or executive 
decision by enacting an appropriate legislation. 
However, without enacting an appropriate legislation, 
the executive or the legislature cannot set at naught a 
judicial order. The executive cannot sit in an appeal or 
review or revise a judicial order. At the highest, the 
government may apply to the Tribunal itself for a review, 
if circumstances so warrant. But the government would 
be bound by the ultimate decision of the Tribunal", 
In the landmark judgment of P.U.C.L v. Union of India,'^^ Justice 
Shah observed: 
"The legislature in this country has no power to ask the 
instrumentalities of the State to disobey or disregard the 
decisions given by the courts. The legislature may 
remove the defect, which is the cause for invalidating the 
law by the court by appropriate legislation if it has 
power over the subject matter and competent to do so 
under the Constitution. The primary duty of the judiciary 
is to uphold the Constitution and the laws without fear or 
favour, without being biased by political ideology or 
economic theory. Interpretation should be in consonance 
with the constitutional provisions, which envisage a 
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republic democracy. Survival of democracy depends 
upon free and fair election. It is true that political parties 
fight elections, yet elections would be farce if the voters 
were unaware of antecedents of candidates contesting 
elections. Such election would be neither free nor fair". 
These bold words of Justice Shah reflect the status, which the Indian 
judiciary is holding in the Indian constitutional set up. The Constitution 
makers have reposed great confidence and trust in Indian judiciary by 
conferring on it such powers as have made it one of the most powerful 
judiciary in. the world. The Supreme Court has from time to time 
indulged in genuine and needful judicial activism and judicial review. It 
gave birth to the famous and most needed "Doctrine of basic Stmcture". 
The need of the changing society encouraged it to formulate and 
incorporate various theories, which originated outside India. One of 
such theory, which has great practical and social significance in India, 
is the "Doctrine of proportionality". The said doctrine originated as far 
back as in the 19'*" century in Russia and was later adopted by Germany, 
France and other European countries. By proportionality, it is meant 
that the question whether while regulating the exercise of fundamental 
rights, the appropriate or least restrictive choice of measures has been 
made by the legislature or the administrator so as to achieve the object 
of the legislation or the purpose of the administrative order, as the case 
may be. Under the principle, the court will see that the legislature and 
the administrative authority maintain a proper balance between the 
adverse effects which the legislation or the administrative order jnay 
have on the rights, liberties or interests of persons keeping in mind the 
purpose for which they were intended to serve'^'. 
The court as far back as in 1952 in State of Madras v VG.Row'^^ 
observed: 
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"The test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should 
be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no 
abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness 
can be laid down as applicable to all the cases. The 
nature of right alleged to have been infringed, the 
underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent 
and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, 
the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing 
conditions at that time, should all enter the judicial 
verdict. In evaluating such elusive factors and forming 
their own conceptions of what is reasonable, in all the 
circumstances of a given case, it is inevitable that the 
social philosophy and the scale of values of the judge 
participating in the decision would play an important 
part, and limit to their interference with legislative 
judgment in such cases can only be dictated by their 
sense of responsibility and self-restraint and the sobering 
reflection that the Constitution is meant not only for 
people of their way of thinking but for all, and the 
majority of the elected representatives of the people have, 
in authorizing the imposition of the restrictions, 
considered them to be reasonable". 
Ever since 1952, the principle of proportionality has been applied 
vigorously to legislative and administrative action in India. Thus, 
administrative action in India affecting the fundamental righis has 
always been tested on the anvil of the proportionality in the last 60 
years even though it has not been expressly stated that the principle that 
is applied is the proportionality principle. 
In Om Kumar v. Union of India ^\ however, the Apex Court evolved 
the principle of primary and secondary review. The doctrine of primary 
review was held to be applicable in relation to the statutes, statutory 
rules, or any order, which has force of statute. The secondary review 
was held to be applicable inter alia in relation to the action in a case 
where the executive is guilty of acting arbitrarily. In such a case Article 
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14 of the Constitution of India would be attracted"''*. In relation to other 
administrative actions, as for example punishment in a departmental 
proceeding, the doctrine of proportionality was equated with 
Wednesbury 's unreasonable . 
In Delhi Development Authority v M/S UEE Electricals Engg.F.Ltd 
the Supreme Court dealt with the judicial review of administrative 
action in detail. The court observed: 
"One can conveniently classify under three heads the 
grounds on which administrative action is subject to 
control by judicial review. The first ground is "illegality", 
the second "irrationality", and the third "procedural 
impropriety". Courts are slow to interfere in matters 
relating to administrative functions unless decision is 
tainted by any vulnerability such as, lack of fairness in 
the procedure, illegality and irrationality. Whether 
action falls in any of the categories has to be established. 
Mere assertion in this regard would not be sufficient. The 
law is settled that in considering challenge to 
administrative decisions courts will not interfere as if 
they are sitting in appeal over the decision. He who seeks 
to invalidate or nullify any act or order must establish 
the charge of bad faith, an abuse or a misuse by the 
authority of its powers. It cannot be overlooked that 
burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the 
person who alleges it. The allegations of mala fides are 
often more easily made than proved, and the very 
seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high 
order of credibility". 
The administrative orders must also satisfy the rigorous tests of the 
"doctrine of legitimate expectation". The principle of legitimate 
expectation is at the root of the rul<e of law and requires regularity, 
predictability and certainty in government's dealings with the public. For 
a legitimate expectation to arise, the decisions of the administrative 
authority must affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or 
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advantage which either: 
(i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision maker to enjoy and 
which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until 
there has been communicated to him some rationale grounds for 
withdrawing it or where he has been given an opportunity to comment; 
or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision maker that they will 
not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing 
reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn. 
The procedural part of it relates to a representation that a hearing or 
other appropriate procedure will be afforded before the decision is 
made. The substantive part of the principle is that if a representation is 
made than a benefit of substantive nature will be granted or if the person 
is already in receipt of the benefit than it will be continued and not be 
substantially varied, then the same could be enforced. An exception 
could be based on an express promise or representation or by established 
past action or settled conduct. The representation must be clear and 
unambiguous. It could be a representation to an individual or to a class 
of persons'^^. 
Another effective tool in the hands of judiciary, to test the validity of 
legisladon, is to invoke the principle of "reading down". The mle of 
reading down a provision of the law is now well established and 
recognized. It is a rule of harmonious construction in a different name. 
It is resorted to smoothen the crudities or ironing the creases found in a 
statute to make it workable. In the garb of reading down, however, it is 
not open to read words or expressions not found in it and thus venture 
into a kind of judicial legislation. The rule of reading down is to be 
used for the limited purpose of making a particular provision workable 
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and to bring it in harmony with other provisions of the statute. It is to 
be used keeping in view the scheme of the statute and to fulfill its 
168 
purposes . 
169 In B.R.Enterprises v. State ofU.P the Supreme Court observed: 
"First attempt should be made by the courts to uphold 
the charged provisions and not to invalidate it merely 
because one of the possible interpretation leads to such a 
result, howsoever attractive it may be. Thus, where there 
are two possible interpretations, one invalidating the law 
and the other upholding, the latter should be adopted. 
For this, the courts have been endeavoring, sometimes to 
give restrictive or expansive meaning keeping in view the 
nature of the legislation. Cumulatively, it is to sub serve 
the object of the legislation. Old golden rule is of 
respecting the wisdom of the legislature, that they are 
aware of the law and would never have intended for an 
invalid legislation. This also keeps the courts within their 
track and checks. Yet inspite of this, if the impugned 
legislation cannot be saved, the courts shall not hesitate 
to strike it down. Here the courts have to play a cautious 
role of weeding out the wild from the crop, of course, 
without infringing the Constitution. The principle of 
reading down, however, will not be available where the 
plain and literal meaning from a bare reading of any 
impugned of any impugned provision clearly shows that 
it confers arbitrary or unbridled power" 
It must be appreciated that a statute cames with it a presumption of 
constitutionality. Such a presumption extends also in relation to a law, 
which has been enacted for imposing reasonable restrictions on the 
fundamental rights. A further presumption may also be drawn that the 
statutory authority would not exercise the power arbitrarily'^*^. Further, 
where a power is conferred upon a higher authority, a presumption can 
be raised that he would be conscious of his duties and therefore will act 
accordingly'^'. These presumptions have to be rebutted before an 
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allegation of unconstitutionally of a statute can be sustained. 
Limits of Judicial Review 
It is true that the courts have wide powers of judicial review of 
constitutional and statutory provisions. These powers, however, must be 
exercised with great caution and self-control. The courts should not step 
out of the limits of their legitimate powers of judicial review. The 
parameters of judicial review of Constitutional provisions and statutory 
provisions are totally different. In J.P.Bansal v. State ofRajasthan ' the 
Supreme Court observed: 
"It is true that this court in interpreting the Constitution 
enjoys a freedom which is not available in interpreting a 
statute. It endangers continued public interest in the 
impartiality of the judiciary, which is essential to the 
continuance of rule of law, if judges, under guise of 
interpretation, provide their own preferred amendments 
to statutes which experience of their operation has shown 
to have had consequences that members of the court 
before whom the matters come consider to be injurious to 
public interest. Where the words are clear, there is no 
obscurity, there is no ambiguity and the intention of the 
legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the 
court to innovate or to take upon itself the task of 
amending or altering the statutory provisions. In that 
situation the judge should not proclaim that they are 
playing the role of lawmaker merely for an exhibition of 
judicial valour. They have to remember that there is a 
line, though thin, which separates adjudication from 
legislation. That line should not be crossed or erased. 
This can be vouchsafed by an alert recognition of the 
necessity not to cross it and instinctive, as well as trained 
reluctance to do so ". 
In case the court forgets to appreciate this judicial wisdom, it would 
undermine the constitutional mandate and will disturb the equilibrium 
between the three sovereign organs of the Constitution. In State (Govt. 
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of NCT of Delhi) v Prem Raj'^^ the Supreme Court took a serious note 
of this disturbing exercise when the High Court commuted the sentence 
by transgressing its limits. The court observed: 
"The power of commutation exclusively vests with the 
appropriate government. The appropriate government 
means the Central government in cases where the 
sentence or order relates to a matter to which the 
executive power of the Union extends, and the state 
government in other cases. Thus, the order of the high 
Court is set aside". 
Similarly, in Syed T.A. Haqshbandi v State of J&K the Supreme 
Court observe: 
"Judicial review is permissible only to the extent of 
finding whether the process in reaching the decision has 
been observed correctly and not the decision itself as 
such. Critical or independent analysis or appraisal of the 
materials by the court exercising powers of judicial 
review unlike the case of an appellate court would 
neither be permissible nor conducive to the interests of 
either the officer concerned or the system and 
institutions. Grievances must be sufficiently substantiated 
to have firm or concrete basis on properly established 
facts and further proved to be well justified in law, for 
being countenanced by the court in exercise of its powers 
of judicial review. Unless the exercise of power is shown 
to violate any other provision of the Constitution of India 
or any of the statutory rules, the same cannot be 
challenged by making it a justiciable issue before the 
court". 
The courts are further required not to interfere in policy matters and 
political questions unless it is absolutely essential to do so. Even then 
also the courts can interfere on selective grounds only. In P.L.C.L v. 
Union of India the Supreme Court observed: 
"This court cannot go into and examine the need of 
Prevention of Terrorism Act. It is a matter of policy. 
Ill 
Once legislation is passed, the government has an 
obligation to exercise all available options to prevent 
terrorism within the bounds of the Constitution. 
Moreover, mere possibility of abuse cannot be counted 
as a ground for denying the vesting of powers or for 
declaring a statute unconstitutional". 
Similarly, in Union of India v. International Trading Co. the Supreme 
Court observed: 
"Article 14 of the Constitution applies also to matters of 
government policy and if the policy or any action of the 
government, even in contractual matters, fails to satisfy 
the test of reasonableness, it would be unconstitutional. 
While the discretion to change the policy in exercise of 
the executive power, when not trammeled by any statute 
or rule is wide enough, what is imperative and implicit in 
terms of Article 14 is that a change in policy must be 
made fairly and should not give the impression that it 
was so done arbitrarily or by any other ulterior criteria. 
The wide sweep of Article 14 and the requirement of 
every state action qualifying for its validity on this 
touchstone, irrespective of the field of activity- of the 
state, is an accepted tenet. The basic requirement of 
Article 14 is fairness in action by the state, and non-
arbitrariness in essence and substance is the heartbeat of 
fair play. Every state action must be informed by reason 
and it follows that an act uninformed by reason is per se 
arbitrary". 
Similarly, where a political question is involved, the courts nonnally 
should not interfere. It is also equally settled law that the court should 
not shrink its duty from performing its functions merely because it has 
political thicket' .^ Thus, merely because the question has a political 
complexion that by itself is no ground why the court should shrin!< from 
performing its duty under the Constitution if it raises an issue of 
constitutional determination. Every constitutional question concerns the 
allocation and exercise of governmental power and no constitutional 
question can, therefore, fail to be political. So large as a question arises 
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whether an authority under the Constitution has acted within the limits 
of its power or exceeded it, it can certainly be decided by the court. 
Indeed it would be its constitutional obligation to do so 178 
In B.R.Kapur v State ofT.N'^^ the Supreme Court held that it is the duty 
of the court to interpret the Constitution. It must perform the duty 
regardless of the fact that the answer to the question would have a 
political effect. 
The role model for governance and decision taken thereon should 
manifest equity, fair play and justice. The cardinal principle of 
governance in a civilized society based on rule of law not only has to 
base on transparency but also must create an impression tliat the 
decision-making was motivated on the consideration of probiiy. The 
government has to rise above the nexus of vested interests and nepotism 
and eschew window-dressing. The act of governance has to withstand 
the test of judiciousness and impartiality and avoid arbitrary or 
capricious actions. Therefore, the principle of governance has to be 
tested on the touchstone of justice, equity and fair play. Though on the 
face of it the decision may look legitimate but as a matter of fact the 
reasons may not be based on values but to achieve popular accolade that 
decision cannot be allowed to operate'^ * .^ 
The Constitution of India envisages separation of power between the 
three organs of the Constitution so that the working of the Constitution 
may not be hampered or jeopardized. This thin and fine line of 
distinction should never be ignored and transgressed upon by an> of the 
organ of the Constitution, including the judiciary. This rigid perception 
and practice can be given a go by in cases of "abdication of duties" by 
one of the organ of the Constitution. Thus, the judiciary can interfere if 
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there is an abdication of duties by the legislature or the executive. For 
instance, if the legislature delegates its essential and constitutional 
functions to the executives, it would amount to "excessive delegation" 
and hence abdication of the legislative functions by the legislature. In 
such cases, the theory of separation of powers would not come in the 
way of judiciary while exercising the power of judicial review. 
This is more so, when the Constitution makers have confened the 
important sovereign function of interpretation of the Constitution and 
various statutes upon the judiciary. The constitutional courts can even 
scrutinize the working of the lower courts besides analyzing legislative 
and executive actions. The superior courts, like High Courts and the 
Supreme Court, can issue various writs to control the functioning of 
lower judiciary. Besides, the High Court has supervisory jurisdiction 
over the lower courts. However, the High court cannot issue a writ 
against another High court. Similarly, the decision of the High Court or 
the Supreme Court cannot be questioned by way of a writ proceeding. 
Thus, a final decision of the Supreme Court cannot be questioned under 
Article 32 of the Constitution of India, except by way of review petition. 
The Supreme Court in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra'^' has 
judicially created an exception to this rule in the form of a "curative 
petition". Thus, a curative petition can be filed before the Supreme 
Court under Article 32 in appropriate cases. The Supreme Court only in 
exceptional cases would exercise this power. This fantastic judicial 
innovation is based on the premises that no person should suffer due to 
the mistake of the court. Similarly, an order passed by the court without 
jurisdiction is a nullity and any action taken pursuant thereto would also 
be nullity. A party cannot be made to suffer adversely either directly or 
indirectly by reason of an order passed by any court of law, which is not 
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binding, on him . 
The power to entertain a curative petition is not specifically conferred 
by the Constitution but can be exercised by the apex court under its 
inherent powers. This means that the Constitution is organic and living 
in nature. It is also well settled that the interpretation of the Constitution 
of India or statutes would change from time to time. Being a living 
organ, it is ongoing and with passage of time, law must change. New 
rights may have to be found out within the constitutional scheme. It is 
established that fundamental rights themselves have no fixed content; 
most of them are empty vessels into which each generation must pour 
its contents in the light of its experience. The attempt of the court should 
be to expand the reach and ambit of the fundamental rights by process 
of judicial interpretation. There cannot be any distinction between the 
fundamental rights mentioned in Chapter III of the Constitution and the 
declaration of such rights on the basis of the judgments rendered by the 
Supreme Court'^^ Thus, horizons of constitutional law are expanding. 
In State of Maharashtra v Dr Praful. B. Desai'^"^ the Supreme Court 
observed: 
"It is presumed that the Parliament intends the court to 
apply to an ongoing Act a construction that continuously 
updates its wordings to allow for changes since the Act 
was initially framed. While it remains law, it has to be 
treated as always speaking. This means that in its 
application on any day, the language of the Act though 
necessarily embedded in its own time, is nevertheless to 
be construed in accordance with the need to treat it as a 
current law". 
At this stage the words of Justice Bhagwati in the case of National 
Textiles Workers Union v. P.R.Ramakrishnan^^ need to be set out. They 
are: 
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"We cannot allow the dead hand of the past to stifle the 
growth of the living present. Law cannot stand still; it 
must change with the changing social concepts and 
values. If the bark that protects the tree fails to grow 
and expand along with the tree, it will either choke the 
tree or if it is a living tree it will shed that bark and 
grow a living bark for itself. Similarly, if the law fails to 
respond to the needs of changing society, then either it 
will stifle the growth of the society and choke its 
progress or if the society is vigorous enough, it will cast 
away the law, which stands in the way of its growth. 
Law must therefore constantly be on the move adapting 
itself to the fast-changing society and not lag behind". 
It is further trite that the law ahhough may be constitutional when 
enacted but with passage of time the same may be held 10 be 
unconstitutional in view of the changed situation'^^\ These changed 
circumstances may also create a vacuum in the legal system, which has 
to be suitably filled up by the legislature. If the legislature fails to meet 
the need of the hour, the courts may interfere and fill-in the vacuum by 
giving proper directions. These directions would be binding and 
enforceable in law until suitable legislation is enacted to occupy the 
field . Thus, directions given by the court will operate only till the law 
is made by the legislature and in that sense temporary in nature. Once 
legislation is made, the court has to make an independent assessment of 
it. In embarking on this exercise, the points of disclosure indicated by 
this court, even if they be tentative or ad hoc in nature, should be given 
due weight and substantial departure there from cannot be 
countenanced'^^ The courts may also rely upon International treaties 
and conventions for the effective enforcement of the municipal laws 
provided they are not in derogation with municipal laws. 
The judicial review in India is absolutely essential and not undemocratic 
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because the judiciary wliile interpreting the Constitution or other statutes 
is expressing the will of the people of India as a whole who have 
reposed absolute faith and confidence in the Indian judiciary. If the 
judiciary interprets the Constitution in its true spirit and the same goes 
against the ideology and notions of the ruling political party, then we 
must not forget that the Constitution of India reflects the will of the 
people of India at large as against the will of the people \^  ho are 
represented for the time being by the ruling party. If we can ap])reciate 
this reality, then all arguments against the democratic nature of the 
judicial review would vanish. The judicial review would be 
undemocratic only if the judiciary ignores the concept of separation of 
powers and indulges in "unnecessary and undesei^ving judicial 
activism". The judiciary must not forget its role of being an interpreter 
and should not undertake and venture into the task of lawmaking, unless 
the situation demands so. The judiciary must also not ignore tlie self-
imposed restrictions, which have now acquired a status of "pmdent 
judicial norm and behaviour". If the Indian judiciary takes these two 
"precautions", then it has the privilege of being the "most democratic 
judicial institution of the world, representing the biggest democracy of 
the world". 
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CHAPTER-2 
EXPENSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS WITH REFERENC E TO 
ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE ROLE OF 
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
The Indian Constitution of 1950 has recognized various fundamental 
rights of the citizens as well as non- citizens; in its part III and Articles 
12 to 35. Among the various fiindamental rights guaranteed, the most 
important and indispensable right is the right to life and personal liberty 
as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. Article 21 constrains 
only one sentence and is perhaps, the smallest Article in the Indian 
Constitution. The Article reads as under: 
"No person shall be deprived of his life or personal 
liberty except according to the procedure established by 
law ". 
Though the language of Article 21 appears to be very simple, and the 
phrases used therein, too easy to apprehend, the fact remains that they 
are couched in a very wide and ambitious intent. Ultimately, it is the 
judiciary which has interpreted the phrases "life", "personal liberty", 
"procedure" and "law". The narrow interpretation given to "the law", 
"the life", "the personal liberty" and "the procedure established by law" 
appearing in Article 21 in A.K. Gopalan v. state of Madras,'' by the 
Supreme Court held sway over the courts in India for almost 28 years 
thereafter. In a way, this narrow interpretation hampered the 
development of humanitarian jurisprudence under Article 21 of the 
Constitution for well over a quarter century. The judicial inertia was 
disturbed only when the Supreme Court rendered the epoch making 
decision in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India} The Supreme Court 
Special Bench consisting of 7-judges made judicial history as regards 
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Article 21 in the instant case. Maneka Gandhi's case opened up a new 
dimension and laid down that it imposed a limitation upon law-making 
as well. 
Another most remarkable feature of this expansion of Article 21 is that 
many of the non-justiciable Directive Princiles embodied in part IV of 
the Constitution have now been resurrected as enforceable fundamental 
rights by the magic wand of judicial activism. 3 
Judicial Behaviour of Supreme Court towards Article 21-Post 
Maneka Gandhi Scenario. 
It has been observed that the Supreme Court has interpreted Article 21 
to include a wide variety of positive and negative right. These right 
include social rights, economic rights, human rights and legal rights of 
many manifestations that are essential for making a man's life 
meaningful and worthwhile and which enable him to live his life with 
basic human dignity. Thus Article 21 includes, the right of locomotion, 
except in so far it is included in Article 19(l)(d), the right to travel 
abroad, the right to socialise with members of one's family and friends, 
the right of a prisoner to a speedy trial, the right to free legal aid, the 
right to fair trial, right to medical treatment in medico legal cases, right 
to livlihood, right to education, right against torture, right to pollution 
free environment, right to privacy, right to health, and right to gender 
equality etc. It is submitted that this list is only illustrative in nature. For 
the purpose of brevity, the judicial behaviour has been discussed under 
the following heads. 
(1) Right to Privacy: The Supreme Court has in Kharak Singh v. 
State ofU.P.\ dealt with the validity of certain police regulations which 
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without any statutory basis, authorised the pohce to keep under 
surveillance, persons whose names were recorded in the 'history sheet' 
maintained by the police in respect of persons who are or are likely to 
become habitual criminals. These regulations were challenged on the 
ground that they violated the fundamental right to movement in Article 
19(l)(d) and personal liberty under Article 21. Speaking for the majority 
Ayyangar J, held that "right to privacy" is not a guaranteed right under 
our Constitution.^ However speaking for the minority Subba Rao, I held 
that "right to privacy" is an essential ingredient of personal liberty. In 
Govind v. State of M.P.!" the Court contemplated a right to privacy 
included, among others, in the right to life and personal liberty 
eventhough it upheld the validity of the impugned regulations. In Malak 
Singh V. State ofP & H ,^ the Supreme Court held that sui-veillance may 
be intrusive and it may seriously encroach on the privacy of citizen as to 
infringe his fundamental right to personal liberty guaranteed by Article 
21 and the freedom under Article 19(l)(d). Without any reference 
Article 21, the Supreme Court has in State of Maharashtra v. Madhukar 
Narain,^ held that even a woman of easy virtue is entitled to privacy and 
that no one can invade her privacy as and when he likes. In Neera v. life 
Insurance Corporation of India, the petitioner, a probationer Assistant 
in Lie gave a false declaration regarding the last menstmation period, 
during her medical examination, since the clauses in declaration were 
indeed embarrassing if not humiliating like the regularity of menstrual 
cycle, the term therefor the number of conceptions taken etc. The 
Supreme Court found that such embarrassing questions violate the right 
to privacy of the employees and further directed the Corporation to 
delete such columns in the declaration. In R. Raja GopaJ v. State of 
T.N. the Supreme Court speaking through B.P. Jeevan Reddy J. 
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declared that even a prisoner condemned to death by the Court, also has 
a right to privacy, which is part of his right under Article 21. In P. U. 
C.L. V. Union of India," the Supreme Court declared that telephone 
tapping violates the right to privacy which is a part of Article 21 only 
with Article 19(l)(a). While, speaking for the Bench, Justice Kuldip 
Singh held that the right to privacy would include telephone 
conversation in the privacy of home or office. In Mr. 'X' v. Hospital 
'Z''', a 2 - Judges Bench of the Supreme Court gave a landmark decision 
pertaining to the rights of AIDS Patients in India. The Court held in this 
case that the right to life includes right to privacy but is not absolute and 
that disclosure by doctor that the patient who was to get married has 
tested HIV+ ve would not be violative of the patent's right to privacy 
and ftirther that right to marry is not absolute therefore if a person is 
suffering from a venereal disease are impotency his right to marry has to 
be treated as suspended right till he is cure the disease and the same 
cannot be enforced through the court. The importance of this case is that 
the Apex Court has clearly laid down the principle that in case of clash 
between fundamental rights, the right which would advance public 
morality and public interest would alone be enforced. 
(ii) Right to go abroad: Prior to the landmark judgment in Maneka 
Gandhi, the Supreme Court had in Satwant Singh v. A.P. New Delhi^^ 
by majority and speaking through Chief Justice Koka Subba Rao held 
that the expression "prersonal liberty" in Article 21 takes in the right of 
locomotion and to travel abroad, but the right to move through-out the 
terrtitories in India is not covered inasmuchas it is specially provided in 
Article 19. The deprived of his right to travel abroad, except according 
to the procedure established by law. However, in Maneka Gandhi v. 
Union of India,, the Supreme Court majority speaking through justice 
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P.N. Bhagwati held that the right to go abroad is clearly not a 
guaranteed right under any clause of Article 19 (1) on the theory of 
peripheral or concomitant rights. Thus right to go abroad per se cannot 
be read into Article 21 as a fundamental right. 
(Hi) Right to shelter: The judicial activism of the Supreme Court has 
contributed in making the right to shelter a fundamental right under 
Article 21. In Prabhakaran Nair v. State ofT.N.,^^ the Supreme Court 
has emphasized the urgent need of a National Housing Policy in view of 
the fact that there is acute shortage of housing in India. While 
recognizing that the rent control legislation must be made rational, 
human, certain and capable of being implemented, declared that shelter 
is one of the fundamental rights and observed that a fast changing 
society cannot operate with unchanging law and preconceived judicial 
attitude.'^ In Samir Sobhan Sanyal v. Tracks Pvt. Ltd., a Supreme 
Court Division Bench, held that dispossession of a tenant without due 
process of law would violate Article 21 of the Constitution. In V.P. Avas 
Evam Vikas Parishad v. Friends Co-operative Housing Society, ^ the 
Supreme Court declared that the right to shelter springs from the right to 
residence assured in Article 19(l((e) and the right to life under Article 
21. Instate of Maharashtra v. Alka B. Hingde, the Division Bench 
held that the court should be more careful and reasonable while giving 
directions to the authorities (to remove encroachments by hutment 
dwellers) and it should not result in high-handed removal but reasonable 
time should be given for removing encroachments. 
(iv) Rights of prisoners:-^ prisoner may be an undertrial or a convicted 
person. In both the cases, their personal liberty would be deprived to the 
extent permitted by the law and in accordance with the procedure 
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established by law. The great contribution of the Supreme Court has 
been that, it has come to recognise the fundamental rights of the 
prisoners even when they are convicted and laid down a new philosopy 
of personal liberty of prisoners inside the prison. Thus in Sunil Batra v. 
Delhi Administration,^ *^ the Supreme Court deprecated the practice of 
keeping undertrials with convicts in jails on the ground that the same 
offends the test of reasonableness in Article 19 and fairness in Article 
21. Some of rights of prisoners are noted below: 
(a) Rights of prisoners to have interview:- in Prabha Diilt v. Union of 
India^^ the Supreme Court held that it would be a part of fundamental 
freedom of the press to interview prisoners sentenced to death. In 
Francis Coralie Mullin v. Union Territory ofDelhi,^^ the Supreme Court 
held that a detenue has a fundamental right to have interview with his 
legal advisor and family members and that it is a part of his fundamental 
right under Article 21. 
(b) Right to speedy trial: In Kadra Pahadia v. State of Bihar,'^ the 
Supreme Court has recognized the fundamental rights of undertrial 
prisoners to speedy trial and also to legal assistance in the form of a 
competent lawyer at the expense of the State. The Court declared that 
both the above rights are part of Article 21. The same principle has been 
reiterated in Sheela Barse v. Maharashtra,^ "^ Raghubir Singh v. S.S. 
Mann, Srinivas Pal v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh}^^ A.R. 
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, Santosh De v. Archana Guhaf Union of India 
V. Ashok Kumar Mitra^^ State ofMahrashtra v. M.P. Vashi,^^ Common 
Cause V. Union oflndia^^ Mansnkhlal Vithal Das Chowhan v. State of 
Gujarat, and Common Cause, a Registered Society v. Union oflndia.^^ 
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In the famous cases of Nimean Sangma v. Home Secretary, Govt, oj 
Meghalaya}^ Hussaianam Khatoon (I to VI) v. Home Secretary, 
Bihar, ^ ^ and Mantoo Mazundar v. State of Bihar, ^ ^ the Supreme Court 
declared that considerable delay in investigation of criminal cases, 
prolonged detention of undertrials awaiting trial and judicial custody of 
an undertrial beyond the period of the maximum imprisonment possible 
on conviction for the offence, violate the personal liberty of undertrial 
prisoners under Article 21. 
(c) Handcuffing of Prisoners: In India, it has become a common 
practice for the police to handcuff undertrails and arrestees, iiTespective 
of the nature of the offence committed by them and the possibility of 
any escape. This practice has become almost indiscriminate, which 
violates the personal liberty of the concerned persons. The Supreme 
Court has made immense contribution by way its judgments and 
directions, on this issue. In Premshanker Shiikla v. Delhi 
Administration,^^ the court declared that handcuffing of only the 
ordinary prisoners and leaving the better class prisoners is arbitrary. 
Similar opinion has been expressed and reiterated by the Court in 
Aeltemesh Rein v. Union of India^^ and Khedat Mazdoor Chetna 
Sangathan v. State of M.P., In President, Citizen for Democracy v. 
State ofAssam,'^^ the Supreme Court held that hand-cuffing of every 
prisoner, regardless of varying reasons and backgrounds violates Article 
21. Thus the Supreme Court through its numerous liberal interpretations 
laid down the principle that handcuffing a prisoner is an exception and 
'not hand cuffing" '^, a rule in criminal cases. 
(d) Right to fair trial: In the landmark judgment of Maneka Gandhi 
the Supreme Court has emphatically declared that the 'procedure' in 
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accordance with, which the life or personal liberty of a person can be 
deprived by the state must be just, fair and reasonable, thereby 
incorporating the American doctrine oi due process under Article 21 of 
the Constitution. In State of Punjab v. Sanvan Singh , the Supreme 
Court held that Article 21 embodies a fair trial in it. The Supreme Court 
reiterated the principle that the 'procedure established by law' embodies 
in itself the public and open trial. In Narkey Joseph v. State of Kerala, 
the Supreme Court held that asking leading questions, to prosecution 
witnesses, to convict an accused person, offends the right of the accused 
to fair trial enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. In Santosh v. 
Archana Guha,'*'* the Supreme Court held that delayed trial defeats the 
right of an accused to speedy and fair trial implicit under Article 21. In 
Joginder Kumar v. State o/UP the Supreme Court has issued number 
of directions effective enforcement of fundamental rights guaranteed 
under Articles 21 and 22. In Police Commissioner, Delhi v. Registrar, 
Delhi High Court,'^^ the Supreme Court reiterated that assurance of fair 
trial is the first imperative of the dispensation of justice. In Vineet 
Narain v. Union of India, the Supreme Court emphatically declared 
that, requirement of public hearing in court, is part of the fair trial under 
Article 21 of the Constitution. 
(e) Right against Illegal Detention: When the criminal justice 
system fails, sometimes a convict or undertrial or detenue has to 
spend his precious time in the prison, even though he is not required 
to do so according to law. In such cases, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that right against illegal or unlawful detention in jail is 
violative of the guarantee under Article 21. 
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Thus in a series of landmark judgments delivered in Hussairiara 
Khatoon (I to VI) v. Home Secretary Bihar,^^ the Supreme Court 
through Justice P.N. Bhagwati, who sat with different judges in 
different cases like R.S. Pathak, A.D. Koshal, A.P, Sen, D.A. Desai 
and O. Chinnapa Reddy J.J., held that judicial custody of an undertrial 
prisoner beyond the period of maximum imprisonment possible on his 
conviction for the offence would contravene the mandate under 
Article 21 and he further held that the practice of keeping lunatics and 
persons of unsound mind along with ordinary prisoners in ordinary 
jails also violates Article 21 of the Constitution. 
(f) Right against torture and custodial violence 
In Nilabati Behra v. State of Orissa, the Supreme Court deprecated 
the barbaric act of the police and declared that any person whose 
fundamental rights have been violated by State action, can move 
either the High Court under Article 226 or the Supreme Court under 
Article 32 for monetary compensation. In D.K. Basu v. State ofW.B., 
the Supreme Court held that custodial deaths, any form of torture or 
cruel or inhuman and degrading treatment, in custody, fall within 
inhibition of Article 21, whether they occur during investigation, 
interrogation or otherwise. The Supreme Court issued many 
guidelines to be followed by the State in all cases of arrest and 
detention till the effective legal provisions are made in that behalf by 
the State as preventive measures. In fact, laying down of these 
guidelines by the Supreme Court amounts to judicial legislation to fill 
the legislative vacuum. In P.U.C.L. vs Union of India, the Supreme 
court held that killing of alleged terrorists by the police without 
following any due process, deprives the right to life of the alleged 
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terrorists without following the 'procedure established' by law In 
Postsangbam Ningol Thockchom v. General Officer Commanding, the 
Supreme Court awarded compensation to the family members of those 
persons who disappeared, after being carried away by army personnel. 
(g) Delay in execution of death sentence and Article 21 
In T.V. Vatheeshwaran v. State of T.N.,'^^ a Division Bench of the 
Supreme held that delay in execution of death sentence exceeding 2 
years would be sufficient ground to invoke the protection of Article 
21 and to commute the death sentence to life imprisonment. In Triveni 
Ben V. Gujarat/'^ the Supreme Court has finally settled the judicial 
position on this point. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Coun, in 
the instant case has set the matter at rest and held that undue and long 
delay in execution of the death sentence would entitle the condemned 
person to approach the court for conversion of death sentence into life 
imprisonment but that before doing so the court should examine the 
nature and circumstances of the case. The court emphatically declared 
that "no fixed period of delay could be held to make the sentence of 
death unexecutable", thereby overruling the earlier Division Bench 
judgment of the Supreme Court in T.V. Vatheeshwaran.'' The same 
principle has been reiterated in a subsequent clarification in Triveni 
Ben V. State of Gujarat.^^ The Court, went one step ahead in Madhu 
Mehta v. Union of India/^ where the court was confronted with the 
question whether delay in execution of death sentence due to 
inordinate delay disposing of mercy petition by the President under 
Article 72. The Supreme Court speaking through Justice Sabyasachi 
Mukerji held that, a delay of 8 years suffered, without justifiable 
reasons, in disposing of a mercy petifion, would make the death 
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sentence liable to be commuted to life imprisonment, on the principle 
of speedy trial. In Shivaji Jaising Babar v. State of Maharashtra,^'' the 
Supreme Court held that "a delay in disposal of a mercy petition, 
demands modification of the death sentence into one of life 
imprisonment. 
(v) Right to free legal aid 
Article 39-A of the Constitution of India which is a Part of Part IV of 
the Constitution, enshrining the Directive Principles of State Policy 
provides that the state shall secure the operation of the legal system 
promotes justice, on the basis of equal opportunity, and shall in 
particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes, to 
ensure that opportunities for justice are not denied to any citizen by 
reason of economic or other disabilities. The Supreme Court has 
interpreted this object of rendering equal justice and fee legal aid, as a 
part and parcel of Article 21 in numerous judgments rendered Dy it. 
Thus in Kavita v. State of Maharashtra,^^ the court held that Article 21 
imbibes in itself the right to legal assistance. In Nandlal Bajaj v. State of 
Punjab^^ the Supreme Court held that denial of legal assistance to a 
detenue violates Article 21. In Khatri v. State of Bihar,^^ popularly 
known as the Bhagalpur Blindings case also the Supreme Ccmrt held 
that the right to legal service under Article 39-A is implicit under 
Article 21. In Kadra Pahadia v. State of Bihar^^ the Supreme Court 
specifically declared that the right to legal assistance of undertrial 
prisoners in the form of a competent lawyer at State's expense is part of 
their fundamental rights under Article 21. The same principle has been 
reiterated in Sheela Barse v. Maharashtra,^*^ SukDas v. Union Territory 
of Arunachal Pradesh,^^ State of Maharashtra v. M,P. Vashi,^^ 
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Gopalana Chart v. State of Kerala, and Hussaina Khatoon v. State of 
Bihar. 
(vi) Right of Inmates of protective Homes 
The Supreme Court has held in a number of cases that the inmates of 
protective and remand homes for women and children have a 
fundamental right to suitable and humane conditions in the homes. In 
Upendra Baxi v. Union of India, and Sheela Barse v. Children Aid 
Society,^^ the Supreme Court has established the above principle. In the 
latter case the Supreme Court declared that, the children inmates of the 
Remand/observation Home run by the respondent society have a 
fundamental right to just and humane conditions in the home. The same 
position has been reiterated with greater force in Vikram Deo Singh 
Tomar v. State of Bihar. 
(vii) Right to Education: 
Right to education is not a specified fundamental right in part III of the 
Constitution. However in Part IV, containing Directive Principles, there 
are two Articles that refer to the right to education. Under Article 41, 
the state is directed, within the limits of its economic capacilty and 
development, to make effective provisions for securing right to 
education among other rights. Under Article 45, the State is directed to 
make an endeavour to provide, within a period of 10 years from the 
commencement of the Constitution, for free and compulsory education 
for all children until they complete the age of 14 years. However, the 
Supreme Court held that though the right to education is not a 
fundamental right and is not judicially enforceable as such, once the 
State, by legislative or administrative action, provides facilities for 
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education, its action must conform to the standard of equality and 
rationality underlying Article 14. 
In Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka,^^ a Division Bench of the Supreme 
Court declared that the right to education is concomitant to the 
fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution. Justice 
Kudip singh, held that 
"The right to education flows directly from right to life. The right to life 
under Article 21 and the dignity of an individual cannot be assured 
unless it is accompanied by the right to educaion". 
In Unnikrishanan v. A.P.^'' a Constitution Bench of the Supreme court 
has drawn the parameters of the right to education from Articles 41 and 
45. Following these Articles in that order, the Supreme Court has held 
that every citizen of this country has a right to free education until he 
completes the age of 14 years. Thereafter his right to education is 
subject to the limits of economic capacity and development of the state. 
Thus the Superme Court in the instant case has realised that the right to 
primary education only is a fundamental rights implicit under Article 21 
of the Constitution. In V. Krishnama Charyulu v. Sri Venkateshwara 
Hindu College of Engineering, a Division Bench of the Supreme Court 
while adjudicating a claim for equal pay for equal work for the 
employees working in private educational institutions, held that "the 
State has obligation to provide facilities and upportunities to the people 
to avail of the right to education."^' 
(viii) Right to Health: 
In Consumer Education and Research Centre v. Union of India J'^ the 
Supreme Court delivered a historic judgment, by holding that the right 
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to health and medical care is a fundamental right under Article 21. 
essential for making the life of the workman meaningful and purposeful 
with dignity of person. The Supreme Court has reiterated the above 
principle in Kirloskar Brothers Ltd v. ESI Corporation, ' and also in 
State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh Chawla/'* Thus the Supreme Court 
has succeeded in highlighting the need to ensure the health of workers 
and others, as an integral part of the right invigorated under Article 21. 
(ix) Right to livlihood 
Article 39(a) of the Constitution, forming part of Directive Principles, 
provides that the State shall direct its policy towards securing the right 
to adequate means of livlihood to the citizens. Clause (d) of Article 39 
embodies the directive to provide equal pay for equal work. Article 43 
directs the State to provide a living wage for all agricultural and 
industrial workers. \n People's Union for Democratie Rights v. Union of 
India ' popularly known as the Asiad case, the Supreme Couit two 
judges Bench held that the right to minimum wages, as prescribed the 
State is a part of Article 21. In State of Maharashtra v. 
ChandrabhansJ^ two judges Bench of the Supreme Court held that the 
Rule providing for payment of Rs. 1/- per month to a convicted 
Government servant towards subsistence allowance violates Article 21 
of the Constitution. In O.P. Gupta v. Union of India J^ a Division Bench 
of two Judges of the Supreme Court held that suspension of an 
employee which continued for 11 years and the departmental enquiry 
kept pending for 20 years would be violative of the fundamental rights 
of the employee. The Supreme Court has cleariy had that right to 
livlihood is included in the right to life "because no person can live 
without the means of living that is the means of livlihood". In Olga 
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Tellis V. Bombay Municipal Corporation. In All India Imam 
Organisation v. Union oflndiaj^ the Supreme Court held that the right 
to livelihood of Imams "incharge of religious activities of moscjue" is 
implicit under Article 21. In Narendra Kumar Chandla v. State of 
Haryanaf^ the Supreme Court held that the right to 'life under Article 
21 includes the right to livelihood. The Court went on to declare that an 
employee afflicted with an unfortunate desease should be adjusted in a 
suitable post. In Captain M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., 
the court held that non-payment of subsistance allowance to an 
employee during suspension period, would be violative of ftindamental 
right to life and held: 
"The Fundamental Rights including the right to life under 
Article 21 of the Constitution or the basic human rights 
are not surrendered by the employee. The provisions for 
payment of subsistence allowance in Service Rules only 
ensures non-violation of the right to life of the 
employee. 
(x) Right Against Cruel and Inhuman Punishment: In Rajendra 
Prasad v. State ofU.P:, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice 
Krishna Iyer held that the capital punishment would not be justified 
unless it was shown that the criminal was dangerous to the society.In 
Mithu v. State of Punjab the Supreme Court declared Section 303, 
Indian Penal Code as unconstitutional, as the same provided for 
mandatory death penalty for those life convicts who commit murders, as 
arbitrary and unreasonable. 
(xi) Right under Article 21 and preventive Detention: 
The aggrieved detenues approached the Supreme Court in a number of 
cases on the ground that the procedure followed, with regard to 
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preventive detention was not fair and reasonable and hence violative of 
Article 21. In A.K. Roy v. Union of India f' the Supreme Court upheld 
the contention of the petitioner that 'an ordinance' is a 'law' under Article 
21. In this case the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the National 
Security Act, 1980. In Kamla v. State of Maharashtra f^ the Supreme 
Court has clearly laid down the principle that the procedure must be 
just, fair and reasonable as contemplated under Article 21. 
In Francis Coralie Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi, the Supreme 
Court held that the right of a detenue to have interview with his legal 
advisor or family members, is part of Article 21. The court applied the 
protection of just, fair and reasonable procedure under Article 21 to 
preventive detention in Hem Lall Bhandari v. Sikkim.' In State of 
Punjab V. Sukhpal Singh, the Supreme Court held that submission of 
report without hearing detenue and affording him an opportunity to 
produce witnesses was illegal and violative of Article 21. In Union of 
India v. Vasanbharthi,^^ the Supreme Court held that right to be 
informed of passing of the detention order and of place of detention, to 
the family members of the detenue is a part of the fundamental rights 
under Article 21. 
(xii) Right to pollution free environment: 
The 42nd Constitutional Amendment has inserted a directive principle 
in the form of Article 48-A, which directs the state to protect and 
improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wild life of 
the country. Similarly one of the fundamental duties of citizens 
introduced in the form of Article 51-A (g) by the same Amendment, 
imposes a duty on every citizen of India to protect and improve the 
natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to 
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have compassion for living creatures. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, ' 
popularly known as ''Oleum gas leakage" case the court held tiiat the 
hardships caused to workmen and neighborhood, in manufacture and 
sale of hazardous products violates the right to pollution free 
environment of them which is their fundamental right under Article 21. 
In Vellore Citizens' Welfare Forum v. Union of India ' the Supreme 
Court has recognized that in the matter of environmental protection, "the 
precautionary principle" and "the polluter pays principle" are part of the 
country. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India f^ the Supreme Court ordering 
the polluting industries to shift from Agra to elsewhere. The court also 
indulged policy making on the ground that the right to live in a pollution 
free environment is a fundamental right under Article 21. In M C Mehta 
V. U.O.I.'^^ the court, noted that "lead-free petrol should be used through 
out the country". In M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath,^^ a 2 Judges Bench of 
the Supreme Court held that the Public Trust Doctrine, and Polluter 
Pays Principle have become part of the law of the land. The court 
reiterated the well established principle that the wrongdoer, the polluter, 
is under an obligation to make good the damage caused to the 
environment. In Church of God (Full Gospel) in India v. K.K.R. 
Majestic Colony Welfare Association, the court emphatically declared 
that in the name of religion, nobody can be permitted to add to noise 
pollution or violate noise pollution norms. 
(xii) Right to Commit Suicide and Article 21: In P. Rathinam v. 
Union of India, the Court emphatically declared that right to live 
includes the right to die and that both of them are implicit under Article 
21. However this decision of the Division Bench was overruled by the 
decision of a Constitution Bench in Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab.'^'^ The 
Bench speaking through Chief Justice J.S. Verma held that the right to 
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life does not include the right to die and that the extinction of life is not 
included in 'protection of life', the court observed that--
"Right to life is a natural right embodied in Article 21 but 
suicide is an unnatural termination or extinction of life 
and, therefore incompatible and inconsistent with the 
concept of "right to life". 
(xiv) Prohibition of bonded labour and Article 21 : - The 'bonded' 
labour, and 'begar' are the two evils that are ailing the modern society. In 
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India,'^' in a Public Interest 
Litigation the Supreme Court held that the system of bonded labour 
violates the right to life and personal liberty of them under Article 21. 
The court in the instant case, reminded the Government that it is the 
constitutional obligation of the state to prohibit forced labour in any 
form. In Neeraja Chowdary v. State of M.P., ^'' the Supreme Court 
issued a series of guidelines for release and rehabilitation of bonded 
labour on the ground that the system of bonded labour violates Article 
21 and 23 of the Constitution, Justice Bhagawati held in this case that 
the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 not only contemplates 
the release of bonded labour but also their rehabilitation as, without 
rehablitation, they would be driven to poverty, helplessness and despair, 
thus into serifdom once again. The learned judge held that this would be 
the plain requirement of Article 21. The activism of the court in this area 
lies in giving an impetus to the State and voluntary organisations, in 
enforcing these social welfare legislations true to their letter and spirit. 
(xv) Right to treatment and medical assistance in Medico-Legal 
Cases: In ParamanandKatara v. Union oflndia,"'^ the Supreme Court 
declared that the right of an injured person to treatment in medico legal 
cases, is part of the fundamental right to life under Article 21. The 
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Supreme Court issued number of guidelines to the Union of India, the 
Medical Council of India and other professional bodies to see that the 
life of the injured person is saved irrespective of any medico-legal 
complications. In P.B. Khedat Mazdoor Samity v. State of W.B., " the 
Supreme Court held that the failure of the Government hospitals to 
provide timely and emergency medical treatment to a person in need, 
results in violation of his right to life. The Court further held that, the 
breach of this right guaranteed under Article 2lean be compensated 
monetarily. 
(xvi) Service Matters and Article 21: 
After expansion of the horizons of the right to life and personal liberty, 
the protection of Article 21 has been sought to be enforced in service 
matters also. In O.P. Gupta v. Union oflndia,"^^ the Supreme Court held 
that the suspension of an employee which continued for long years and 
keeping the departmental enquiry pending for 20 years would be 
violative of Article 21 as the same is unreasonable and arbitrary and not 
in accordance with just, fair and reasonable procedure contemplated 
under Article 21. In Narendra Kumar Chandla v. State of Haryana,""" 
the Supreme Court held that dismissal or terminatior of a government 
servant from service on the ground that he was afflicted with an 
unfortunate desease, violates his fundamental right to livlihood implicit 
in Article 21. The Court directed the State to adjust him in a suitable 
post. 
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(xvii) Right to monetary compensation for violation of fundamental 
rights : 
In Rudul Shah v. State of Bihar J'^^ a 3-judges Bench of the Supreme 
Court dehvered its judgment through the then Chief Justice Y.V. 
Chandrachud held that— 
"In the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 32, the 
Supreme Court can pass an order for the payment of 
money in the nature of compensation consequential upon 
the deprivation of a fundamental rights to and liberty of a 
.... ,,108, 
petitioner 
In the instant case, the court, found that a person was detained in jail for 
14 years, even after his acquittal in trial. The court has awarded a 
compensation of Rs. 30,000/- to the petitioner for violation of his 
fundamental rights under Article 21 payable by the State. In M.C. 
Mehta v. Union of India,"'^ in a Public Interest Litigation, a 
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court headed by Justice P.N. 
Bhagwati, approved the above principle and reiterated that "in case of 
infringement of fundamental right of large number of persons, the 
Supreme Court can award remedial relief of compensation in writ 
petition itself'."^ 
In Bhim Singh v. State of J &K,'" the Supreme Court held that anesting 
an MLA but not producing before the magistrate results in gross 
violation of fundamental rights under Article 21, hence awaided a 
compensation of Rs. 50000/- to the petitioner. In Nilabati Behare v. 
State of Orissa, the Supreme Court held that the right to monetary 
compensation for violation of fundamental rights and human rights is a 
part of the guarantee under Article 21. The same principle has been 
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reiterated and followed in Dhananjay Sharma v. State of Haryana, 
and P.B. Khedat Mazdoor Samithy v. State of Harayana. In 
Bodhisatwa Gautum v. Subhra Chakmborthy,"^ the Supreme Court held 
that rape is a crime that violates the right to life under Article 21 and 
ordered interim compensation to the rape victims. 
(xviii) Right to safe Drinking Water: 
In O.K. Joshi v. Chief Secretary, State ofU.P.,"^ a 3 Judges Bench of 
the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of right to safe drinking water. In 
this case an inhabitant of Agra Town had filed the writ petition in 1992, 
alleging that the supply of drinking water in Agra City is extremely 
polluted, the water being, contaminated, filthy, and totally unhealthy for 
human consumption. He further alleged that different agencies like 
Nagar Mahapalika, the State of U.P., the Uttar Pradesh Pollution 
Control Board etc. have not exercised their power, as a result of which 
the common man and citizens of Agra have been suffering. The 
Supreme Court monitored the situation for about 7 years and instead of 
retaining the matter any further, directed the State to set-up a monitoring 
committee to be headed by the Municipal Commissioner, Agra and 
comprising the representatives of NEERI and others to look into 
effective functioning of several public authorities, responsible for supply 
of drinking water, providing sewerage and providing adequate measures 
for disposal of solid waste, 
(xix) Other Facets of Article 21 and Judicial interpretation: Apart 
from the above discussed implicit rights under Article 21, the Supreme 
Court has dealt with the expanding horizons of Article 21 in a number of 
cases. Some of these decisions are discussed hereunder. 
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(a) Sexual Harassment of Working Women and Article 21: In a 
very significant judgment, the Supreme Court in Visakha v. State of 
Rajasthan,"^ resorted to judicial legislation, by empthically declaring 
that sexual harassment of working women violates the right to gender 
equality and the right to life and personal liberty which implicitly 
contains the right to work with human dignity. In Apparel Export 
Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra"^ a 2-Judges Bench of the Supreme 
Court dealt with a case where a male superior officer was found by 
Departmental authorities to be guilty of molesting and of having tried to 
physically assault a subordinate female employee, Supreme Court 
upheld the punishment of dismissal awarded and held that "in cases 
involving violation of human rights, the courts must for ever remain 
alive to the international instnjments and conventions, and apply the 
same to a given case when there is no inconsistency between the 
international norms and the domestic law occupying the field". 
(b) Rights of Mother as natural guardian: In Ms. Githa Harihamn v. 
R.B.I, and Dr, Vandana Shiva v. Jayantha Bandhopaddyay,"'^ a 3-
Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held that a natural mother can act as 
'Natural guardian of minor' even when father is alive. 
(c) Bundhs are violative of Article 21: In Ranchi Bar Association v. 
State of Bihar,'^'^ a Division Bench of Patna High Court held that the 
government is duty bound not to allow unlawful bandh, rally etc. in 
order to protect life and personal liberty. Supreme Court in the case of 
CPI(M) V. Bharat Kumar has approved the judgment of Kerala High 
Court that bandhs are unconstitutional. 
It is clear that the court has acted with an unprecedented dynamism in 
expanding the scop of Article 21. The Supreme Court itself has assested 
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in a Consititutional Bench decision'^' that it is not necessary that all the 
fundamental rights must be specifically enumerated in part III of the 
Consititution. Justice Reddy stated in this decision that sexeral 
unenumerated rights fall within Article 21, since the expression 
"Personal Liberty" is of the widest amplitude. In that case, the court 
gave as many as 13 implicit rights guaranteed under Article 21. Thanks 
to the judicial activism the list has been expanded so as to include many 
more social as well as human rights under Article 21. More particularly 
from Article 21, sprung up a whole lot of human rights jurisprudence 
and the credit goes solely to the Supreme Court for its assertion of 
judicial power for a humanitarian purpose and with a humane louch. 
Thus, with more and more cases being brought under the umbrella of 
Article 21, it can now be said without any fear of contradiction that the 
above cases have broadened the scope and ambit of the right of personal 
liberty beyond the imagination of the framers of the Constitution. 
Professor Ghouse seems to have been fully vindicated when as far as 
back in 1969, emphasizing the need of procedural safe guard for life and 
liberty, he had almost prophetically pointed out that: 
"In India, because of poverty and illiteracy 
observance of fundamental rights is not yet regarded as 
good politics and their transgression as bad politics. The 
need for procedural safeguards, particularly in cases of 
deprivation of life and personal liberty is therefore more 
than obvious". ^ 
Thus one can now feel rest assured on the procedural front because after 
surveying the panorama of personal liberty, as shown above, the Indian 
judiciary has come to the conclusion that the courts should expand the 
reach and ambit of the fundamental rights rather than attenuate their 
meaning and content. 
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An analysis of the judicial behaviour of the apex court vis-a-vis Article 
21, after the landmark judgment in the Maneka Gandhi v. Union of 
India, makes it clear that the court has expanded the horizons of Article 
21 beyond the imagination and contemplation of the framers of the 
Constitution, the judges themselves and the constitutional lawyeis. The 
court, has by its liberal interpretation in numerous cases, has widened 
the scope of 'personal liberty' so as to include many unenumerated and 
implied rights in the fold of Article 21. The court has more convincingly 
read the requirement of reasonableness in all laws and actions affecting 
personal liberty. There by the court's most fruitful and beneficial 
activism in personal liberty cases has been achieved. Beginning with 
Maneka Gandhi's case, in 1978, the Supreme Court by gradual phases 
has, for all practical purposes introduced the concept of 'due process of 
law' in the expression "procedure established by law" in that Article, 
allowing the court to review the unreasonableness of any law or an 
order affecting a person's individual liberty. As an eminent lawyer has 
rightly observed, this is a remarkable tour de force by the court 
considering the fact that the framers of the Indian Constitution had 
deliberately avoided the introduction of the American doctrine of 'due 
process of law' in Article 21 and opted for the words "procedure 
established by law" from the Japanese Constitution, as the former 
exression has enabled the courts in United States to acquire too great a 
power of judicial review. Thus the judicial activism and enthusiasm 
of the court saw to it that many rights which were not specifically 
included are implied from Articles 19 and 21, like the right to shelter, 
right to education, right of locomotion, right to know and the right to 
development. 
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Another welcoming development in the judicial interpretation of Article 
21, particularly as regards the expression "life" is that, it includes the 
right not to mere animal existence but the right to live with basic human 
dignity. As the Supreme Court has laid down in a number of cases, the 
right to life under Article 21, at present means and includes the right to 
a decent living, replete with the right to pollution free environment, the 
right to education, the right to health and medical aid, among other basic 
human rights. Infact all the established and recognised human rights all 
over the world, are considered as part and parcel of the right to life and 
personal liberty under Article 21, thanks to the judicial activism in 
liberally interpreting the expression 'life' thereunder. As regards the 
concept of 'personal liberty' under Article 21, the Supreme Court's 
activism has ensured that the expression has been given the widest 
possible interpretation. The extent of the protection, has been 
considered to cover even those persons convicted under a criminal law 
in accordance with the procedure established by law. Thus the court has 
developed a prison jurisprudence whereby even those persons, whose 
personal liberty is deprived by the State, came to enjoy many a rights, 
even while undergoing the imprisonment. These judicially conferred 
and recognised rights of the prisoners include the right to safety, right to 
free legal aid, right against torture, right to speedy trial, right against 
handcuffing and the right to meet his family members and lawyers. In 
respect of the persons sentenced to death, the court held that they have a 
right to privacy, right to speedy disposal of mercy petitions filed before 
the President, and right against solitary confinement. In a number of 
cases the courts in India have commuted the death sentence imposed on 
a person, to life imprisonment in view of the inordinate delay in 
execution of death sentence. Another important contribution of judicial 
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activism is the evolution of compensatory jurisprudence, in respect of 
violation of the right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under 
Article 21. The Supreme Court has, established the principle that 
eventhough the monetary compensation that may be ordered to be paid 
either by the state or hazardous polluting industries, may not be the 
most effective remedy for violation of the fundamental rights under 
Article 21, it can be a supplemental remedy. Thus, rape victims have 
been directed to be paid interim compensation, by the accused guilty of 
committing the offence. While evolving this new jurisprudence to 
protect the fundamental rights, the court has diluted the principle of 
sovereign immunity. The court has discarded the rigid principle of the 
strict liability in awarding compensation to the aggrieved persons and 
substituted the same with the principle of Absolute Liability. The 
noteworthy new principle that has been innovated is that, the erring or 
negligent official, has been directed to pay the damages or 
compensation. Thus the court held the officials found guilty of abuse or 
misuse of their administrative power, personally liable to pay 
damages.'• '^^  The apex court, thus ensured that the protection under 
Article 21 is all-pervading, not suspendable even during emergency. 
The judicial activism guaranteed that Article 21 stands like a sentinel 
over human misery, degradation and oppression, and that its voice is the 
voice of justice and fair play and a voice which can never to silenced on 
any gound. 
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CHAPTER-3 
ANALYSIS FOR EMERGENCE OF PUBLIC 
INTEREST LITIGATION (PIL) IN INDIA 
The origin of this new tool forged by the apex court, Hes in the struggle 
to solve social and economic problems which is never ending. Starting 
from mid-seventies, a harmone called "judicial activism" injected to the 
judicial stream through necessity, suddenly brought about a 
revolutionary change in the out-look of the Indian judiciary. Till then, a 
generally conservative, tradition-bound institution became sensitive to 
the need of the weaker sections, downtrodden and traditionally 
oppressed classes of India. It is the lack of legislative thinking and 
executive inaction coupled with exploitation of the masses by the 
opportuned few, which made a section of the judiciary come down 
almost in a revolt to extend its hand of help to atleast some of the needy 
people.' It is a universally known tmth that India is a poor country 
inhabited by illiterate masses. The nation can at the best be described as 
a developing and a third world country. The social, cultural and 
economic problems are abound, naturally. Irrespective of the objectives 
set in by the framers of the Constitution and the Welfare State envisaged 
by them, even after half a century of freedom, the social and economic 
problems do persist. This is not to suggest that the successive 
governments at the Centre and in the States have totally failed in their 
endeavour to ameliorate the conditions of the people in India. Inspite of 
best of the efforts made by the State, the common man in India largely 
remains poverty stricken, illiterate and consequently ignorant of his 
rights and incapable of enforcing them even if he is aware of the same. 
It is in this back-ground 'that the Supreme Court of India has innovated a 
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new and unforeseen tool to enforce the rights of the helpless even at the 
cost of breaking certain well established barriers and traditional legal 
barricades which were firmly entrenched in our system. This process of 
judicial demolition of the rigid barriers of justice system in India, to lend 
a helping hand to the needy sections of the society started in 1980's." At 
the outset it may be made clear that Public Interest Litigation is not a 
unique and judicially fashioned tool in India alone but, it was the 
U.S.A., which gave lot of prominence to this concept, of course under a 
different name viz. Public Interest Law. Even the U.K. has also 
witnessed the on-set of this phenomenon in the seventies of this century 
by judges like Lord Denning. However, its acceptance and admission 
into the constitutional jurisprudence is a little late, as compared to the 
U.S.A. and the U.K. Another very important factor that should be borne 
in mind in discussing the Public Interest Litigation in India is that the 
background of Public Interest Litigation is not the same in India and the 
other two leading constitutional democracies mentioned above. In his 
pioneering work on 'Public Interest Litigation in India' Prof S.K. 
Agarwala remarks that "Public Interest Law has been an uniquely 
American Development. Public Interest Litigation (PIL), as it has 
become popular in India is one of the judiciary-led and judiciary-
induced phenomenons, which has been brought into existence by the 
Supreme Court, in order to protect the rights and interests of the 
oppressed sections, weaker and vulnerable quarters and the 
unrepresented sections of the society. As Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer has 
rightly pointed out, only a judicial culture aimed at social justice and 
human dignity can help the little man in a third world country like India. 
He stated: 
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"Only a judicial culture which, in its texture, has social 
justice, human dignity and egalite woven into it can make 
the judicature in a Third World country, based on a 
socialistic democratic order, functional. The raw 
realities of Indian society to-day are colossal illiteracy, 
intractuable indigency, and countless chronic injustices, 
blended with a militancy generated by the Preambular 
Rhetoric of the Constitution. The feudal—colonial status 
quo ante received its legal death sentence with Indian 
Independence. The tryst with destiny Indians made, when 
the country awoke to Freedom, 'to wipe every tear from 
every eye' and to underwrite "a social order in which 
justice, social, economics and political shall inform all 
the institutions of the national life", is still a pious wish,' 
In an adversarial system of justice, the judiciary is expected to render 
justice when the litigating parties come before the courts seeking a 
remedy or redressal. Generally the right to approach a court for 
redressal of a legal injury is given to an 'aggrieved party' alone. This 
right or standing is known as 'Locus standi' in the legal parlance. 
Generally, an aggrieved person is a person who has suffered a legal 
grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which 
has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him 
something or wrongfully affected his title to something."^ Thus, the 
term "Locus standi" or "standing to sue" denotes the existence ol" right 
of an individual to have a court enter upon adjudication on an issue 
brought before that court by proceedings instituted by the individual. 
The traditional principle followed by the Court is that a litigant has 
standing to challenge the action sought to be adjudicated in the 
proceedings. The traditional view has been that a petition could only be 
maintained by such a petitioner who has himself suffered infraction of 
his rights and is a 'person aggrieved'''. However exception was made 
only in case of a petition for 'habeas corpus' where a relative or friend 
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"1 
could file a petition on his behalf. The rigid principle of 'locus standi" 
has caused greater injustice than the justice, in India, as every aggrieved 
person was and is not in a position to move the constitutional courts for 
an extraordinary remedy either under Article 32 or 226 of the 
Constitution. As one of the famous judges credited with the emergence 
and birth of Public Interest Litigation in India, Justice Krishna Iyer 
points out"- "The people of India are illiterate, around 70% indigent, 
around 50% being below the poverty line, primitive more than 20% 
o 
being depressed classes and tribal miserables". Probably the eminent 
Judge was referring to the goals set out in the preamble of the 
Constitution viz. to secure to all the citizens equality of opportunity and 
status, justice, social, economic and political. The aforementioned 
factors naturally deny a person whose fundamental and other rights are 
violated either due to repression or governmental lawlessness, an easy 
access to justice. Public Interest Litigation is very closely linked with 
the relaxation of 'locus standi' and providng easy access to justice.lt is 
also concerned with the protection of the countless and unrepresented 
masses of India, a third world country, who are in no position to protect 
their rights due to poverty, illiteracy, indigency and other social, 
economic and political factors. As regards the civil remedies they 
recognise the 'locus standi' of only the aggrieved persons, to seek a 
remedy in a Civil Court. A minor concession is made under the Code of 
Civil Procedure, providing for class or representative action.'* Under the 
Criminal Procedure, only an affected or aggrieved person is competent 
to maintain an accusation or complaint, and generally not a stranger. As 
regards the constitutional remedies provided under Article 32 before the 
Supreme Court and under Article 226 before the High Courts, there is 
nothing contained in these two Articles to suggest that the 'locus standi' 
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of only the aggrieved person is to be recognised, while issuing 
appropriate orders, directions or writs. Inspite of such glaring silence 
the Constitutional Courts in India have followed the traditional principle 
of "locus standi" and permitted only the aggrieved person to initiate 
proceedings under Article 32 and 226. Probably this is due to the 
influence of the Anglo Saxon jurisprudence which has had a sway over 
the Indian judicial system in almost all the areas of administration of 
justice. 'Locus standi' concept was not an exception to this phenomenon. 
This rigid procedural barricade has been broken by the Supreme Court 
of India only in the 1980's through the concept of Public liiterest 
Litigation, popularised by judges like Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer and 
Justice P.N. Bhagwati. 
Public Interest Litigation or 'Pro bonon Publico Litigation ' is a litigation 
at the instance of a Public spirited citizen espousing cause of others.'" It 
is a strategic arm of the legal aid movement and which is intended to 
bring justice within the reach of poor masses who constitute the low 
visibility area of humanity." Public Interest Litigation is essentially a 
co-operative or collaborative effort on the part of the petitioner, the State 
or Public authority and the court to secure observance of the 
constitutional or legal rights, benefits or privileges confeiTed upon the 
vulnerable sections of the community and to reach social justice to 
them.'^ 
Justice Krishna Iyer, one of the pioneering judges who legitimised and 
popularised the Public Interest Litigation in India considers Public 
Interest Litigation as the product of creative judicial engineering. 
According to the eminent judge, "the jurisdiction of the Indian Supreme 
Court is the widest in the world; the challenges of India's social changes 
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are the sharpest; the dynamics of a functional jurispmdence is the 
creative expression of judicial response to the crisis of hunger for 
justice. Public Interest Litigation is the off spring of these social forces. 
This burgeoning process, seminal and innovative, makes the court a 
catalyst of social justice, a defender of the constitutional faith and the 
protagonist in the drama of human rights for the common man. .fustice 
Iyer views Public Interest Litigation as a part of the participative 
justice.'"* For Professor Upendra Baxi, Public Interest Litigation is the 
medium through which (a new kind of lawyering and a novel kind of 
judging) has happened, and is happening.'^ However Professor Baxi 
uses the term Social Action Litigation (SAL) in preference to the Public 
Interest Litigation. He considers the SAL as a by-product of the 
catharisis of 1975-76 emergency, which is primarily judge-led and even 
judge-induced, and as an exercise of judicial populism. Prof. Baxi's 
views are followed by LP. Massey who says that SAL is a socio-
economic movement generated by the judiciary to reach justice 
especially to the weaker sections of the society for whom even after 
decades of independence, justice is a merely a teasing illusion. In other 
words it is a long-arm strategy of the judiciary to reach justice to those 
who due to socio-economic handicap cannot reach the doors of the 
courts.'^ The Council for Public Interest Law set up by the Ford 
Foundation U.S,A., in its Report'^ has opted for a broad definition: 
"Public Interest Law is the name that has recently been 
given to effort to provide legal representation to 
previously unrepresented groups and interests. Such 
efforts have been undertaken in recognition that the 
ordinary market place for legal services fails to provide 
such services to significant segments of the population 
and to significant interests. Such groups and interests 
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include the poor, environmentalists, consumers and 
ethnic minorities, and others." 
In India, Public Interest Litigation is an innovative strategy which has 
been invented by the Supreme Court for the purpose of providing easy 
access to justice to the weaker sections of Indian humanity and it is a 
powerful tool in the hands of public spirited individuals and social 
action groups for combating exploitation and injustice and securing for 
the under-privileged segments of society, their social and economic 
entitlements. It is a highly effective weapon in the armoi-y of the law for 
1 O 
reaching social justice to the common man. Public Interest Litigation 
basically consists of (a) A new use of the law and (b) A new use of 
Courts.'^ The foregoing discussion makes it clear that Public Interest 
Litigation or Social Action Litigation is a concept developed by the 
mutual collaboration between the Supreme Court, and the public spirited 
citizens or organizations. It is a result of the relaxation of the rigid 
principle of'locus standi' which had been a stumbling block in providing 
access to justice, to a majority of the poor, poverty stricken, illiterate 
masses of India. Thanks to the judicial or judicial activism of the 
Supreme Court, more particularly of a few judges like Justice Krishna 
Iyer and Justice P.N. Bhagwati. In India, the recognition to the Public 
Interest Litigation has been given mainly in the 1980's eventhough there 
are a few instances where the Supreme Court had allowed representative 
action in writ proceedings before the Supreme Court and the High 
Courts, before the 1980s. The Public Interest Litigation is concerned 
primarily with the constitutional remedies sought under Article 32 or 
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However a few other instances 
of representative action can be seen under the Consumer Protection Act, 
1986, also. However such voluntar organisation or consumer can 
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initiate the legal proceedings only before certain fora like the District 
Forum, State Commission or National Commission and that too only 
regarding the consumer related complaints. The Public Interest 
Litigation in India is a consequence of the relaxation of 'locus standi' 
principle which is an inherent part of the adversarial system of Justice. 
Its main aim is to provide Justice within the reach of the needy, 
irrespective of their back- ground like the status, literacy and other 
factors. That is the precise reason, why the Public Interest Litigation 
has been called an arm of the legal aid movement in India. It is only in 
the 1980's that the Supreme Court has exhibited a dynamism to break 
the procedural barriers oi locus standi to achieve a constitutional goal of 
reaching Justice to one and all, irrespective of their background and 
status. Though a number of factors are responsible for the rapid growth 
and development of Public Intreast Litigation in India, the following are 
the most important and to be highlighted in this context. 
(i) Socially and economically disadvantaged position: Where a 
person who has suffered a legal wrong or injury or whose legal 
right or interest is violated, is unable to approach the court on 
account of his socially and economically disadvantaged position, 
any other person can invoke assistance of the court for the 
purpose of providing judicial redress to the person wronged-or 
injured; so that the legal wrong or injury caused to such person 
does not go unredressed and justice is done to him. These 
helpless sections include the bonded labour^' and the labour not 
receiving minimum wages.^^ Here the reasons are indigency, 
poverty and illiteracy and the fact of being unorganised which is 
a handicap. 
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(ii) Rights of tax-payers: A tax-payer has every right to expect 
certain basic amenities from the State. Thus a tax-payer of a local 
authority can also challenge an 'illegal action or omission of that 
authority.^^ 
(iii) Injury to public Interest: Where the State or public authority 
acts in violation of a constitutional or statutory obligation or fails 
to carry out such obligation, resulting in injury to public interest 
or public injury as distinguished from private interest or j^rivate 
injury. In such a case any member of the public can maintain an 
action for redressal of such public wrong or injuiy as otherwise it 
would be disastrous for the rule of law, for it would be open to the 
State or a public authority to act with impunity beyond the scope 
of its power or in breach of a public duty owed by it." 
(iv) Organised social action: The changing times have brought into 
existence, new social and economic rights in India. These new 
rights guaranteed in pursuance of the Directive Principles of State 
Policy require a concerted social action, for their effective 
implementation. Towards this purpose, various voluntary 
organisations have been formed, with the specific purpose of 
protecting the rights of the unrepresented and unorganised. These 
organisations and bodies have succeedeed in making the citizens 
aware of their rights. This new found awareness has led to the 
rapid growth of Public Interest Litigaation in India. The organised 
bodies and voluntary organisations working in this direction 
include ABSK Sangh (Railway), Bandhua Mukti Morcha, 
People's Union for Democratic Rights, Common Cause, and 
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Consumer Education and Research Centre etc. The Hst is only 
illustrative and not exhaustive in any manner. 
(v) Court's willingness to innovate: These days the Courts especially 
the higher judiciary views themselves as partners in the 
development of the country and in reformation of the society. 
During the post-emergency era, the Supreme Court has realised 
that its role is not merely to interpret the law but to apply the 
constitutional spirit. This realisation has prompted the courts to 
innovate new tools in the judicial process, which include the 
Public Interest Litigation. 
(vi) Judicial Activism: The judicial activism of the Supreme Court is 
the main factor for the emergence of the concept of Public 
Interest Litigation in India. A few bold judgments rendered by the 
Supreme Court through justices like Krishna Iyer and Bhagwati 
after the landmark judgment 'Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India' 
emboldened the other justices to provide greater access to the 
people, to avail easy and informal redressal of their grievances. 
The result, is the complete relaxation of the 'locus standi' in writ 
proceecdings and entertaining any petition filed by any "public 
spirited" or "public interested" citizen or body. A striking feature 
of SAL is that it is primarily judge-led and even judge-induced. 
And it is in turn related to justice and judicial activism on the 
High Bench^ ;^ and 
(vii) The Constitution 42"'' Amendment: The Constitution (42'"' 
Amendment) Act, 1976 which came into effect from 03-01-1977 
has inserted a new Article 39-A in Part IV of the Constitution. 
This Article directs the State to secure equal justice and free legal 
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aid to one and all, irrespective of economic and other disabilities. 
Probably this constitutional provision also has helped the 
emergence of the Public Interest Litigation in India. 
These are some of the important factors that led to the emergence of the 
'Public Interest Litigation' in India. Even though it is a primarily judge-
led and judge-induced litigation, the credit for which, should go to the 
judicial activism of the Supreme Court. 
Evolution of 'Public Interest Litigation' in India: Public Interest 
Litigation in India is an aspect of post-emergency catharisis.'^'The jurist 
considers the same as a result of the judicial populism resorted to, by the 
Supreme Court, in an attempt to refurbish the image of the Court, 
tarnished by a few emergency decisions and also an attempt to seek 
- ) -7 
new, historical basis of legitimation of judicial power." This view gains 
support also from another constitutional writer. The press made an 
important contribution for the development of Public Interest Litigation 
in India, by highlighting the repression unleashed by the State against 
the people and by exposing the Court's behaviour during the emergency 
of 1975-76. The first dramatic opportunity to initiate this new kind of 
constitutional litigation in India was probably provided by the Supreme 
Court advocate Ms. Kapila Hingorani, who filed a writ based on a series 
of articles in 'Indian Express' a national daily, a exposing the plight of 
Bihar undertrial prisoners, most of whom had served long-pre trial 
detentions. This culminated in Supreme Court accepting the locus 
standi' of the advocate and another in a series of six interim matters viz. 
Hussainara Khatoon (I) to Hussainala Khatoon (VI) v. State of Bihar s"^ 
In 1980, two law professors initiated a writ petition before the 
Supreme Court, by sending a letter addressed to the editor, Indian 
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Express, describing the inhuman conditions of detention in the Agra 
Protective Home for women, which was considered as a writ petition 
on the ground violation of Article 21.^ *^  This was followed by 
acceptance of petitions filed by law students, law teachers, social 
workers, and legal correspondents of newspapers as writ petitions 
under Article 32, by the Supreme Court in a number of cases. What is 
striking in this episode of treating letters addressed to the court 
complaining violation of legal and fimdamental rights, is that, most of 
these letters were addressed to the individual judges like Justice P.N. 
Bhagwati, who was besides being a sitting judge of the Supreme 
Court, also the chairman of the National Committee for the 
Implementation of the Legal Aid Schemes. " In Sunil Batra v. Delhi 
Administration,^^ a 3-judges Division Bench of the Supreme Court, 
headed by Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, treated a letter written by Sunil 
Batra, a fellow prisoner, to a judge of the Supreme Court complaining 
of a brutal assault by a head warder on another prisoner, Premchand, 
as a writ petition, forsaking the prescribed forms, since the freedom 
was at stake. The letter was posted on the Bench to be 
metamorphasized into a habeas corpus proceeding. Probably, this 
particular beginning can be validly cited as the beginning of exercising 
the epistolary jurisdiction by the Supreme Court in India. In Municipal 
Council, Ratlam v. Vardhi Chand,'^'^ a Division Bench of the Supreme 
Court consisting of Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer and Justice O. Chinnappa 
Reddy, recognised the standing of the citizens, to seek directions 
against the municipality for removal of stench and stink caused by 
open drains and public excretion, under Section 133 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure. While quoting a popular work^^ the learned 
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justice explained the philosophy of the Public Interest Litigation in the 
following words: 
"the urgent need is to focus on the ordinary man one 
might say the little man the paramount concern is 
increasingly with 'social justice' i.e. with finding 
procedures which are conducive to the pursuit and 
protection of the rights of the ordinary people.' 
Justice Iyer further Consolidated the Public Interest Litigation in P.S.R. 
Sadanantham v. Arunachalam.' In this case, a Constitution Bench 
speaking through Justice Krishna Iyer, declared that: 
"access to justice to every 'bona fide' seeker is a 
democratic dimension of remedial jurisprudence even as 
public interest litigation, class action, pro bono 
proceedings, are."' 
In Icchu Devi v. Union of India," Justice P.N. Bhagwati speaking for a 
Division Bench of two judges, held that in case of an application for a 
writ of habeas corpus, the practice evolved by Supreme Court is not to 
follow strict rules of pleading nor place undue emphasis on the question 
as to, on whom the burden of proof lies. The eminent judge, while 
referring probably to the perecedent created in Sunil Batra, held that 
even a post card written by a detenue from jail has been sufficient to 
activise the Supreme Court into examining legality of detention."**^ In 
A.B. S.K. Sangh (Railway) v. Union of India,'^' a 3-judges Division 
Bench of the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Krishna Iyer, 
observed in his inimitable style-
"...,. our current procedural jurisprudence is not of 
individualistic Anglo-Indian mould. It is broad-based and 
people-oriented and envisions access to Justice through 
class actions', 'public interest litigation' and 
'representative proceedings.... we have, no hesitation in 
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holding that the narrow concept of cause of action and 
'person aggrieved' and individual litigation is becoming 
obsolescent in some jurisdictions". 
In Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union vs, Union of India, ' Justice 
Krishna Iyer who spoke for himself and Justice P.N. Bhagwati made a 
number of observations relating to the Public Interest Litigation and its 
necessity in India. The judge observed that: 
"Law, is a social auditor and this audit function can be 
put into action only when someone with real public 
interest ignites the jurisdiction. We cannot be scared by 
the fear that all and sundry will be litigation-happy and 
waste their time and money and the time of the court 
through false and frivolous cases. In a society where 
freedoms suffer from atrophy and activism is essential for 
participative public Justice, some risks have to be taken 
and more opportunities opened for the public-minded 
citizen to rely on the legal process and not be repelled 
from it by narrow pendantry now surrounding locus 
standi".... 
Justice Krishna Iyer, speaking for a 03-Judges Division Bench in 'Azad 
Rickshaw Pullers Union v. State of Punjab, recognised the standing of 
a Rickshaw Pullers Union to challenge certain regulations framed by the 
Government of Punjab and spoke about the judicial activism of the 
Court in the following words : 
"All is well that ends well and judicial activism gets its 
highest bonus when its order wipes some tears from some 
tt46 
eyes. 
In Khatri v. State of Bihar, popularly known as the 'Bhagalpur 
blindings case, Justice P.N. Bhagwati explained the importance of the 
right to free legal services and issued a series of directions, to get the 18 
blinded prisoners treated by expert doctors. The real and most powerful 
thrust to the Public Interest Litigation in India was given by a 7-Judges 
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Special Bench of the Supreme Court in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India,'' 
popularly known as the Judges Transfer case No. 1. Justice Bhagwati. 
gave in this landmark judgment, a proper shape and perspective to the 
Public Interest Litigation and its emergence in India. A few of his 
observations, he made, while accepting the 'locus standi' of Lawyers to 
question the transfer of justices etc., are worth reproducing in this 
context. He observed: 
" it must be regarded as well settled law, where 
a person who has suffered a legal wrong or a legal injury 
or whose legal right or legally protected interest is 
violated, is unable to approach the court on account of 
some disability or it is not practicable for him to move 
the court for some other sufficient reasons, such as his 
socially or economically disadvantaged position, some 
other person can invoke the assistance of the court for 
the purpose of providing judicial redress to the person 
wronged or injured so that the legal wrong or injury-
caused to such person does not go unredressed and 
Justice is done to him.' 
In the Asiad case^^ Justice Bhagwati speaking for himself and Baharul 
Islam J, treated a letter written by the petitioner, an organisation 
working for the protection of democratic rights of citizens, as a writ 
petition and exercised the epistolary jurisdiction. In this case Justice 
Bhagwati explained the nature and scope of the Public Interest 
Litigation and observed that it is a strategic arm of the legal aid 
movement and which is intended to bring justice within the reach of 
poor masses, who constitute the low visibility area of humanity. He 
explained that the object of public Interest Litigation is primarily to 
promote and vindicate public interest which demands that violations of 
constitutional or legal rights of large number of people who are poor, 
ignorant or in a socially or economically disadvantaged position should 
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not go unnoticed and unredressed.^' The Court further declared that the 
concept of Public Interest Litigation is essentially a cooperative or 
collaborative effort on the part of the petitioner, the State or Public 
authority and the Court to secure observance of the constitutional or 
legal rights, benefits and privileges conferred upon the vulnerable 
sections of the community and to reach social justice to them.^ " In the 
same vein. Justice Bhagwati has also exhorted the State to welcome the 
Public Interest Litigation as it would give it an opportunity to right a 
wrong or to redress an injustice done to the poor and weaker sections of 
the community whose welfare is and must be the prime concern of the 
State or the public authority. In Veena Sethi v. State of Bihar/ a 02-
Judges Division Bench of the Supreme Court speaking through 
Bhagwati, J, set the judicial process in motion, on the basis of a letter 
written to him by the Free Legal Aid Committee, Hazaribagh. The letter 
complained of the illegal detention of certain insane prisoners declared 
sane, for 20 to 37 years. The Court directed the release of such prisoners 
forthwith. 
In Sanjit Roy v. State of Rajasthan,''' a Division Bench of the Court, 
headed by Justice P.N. Bhagwati admitted a writ petition filed by a 
social Action Group called the Social Work and Research Centre, 
operating in Ajmer, Rajasthan, challenging the practice of non-payment 
of minimum wages by the PWD to workers, engaged in famine relief 
work. The Court declared such practice unconstitutional and directed the 
payment of minimum wages. In Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra,^' 
the 03-judges Division Bench of the Supreme Court entertained a writ 
petition, based on a letter addressed by Sheela Barse, a journalist 
complaining of custodial violence to women prisoners while confined in 
the police lock-up in Bombay. On ascertaining the veracity of the 
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complaint, by appointing a commissioner of the Court, the Supreme 
Court Bench issued number of directions to the State to protect the 
dignity and honour of the female prisoners, while in the custod> of the 
police. In National Textile Workers' Union v. P.R. Ramakrishnan,' a 
Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that workers of a 
company have 'locus' to appear and to be heard in windmg up 
proceedings of the company. Justice Bhagwati who spoke for the 
majority, while referring to the directive principle under Article 43-A, 
pertaining to the workers' participation in management of industries, 
expounded a new principle that the company during modern times can 
no more be considered as a property of the shareholders. Bandhua Mukti 
Morcha v. Union of India,^^ is a watershed in the evolution of Public 
Interest Litigation movement in India. In this case, a 03-judges Bench of 
the Supreme Court reiterated the position earlier made clear in S.P. 
Gupta V. Union of India. The Court acted on a petition filed by an 
organisation, dedicated to the cause of release of bonded labourers. In 
Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State ofU.P.' the Supreme 
Court in continuation of its directions in an earlier decision^'^ dealt with, 
admittedly the first case of its kind in the country invoking the issues 
relating to environment and ecological balance. A Divsion Bench of the 
Supreme Court consisting of Justice Bhagwati and Justice Ranganath 
Misra, speaking through the latter held: 
"// is for the Government and the Nation and not for the 
Court, to decide whether the deposits should be exploited 
at the cost of ecology and environmental considerations 
or the industrial requirements should be otherwise 
satisfied " 
One of the most significant decisions, rendered by Justice Bhagwati on 
Public Interest Litigation was M.C. Mehta v. Union of India.^' In this 
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case, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court speaking through the 
eminent judge, dealt with a reference made by a three judges Bench of 
the Supreme Court, pertaining to the Oleum gas leakage, during 
pendency of petition by a public spirited body like the Legal Aid and 
Advice Board, for closure of certain units of a company. The Court held 
that the Supreme Court can entertain applications for compensation on 
behalf of victims of gas leak and further held that the Court can award 
remedial relief of compensation, the writ petitioner itself "" 
Significantly, the Court ostensibly, rebutted the criticism about treating 
simple letters addressed to individual judges, a series petitions-
Bhagwati, J declared: 
"it would not be right to reject a letter addressed to an 
individual justice of the Supreme Court merely on the 
ground that it is not addressed to the Court or to the 
Chief Justice and his companion judges. Similarly the 
court should not adopt a rigid stance that no letters will 
be entertnined unless they are supported by an affidavit 
Even if a letter is addressed to an individual 
judge of the court, it should be entertained, provided of 
course, it is by or on behalf of a person in custody or on 
behalf of a woman or a child or a class of deprived or 
disadvantaged persons." ' 
A Division bench of the Supreme Court in Janata Dal v. H.S. 
Chowdhary,'^'* Justice Pandian approvingly quoted Justice P.N. 
Bhagwati's observations which are worth reproducing here. Justice 
Bhagwati observed in one of his articles thus: 
"The judiciary has to play a vital and important role not 
only in preventing and remedying abuse and misuse of 
power but also in eliminating exploitation and injustice. 
For this purpose, it is necessary to make procedural 
innovations in order to meet the challenges posed by this 
new role of an active and committed judiciary. The 
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summit judiciary in India, keenly alive to its social 
responsibility and accountability to the people of the 
country, has liberated itself from the shackles of western 
thought, made innovative use of power of judicial review, 
devised new methods and fashioned new strategies for 
the purpose of bringing justice for social and 
economically disadvantaged groups During the last 
four or five years, however, judicial activism has opened 
up a new dimension for the judicial process and, has 
given new hope to the justice-starved millions of India.' 
The undisputed fact is that Pubhc Interest Litigation is a concept 
innovated by the judiciary as a result of its judicial activism. It is a 
concept which aims at providing easy access to justice, to all the 
sections of the society. It is the result of a unique exercise of the power 
of judicial review by the apex court. It is primarily judge-led and judge-
induced in India even though the State and public spirited individuals 
and organizations, have played an equally supportive role in giving it a 
proper shape. A keen analysis of the judicial trends makes it clear that 
the apex court has widely enlarged the scope of Public Interest 
Litigation by relaxing and liberalising the rule of standing by treating 
letters or petitions sent by any person or association complaining 
violation of any fundamental rights and also entertaining writ petitions 
filed under Article 32 of the Constitution by public-spirited and policy-
oriented activist persons or journalists or any organization. The court 
rejected serious challenges made with regard to the maintainability of 
such petitions and rendered many vzWi/o /^c judgments, against the State, 
for the betterment of the people at large in many fields in confonnity 
with the constitutional prescriptions. 
As the Supreme Court itself has acknowledged, the newly invented 
proposition of law laid down by many learned judges of the Supreme 
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Court in the arena of Public Interest Litigation manifestly establishes 
that the court's dynamic activism in the field of Public Interest 
Litigation is by no means less than those of other activist judicial 
systems in other parts of the world.^ ^ 
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Selected area of Constitutional Law wherein 
Expansion has taken place through Judicial Activism 
CHAPTER-1 
EQUALITY RIGHTS: 
Case Law based on: Article-14, Article-15 and 
Article-16 of the Constitution 
Equality is an important aspect of human dignity. In a strict sense, 
equality does not mean identical treatment. There can be no similarity of 
treatment as long as people differ in their want, capacity and need. The 
Constitution guarantees under Article 14, that "The state shall not deny 
to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws 
within the temtory of India". 
The guiding philosophy of Article 14 is undoubtedly to secure to all 
persons, citizens or non-citizens, the equality of status and opportunity 
referred to in the glorious Preamble to the Constitution. Speaking about 
the value and significance of Article 14 for the people of India, Vivan 
Bose, J. stated that Article 14 sets out an attitude of mind, a way of life, 
rather than a rule of law. Thus, 'equality before the law" or the equal 
protection of the laws within the meaning of Article 14 of the 
Constitution means absence of any arbitrary discrimination by the law in 
its administration. The judicial decisions pertaining to Equality Rights 
are as under: 
In Triloki Nath v. State of Jammii and Kashmir,^ Chief justice Subba 
Rao defined the constituUonal policy that motivates protective 
discrimination for the backward classes in the following words: 
"In a country where there are different strata of 
society ranging from highly sophisticated to lowly 
backward the concept of equality will drive the latter 
to the wall. Their condition would become \vorse than 
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what it is. So in order to give a real opportunity to 
them to compete with the better placed people, els. (3) 
and (4) are introduced in the article 16". 
These observations were made with reference to article 16 but they 
would also apply to article 15. However, protective discrimination 
should not result in the perpetuation of the caste-wise division of the 
society. The Court has, therefore, disapproved the caste-wise 
definition of "backwardness". The principle that caste should not be 
the sole test for deciding the backwardness which has been laid down 
by the Court in a number of cases in the past" was once again 
reiterated in Rajendran v. State of Madras.' However, the Court there 
pointed out that it could be that an entire caste was of socially and 
educationally backward class people and hence reservation could be 
made in favour of such caste. In State of A.P. v. P. Sagar the Court 
observed that the criterion for determining the backwardness must not 
be based on religion, caste, race, sex or place of birth and that the 
backwardness should be social and educational similar to the 
backwardness from which the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes suffered. 
In Triloki Nath v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, the government of 
Jammu and Kashmir formulated the policy of reserving fifty per cent of 
the vacancies to the civil services of the state for Muslims of the entire 
state of Kashmir, forty per cent of vacancies for the Jammu Hindus and 
ten per cent for the Kashmir Hindus. The state justified such a policy 
under article 16(4) on the ground that Muslims of the state and the 
Jammu Hindus constituted 'backward' classes of the citizens who were 
not adequately represented in state services and therefore, reservations 
could be made for them in state services under article 16(4). The 
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Supreme Court did not agree with this approach of the state, but 
emphasized that in determining whether a section forms a backward 
class, a test based solely on caste, community, race, religion, sex, 
descent, place of residence or birth cannot be adopted because it would 
directly infringe article 16(2). The Court emphasized that the normal 
rule contemplated by the Constitution is equality between aspirants to 
public appointments, but in view of the backwardness of certain classes, 
the state could make a provision for reservation of posts in their favour. 
This was contrary to articles 16(1) and (2) and was hardly permissible 
under article 16(4) 
In R.C. Cooper v. Union of India!;' popularly known as the Bank 
Nationalization case. On 19"' July 1969, the Vice-President, acting as 
the President, Promulgated an ordinance under article 123 of the 
Constitution transferring to and vesting the undertakings of fourteen 
named commercial banks in the corresponding new banks. 
The Act was challenged on the ground of the alleged violation of article 
14. It was contended that by picking out these fourteen banks and 
leaving out other banks the legislature had discriminated against the 
named banks. The Court, speaking through Justice Shah who delivered 
the majority judgment on behalf of ten Judges, noted the contention of 
the Attorney- General that the fourteen banks had been selected for 
acquisition on the basis of "larger business and wider coverage in 
comparison with other banks not selected". The other factors on which 
reasonable classification was sought to be established were larger 
organization, better managerial resources and better trained employees. 
Justice Shah observed that "these are primarily grounds for 
classification and not for explaining the relation between the 
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classification and the object of the Act". The learned Judge, however, 
declined to express an opinion on the question whether selection of the 
undertakings of some out of many banking institutions for compulsory 
acquisition could be struck down due to absence of the nexus between 
the above criteria and the object of the Act', The Court, however, chose 
to strike down the Act on another ground. The fourteen named banks 
were prohibited from carrying on banking business. The Court felt that 
there was no rational explanation for such disability being imposed on 
the named banks while other banks could carry on the business. Section 
15(2) which contained such provision was, therefore, struck down as it 
contained hostile discrimination against the named banks. 
In Periakanippan v. State of Tamilnadu, It was contended that the lists 
of socially and educationally backward classes prepared by the 
government for preferential treatment under article 15(4) was based 
entirely on caste. Hegde, J., reiterated what had been said before that the 
classification of backward classes on the basis of caste was within the 
purview of article 15(4) if they were shown to be socially and 
educationally backward. The learned judge conceded that there were 
numerous castes which were so, but warned against letting vested 
interests be created in the backwardness. He observed: 
"The government should not proceed on the basis that 
once a class is considered as a backward class it 
should continue to be backward class for all times. 
Such an approach would defeat the very purpose of 
the reservation because once a class reaches a stage 
of progress...then competition is necessary for their 
future progress. The Government should always keep 
under review the question of reservation of seats and 
only the classes which are really socially and 
300 
educationally backward should be allowed to have the 
benefit of reservation ". 
In State of Punjab v. Hiralal,^^ the Supreme Court speaking through 
Hedge, J., gave evidence of the complexities involved in such balancing. 
The Government of Punjab had decided to reserve some higher posts for 
the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and backward classes. The High 
Court held that such reservation was excessive and could lead to various 
anomalies such as that the person getting the benefit might jump over 
the heads of several of his seniors. While allowing the state's appeal, 
Hegde, J. observed: 
"It is an inevitable consequence of any reservation of 
posts that junior officers are allowed to take a march 
over their seniors. This circumstance is bound to 
displease the senior officers. It may also be that some 
of them will get frustrated but then the Constitution-
makers have thought fit in the interests of society as a 
whole that the backward class of citizens of this 
country should be afforded certain protection ". 
The court upheld the reservation. It is submitted that this is a bold and 
dynamic approach which shows adequate understanding of the stresses 
and strains of social change. 
In State of A.P. v. U.S. V. Balaram the Supreme Court observed that the 
commission's determination of backwardness was based on valid and 
relevant criteria. If a caste was wholly, socially and educationally, 
backward, its inclusion in the list of backward classer is not bad. Where 
students of a backward class capture seats on merit, this does not 
prejudice the reservation of seats in their favour. It is, however, a factor 
which the government ought to take into account while reconsidering 
the classification. 
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^ In Nagpur Improvement v. Ganesh Sikri C.J. maintained that llioughi 
' article 14 permits reasonable classification the object of the legislation 
should not itself be discriminatory. If the object of the law is 
compulsory acquisition of land for a public purpose, principles flowing 
from article 14 should be followed for determining compensation. 
In State ofJammu and Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa, Krishna Iyer J. 
delivered a concurring opinion. He held that the theory that all men are 
equal "had working limitations since absolute equality would lead to 
Procrustean cruelty or would sanction indolent proficiency" The 
doctrine of reasonable classification made the equality issue workable 
by forging an imaginative and constructive modus vivendi between 
commonness and excellence. This doctrine insisted on equality among 
equals and permitted dissimilar things to be treated differently. The 
learned judge emphasized. 
"The social meaning of Articles 14 to 16 is neither 
dull uniformity nor specious talentism. It is a process 
of producing quality out of larger areas of equality 
extending better facilities to the latent capabilities of 
the lowly. It is not a methodology of substitution of 
pervasive and slovenly mediocrity for activist and 
intelligent - but not snobbish and uncommitted -
cadres." 
He said that the dilemma of democracy was how to preserve the 
difference between the good and the bad without impeding the 
protection and promotion of the weaker classes of the society. He 
emphasized the role of judicial review.'^ 
These are meta-judicial matters left to the other 
branches of government, but the court must hold the 
Executive within the leading strings of egalitarian 
constitutionalism and correct, by judicial review, 
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episodes of subtle and shady classification grossly 
violative of equal justice. 
B.Banerjee v. Anita Pan Case involved a choice between competing 
values- protection of the interests of a weaker section of the society 
threatened with eviction from houses and prevention of purposeless 
litigation. The court, speaking through Krishna Iyer J., displayed 
awareness of the sociology of the housing problem and the pathetic lot 
of the tenants in Calcutta and the need for discouraging purposeless 
litigation. 
The "background observations" of Krishna Iyer J. Like the prefaces of 
Bernard Shaw highlighted certain facets of sociological jurisprudence. 
He emphasized that courts were not a third chamber, law was a social 
science, judges acted not by hunch but on hard facts, constitutionality of 
a statute depended not on abstract principles or rigid legal cannons alone 
but also on concrete realities and the rule of law stemmed from the mle 
of life. He said that to enable the court to adopt and apply these facets of 
sociological jurisprudence the counsels must help the court: 
Welfare legislations, calculated to benefit weaker 
classes, when their vires is challenged in court, cast 
an obligation on the state, particularly when notice is 
given to the Advocate General, to support the law, if 
necessary, by a Brandeis brief and supply of 
socioeconomic circumstances and statistics inspiring 
the enactment. Courts cannot, on their own, adventure 
into social research outside the record and if 
Government lets down the legislature in Count by not 
illumining the provisions from the angle of the social 
mischief or economic menace sought to be countered, 
the victims will be the class of beneficiaries the State 
professed to protect.'^ 
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Recondite instances and casual hardships cannot 
deflect constitutional construction of social 
legislation, if the main thrust of the statute relates to a 
real social evil of dimensions deserving to be 
antidoted by antedated legislative remedy.... Social 
legislation without tears affecting vested interests is 
impossible. The gain of the few as opposed to the 
general public cannot be the touch-stone for justifying 
reasonableness of the restriction imposed on the 
rights of the transferee landlords.... 
In Subash Chandra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Ray C.J. emphasized 
that employment of the constitutionally prohibited grounds ot" 
discrimination like religion, race or caste as criteria of social and 
educational backwardness would stultify the prohibition oi 
discrimination on those grounds in articlelS (1). In view of this 
prohibition and the accent in article 15 (4) on classes, "the socially 
backward classes of citizens are groups other than groups based on 
caste."" He pointed out that classes of citizens meant a homogeneous 
group of people with some common traits and who are identifiable by 
those traits. He emphasized the economic element in backwardness: 
Backwardness is judged by economic basis that each 
region has its own measurable possibilities for the 
maintenance of human members, standards of living 
and fixed property. From an economic point of view 
the classes of citizens are backward when they do not 
make effective use of resources. ' 
Ray C.J. has also held that the onus of proof was on the state to 
established that "the reservations are for socially and educationally 
backward classes." 
Though the invalidation of the reservation for the rural areas does not 
mainly rest on rejection of poverty as a basis of backwardness, it invites 
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a comment. Ray C.J. gives the following reasons for refusing to admit 
the relevance between poverty and backwardness. 
If poverty is the exclusive test a large population in 
our country would be socially and educationally 
backward class of citizens. Poverty is evident 
everywhere and perhaps more so in educationally 
advanced and socially affluent classes. 
The petitioner in Urmila Ginda^^ relied on N.E. Horo ^ to claim that 
even though by birth she was a high caste Hindu, she became a member 
of the scheduled caste by virtue of her marriage with a chamar. \n N.E. 
Horo the Supreme Court had held that the respondent, who had been 
assimilated in the Mundra tribe by her marriage, accepted by the elders 
of the tribe, was eligible to contest for a parliamentary seat reserved for 
the scheduled tribes. The Delhi High Court refiised to apply this analogy 
to the petitioner: 
It seems to me that to permit a lady like the petitioner 
belonging to a higher caste to compete for a seat 
reserved for such socially and educationally 
backward class of people, merely by reason of her 
marrying a person belonging to such caste, might 
even defeat the provision made by the state in favour 
of such socially and educationally backward classes 
by reserving certain posts for them. 
The court's refusal to extend the Hindu theory of the husband and wife 
being one for secular purposes leaves no doubt that a woman from a 
scheduled caste marrying a high caste Hindu would not continue to be 
entitled to protective discrimination. 
As protective discrimination favours a less meritorious person agamst a 
meritorious one, it is necessary that its benefit should be confined to 
those who deserve it. Further this benefit available to a backward family 
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from a long period at various stages and in a variety of forms must have 
contributed to the educational and social advancement of the family. 
When a backward family has, with the help of the state-support, moved 
out of the shadow of backwardness, why should this benefit be 
continued in respect of such a family? 
The opinion of Anand J. of the Delhi High Court in W.A. Baid v. Union 
oflndicP contains some interesting observations on a question of great 
social importance. The issue involved in that case was whether the post 
of senior sister tutor in the School of Nursing, Irwin Hospital, New 
Delhi, could validly be made a female preserve and whether the male 
sister tutor working in this school could be made ineligible for that post 
on the ground that he was a male. In the writ petition, alleging that 
rendering the petitioner ineligible for the post of senior sister tutor 
violated article 16(2), which forbade discrimination on the basis of 
among others, sex, it was argued that the School of Nursing was a 
predominantly female institution and that, having regard to the duties of 
senior sister tutor, it was eminently proper that the post should be held 
by a woman. It was further argued that such an appointment would 
ensure smooth administration. It was, therefore, pointed out that the 
impugned discrimination was not based on sex along and that article 
16(2) forbade discrimination on the basis of sex only. 
In Jagdish Rai v. State of Haryana^^ relying on the doctrine of 
reasonable classification read into article 16(1) by the earlier cases, 
Thomas had held that equality of opportunity in that article permitted 
preferential treatment of scheduled castes. But, at least, two of the 
concurring opinions riddled this ratio with reservations. Krishna Iyer J. 
had said that only Harijans should be allowed to run the gauntlet of 
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equality. He had said further that care should be taken to prevent the 
creamy elites among the Harijans from swallowing the benefits of 
preferential treatment. Beg J. (as he then was) had said that the 
preferential treatment now read into article 16(1) otiose. To these 
reservations we may add the questions asked in the dissenting opinions 
of Khanna and Gupta JJ. Which were not answered in any of the 
multiple opinions? All these facts render the following assertion of 
Reddy J. questionable: 
The legal position, as explained in State of Kerala v. 
N.M. Thomas...may now be taken to be settled, that 
Article 16(4) is not an exception to Article 16(1) but is 
illustrative of one of the methods of achieving 
equality, that it is not exhaustive of the classifications 
necessary and therefore permissible....' 
The other feature of the opinion of Reddy J. is that he treated a vague 
slogan as a juristic postulate and relied on it heavily to decide very 
important issue: 
And what does efficiency mean? As Krishna Iyer J. 
points out "Efficiency means, in terms of good 
Government, not marks in examination only, but 
responsible and responsive service to the people 
In O.M. Chanchala v. State of Mysore^^ where the Supreme Court had 
upheld reservation in favour of a politically backward class, the High 
Court deduced the principle that article 15(4) was not the sole source of 
reservations for purposes of admission to educational institutions. It held 
that a reasonable classification related to the object of maintaining the 
excellence of educational standards and attracting variegated and best 
talents in educational institutions was valid under article 14. It, 
therefore, upheld reservation of seats in favour of the Malabar district. It 
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is submitted that judges may decide whether reservation should be 
confined to the weaker sections only. To predicate the reservation poHc}' 
on the doctrine of reasonable classification is to permit reservation for a 
wide variety of non-weaker sections. Such a policy will oust merit and 
efficiency from our educational institutions and public offices and mock 
at the right to equality. 
In the International Airport Authority case^'^ Bhagwati J. has refined 
and reformed the law relating to giving of largess by the government to 
attune it to the needs of the welfare state. Bhagwafi J. held that having 
regard to the ever increasing encounters between the citizen and the 
government in a welfare state, it was necessary to restrict and structure 
the executive power to prevent its arbitrary exercise. He, therefore, held 
that "every action of the Government must be informed with reason and 
should be free from arbitrariness.^^ He drew attention to the opinion of 
Ray C.j}^ that these activities of the government had a public element 
and so there should be fairness and equality and that it was free not to 
enter into contract with any one, but if it chose to do so it must act fairly 
and without discrimination. Bhagwati J., therefore, held'^ 
// must, therefore, he taken to he the law that where 
the government is dealing with the puhlic, whether hy 
way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or 
issuing quotas or licenses or granting other forms of 
largess, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its 
sweet will and, like a private individual, deal with any 
person it pleases, hut its action must he in conformity 
with standard or norm which is not arbitrary, 
irrational or irrelevant. 
State ofHaryana v. Darshana DevV^^ arose out of an appeal by State of 
Haryana demanding fi-om the dependents of the victim of an automobile 
accident court fee for their claim for compensation under the Motor 
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Vehicles Act, 1939. To drag these poor persons, deprived of tJie sole 
bread winner, upto the Supreme Court just to demand court fee Haryana 
must have spent a lot more than the court fee it demanded. This case, 
thus, demonstrates with cruel clarity that the social ethos has not 
imbibed the legal aid values woven into a fundamental right and 
enshrined in a directive principle reputed to be fundamental in the 
governance of the country. 
The opinion of Krishna Iyer J. bristling with compassion for the poor is. 
in effect, an eloquent appeal to the dormant social conscience. It has 
brought into focus the insensitivity of the state to values in articles 14, 
39-Aand41. 
In the face of these facts the following provocative appeal of Krishna 
Iyer J. to the judges should stir the researcher in constitutional law to 
explore whether a plausible case can be made out against the sale of 
justice by the state to salvage the most fundamental of all fundamental 
rights the right to access to justice:^^ 
We should expand the jurisprudence of Access to 
Justice...and examine the constitutionalism of court-
fee levy as a facet of human rights highlighted in our 
Nation's Constitution. If the state itself should 
travesty this basic principle in the teeth of Articles 14 
and 39A, where an indigent widow is involved, a 
second look at its policy is overdue. The court must 
give the benefit of doubt against levy of a price to 
enter the temple of justice until one day the whole 
issue of the validity of profit-making through sale of 
civil justice, disguised as court-fee, is fully reviewed 
by this court. 
In Jagdish Saran v. Union of India^'^ the petitioner, with an M.B.B.S. 
from Madras University and an unsuccessful applicant for a seat in M.D. 
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in Dermatology in Delhi University, challenged the validity of 
reservation of 70 per cent of the seats in post-graduate courses in 
medicine for University candidates. Krishna Iyer J. observed: 
[R]eservation cannot be built on the vague ground 
that all other Universities are practicing it - a fact not 
fully proved before us either. 
There is however, the following contrary finding elsewhere m the 
opinion: 
Many Universities now adopt the exclusionary or 
segregative device of de facto monopoly of seats for 
higher medical course to its own alumni, Indians from 
other Universities being treated as aliens. 
Later he said categorically: 
[YJou cannot wholly exclude meritorious candidates 
as that will promote sub-standard candidates and 
bring about a fall in medical competence, injurious, in 
the long run, to the very region....But one factor 
deserves great emphasis. The higher the level of 
speciality, the lesser the roles of reservation. ' 
But on this issue, too, he asserted as follows: 
What is merit or excellence? Marks on this basis will 
take us to the same preference as reservation for in-
University candidates. Again merit is not measured by 
marks alone but by human sympathies.'^'' 
Krishna Iyer J. pointed out that reservation for Delhi graduates "is not 
that invidious because...the students are from families drawn from all 
over India".'*^ He found that reservation of 70 percent of the seats in 
courses in medicine was "too high". 
He ordered the admission of the petitioner in M.D. and directed the 
University to "investigate in depth the justification for the quantum of 
reservation at the post-graduate level from the angle of equality of 
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opportunity for every Indian but taking into consideration other 
constitutionally relevant criteria. 
In M. Narasimha Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, ' ^lladi 
Kuppuswami J. (as he then was) upheld reservation for in-sei-vice 
candidates on the ground that the classification of applicants for 
admission to post graduate courses in medicine into in-service 
candidates and others was reasonable and valid. He, however, rejected 
the argument that seats set apart for in-service candidates should not be 
considered for determining under article 15(4) the validity of the 
quantum of reservation made by the state. In response to the contention 
that Chitra Ghosh"*^  had upheld reservation of as many as 63 percent of 
the seats - 45 percent for weaker sections and 18 percent for nominees 
of the Union Government Alladi J. pointed out that the Government of 
India nominated candidates for only 9 out of the 23 seats and left the rest 
Aft 
for the merit pool. Similarly, in Tandon the reservation for weaker 
sections and nominees of the Government of India was only 52 per cent. 
He held: 
The entire question of reservation must be considered 
as a whole and if the reservation is so excessive as to 
leave very few seats available for candidates to be 
selected on the basis of merit, such reservation would 
be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the 
Constitutions. 
Alladi J. said .50 
It was argued that there is no rational basis for 
providing a lower percentage of minimum marks in 
the case of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. 
We do not agree. It is well-known that the Scheduled 
Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates suffer from a 
severe handicap while competing with other and 
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Constitution itself recognized that they need special 
treatment. Such a provision is one which is necessaiy 
"for the advancement of Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes and is therefore" justified under 
Article 15 (4) of the Constitution. 
The Andhra case raised for the first time the sensitive question whether 
a person with an M.B.B.S. degree is educationally backward for 
purposes of admission to a reserved seat in M.D. or M.S. Those familiar 
with the agitation in Gujarat will not miss the significance of this issue. 
The response of Alladi J. (as he then was) to this question is summarized 
below: 
(i) Article 15 (4) speaks of backwardness of the class. 
(ii) A member does not cease to be a member of that class as long 
as that class is backward even if he acquires the M.B.B.S. 
degree. 
(iii) Article 15(4), as it now stands, protects members of a 
backward class though they are not, as individuals, backward. 
(iv) It is not for the court to question the wisdom of the framers of 
the Constitution or to disregard the language of article 15(4). 
(v) On this issue article 15(4) needs amendment. 
Air India v. Nargesh Meerza^^ case attracted attention because the 
petitioners were the pretty air hostesses and the issue was equality 
between man and woman. There was a good deal of disparity between 
the pay scales and promotional avenues of the male cabin crew 
consisting of flight pursers (FP) additional flight pursers (AFP) and In-
flight pursers (IFP) on the one hand and the air hostesses (AH), check 
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air hostesses, deputy-chief air hostess, additional chief air hostess and 
chief air hostess on the other. The two cadres of pursers and air 
hostesses were different in respect of qualifications, starting salaries and 
the number of posts. There were however, provisions affecting air 
hostesses which did not apply to men stewards who did the same type of 
job. An AH's service could continue upto 35 years of age or upto her 
marriage if contracted within 4 years since recruitment or till first 
pregnancy. 
In the court's opinion the condition of termination of an air hostess" 
services on first pregnancy was "unreasonable and arbitrary provision 
which shocks the conscience of the court."^^ 
The court reacted sharply to such a suggestion when it said that the 
power to terminate the services of an air hostess if she became pregnant 
amounted to compelling the poor lady not to have any children and thus 
interfered with and diverted the ordinary course of human nature. 
An air hostess had to retire at the age of 35 whereas a male steward 
could work upto 58. An air hostess however, could be continued by the 
managing director upto 45. The court took strong exception to this 
provision, which in its opinion violated article 14 and also suffered from 
the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power. It was held that the 
air hostesses could continue to work upto 45 unless they were found 
medically unfit. 
In Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mnjib,^^ the Supreme Court observed that right 
to equality did not mean mere classification. The court held that an oral 
interview test was undoubtedly not a very satisfactory test for assessing 
and evaluating the capacity and calibre of the candidates because it was 
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subjective and based on first impression, its result was influenced by 
many uncertain factors and it was capable of abuse. But in the absence 
of a better test for measuring personal characteristics and traits, the oral 
interview test must be regarded as rational or relevant. An oral 
interview test could not be relied upon as an exclusive test, but it might 
be used as an additional or supplementary test. It was held that 
allocation of 33/4 per cent of the total marks for oral interview infected 
the admission procedure with arbitrariness. It was observed that 
allocation of more than 15 per cent of the marks to interview would be 
arbitrary and unreasonable. 
R.K. Garg v. Union of India, popularly called the Bearer Bonds case 
in which the constitutional validity of the Special Bearer Bonds 
(Immunities and Exemptions) Ordinance, 1981 and the Special Bearer 
Bonds (Immunities and Exemptions) Act, 1981 were challenged on a 
number of grounds, the principal ground being that they violated 
article 14. 
Bhagwati J. stated at the outset that there are "certain well established 
principles" which had "been evolved by the courts as rules of guidance 
in discharge of its constitutional function of judicial review."^^ These 
were: 
i) There was always a presumption in favour of the 
constitutionality of a statute and the burden was upon him 
who attacked it to show that there had been a clear 
transgression of the constitutional principles; 
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ii) Laws relating to economic activities had to be viewed with 
greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as 
freedom of speech, religion etc. 
The court held that there was a practical and real classification between 
persons having black money and those who did not have the black 
money. 
Gupta J. in his lone dissenting judgment held that the Act violated 
article 14 and, therefore, was void. According to him the Act 
distinguished between two classes of holders of special bearer bonds-
tax evaders and honest tax payers. 
In Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh 's (ABSK Sangh). ' The 
government adopted a policy of "carry forward" upto three recruitment 
years of reserved vacancies, if enough numbers of candidates from the 
said groups did not get selected. The "carry forward" rule was 
calculated to keep open the reserved vacancies for at least 3 years. 
When reservations in the promotions were challenged, the court 
speaking though Krishna Iyer J. pointed out that the preponderant 
majority coming from the unreserved communities were presumably 
efficient and that the dilution of efficiency caused by the minimal 
induction administrative efficiency significantly. Moreover, care had 
been taken to give in service training and coaching to correct the 
deficiency. In promotion by selection from class III to class IV, the SCs 
and STs, if they were otherwise eligible, were to be given one grade 
higher than the grading otherwise assignable to them on the basis of 
their record of service. It was further provided that in promotions made 
by selection in or to class III and class IV posts, in grades or services in 
which the element of direct recruitment, if any, did not exceed 50 per 
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cent, there would be reservation of 12 per cent and 5 percent of the 
vacancies for the SCs and STs. It had been further decided that in 
respect of promotions to selection posts in class III, where safety aspect 
was not involved the qualifying marks under "professional ability" in 
respect of SC and ST candidates should be 25 out of 50 instead of 30 
out of 50 as applicable to the candidates belonging to the unreserved 
groups. 
Chinnappa Reddy J. stated that when posts were reserved for the SCs 
and STs, whether at the stage of initial recruitment or at the stage 
promotion, "it was not a concession or privilege extended to them" but it 
was "in recognition of their undoubted fundamental right to equality of 
opportunity." There was "no fixed ceiling to reservation or preferential 
treatment in favour of the SCs and STs though generally reservation 
en 
may not be far in excess of fifty per cent". There could not be rigidity 
about 50 per cent rule which was only" a convenient guideline laid 
CO 
down by the judges". The impugned orders were upheld by both the 
judges. Pathak J. in his dissenting judgment, however, said that "a 
maximum of 50 per cent for reserved quotas in their totality" was a rule 
which appeared fair and reasonable. The majority view, therefore, 
appears to permit reservations beyond 50 per cent of the total number of 
seats but subject to judicial approval. 
In Randhir Singh v. Union oflndia,^'^ the petitioner was a driver in the 
Delhi Police Force in Delhi Administration and he demanded that his 
scale of pay should at least be the same as the scale pay of other drivers 
in the service of the Delhi Administration. This plea was upheld by the 
Supreme Court. Chinnappa Reddy J. observed:^ *' 
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Hither to the quality clauses of the Constitution, as 
other articles of the Constitution guaranteeing 
fundamental and other rights were most often invoked 
by the privileged classes for their protection and 
advancement and for a fair and satisfactory' 
distribution of the buttered loaves amongst 
themselves. Now, thanks to the rising social and 
political consciousness and the forward looking 
posture of this Court, the underprivileged also are 
clamouring for their rights and are seeking the 
intervention of the Court with touching faith and 
confidence in the court. 
The court conceded that where all things are equal, persons holding 
identical posts may not be treated differently in the matter of their pay 
merely because they belong to different departments. 
The judge observed that equal pay for equal work was a constitutional 
goal set forth by article 39 (d) of the Constitution. The right to equality 
guaranteed by article 14 must be interpreted in the light of the above 
provision and when so interpreted, equal pay for equal work became a 
fundamental right. 
In State of Maharashtra v. Raj Kumar,^' a rule framed by the 
Government of Maharashtra and adopted by the Public Service 
Commission was held invalid by the Supreme Court. The rule said that a 
candidate coming from rural areas would be given weightage in the 
selection of candidates for certain posts. The rule said that a candidate 
who hailed from rural areas and had passed the Secondary School 
Certificate (S.S.C.) examination from a village or town having only a 
"C" type of municipality was eligible for the posts. Although the rule 
was made with the object of taking officers who had full knowledge of 
rural life, its problems, aptitudes, etc. in order to be able to make 
constructive contribution to the upliftment of rural life, it did not fulfill 
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that object because any person who had not lived in a village could 
appear for the S.S.C. examination from a village and thus become 
eligible for that post. The rule was, therefore, held to be arbitrary and 
violative of articles 14 and 16. 
In Suman Gupta v. J. & K.^^ The Supreme Court (Chandrachud C.J.. 
Pathak and Sabyasachi Mukharjee J.) dealt with the question of the 
nomination of candidates of other states for admission to a medical 
college. Pathak J. said .63 
After considering the matter carefully, we confess, we 
are unable to subscribe to the view that the selection 
of candidates for that purpose must remain in the 
unlimited discretion and uncontrolled choice of the 
State Government. We think it beyond dispute that the 
exercise of all administrative power vested in public 
authority must be structured within a system of 
controls informed by both relevance and reason-
relevance in relation to the object which it seeks to 
serve, and reason in regard to the manner in which it 
attempts to do so. 
The judge conceded that an element of discretion was indispensable to 
the exercise of administrative power but such discretion must be 
exercised within defined limits. 
In D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, this was assailed by the petitioners 
on the ground that since pension was paid for the past satisfactory 
service rendered, and to avoid destitution in old age and also as a 
measure of social welfare and social justice, the differential rate of 
pension for those retiring after a particular date was arbitrary and was 
based on no classification. The pensioners as a whole formed a class 
and, therefore, were entitled to equal pension irrespective of the date of 
retirement. Desai J. agreed that pension was a measure of social justice 
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and drawing form the decision of the court in Randhir Singh, v. Union of 
India'^ in which the principle of equal pay for equal work had been laid 
down, he observed that if pensioners formed a class, computation of 
pension could not be different according to the dates of retirement. 
It was argued by the Attorney-General that the court had no power to 
augment the class. He said that "severance always cuts down the scope, 
never enlarges it". By enlarging the scope the court was legislating, he 
said. Desai J. in reply observed. 
We are not sure whether there is any principle which 
inhibits the court from striking down an 
unconstitutional part of a legislative action which 
may have the tendency to enlarge the width and 
coverage of the measure. Whenever classification is 
held to be impermissible and the measure can be 
retained by removing the unconstitutional portion of 
classification, by striking down words of limitation, 
the resultant effect may be of enlarging the class. 
In State ofM.P. v. Ramashakar Raghuvanshi,^^ a school had been taken 
over by government and its staff was absorbed in government service. 
The respondent's service was however, terminated on the ground that 
the police report showed his past involvement in R.S.S. and Jan Sangh 
activities. The high court quashed the termination order and reinstated 
the defendant. The Supreme Court rejected the special leave petition. 
Chinnappa Reddy J. in his judgment, however, dealt with the question 
of such past political activity being a bar to government service. Reddy 
J. observed.^^ 
It is important to note that the action sought to be 
taken against the respondent is not any disciplinary 
action on the ground of his present involvement in 
political activity after entering the service of the 
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government, contrary to some Service Conduct Rule. 
It is further to be noted that it is not alleged that the 
respondent ever participated in any illegal, vicious or 
subversive activity. 
The judge further observed that R.S.S. was not a banned organization. 
He said.^ ^ 
The whole idea of seeking a police report ort the 
political faith and the past political activity of a 
candidate for public employment appears to our mind 
to cut at the very root of the fundamental Rights of 
equality of opportunity in the matter of employment, 
freedom of expression and freedom of association. 
In Sengana Singh v. Punjab where a large number of workers were 
dismissed for the misconduct of participating in an unlawful agitations 
and a majority of them were reinstated leaving out others and this was 
done without disclosing the criteria applied for such selection, the 
dismissal of the employees was held to be discriminatory. 
7/ 
In Sowmithri Vishnu v. Union of India, the Supreme Court Y.V. 
Chandrachud CJ, R.S. Pathak and A.N. Sen JJ) dealt with the 
constitutional validity of section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 
which punishes adultery. This question came in a writ petition filed 
under article 32 by the petitioner, who was wife of the person, who had 
prosecuted one Dharma Ebenezer for adultery under the above section. 
Earlier, the husband had tried to obtain divorce on the ground of 
adultery but had succeeded in obtaining divorce on the ground of 
desertion, an alternate ground urged by him. Having failed to obtain a 
judicial declaration as to the alleged adultery he had made criminal 
complaint against her alleged paramour for adultery. It was to get this 
prosecution quashed that the writ petition had been filed. The main 
grounds of attacks were the following: (i) Section 497 conferred upon 
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the husband the right to prosecute the adulterer, but it did not confer an> 
right upon the wife to prosecute woman with whom her husband had 
committed adultery; (ii) section 497 did not confer any right on the wife 
to prosecute the husband who had committed adultery with another 
woman, and; (iii) it did not take in cases where the husband and sexual 
relations with an unmarried woman with the result that husband had a 
free license under the law to have extra-marital relationships with 
unmarried women. It was therefore, contended that this section was a 
flagrant instance of gender discrimination. It treated women as chattel, 
property of men. Chandrachud CJ, while dealing with this argument, it 
is respectfiilly submitted, did not correctly grasp the thrust of the 
argument which was essentially against man-woman inequality. For 
example, he said that why the offence of robbery should be punished 
with ten years of imprisonment was a matter of policy and not 
constitutionality. True but if the legislature punished only acts of 
adultery by men and not those by women, it was not a question of 
policy, it was essentially a question of constitutionality. Such 
discrimination could be made provided it was based on classification. 
Only women can get the benefit of maternity leave under the law today. 
Men might be given that benefit but consideration will not be of 
physiological confinement but of a joint responsibility for child care. On 
the question of adultery, however, we find no justification for 
discriminating between man and woman. The chief justice, however, feh 
that man alone was the villain and woman was a helpless victim of 
adultery. His observation that "it is commonly accepted that it is the 
man who is the seducer and not the woman"''^ is an evidence of such a 
view. Whatever justification there might have been for such a view 
when the code was drafted, today, we must give up such thoughts based 
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on Victorian morality. If 'adultery' is to be punished by law, its 
definition must include both man and woman. The present section 
clearly discriminates against women and also treats married women 
differently from other women. The chief justice wanted this to be 
decided by parliament. 
In K.C. Vasanth Kumar v. Karnataka/hhe Supreme Court 
(Chandrachud CJ) laid down the following policy propositions: (i) the 
reservations in favour of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes must 
continue as at present, that is, without the application of a means test, for 
a further period not exceeding fifteen years. Another fifteen years will 
make it fifty years after the advent of the Constitution, a period 
reasonably long for the upper crust of the oppressed classes to overcome 
the baneful effects of social oppression, isolation and humiliation; (ii) 
the means test, that is to say, the test of economic backwardness ought 
to be made applicable even to the SCs and STs after the period 
mentioned in (i) above; (iii) so far as the other backward classes were 
concerned, they should satisfy two tests, namely (a) that they should be 
comparable to the SCs and STs in the matter of their backwardness and 
(b) that they should satisfy the means test such as a state government 
may lay down in the context of the prevailing economic conditions; (iv) 
the policy of reservations in employment, education and legislative 
institutions should be reviewed every five years or so. 
D.A. Desai J strongly advocated the application of economic criterion 
for identifying the socially and educationally backward classes. The 
judge noted with concern how the use of caste as criterion of 
backwardness had created vested interests in remaining or being 
identified as backward. It had led to perpetuation of the caste system. In 
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the case of SCs and STs the judge conceded that caste as a criterion 
could not be excluded. But even in that respect the economic criterion 
was worth applying by refusing preferred treatment to those who had 
already benefited by it and had improved their position. O. Chinnapa 
Reddy J was obviously not in favour of using economic criterion alone 
for identifying the backward classes. He said:^ "* Poverty, of course, is 
basic, being the root cause as well as the useful result of social and 
educational backwardness. But mere poverty it seems is not enough to 
invite the Constitutional branding, because the vast majority of the 
people of our country are poverty-struck but some among them are 
socially and educationally forward and others backward. 
The judge further said''^ : 
Class poverty, not individual poverty, is therefore the 
primary test. Other ancillary tests are the way of life, 
the standard of living, the place in the social 
hierarchy, the habits and customs etc... 
Notwithstanding our antipathy to caste and sub-
regionalism, these are facts of life which cannot be 
wished away. 
A.P. Sen J also agreed with Reddy J in the view that economic 
backwardness could only be one of the test of backwardness. According 
to him, the expression "backward classes" should be used as 
synonymous with the weaker sections of society. The predominant and 
the only factor for making special provisions under Article 15(4) or for 
the reservation of posts and appointments under article 16(4) should be 
poverty and caste or a sub-cast or a group should be used only ibr the 
purpose of identification of persons comparable to the SCs and STs. 
Venkataramiah J emphasized that the rule that more than 50 percent of 
the total number of seats could not be reserved had not been ovenuled 
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by the court and was still the law. The judge pointed out that various 
ameliorative measures such as liberal grants of scholarships, free 
studentships, free boarding and lodging facilities would go a long way 
towards mitigating the disadvantage of backwardness. 
In V. Narayana Rao v. A.P/^ the A.P. High Court held that while 
categorization of backward classes into five groups might not be bad, 
treating those groups as separate water-tight compartments and carrying 
forward the unfilled vacancies of each group separately and than back 
into general pool at the end of three years, in case of non-availability of 
candidates from that group, was not jusfified or valid. While it might be 
permissible for the state government to carry forward the imfilled 
vacancies in respects of each group for a period of two years for that 
group, they could be made available to other groups at the end of five 
years if the candidates from that group were not available. The court 
further held that no illegality was committed if the commission 
appointed to make recommendations on reservations in educational 
institutions or services recommended that barbers, washermen or 
fishermen among Hindus be recognized as backward but not the similar 
professionals/classes among Muslims. The court warned that too much 
reliance on caste for identifying the backward was not desirable. Placing 
of income limit even among these castes identified as backward, would 
be desirable in the long run. 
In A.R. Antulay v. R.C. Nayak , the Supreme Court suo motu transfened 
the criminal case pending against Antulay before a special judge to the 
Bombay High Court. Neither party to this case had sought such a 
transfer. The appellant challenged the court's competence to issue 
directions transferring the case to the High Court. 
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Sabyasachi Mukharji J observed in the "majority view" that the 
Supreme Court, as well as the House of Lords, had reduced to the 
vanishing point the distinction between "jurisdictional error and error of 
law within jurisdiction". The judge held: 
We are of the opinion that in view of the clear 
provisions of section 7(2) of the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act, 1952, and Articles 14 and 21 of the 
Constitution these directions were legally wrong. 
79 He noticed that in Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, U.P. 
Gajendragadkar J had held that though the court's power was wide, it 
should always be exercised in the interest of justice and any order it 
made must be consistent with the fundamental rights and with the 
substantive provisions of the relevant statute. 
Mukharji J said that as violation "of a fundamental right itself renders 
the impugned action void, "no "prejudice need be proved for enforcing 
OA 
the fiindamental rights, "that violation of the principles of natural 
justice "renders the act a nullity;" that the appellant's right not to be 
singled out for special treatment implicit in articlel4, was also violated. 
Soheheld:^' 
In giving the directions this court infringed the 
Constitutional safeguards guaranteed to a citizen or 
to an accused and injustice result therefrom. It is just 
and proper for the Court to rectify and recall that 
injustices, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of 
this case. 
They maintained that Antulay had a right to appeal against the 
impugned order under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1974. Hence his 
right of appeal was not taken away. They found that Anwar Ali Sarkar 
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and Prem Chand Garg were not relevant and that the impugned order 
had not violated articles 14 and 21. 
In the Stenographers case^^ by Sabyasachi Mukharji J the following 
principles emerge: (i) Equal pay for equal work is a constitutional goal 
attainable through constitutional remedies, (ii) It is not an abstract 
doctrine when applied to government servant performing similar 
functions and having identical powers, duties and responsibilities, (iii) 
Equation of posts and pay scales fall within the province of the 
executive or expert bodies like pay commission, and not of courts. But 
the court will move in if, though all thjngs are equal, persons holding 
identical posts are treated differently in the matter of pay simply because 
they belong to different departments, (iv) As article 39 (d) has to be and 
has been red into articles 14 and 16, equal pay for equal work is 
constitutional goal applicable to cases of unequal scales of pay, which 
are based on irrational classification of persons doing identical work 
under the same employer. 
The Supreme Court upheld in Aarti Gupta v. Punjab the reducation of 
minimum qualifying marks from 35 percent to 25 percent in the 
competitive entrance examination for admission to MBBS and BDS in 
favour of SCs and STs. The Court rejected the contention, advanced on 
the basis of the stand taken by the Indian Medical Council (IMC), that 
the impugned reduction was wrong. It followed M.P. v. Nivedita Jain^'* 
and held that the IMC's regulation was only recommendatory sand held 
that the contrary opinion expressed by Krishna Iyer J in Kerala v. 
Roshana and by Fazal Ali J in Krishna Priya Ganguli v. Lucknow 
University were obiter. It pointed out that the question of eligibility for 
admission to the medical courses came within the power and jurisdiction 
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of the IMC; the question of selection of candidates from among the 
eligible candidates was not within its power. It pointed out that Nivedita 
Jain did not invalidate the deletion "in the prescription of the percentage 
of marks in the selection examination". The court, however, appended 
87 
an epilogue to its opmion . 
There has been perceptible fall in national standards 
and general efficiency for ^  the professional men. While 
it is not for us to say anything against reservation, we 
approve of the concern shown by the India Medical 
Council that high standards of efficiency should be 
maintained and that can only be possible if the state 
and council cooperate to maintain a high standard. 
no 
In Sanjay Jain v. M.P. Rampal Singh J. Quoted with approval an 
observation from an article by Subba Rao CJ. 
"Economic rights " do not exist in nature. They have 
to be created. A right to work, to education, to 
livelihood, to equal pay, to security, to leisure and 
such other are very desirable rights. But unless a 
State, creates conditions by positive action, such 
rights can 't come into existence. 
The Supreme Court invalidate in H.L. Trehan v. Union Of India'^'^ the 
alteration of the conditions of service of the employees of the Caltex 
(India) Ltd. to their disadvantage after its acquisition by the respondent. 
The court said that it was now a well established principle of law that 
there can be no deprivation or curtailment of an existing right, advantage 
or benefit enjoyed by a government servant without complying with the 
rules of natural justice by giving the government servant concerned an 
opportunity of being heard."^' It held that the post-decisional hearing 
given to the government servant did not subserve the rules of natural 
92 
justice: 
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The authority who embarks upon a post-decisional 
hearing will naturally proceed with a closed mind and 
there is hardly any chance of getting a proper 
consideration of the representation at such a post-
decisional opportunity. 
In Charan Lai Sahu v. India,^^ the Supreme Court upheld the vahdity of 
the Bhopal Gas Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985. Under this 
Act, the state had taken over the exclusive right to represent and act in 
place of every person who had made or was entitled to make a claim for 
compensation against the multinational corporation. The court upheld 
this exclusion of the right of the victims to put forward their claims 
independently. Sabyasachi Mukharji CJ said: 
The act does provide a special procedure in respect of 
the rights of the victims and to that extent the central 
government takes upon itself the rights of the victims. 
It is a special Act providing a special procedure for a 
kind of special class of victims. In view of the 
enormity of the disaster the victims of the Bhopal gas 
leak disaster, as they were placed against the 
multinational and a big Indian corporation and in 
view of the presence of foreign contingency lawyers to 
whom the victims were exposed, the claimants and 
victims can legitimately be described as a class by 
themselves different and distinct, sufficiently separate 
and identifiable to be entitled to special treatment for 
effective, speedy, equitable and best advantageous 
settlement of their claims. There indubitably is 
differentiation. But this differentiation is based on a 
principle which has rational nexus with the aim 
intended to be achieved by its differentiation. The 
disaster being unique in its character and in the 
recorded history of industrial disasters situated as the 
victims were against a mighty multinational with the 
presence of foreign contingency lawyers looming on 
the scene, in our opinion, there were sufficient 
grounds for such differentiation and different 
treatment. In treating the victims of the gas leak 
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disaster differently and providing them a procedure 
which was just, fair, reasonable and which was not 
unwarranted or unauthorized by the Constitution, 
Article 14 is not breached. 
Admissions to professional colleges, particularly, engineering and 
medical colleges, have been the subject of prolific litigation almost since 
the early years of the Constitution.^^ Professional education in 
engineering and medicine has been the hotbed of such litigation. 
Demand for admission increased but the number of admissions 
remained stagnant. In order to overcome such a situation better planning 
of higher education was necessary. Some manpower planning also was 
necessary. But some state governments took the easy way out of 
allowing private professional colleges to come up. There is nothing 
wrong in privatization of higher education. But privatization has to be 
distinguished from commercialization. Some people mshed into this 
new enterprise not with the intention of providing education but to make 
easy money. Admissions were given to candidates who offered huge 
sums as capitation fee. Some states passed legislations to curb the 
practice of capitation fee but such legislations can seldom succeed. 
Should the state allow such private institutions to function? How should 
they be regulated? How to make sure that opportunities of higher 
professional education are not monopolized by the rich? How should 
educational system be organized so as to make access to such higher 
educational merit-based and not money-based? 
Some of these questions were expected to be answered by the Supreme 
Court when a student called Mohini Jain, who had secured admission 
into a medical college, but could not avail herself of it, due to heav> fees 
demanded from her, petitioned the Supreme Court against such heavy 
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fees. The validity of the notification of the Karnataka government 
permitting the private medical colleges to charge such exhorbitant fees 
from students other than those admitted to government seats was 
questioned in Mohini Jain. V. Karnataka.'^^ Kuldip Singh J, speaking for 
himself and Sahai J, observed that gone were the days when Article 14 
was confined to classification being the basis of differential treatment. 
Since the decision of the Supreme Court in E.P. Royappa v. Tamil 
Nadu,^'' the court had expanded the scope of Article 14 to hold that any 
arbitrary action was per se violative of the right to equality. The judge 
said:^^ 
The capitation fee brings to the fore a clear class 
bias. It enables the rich to take admission whereas the 
poor has to withdraw due to financial inability. A 
poor student with better merit cannot get admission 
because he has no money whereas the rich can 
purchase the admission. Such a treatment is patently 
unreasonable, unfair and unjust. There is therefore, 
no escape from the conclusion that charging of 
capitation fee in consideration of admissions to 
educational institutions is wholly arbitrary and as 
such infarcts Article 14 of the Constitution. 
The judge emphatically stated that "the only method of admission to the 
medical colleges in consonance with fair policy and equity is by way of 
merit and merit alone." Since the state is now short of funds, it cannot 
further augment its investment in such higher professional education. In 
terms of priorities, the state must spend more on primary education. If 
higher education is to become available to all those who deserve it and 
desire it, its privatization is inevitable. The state has to step in merely to 
see that privatization does not end up in commercialization.'^'^ The state 
must rationalize the fee structure in its own colleges so that it does not 
subsidize education of those who can afford to buy it. 
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In 1989, the acceptance of the recommendations of the Mandal 
Commission by the National Front Government had triggered a fierce 
controversy. The Mandal Commission had recommended reservation of 
27 percent government jobs for the backward classes; in addition to the 
reservations in favour of the SCs and STs, thus taking the total 
reservation to 52 percent. A writ petition was filed in the Supreme Court 
challenging the decision of the government to give effect to the 
recommendations of the Mandal Commission. After almost three years, 
the court gave its decision in Indra Sawhney v. India.'*^° This time lag 
helped the tempers to cool down. A Bench of nine judges heard these 
petitions and the decision was by a majority of six against three. The 
majority upheld the government's decision to extend reservations to the 
backward classes. 
In Balaji"^' Gajendragadkar J (as he then was) had drawn a ceiling on 
reservations at 50 percent of the total number of seats in medical 
colleges. Since then the same rule was applied to job reservation also.'"" 
Every judge in the present case quoted the speech of Ambedkar in which 
he had stressed that reservations ought to be confined to a minority of 
the posts or appointments. Jeevan Reddy J observed that reservation 
of the majority of jobs could not have been envisaged by the Founding 
Fathers of the Constitution. He, therefore, laid down that reservation 
should not exceed 50 percent of the vacancies. This, however, could not 
be an inflexible rule. The judge said:'^ '* 
While 50% shall be the rule, it is necessary not to put 
out of consideration certain extraordinary situations 
inherent in the great diversity of this country and the 
people. It might happen that in farflung and remote 
areas the population inhabiting those areas might, on 
account of their being out of the mainstream of 
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national life and in view of conditions peculiar to and 
characteristic to them, need to be treated in a 
different way, some relaxation in this strict rule may 
become imperative. In doing so, extreme caution is to 
be exercised and a special case made out. 
Sawant J concurring observed: "^ ^ 
What was in the mind of the Constitution-framers was 
the removal of the inadequacy in representation over 
a period of time, on each occasion balancing the 
interests of the backward classes and the forward 
classes so as not to affect the provisions of equality' 
enshrined in Articles 14 and 16(1) as also the 
interests of the society as a whole. As pointed out 
earlier. Dr. Ambedkar was not only not in favour of 
proportional representation but was on the contrary, 
of the firm view that the reservations under Article 
16(4) should be confined to the minority of the 
posts/appoin tmen ts. 
Sawant J pointed out that all economically disadvantaged were not 
backward classes for the purpose of article 16(4). All those who formed 
the weaker sections of society were not backward classes. The judge 
said:'«^ 
Economic backwardness is the bane of the majority of 
the people in this country. There are poor sections in 
all the castes and communities. Poverty runs across 
all barriers. The nature and degree of economic 
backwardness and its causes and effects, however, 
vary from section to section of the populace. Even the 
poor among the higher castes are socially as superior 
to the lower castes as the rich among the higher 
castes. Their economic backwardness is not on 
account of social backwardness. 
The judge pointed out that the provision for reservation in appointments 
under article 16(4) was not aimed at "economic upliftment or alleviation 
of poverty."'"^ Article 16(4), according to Judge, was "Specifically 
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designed to give a due share in the State power" to the backward 
classes.'*^^ 
In Auditor-General of India v. G. Ananta Rajeswara Rao, an office 
memorandum which provided for appointment of the son, daughter, or 
widow of an employee who died in harness on compassionate giounds 
"to assist a family to relieve economic distress created by sudden demise 
of the bread winner" came up for consideration. The court held that the 
extension of the benefit to other eventualities or to "other relatives" of 
the deceased were vague and could be used discriminatorily. These 
extensions were, therefore, held to be constitutionally void. 
In Ashok Kumar Thakur v. State ofBihar^'°, the Government of India in 
conformity with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Mandal 
case, had laid down the criteria for identification and exclusion of 
"Creamy layer" vide office memorandum dated 8.9.1993. But the State 
of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh laid additional criteria such as spouse to be 
graduate, holding property in urban area, members of IAS, IFS, IPS 
having income of Rs. 10000/- per month or more, professionals having 
income of Rs. 10 lakhs per annum. The Supreme Court rightly struck 
down the additional criteria by holding that it has no nexus with the 
object to be achieved and also being arbitrary it is violative of Article 14 
and 16(4) of the Constitution. 
Article 14 of the Constitution is a shining star among the fundamental 
rights which guarantees equality to every citizen and equal protection of 
laws to all persons. Equality before law is correlative to the concept of 
rule of law for all-round evaluation of healthy social order.'" In Dalmia 
Cement (Bharat) Ltd. V. Union of India,"^ the Supreme Court expressed 
the view that the court is not well equipped to adjudge crudities and 
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inequities emerging from economic legislation. The legislature is 
empowered to experiment on economic legislation in its attempt to 
remove inequalities in income or status or to provide facilities and 
opportunities to improve economic status or provide social and 
economic justice to the society. 
Government ofA.P. v. Bala Musalaiah,^^^ is an "unusual case despite it 
being related to the usual demand of reservation for SC/ST". The 
peculiarity of this case was that the demand for reservation did not relate 
to appointment, but to termination of service. In this case the Andhra 
Pradesh Government had issued an order requiring the retrenchment of 
non SC/ST temporary appointees, probationers and approved 
probationers before retrenching even a temporary SC/ST employee. The 
Supreme Curt speaking through B.L. Hansaria J, rightly held that such 
an order was violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 
However, since the impugned order had remained in operation for about 
three decades, the court applied the principle of prospective overruling 
and annulled it only from the date of the decision. 
The rule of reservation may give the reserved candidates an "accelerated 
promotion" but it does not give them the accelerated "consequential 
seniority". On this point and on the point of application of roster system 
in reservation, the Supreme Court has given three landmark rulings in 
the cases of R.K. Sabharwal,^ "^  Virpal Singh Chauhan,^ '^  and AJit Singh 
J - 1 1 6 
Januja. 
In R.K. Sabhanval ' the Constitution bench of the Supreme Court while 
considering the reservation under instructions issued under the Punjab 
Service of Engineers Class I PWD (IB) Rules 1964, held when roster 
indicating the reserved points is there then the government is required to 
334 
implement it in the form of "running account" from year to year. The 
"running account" is to operate only till the quota provided under the 
rules is reached and not thereafter. As and when there is a vacancy 
whether temporary or permanent in a particular post the same has to be 
filled amongst the category to which the post belonged in the roster."^ 
However, in the event of non-availability of a reserve candidate at the 
roster point, it would be open to the state to carry forward the point in a 
just and fair manner. However, the Supreme Court held that this 
decision will apply prospectively from the date of the decision (i.e., 
w.e.f 10-02-1995.) The court also held that while computing the 
percentage of reservation, the candidates appointed or promoted in non-
reserved posts as a result of competition cannot be added and taken into 
consideration. The computation of percentage of reservation has to be 
done in relation to posts comprising in the cadre and not in relation to 
vacancies. The word 'post' means appointment, job, office or 
employment; a position to which a person is appointed. Whereas 
'vacancy' means an unoccupied post or office. Thus, there musi be a 
'post' in existence to enable the 'vacancy' to occur. The concept of 
vacancy has no relevance in operating the percentage of reservation."'^ 
In Virpal Singh Chauhan, the Supreme Court followed R.K. 
Sabharwal, and held that percentage of reservation would be worked 
out in relation to number of posts which form the cadre strength and not 
in relation to number of vacancies. While interpreting the circular/letters 
of the railway board providing concession to SC/ST candidates the court 
held that the reservation is permissible not only at the initial stage of 
appointment but at every stage of subsequent promotion. Relying on 
Mandal Commission case,'^^ the Supreme Court made it clear that there 
is no uniform or prescribed method of providing reservation. The extent 
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and nature of reservation is a matter for the state to decide having regard 
to the facts and requirements of each case, consistent no doubt, \\'ith the 
requirement of efficiency of administration as mentioned in article 335 
of the Constitution. Therefore, it is open to the state, if it is so advised, 
to say that while the rule of reservation shall be applied and the roster 
followed in the mater of promotions to or within a particular service, 
class or category, the candidate promoted earlier by virtue of mle of 
reservation/roster shall not be entitled to seniority over his senior in the 
feeder category and that as and when a general candidate who was 
senior to him in the feeder category is promoted, such general candidate 
will regain his seniority over the reserved candidate notwithstanding that 
1 7 ^ 
he is promoted subsequent to the reserved candidate. " This means that 
while the rule of reservation gives accelerated promotion, it does not 
give the accelerated - or what may be called, the consequential -
seniority. 
Another important feature of this case is that the court recalled that in 
Mandal case, eight of the nine judges constituting the bench had opined 
that article 16(4) did not permit or warrant reservation in the matter of 
promotions because it resulted in several untoward and iniquitous 
results. It is another matter that since then a constitutional amendment 
has been brought in permitting reservation in promotions to the extent of 
SC/ST only. The court did not express any opinion on the said 
amendment. However, before parting with appeals in this case, it felt 
obliged to reiterate the principle affirmed in Mandal case that providing 
reservation in promotion is not warranted by article 16(4) of the 
Constitution.'^ "* 
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Both R.K. Sabharwal and Virpal Singh Chauhan were followed in Ajit 
Singh Januja.'^ ^ In this case the Supreme Court laid stress on the point 
that merit criterion cannot be given a go-by. Balance has to be 
maintained vis-a-vis reservation. Thus, the court rightly held that 
accelerated promotion through reservation or roster system will not 
grant such promotee seniority over general category promotee for the 
next promotion in the general category post. They an again gain 
advantage only against the reserved posts in the higher grade. By 
accelerated promotion they did not supersede their seniors in the general 
category who were promoted subsequently because there was no 
occasion to examine the merit of such SC/ST candidates vis-a-\'is his 
seniors belonging to the general category. If this rule and procedure is 
not applied then the result will be that majority of posts in the higher 
grade shall be held at one stage by persons who have not only entered 
service on the basis of reservation and roster but have excluded the 
general category candidates merely on the ground of their initial 
accelerated promotion. This will not be consistent with the requirement 
of the spirit of Articles 16(4) and 335 of the Constitution.'"^^ 
/ 77 
In Anukul Chandra Pradhan v. Union of India the constitutional 
validity of section 62(5) of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1951, 
which denied the right to vote persons confined in prisons or police 
custody was challenged as violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the 
Constitution. J.S. Verma, CJ speaking for the court, rightly rejected the 
challenge and held that the prisoners could not claim fundamental rights 
on a par with other and, therefore, their classification was reasonable 
and valid. In this case, the object of the classification was to prevent 
criminalization of politics and maintain probity in election. There are 
also other reasons to justify this classification. It is well known that for 
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the conduct of free, fair and orderly elections. There is need to deploy 
considerable police force. Permitting every person in person to vote 
would require the deployment of much larger force and much greater 
security arrangements. A right to vote is a statutory right and not a 
common law right. Thus, this right has to be exercised subject to the 
limitations imposed by the status. 
The fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution of India are of 
sufficient amplitude to encompass all the facets of gender equality 
including prevention of sexual harassment or abuse. In the absence 
of enacted law to provide for the effective enforcement of the basic 
human right of gender equality and guarantee against sexual harassment 
and abuse, more particularly against sexual harassment at workplaces. 
The apex court in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan ' laid down detailed 
1 90 
guidelines and norms for due observance at all workplaces or other 
institutions, until a legislation is enacted for the purpose. 
In Vishaka the petition was filed as a class action by certain social 
activist and NGOs with the aim of focusing attention towards increasing 
incidence of sexual violation particularly at workplace and in finding 
suitable methods for realization of the true concept of "gender equality" 
through judicial process, to fill the vacuum in existing legislation. 
The Supreme Court rightly pointed out that the "primary responsibility" 
for ensuring the safety and dignity of women through legislation, and 
the creation of a mechanism for its enforcement, is of the legislature and 
the executive. However, whenever any instance of violation of 
fundamental right is brought before the court then an effective redress 
under article 32 of the Constitution requires that some guidelines should 
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be laid down for the protection of these rights to fill the legislative 
vacuum. 
The Supreme Court has Demonstrated great judicial activism while 
coming to the rescue of the working women and in ensuring gender 
equality to them. One of the most important aspects of this case is that 
the Supreme Court, apart from article 32, referred to some of the other 
provisions'^°of the Constitution which envisage judicial intervention for 
eradication of the social evil of sexual harassment at workplace and 
underlined the significance of the contents of international conventions 
and norms for the purpose of interpretation of the guarantee of gender 
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equality. Verma CJ, speaking for the court rightly observed: 
Any international convention not inconsistent with 
fundamental rights and in harmony with its spirit must 
be read into these provisions to enlarge the meaning 
and content thereof, to promote the object of the 
constitutional guarantee. 
After referring to the role of judiciary as envisaged in the "Beijing 
Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the 
LAWASIA Region" and to some of the provisions of "Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women" 
(CEDAW) he further observed:'^^ 
It is now an accepted rule of judicial construction that 
regard must be had to international conventions and 
norms for construing domestic law when there is no 
inconsistency between them and there is a void in the 
domestic law. 
In Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of UP'^^ the there judges bench 
consisting of K. Ramaswamy, S. Saghir Ahmad and G.B. Pattanaik JJ, 
held that reservation for SCs and STs, is a part of the constitutional 
339 
scheme for socio-economic justice. Articles 14, 16(1) and 16(4-A) read 
together guarantee the SCs and STs a fundamental right to promotion 
where they do not have adequate representation. However, this light is 
to be exercised consistently with the efficiency in administration. K. 
Ramaswamy J, speaking for the court, criticised the decision in Mandal 
case'^ "* wherein it was held that reservation for SCs and STs in 
promotion was unconstitutional and deteriorative of efficiency. He 
criticised the Mandal case firstly on the ground that this issue did not 
arise directly for decision in that case and secondly, there was no 
evidence to support the argument of deterioration of efficiency. 
Further, according to the judge, the legislative policy behind Article 
16(4-A) is not judicially reviewable on the round of violation of 
fundamental rights. 
Non-arbitrariness is an essential facet of Article 14 and pervades the 
entire realm of state action. Natural justice in turn is an antithesis of 
arbitrariness. In Basudeo Tiwary v. Sido Kanhu University ' the 
services of the appellant were terminated on the ground that his 
appointment was made by an incompetent authority and was therefore 
invalid. Section 35(3) of the Bihar University Act, provided that, "any 
appointment or promotion made contrary to the provisions of the Act, 
Statutes, rules or regulations or in any irregular or unauthorized manner 
shall be terminated at any time without notice." The Supreme ('ourt 
rightly read the requirement of natural justice into this provision and 
held that the conferment of absolute power to terminate the services of 
an employee is an antithesis of fair, just and reasonable treatment.'^' 
M.I. Builders Pvt. Ltd., v. Radhey Shyam Sahu'^^ is an example of 
arbitrary exercise of power in grant of state largesse. The Supreme 
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Court, speaking through Wadhwa J appHed the principle of 
'Wednesbury unreasonableness' and held the agreement as illegal, 
unreasonable, atrocious, irrational and arbitrary and thus violative of 
Article 14 of the Constitution.'^ *^ Consequently, it issued certain 
directions''*'' which, inter alia, included a direction to dismantle and 
demolish the unauthorized structure irrespective of whatever 
expenditure was incurred by the builder. Thus the judgment of the court 
enunciates a very important principle of law, i.e., an unauthorised or 
illegal construction will not clothe a person or body with any right or 
interest in that structure and no consideration should be shown to the 
builder or any other person where construction is illegal or unauthorised. 
This dicta is now almost bordering the rule of law. When stress was laid 
by the appellant and the prospective allottee of the shops to exercise 
judicial discretion in moulding the relief, Wadhwa J speaking for the 
court rightly observed: 
Such discretion cannot be exercised which 
encourages illegality or perpetuates an illegality.... 
Judicial discretion cannot be guided by expediency. 
Courts are not free from statutory fetters. Justice is to 
be rendered in accordance with law. Judges are not 
entitled to exercise discretion wearing the robes of 
judicial discretion and pass orders based solely on 
their personal predilections and peculiar dispositions. 
Judicial discretion whenever it is required to be 
exercised has to be in accordance with law and set 
legal principles. 
The Supreme Court followed Vishaka'^' in Apparel Export Promotion 
Council V. A.K. Chopra/^^ Annad C J, speaking for the court 
observed''*'': 
[EJach incident of sexual harassment at the place of 
work, results in violation of the fundamental right to 
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gender equality and the right to life and liberty- the 
two most precious fundamental rights guaranteed by 
the Constitution of India....the contents of the 
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution are 
of sufficient amplitude to encompass all facets to 
gender equality, including prevention of sexual 
harassment and the courts are under a constitutional 
obligation to protect and preserve those fundamental 
rights. That sexual harassment of a female at the 
place of work is incompatible with the dignity and 
honour of a female and needs to be eliminated and 
there can be no compromise with such violations, 
admits of no debate. 
The Chief Justice, relying on Vishaka,'"*^ rightly analyzed the definition 
of "sexual harassment" which "is a form of sex discrimination projected 
through unwelcome sexual advances, request for sexual favours and 
other verbal or physical conduct with sexual overtones, whether directly 
or by implication, particularly when submission to or rejection oi" such 
conduct by the female employee was capable of being used for affecting 
the employment of the female employee".''*^ Thus, any action or gesture, 
whether directly or by implication, aims at or has the tendency to 
outrage the modesty of a female employee, must fall under the general 
concept of definition of sexual harassment.'"^^ 
Regarding the nature of approach which the courts should follow in 
dealing with the cases of "sexual harassment", the Chief Justice 
observed:'"^^ 
In a case involving charge of sexual harassment or 
attempt to sexually molest, the courts are required to 
examine the broader probabilities of a case and not 
get swayed by insignificant discrepancies or narrow 
technicalities or the dictionary meaning of the 
expression "molestation"... Sympathy in such cases 
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in favour of the superior officer is wholly misplaced 
and mercy has no relevance. 
Another important aspect of this judgment is that the Supreme Court 
once again reiterated the underUned significance of the contents of 
international instruments and conventions for the purpose of 
interpretation of the guarantee of gender equality. It was rightly 
observed that in cases involving violation of human rights, the courts 
must forever remain alive to the international instruments and 
conventions and apply the same to a given case when there is no 
inconsistency between the international norms and the domestic law 
occupying the field.' 
In Dr. Preeti Srivastava ^^, the Supreme Court laid stress on the need to 
maintain the standards of education, particularly at the post graduate 
level, and ruled that there should not be a wide disparity in qualifying 
marks between the reserved and general categories. The constitution 
bench of the Supreme Court in Dr. Preeti Srivastava,'^' after analyzing 
the constitutional imperatives enshrined in articles 15 (4), 16 (4) and 
335, and scanning various judgments on the point, set aside the 
impugned orders of the UP Government and the MP Government 
regarding the lowering of marks for the reserved category of candidates. 
Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the two judges bench decision m Dr 
Sadhna Devi'^ ^ and over-ruled the three judges bench decisions in 
Ashok Kumar Gupta'^ ^ and K.L. Narasimhan.'^'^ 
As per majority, a common entrance examination envisaged under the 
regulations framed by the Medical Council of India for post-graduate 
medical education requires fixing of minimum qualifying marks for 
passing the examination since it is not a mere screening test. The 
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question of lower minimum qualifying marks for the reserved category 
candidates at the post graduate level must be decided by the Medical 
Council of India since it affects the standards of post-graduate medical 
education.'^^ 
All the five judges rightly agreed to the point that even if minimum 
qualifying marks can be lowered for the reserved category candidates, 
there cannot be a "wide disparity" between the minimum qualifying 
marks for the reserved category candidates and general category 
candidates. As per majority, this disparity should be minimal and 
certainly not more than for admission to MBBS.'^^ Majmudar .1, 
expressed the view that maximum dilution can be up to 50 per cent of 
the minimum qualifying marks prescribed for the general categoiy 
1 ^7 
candidates. It is submitted that one must remember the note of caution 
1 ^ R 
sounded by Krishna Iyer J who observed: 
The first caution is that reservation must be kept in 
check by the demands of competence. You cannot 
extend the shelter of reservation where minimum 
qualifications are absent. Similarly, all the best talent 
cannot be completely excluded by whole sale 
reservation. 
As per majority, the selection should also be consistent with Article 335 
of the Constitution as these entrants occupy the posts in teaching 
hospitals. It is submitted that Article 15(4) envisages the policy of 
protective discrimination. But such a policy has to be reasonable and 
consistent with the ultimate object of public interest. The consideration 
of national interest and the interest of the community as a whole cannot 
be ignored in determining the reasonableness of special provision under 
Article 15(4) of the Constitution.'^^ 
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On the question of reservation of seats in super specialty medical 
courses, the bench was of the unanimous view that at the level of super 
specialization no reservation is permissible for any class and admission 
should be entirely on the basis of merit. This would also imply that there 
can be no lowering of minimum qualifying marks for any category of 
candidates at the level of admission to the super specialty courses. At 
that level no special provision is permissible because that would be 
contrary to the national interest.'^° Thus, it can be seen that the Supreme 
Court has kept the "national interest" and the "interest of the 
community" in mind while interpreting the special provisions dealing 
with protective discrimination." This is a positive future of this 
judgment. 
In AJit Singh (II) v. Sate ofPunjab^^^ the constitution bench did not deal 
with the reservation policy of the state or with the validity of any 
procedure fixing roster points for the purpose of promotion of reserved 
candidates. The court in this case was concerned with the limited 
question as to whether Virpal Singh Chauhan'^^ and Ajit Singh Januja'^" 
(hereinafter referred to as Ajit Singh-I) which were earlier decided in 
favour of the general candidates were to be affirmed or whether the 
latter deviation made in Jagdish Lai '^ "^  against the general candidates 
was to be accepted. In other words, can the roster point promotee 
(reserved category) count their seniority in the promoted category' from 
the date of their continuous officiation vis-a-vis general candidates who 
were senior to them in the lower category and who were later promoted 
to the same level?'^^ 
The Constitution bench of the court in Ajit Singh-(ll), speaking through 
Jagannadha Rao J, held that Virpal Singh Chauhan and Ajit Singh-I 
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have been correctly decided and that Jagdish Lai was not correctly 
decided. In other words, the roster-point promotees (reserved category) 
cannot count their seniority in the promoted category from the date of 
their continuous officiation in the promoted post, vis-a-vis, the general 
category calldidates and who were later promoted.'^^ Thus, the rule of 
reservation may give the reserved candidates an "accelerated 
promotion" but it does not give them the "consequential seniority". 
The most important aspect of Ajit Singh-II is that the constitution bench 
not only clarified the earlier rulings on the point under discussion but 
also reasonably balanced the rights of the candidates in two groups, i.e., 
reserved category and general category candidates, when it rejected the 
extreme "catch-up" rule as contended by the general category 
candidates. The Court further pointed out that even if seniority of roster-
point promotee does not count, experience of groups can be considered 
as part of merit for fiirther promotion. Another important feature of 
Ajit Singh-II is that the Supreme Court emphasized that while 
interpreting Articles 16(4) and 16(4-A), which permit protective 
discrimination, the other provisions of Articles 14, 16 (1) and 335 must 
also be kept in mind. It was rightly clarified that Articles 16 (4) and 
16(4- A) do not confer any fundamental right and they are only enabling 
provisions. 
There is no directive or command in Articles 16 (4) or 16 (4-A) as in 
Article 16 (1) and thus they confer only a discretion and do not create 
any constitutional duty or obligation which could be enforced by issuing 
a writ of mandamus to provide reservation or relaxation.'^ ** A reasnoble 
balance has to be struck so that the affirmative action under Articles 
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16(4) and 16(4-A) does not lead to reverse discrimination. In other 
words, affirmative action stops where reverse discrimination begins. 
In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll) 
it was held that the provision in the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, for 
maternity leave, was available to women engaged on casual basis or on 
muster roll basis or on daily waged and not only to those who were in 
regular employment. 
S. Saghir Ahmed J in his judgment observed:'^' 
A just social order can be achieved only when 
inequalities are obliterated and everyone is provided 
what is to support the above conclusion. 
In V.P. Ahuja v. State of Punjab, the court gave an important ruling 
regarding the probationers. It was generally believed that the services of 
a probationer could be terminated at the end of the term without holding 
any inquiry or giving any reasons. Whether his performance was good 
or bad was to be decided by the superior authorities. The court held that 
an order terminating the services of a probationer on the ground of 
unsatisfactory work is stigmatizing and must be preceded by an inquiry 
and giving her an opportunity to be heard. The rules of natural justice 
must to observe before the services of a probationer are terminated. In 
the days of talk of revising the labour laws with a view to giving the 
power of hire and fire to the employers, such a decision of the court is 
doubtless an assurance that whatever the politicians might say, the 
Supreme Court will not allow social justice and social security to be 
given a back seat in the economic policies of the state. 
On the question of creamy layers, the court once again reiterated Indira 
Sawhney v. India that exclusion of creamy layers from reservation 
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was necessary in order that unequal are not treated as equals. According 
to the court, this was a basic feature of the Constitution. This could not 
be circumvented even by legislation. Kerala's declaration that there was 
no creamy layer in the state and reservation would continue to apply 
"notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of 
any court" contained in sections 3 and 6 of the Kerala State Backward 
Classes (Reservation of Appointment or Posts in the Services under the 
State) Act, 1995, was held to be unconstitutional. Before making rules 
providing for reservation of judicial posts under Article 16(4) of the 
Constitution, the high court must be consulted. 
In K. Thimmappa v. Chairman, Central Board of Directors, SB I , the 
Supreme Court has reiterated the well- settled following two-fold test of 
permissible, classification: 
(i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible 
differentia which distinguishes persons or things which are 
grouped together from others left out of the group; and 
(ii) that the differentia must have rational relation to the object 
sought to be achieved 
Article 14 does not insist that the classification should be scientifically 
perfect and a court would not interfere unless the alleged classification 
results in apparent inequality. 
The Supreme Court held that bifurcation of grade I officers into two 
newly created grades on the basis of confirmation would not constitute 
any discrimination. The court rightly pointed out that confirmation may 
be an uncertain criterion for determining inter se seniority between the 
direct recruits and promotees in certain situations but in the present, 
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context where under the impugned order after satisfactory completion of 
probation an officer is confirmed, confirmation as basis for creating two 
different grades would not be discriminatory or violative of Article 14 of 
the Constitution. Another important aspect of this case is that the court 
has held that a petition cannot be rejected solely on grounds of latches 
when question of violation of fundamental right such as Article 14 is 
involved in it. But when there is no infraction of Article 14, the question 
1 7S 
of delay in filing the petition cannot be ignored. 
In K. Duraisamy v. State of T.N}'^^ the Supreme Court upheld the 
Government of T.N., Health and Family Welfare (MCA) Department 
order which envisaged 50 percent open quota while reserving 50 per 
cent of seats for in-service candidates for admission to post graduate 
diploma/degree/MDS and higher-specialty courses for the academic 
session 1999-2000. The court held that it is well settled that the 
government possesses the right and authority to decide from what 
sources the admission in educational institutions or to pailicular 
disciplines and courses therein have to be made and that too in what 
proportion. It is also settled that at the super-specialty level, in 
particular, and even at the post graduate level reservation of the kind 
known as "protective discrimination" in favour of those considered to be 
backward should be avoided as being not permissible. The mere use of 
the word "reservation" per se does not have the consequence of ipso 
facto applying the entire mechanism underlying the constitutional 
concept of protective reservation envisaged under Articles 15 (4) and 16 
(4) of the Constitution'^^ 
In AIIMS Students' Union v. AIIMS^^^ case the main question for 
consideration of the court was whether "institutional reservation" based 
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on the rationale of continuity for admission to post-graduate couises in 
medical colleges such as the All India Institute of Medical Sciences 
(AIIMS) is permissible or not AIIMS an autonomous premier institute 
of national importance, provided for 33 percent reservation of the 
available post graduate seats to the AIIMS in-house MBBS candidates 
and of 50 per cent seats discipline-wise subject to an overall 33 per cent 
quota along with 65 per cent percentile method. At the counselling, the 
institute's in-house candidates were given priority by being called first 
in point of time. The figure of 33 per cent reservation for in-house 
candidates was statistically so arrived at so as to secure 100 per cent 
1 70 
reservation for AIIMS students. 
R.C. Lahoti J, speaking for the court, distinguished this case from 
1 SO 
K.Doraisamy, and observed that "this is not a reservation but super-
reservation and certainly not a source of entry"'* '^ and found it ultra 
virus the Constitution and hence struck it down. The judge stated the 
underlying principle of reservation as enshrined in Articles 15(4) and 
16(4) and further examined the issue of reservadon in educational 
institutions in the context of preamble and Articles 14, 41, 46, 47 and 
51-A (j) and (h). The judge rightly observed:'^^ 
Reservation unless protected by the Constitution 
itself, as given to us by the founding fathers and as 
adopted by the people of India, is subversion of 
fraternity, unity and integrity and dignity of the 
individual. While dealing with the directive principles 
of state policy. Article 46 is taken note of often by 
over looking Articles 41 and 47. Article 41 obliges the 
State inter alia to make effective provision for 
securing the right to work and right to education. Any 
reservation in favour of one, to the extent of 
reservation, is an inroad on the right of others to 
work and to learn. Article 47 recognizes the 
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improvement of public health as one of the primary 
duties of the State. Public health can be improved by-
having the best doctors, specialists and super 
specialists. Undergraduate level is a primary or basic 
level of education in medical sciences wherein 
reservation can be understood as fulfdlment of 
societal obligation of the state towards the weaker 
segments of the society. Beyond this, a reservation is a 
reversion or diversion from performance of primary 
duty of the State. 
He further observed:'^^ 
Permissible reservation at the lowest or primary rung 
is a step in the direction of assimilating the lesser 
fortunate in the mainstream of the society by bringing 
them to the level of others which they cannot achieve 
unless protectively pushed. Once that is done the 
protection needs to be withdrawn in the own interest 
of protectees so that they develop strength and feel 
confident of stepping on higher rungs on their own 
legs shedding the crutches. Pushing the protection of 
reservation beyond the primary level betrays the 
bigwigs' desire to keep the crippled crippled for 
over.... Every citizen of India is fundamentally ... duty-
bound to strive towards excellence in all spheres of 
individual and collective activity so that the nation 
constantly rises to higher levels of endeavors and 
achievements. 
In order to meet the ends of justice in the instant case, the Supreme 
Court issued the following directions: (i) the institutional reservation for 
AIIMS candidates was declared ultra vires the Constitution and hence 
struck down, (ii) By way of institutional preference the institutional 
candidates, i.e., those who graduated from AIIMS shall be preferred 
against 25 per cent seats available to open category candidate and not 25 
per cent seats discipline wise out of the total seats, (iii) A uniform 
minimum cut-off of 50 per cent marks in the competitive entrance as a 
condition of eligibility for all the candidates may be adopted. 
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In Lakshmi Precision Screws Ltd. v. Ram Bhagat there was a 
provision in the standing orders that if an employee remains absent for 
ten consecutive days without leave he is deemed to have left the service 
of the firm and hence his services would be terminated. The respondent 
absented himself without prior information. The appellant, before the 
expiry of the said ten days, asked the respondent to report back on duty 
within 48 hours and also tender explanation for his absence. It was 
further stated that in case of non-compliance it would be presumed that 
he has abandoned service and would be removed from muster roll. The 
respondent did not comply with that direction. After the expiry of the 
prescribed time limit, the appellant informed the respondent that his 
name has been removed from the muster roll. The Supreme Court held 
that the action of the appellant is violative of the principles of natural 
justice. 
One ought to read the doctrine of natural justice as an inbuilt 
requirement of the standing orders. Arbitrariness is an antithesis to rule 
of law, equity, fair play and justice. The contract of employment there 
may be but it cannot be devoid of the basic principles of the concept of 
justice. Justice-oriented approach, which is the present trend in Indian 
jurisprudence, shall have to be read as an inbuilt requirement of the 
basics of concept of justice, to wit, the doctrine of natural justice, 
fairness, equality and rule of law.'^ ^ 
In Javed v. State ofHaryana , the core issue before the Supreme Court 
was the vires of the provisions of sections 175(1) (g) and 177(1) of the 
Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994. The said provisions disqualified a 
person having more then two living children from holding the specified 
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offices in Panchayats. While upholding the impugned provisions, the 
Supreme Court Rightly observed. '^ ^ 
The classification is well defined and well perceptible. 
Persons having more than two living children are 
clearly distinguishable from persons having not on me 
than two living children. The two constitute two 
different classes and the classification is founded on 
an intelligible differentia clearly distinguishing one 
form the other. One of the objects sought to be 
achieved by the legislation is popularizing the family 
welfare/ family-planning programme. The 
disqualification enacted by the provision seeks to 
achieve the objective by creating a disincentive. The 
classificatiom does not suffer form any arbitrariness. 
The number of children viz. two is based on legislative 
wisdom. It could have been more or less. The number 
is a matter of policy decision, which is not open to 
judicial scrutiny. 
In Union of India v. International Trading Co., the Supreme Court 
observed that while the discretion to change the policy in exercise t?f the 
executive power, when not trammeled by any statute or rule is wide 
enough, what is imperative and implicit in terms of article 14 is that a 
change in policy must be made fairly and should not give the impression 
that it was so done arbitrarily or by any ulterior criteria. The wide sweep 
of Article 14 and the requirement of every state action qualifying for its 
validity on this touchstone irrespective of the field of activity of the state 
is an accepted tenet. The basic requirement of article 14 is fairness in 
action by the state, and non- arbitrariness in essence and substance is the 
heartbeat of fair play. Actions are amenable, in the panorama of judicial 
review only to the extent that the state must act validly for a discernible 
reason, not whimsically for any ulterior purpose. The meaning and true 
import and concept of arbitrariness is more easily visualized than 
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precisely defined. A question whether the impugned action is arbitrary 
or not is to be ultimately answered on the facts and circumstances of a 
given case. A basic and obvious test to apply in such cases is to see 
whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the impugned 
action and if so, does it really satisfy the test of reasonableness.' '' 
In Onkar Lai Bajaj v. Union oflndia^^, Dealer Selection Boards (DSBs) 
made selection of a large number (3760 in this case) of applicants for 
allotment of retail outlets, dealership/distributorships of petroleum 
products. The insinuations made were that allotments were made to 
members of Parliament, assembly, party workers of political party in 
power, their relatives etc. Consequently, the government took a decision 
to cancel all such allotments. It may be noted that the only reason for the 
en masse cancellation was that a "controversy" had been raised. 
The Supreme Court held that such a decision must withstand the test of 
Judiciousness and impartiality and must avoid arbitrariness and 
capriciousness. Hence in mass cancellation of the allotments in the 
present case merely on account of the said allegation, without 
application of mind to individual cases was arbitrary and violated 
Article 14. 
Sabbarwal J, speaking for the court, rightly observed that the solution by 
resorting to cancellation of all was worse than the problem. Cure was 
worse than the disease. Equal treatment to unequal is noting but 
inequality. To put both the categories, tainted and the rest, on a par is 
wholly unjustified, arbitrary, unconstitutional being violative of Article 
14 of the Constitution.'^^ The court has also rightly held that being the 
son or wife of a member of parliament is not a qualification for 
allotment of retail outlets of petroleum products. But making of huge 
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investment after the allotment or resigning form the job of professor to 
fulfill the condition of letter of intent cannot sustain an illegal 
allotment.''^^ 
In Air India Cabin Crew Association v. Yeshaswinee Merchant^ case 
retirement age of 50 years was fixed for flying duties for female 
members with the option to accept ground duties beyond 50 years and 
up to the age of 58 years in terms of binding agreement, settlement or 
award whereas for male members the age of retirement was fixed as 58 
years. A small member of air hostesses nearing the age of 50 years and 
who were then in the executive cadre challenged the binding 
'agreements and settlements, to which they were parties through the 
association, as violative of, inter-alia, Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the 
Constitution. It was surprising that the high court in the impugned 
judgment completely sidestepped the legal issues firmly settled in the 
decision of the three-judge bench of the Supreme Court in Nargesh 
Meerza,'^^ which were binding on it. The court overruled the judgment 
of the high court and observed:'^^ 
The constitutional prohibition to the State not to 
discriminate citizens only on sex, however, does not 
prohibit special treatment to the women in 
employment on their own demand. The terms and 
conditions of their service save been fixed through 
negotiations and resultant agreements, settlement and 
awards made from time to time in the course of 
industrial adjudication. Where terms and conditions 
are fixed through collective bargaining as a 
comprehensive package deal in the course of 
industrial adjudication and terms of service and 
retirement age are fixed under, agreements, 
settlements or awards, the same cannot be termed as 
unfavorable treatment meted out to the women 
workers only on basis of their sex and one or the 
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other alone tinkered so as to retain the beneficial 
terms dehorns others offered as part of a package 
deal. The twin Articles 15 and 16 prohibit a 
discriminatory treatment but not preferential or 
special treatment of women, which is a positive 
measure in their favour. The Constitution does not 
prohibit the employer to consider sex in making the 
employment decisions where this is done pursuant to 
a properly or legally chartered affirmative action 
plan. 
In Dharam Dutt v. Union of India^"^^ the challenge related to the 
constitutional validity of an ordinance by which a statutory body known 
as the Indian Council of World Affairs was constituted, having petpetual 
succession and a common seal, with power to hold and dispose of 
movable and immovable property. The said ordinance was subsequently 
replaced by an Act of Parliament, which was also challenged. 
Dismissing the writ petitions with costs, the Supreme Court obsei^ ved 
that Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits class legislation and not 
reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. The requirements 
of the validity of legislation by reference to Article 14 of the 
Constitution are: that the subject-matter of legislation should be well 
defined class founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes 
that subject-matter from the others left out, and such differentia must 
have rational relation with the object sought to be achieved by the 
legislation. A single institution is capable of being treated as a class 
by itself for the purpose of legislation if there are special circumstances 
or reasons, which are applicable to that institution and such legislation, 
would not incur the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution''^ '^  
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The laying down of intelligible differentia does not, however, mean that 
the legislative classification should be scientifically perfect or logically 
complete.^ *^ 
E. V. Chinnaiah v. State of A.P.^^' The main question before the 
constitution bench was whether sub-classification or micro-classification 
of scheduled castes is violative of Article 4 of the Constitution or not. 
Santosh Hedge J (for himself and S.N. Variava and B.P. Singh JJ) after 
re erring to the Constituent Assembly Debates and Article 341 of the 
Constitution rightly observed that the Constitution of India has provided 
for only one list of scheduled castes to be prepared by the President with 
a limited power of inclusion and exclusion by Parliament." " The court 
also rejected the arguments that in Indira Sawhney case,' the Supreme 
Court had permitted Sub-classification of other backward communities, 
as backward and more backward based on their comparative under-
development, and, therefore, the similar classification amongst the class 
enumerated in the presidential list of scheduled castes is permissible in 
law. It was rightly pointed out by the Supreme Court that in Indra 
Sawhney, it was specifically held that subdivision of other backward 
classes is not applicable to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes.^ '"* 
It is submitted that if the object of reservation is to take affinnative 
action in favour of a class which is socially, educationally and 
economically backward, the state's jurisdiction while exercising its 
executive or legislative function is to decide as to what extent 
reservation should be made for them either in public service or for 
obtaining admission in educational institutions. Such a class cannot be 
subdivided so as to give more preference to a miniscule proportion of 
the scheduled castes in preference to other members of the same class.^ ^^ 
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Mini classifications based on micro-distinctions are false to our 
egalitarian faith and only substantial or straightforward classifications 
plainly promoting relevant goods can have constitutional validity. 
In Saurabh Chaudri (Dr.) v. Union oflndia^^^ several applications had 
been filed seeking classifications in and/or directions for implementing 
the earlier decision of the constitution bench of the Supreme Court, 
which had increased all India quota in post-graduate seats in medical 
colleges from 25 per cent to 50 per cent. 
Sinha J in his dissenting opinion observed that the judgment must be 
given full effect from the academic year 2004-05 so that no benefit is 
derived by students who could not secure any rank in all India 
examination but secured rank in the examination held by the states."'^ '^  
He rightly observed:"• 
Right of a meritorious student to get admission in 
post-graduate course is a fundamental and human 
right, which is required to be protected. Such a 
valuable right cannot be permitted to be whittled 
down at the instance of less meritorious students. 
It is submitted that the dissenting opinion of Sinha J is more convincing 
as it aims at balancing interests in the society and protecting the rights of 
the meritorious students. 
In Sarbananda Sanowal v. Union oflndia^^^ the constitutional validity 
of the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983 was 
challenged. Prior to its enactment, the problem of illegal migrants was 
dealt with by the Foreigners Act, 1946, which applied to foreigners 
throughout India. In recent times, however the rampant influx of illegal 
migrants from Bangladesh had become a matter of considerable 
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concern. Consequently, Parliament enacted the present Act, popularly 
known as the IMDT Act, to specifically tackle this problem. The 
petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the Act on several grounds 
that it was wholly arbitrary and unreasonable in its scope and 
application, that it made the detection and deportation of illegal 
immigrants virtually impossible. The court stated: 
The analysis of the provisions of the IMDT Act and 
the Rules made thereunder clearly demonstrate that 
the provisions thereof are very stringent as compared 
to the provisions of the Foreigners Act, 1946 or the 
Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964, in the matter of 
detection and deportation of illegal migrants. It is far 
more easier (sic) to secure conviction of a person in a 
criminal trial where he may be awarded a (sic) 
capital punishment or imprisonment for life than to 
establish that a person is an illegal migrant on 
account of extremely difficult, cumbersome and time-
consuming procedure laid down in the IMDT Act and 
the Rules made thereunder. 
The court also examined the question whether making a law applicable 
only to Assam could be held discriminatory under Article 14. It referred 
to decisions such as Kangshari Haldar v. State of West Bengal'^^ which 
held that as long as the twin tests of intelligible differentia and nexus 
with objective were satisfied, the statute could not be invalidated as ultra 
vires Article 14. Further, it noted that the problem of illegal immigrants 
in Assam was certainly serious enough to merit special treatment. 
However, the IMDT Act, instead of ameliorating the problem, actually 
contributed to aggravating it. The court struck down the Act as violative 
of Article 14 observing: '^"* 
Parliament had enacted a legislation exclusively for 
the State of Assam which was more stringent than the 
Foreigners Act, which is applicable to rest (sic) of 
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India..., such a legislation would have passed the test 
of Article 14 as the differentiation so made would 
have had rational nexus with the avowed policy and 
objective of the Act. But the mere making of a 
geographical classification cannot be sustained where 
the Act instead of achieving the object of the 
legislation defeats the very purpose for which the 
legislation has been made For satisfying the test 
of Article 14 the geographical factor in making a 
classification is not enough but (sic) there must be a 
nexus with the objects sought to be achieved.... Since 
the classification made whereby the IMDT Act is 
made applicable only to the State of Assam has no 
rational nexus with the policy and object of the Act, it 
is clearly violative of Article 14 of the Constitution 
and is liable to be struck down on this ground also. 
In EV Chinnaiah v. State ofAndhra Pradesh. 
Hegde J ruled: 
Whatever may be the objective of this 
subclassification and apportionment of the 
reservation, we think the State cannot claim 
legislative power to make a law dividing the 
Scheduled Castes List of the State by tracing its 
legislative competence to Entry 41 of List II or Entry 
25 of List III. Therefore, we are of the opinion that in 
pith and substance the enactment is not a law 
governing the field of education or the field of State 
Public services. 
The court also held that the special classification of scheduled castes in 
the impugned enactment was also violative of Article 14 of the 
Constitution:^''' 
It may be true, as has been observed by the High 
Court, that the caste system has got stuck up in the 
society but with a view to do away with the evil effect 
thereof a legislation which does not answer the 
constitutional scheme cannot be upheld. It is also 
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difficult to agree with the High Court that for the 
purpose of identifying backwardness, a further 
inquiry can be made by appointing a commission as 
to who amongst the members of the Scheduled Castes 
is more backward. If benefits of reservation are not 
percolating to them equitably, measure should be 
taken to see that they are given such adequate or 
additional training so as to enable them to compete 
with the others but the same would not mean that in 
the process of rationalizing the reservation to the 
Scheduled Castes the constitutional mandate of 
Articles 14, 15 and 16 could be violated. 
S.B. Sinha J in his concurring opinion held that though the Constitution 
permits a mere additional protection to the disadvantaged class so as to 
bring them to equal platform with the other advantaged class, those 
belonging to the disadvantaged class could not, however, be 
discriminated inter se only on the presumption that some among them 
have made some advancement while others remained in abysmal 
backwardness and also inadequate representation in public service. He 
held:^'^ 
The Constitution of India is not caste-blind and, thus, 
if the citizens belonging to a caste can as such be 
rationally assumed to be backward, the entire caste 
can as such be recognized as backward class, Articles 
15(2) and 16 (2) of the Constitution prohibit 
discrimination based "only on caste" and not "caste 
and something else. 
Emphasizing the position of the states in the Indian Union and in the 
context of their legislative powers vis-a-vis the mandate of Article 341 
of the Constitution, it was held: 
In India, States are not separate sovereigns. The 
respective legislative competence of the Union and the 
States have although been delineated under Article 
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246 but the same would be subject to other provisions 
thereof. The legislative, executive and judicial powers 
in India are divided between the Union and the States. 
The States indisputably have been granted legislative 
competence as regards education (Entry 25 List III) 
and public employment (Entry 41 List II) but the same 
is circumscribed by Article 341 of the Constitution. 
In M. Nagaraj v. Union of India the Supreme Court was dealing with 
a group of case wherein the general category persons challenged the 
validity of four amendments to the Constitution dealing with reservation 
in government services. These amendments brought in changes in 
Articles 16 and 335 of the Constitution. All the amendments are 
concerned with the SCs and STs except the second one, i.e., the 81"' 
amendment, which relates to the OBCs also. 
The Supreme Court upheld all the constitutional amendments on a 
finding that they did not violate any of the basic features or structures of 
the Constitution. Thus, as a whole, the court gave its approval of the 
reservation policy and the measures intended through these 
amendments. However, it directed that individual cases arising out of 
different enactments and provisions for reservation would be decided by 
smaller benches according to the facts and circumstances of each case. 
The judgment has to a great extent clarified the principle of testing the 
validity of constitutional amendments and the distinction between basic 
feature and basic structure. Even the alterations of the basic features 
need not destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. The judgment 
also has clarified the debate regarding the merit and efficiency in the 
context of reservations, it has agreed that merit is not a fixed absolute 
concept. The court has approvingly quoted the view of Amartya Sen, 
that merit is a dependent idea and its meaning depends on how a Society 
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defines a desirable act. An act of merit in one society may not be the 
same in another. The difficulty is that there is no natural order of 'merit' 
independent of our value system. The content of merit is context 
specific. It derives its meaning from particular conditions and purposes. 
The impact of any affirmative action policy on 'merit' depends on how 
that policy is designed. The court also found that the attack on the 
ground of merit in the present case has taken place in an empirical 
vacuum. According to it the basic presumption however, remains that it 
is the state who is in the best position to define and measure merit in 
whatever ways they consider it to be relevant to public employment 
because ulfimately it has to bear the costs arising from errors in defining 
and measuring merit. It also agreed that the concept of ''extent 
reservation" is not an absolute concept and like merit it is context 
specific. 
It has also reiterated the judicial approval on the concept of substantive 
equality which the court has now termed as equality in fact, egalitarian 
equality, proportional equality, etc. The judgment speaks of two kinds of 
equality: formal equality and proportional equality. "Formal equality' 
means that law treats everyone equal and does not favour anyone either 
because he belongs to the advantaged section of the society or to the 
disadvantaged section of the society. Concept of 'proportional equality' 
expects the states to take affirmative action in favour of disadvantaged 
sections of the society within the framework of liberal democracy. The 
court also reiterated that the provisions of reservation is not an exception 
to equality principle but a facet of the equality principle itself Thus, 
reservation proper is a mandate of the egalitarian equality or the equality 
in fact. This restatement of the principle will clear a lot of doubts 
regarding the desirability of reservations and it has brought the concept 
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of reservations from the margins and corollaries to the centre of the 
discussions on equality. The Supreme Court has reiterated that equality 
is a part of fundamental features or basic structure of the Constitution, as 
it is an essence of democracy. There can be no rule of law if there is no 
equality before the law. The rule of law and equality before the law are 
designed to secure among other things justice both social and economic. 
According to the court, equality is the essence of democracy and, 
accordingly a basic feature of the Constitution. 
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In Government ofAndhra Pradesh v. G. Jaya Prasad Rao " it was held 
that equality clauses under Articles 14 and 16 require that dissimilarly 
placed persons cannot be treated similarly and that wooden equality is 
not possible. The court examined the validity of the scheme for 
accelerated promotion of police officers for the outstanding work in the 
field of anti extremist operation. It found that those who take risk in 
their life and prefer to face hazardous duties, form a class and they stand 
differentiated from other class of persons who are not prepared to take 
risk in their life and want to continue with the normal police duties and 
seek their promotion in due course of time. According to the court, such 
classification cannot be looked down as arbitrary or violative of Articles 
14 and 16 of the Constitution. 
In Management of Coimbatore District Central Co-operative Bank v. 
Secretary, Coimbatore District Central Co-operative,^^^ it was held that 
equals must be treated equally and unequal treatment to equals would be 
violative of Article 14 and equal treatment to unequals would also be 
violative of the 'equal protection clause' enshrined therein. The court 
found that 134 employees gave up strike call and resumed work but 53 
employees continued strike. Disciplinary action against the latter was 
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found to be not discriminative or arbitrary.^ "^^  However, the Supreme 
Court attempted to temper justice with mercy by observing that "Hence, 
while declaring the law on the point, we temper justice with mercy. In 
the exercise of plenary power under Article 142 of the Constitution, we 
think that it would not be proper to deprive 53 workmen who have 
received limited benefits under the order passed by the Division Bench 
ofthe High Court. 
Whether prohibition of women in bar was an impermissible 
discrimination on the ground of sex was one ofthe issues in Anuf Garg 
V. Hotel Association of India. As a matter of principle the court has 
held that when the validity of a legislation is tested on the anvil of 
equality clauses contained in Articles 14 and 15, the burden therefore 
would be on the state. It is doubtful whether this principle will have 
binding, force in view ofthe law on the presumption of constitutionality 
even in such matters as held by several constitution benches of the apex 
court. Dealing with the issue of prohibition of employment of women in 
places where lacquor is served, the court was ofthe view that instead of 
prohibiting of employment of women in bar, state should strive for 
elimination of sexual discrimination. The court found that the impugned 
legislation suffers from stereotype morality and outmoded content. The 
court relied on a number of earlier decisions.^^^ 
Women would be as vulnerable without state protection as by the loss of 
freedom because of the impugned Act. The court has found that the 
present law ends up victimizing its subject in the name of protection. It 
was of the view that instead of putting curbs on women's freedom, 
empowerment would be a more tenable and socially wise approach. 
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In Rajesh Kumar Daria v. Rajasthan Public Service Commission'" the 
court found that the special provision for women made under Article 
15(3), in respect of employment, is a special reservation when 
contrasted with the social reservation under Section 16(4). According to 
the court, these are vertical and horizontal reservations and hence 
distinct from each other. The court laid down that the principle 
applicable to vertical (social) reservations will not apply to horizontal 
(special) reservations. It directed that where a special reservation for 
women is provided within the social reservation for scheduled castes, 
the proper procedure is first to fill up the quota for scheduled castes in 
order of merit and then find out the number of candidates among them 
who belong to the special reservation group of 'Scheduled castes-
Women'. If the number of women in such list is equal to or more than 
the number of special reservation quota, then there is no need for further 
selection towards the special resei"vation quota. Only if there is any 
shortfall, the requisite number of scheduled caste women shall have to 
be taken by deleting the corresponding number of candidates from the 
bottom of the list relating to scheduled castes. According to the court, to 
this extent, horizontal (special) reservation differs from vertical (social) 
reservation. 
In Ashok Kumar Thakur v. Union of India^^^ a bench of two judges 
stayed the implementafion of the Central Educational Institutions 
(Reservation in Admission) Act, 2006 with regard to reservation of 27% 
for "other backward classes" holding that differentiation or classification 
for special preference must not be unduly unfair for the persons left out 
of the favored groups. The court held that baseless figure of 27% cannot 
be pressed into service for introducing a statute which has wide 
ramifications. According to the court, no methodology has been laid 
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down for determining socially and educationally backward classes 
because caste alone should not be made the basis for identification and 
non-exclusion of "creamy layer". However, operation of the statute so 
far as scheduled castes and scheduled tribes are concerned was not 
stayed. The Act was promulgated in furtherance of newly added Article 
15 (5) of the Constitution. 
In State of Mahrashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lai Shah and Others. ~ the 
validity of various provisions of the Maharashtra Control of Organized 
Crimes Act, 1999 (MCOCA) were challenged initially before the 
Bombay High Court, which upheld the validity of some of the 
provisions of the Act, but held sections 13 to 16 as unconstitutional 
being beyond the competence of the state legislature and also struck 
down section 21 (5) of the Act as being violative of Article 14 of the 
Constitution. 
MK Sharma, J, speaking for the court held: 
We consider that a person, who is on bail after being 
arrested for violation of law unconnected with 
MCOCA, should not be denied his right to seek bail if 
he is arrested under the MCOCA, for it cannot be said 
that he is a habitual offender. The provision of 
denying his right to seek bail, if he was arrested 
earlier and was on bail for commission of an offence 
under any other Act, suffers from the vice of 
unreasonable classification by placing in the same 
class, offences which may have nothing in common 
with those under MCOCA, for the purpose of denying 
consideration of bail. The aforesaid expression and 
restriction on the right of seeking bail is not even in 
consonance with the object sought to be achieved by 
the Act and, therefore, on the face of the provisions 
this is an excessive restriction. 
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In State of Bihar and Others v. Bihar State 'Plus-2' Lecturers 
Associations and Others, the court was called upon to consider 
whether different pay scales prescribed by the state for trained and 
untrained lecturers was valid and permissible under Article 14 of the 
Constitution. 
Thakkar, J, speaking for the court held:^^^ 
There is a clear distinction between a trained teacher 
(lecturer) and an untrained teacher (lecturer). Such a 
distinction is legal, valid, rational and reasonable. 
Trained lecturers and untrained lecturers, therefore, 
can neither be said to be similarly circumstanced nor 
they form one and the same class. The classification is 
reasonable and is based on intelligible differentia 
which distinguishes one class (trained) included 
therein from the other class (untrained) which is left 
out. Such classification or differentia has a rational 
nexus or reasonable relation to the object intended to 
be achieved, viz., imparting education to students. It, 
therefore, cannot be successfully contended that 
different pay scales cannot be fixed for trained 
lecturers on one hand and untrained lecturers on the 
other hand. Prescribing different pay scales, under 
the circumstances, cannot be held illegal, improper or 
unreasonable infringing Article 14 of the 
Constitution. 
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CHAPlER-2 
LIBERTY RIGHTS: 
Case Law based on: Article-21 and 
Article-22 of the Constitution 
The guarantee to 'personal liberty' which has rightly been coupled with 
the right to life has been enumerated in Article 21 of the Constitution 
which states that: "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal 
liberty except according to procedure established by law". Moreover, 
the amalgamation of right to life with that of personal liberty has made 
the article 'absolutely sacred' and not subject to any other restriction 
except that of public order and tranquility. 
We can observe that Article 21 has been couched in negative language 
still it underscores the 'absolute sacred' and fundamental charter of right 
to life and personal liberty. I can be hardly overemphasized that Article 
21 not only guarantees against the taking away of life but also must be 
understood as an expression replete with wider application. Initially 
Article 21 guaranteed the right to life and personal liberty to citizens 
only against the arbitrary action of the executive and not from legislative 
action. But since the passing of decision of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of 
India, Article 21 now protects the right to life and personal liberty of 
citizens not only from executive action but also from legislative action. 
Inversely this means that a person can be deprived of his life and 
personal liberty if two conditions are fulfilled; first, there must be a law 
and secondly, there must be a procedure by that law, provided tliat the 
procedure is just, fair and reasonable. 
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The implication of the article 21 is that an individual could be dqirived 
of his life or personal liberty if such a deprivation was brought about in 
accordance with the procedure enacted by an appropriate legislature. It 
is noteworthy that the principle of reasonableness permeates the Article 
with the result that the procedure contemplated by the Article 21 must 
be right, just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful, oppressive, otherwise it 
would be no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would 
not be satisfied. The judicial decisions pertaining to Liberty Rights are 
as under: 
In Ram Manohar v. State of Bihar' where the petitioner, Dr Ram 
Manohar Lohia, the leader of Samuykta Socialist Party, and a member 
of Parliament, was arrested under the impugned order of the district 
magistrate of Patna, on grounds of "maintenance of law and order". The 
Supreme Court by a majority quashed the order of detention. The 
majority, led by Mr. justice Sarkar, ordered release simply on the ground 
that there was inconsistency between the order and the mle under which 
the order was passed. The order used the words "maintenance of public 
order". He observed: 
"Strict compliance with the letter of the rule is the 
essence of the matter. We are dealing with a statute 
which drastically interfere with the personal liberty of 
people, we are dealing with an order behind the face of 
which a Court is prevented from going".^ 
In State of M.P. v. Shobhram^ the respondents were arrested on a 
complaint of criminal trespass. The arrest was effected under the 
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and the trial was 
held in the court of nyaya panchayat, functioning under the Madhya 
Pradesh Panchayat Act, 1949, which sentenced them to a fine of rupees 
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seventy-five each. The High Court quashed the conviction in revision on 
the ground that section 63 of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Act was 
uhra vires inasmuch as it provided that no lawyer could plead a case 
before a nyaya panchayat. This, the High Court held, was violative of 
article 22(1) of the Constitution. 
Mr. Justice Hidayatullah, pointed out: 
"A person arrested and put on his defence against a 
criminal charge which may result in penalty, is entitled 
to the right to defend himself with the aid of counsel and 
any law that takes away this right offends against the 
Constitution ". 
In Motilal v. State of Biha/ a detention was held to be unlawful The 
appellant was detained for selling certain commodities at prices higher 
than the rates fixed by the Government. The Court held that the grounds 
communicated to the detenue were vague and incomplete. Hegde J. 
observed: 
"Preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal 
liberty and such safeguards as the Constitution has 
provided against the improper exercise of the power must 
be jealously watched and enforced by the Court". 
In re Madhu Limaye, the Supreme Court granted a writ of habeas 
corpus as the arrest of Madhu Limaye was held to have infringed article 
22(1). He was arrested on 6 November 1968, for violating an order 
made under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure but was not 
told the reasons for his arrest or of the offences for which he had been 
taken into custody. The Court held that as there was a breach of article 
22(1), he was entitled to be released. The requirements of article 22(1), 
the Court emphasized; were meant to afford the earliest opportunity to 
the arrested person to remove any mistake, misapprehension or 
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misunderstanding in the minds of the arresting authority and also to 
know exactly what the accusation against him was so that he could 
exercise his second right under article 22(1), namely, that of consulting 
a legal practitioner of his choice and to be defended by him. 
D.M.K. Patnaik v. State of Andhra Pradesh^ raised interesting issues 
concerning personal liberty guaranteed in article 21. The petitioners, 
Naxalite under-trial prisoners, alleged that location of the police force 
on a part of the vacant jail land and fixation of live-wire mechanism 
atop the walls of the jail to prevent the prisoners from escaping from the 
jail infringed their personal liberty. Chandrachud J. said that conviction 
and imprisonment would deprive prisoners of some but not all of their 
fundamental rights. They might lose freedom of movement throughout 
the territory of India or freedom to practice any lawful trade or business. 
But they would retain their right to acquire, hold and dispose of property 
and the right to life and personal liberty. 
In State of Maharashtra v. Prabhakar Padurang Chandrachud J. 
rejected the plea, for want of proof, that the unwholesome conditions 
prevalent in the jail violated their personal liberty, he said. 
We would like to emphasize once again, and no emphasis 
in this context can be too great, that though the 
Government possesses the constitutional right to initiate 
laws, it cannot, by taking law into its own hands, resort 
to oppressive measures to curb the political beliefs of its 
opponents....We cannot do better than say that the 
directive principle contained in Article 42 of the 
Constitution that "The State shall make provision of 
securing just and humane conditions of work" may 
benevolently be extended to living conditions in jails. 
There are subtle forms of punishment to which convicts 
and under- trial prisoners are sometimes subjected but it 
must be realized that these barbarous relics of a by-gone 
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era offend against the letter and spirit of our 
Constitution. 
Govind v. State of M.P, raised the sensitive question whether our 
Constitution guaranteed a fundamental right to privacy. The petitioner in 
this case claimed that regulations 855 and 856 of the police Regulations, 
made under the police Act, violated his fundamental right to privacy, 
forming a part of freedom of movement guaranteed in article 19( 1) (d) 
of the Constitution. He pointed out that the police were making 
domiciliary visits by day and by night, picketing his house and the 
approaches thereto, keeping a watch on his movements, and often 
calling and harassing him. 
The Supreme Court had examined in Kharak Singh' the validity of 
sui'veillance and domiciliaiy visits authorized by police regulations, not 
framed under any statute. The court held that the regulation, which 
authorized domiciliary visits without the authority of law, violated 
article 21, which provided that no one should be deprived of his life or 
personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. 
The court found that personal liberty in article 21 encompassed a wide 
variety of rights that made up the personal liberty of man and that the 
scope of the right to life was similar to that in the 5* and 14^ '' 
amendments of the American Constitution. The court interpreted article 
21 in the light of the objective of the Constitution evident from the 
preamble that the cherished human values basic to the dignity of man 
and his evolution and development should be preserved and protected. 
In his dissent Subba Rao. J. (later C.J.) held that as even psychological 
restraints on freedom of movement violated article 19 (1) (d) 
surveillance was unconstitutional. 
382 
Methew J.held: 
There can be no doubt that the makers of our 
Constitution wanted to ensure conditions favourable to 
the pursuit of happiness. They certainly realized, as 
Brandeis, J. said in his dissent in Olmsteady v. United 
States....the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his 
feelings and of his intellect and that only a part of the 
pain, pleasure, satisfaction of life can be found in 
material things and therefore they must be deemed to 
have conferred upon the individual as against the 
government a sphere where he should be let alone. 
He added: 
Assuming that the right to personal liberty, the right to 
move freely throughout the territory of India and the 
freedom of speech create an independent right of privacy 
as an emanation from them which one can characterize 
as a fundamental right, we do not think that the right is 
absolute. 
In Golam v. State of West Bengal^^ the Supreme Court found that the 
detaining authority had disclosed to the detenu neither the contents of 
the F.I.R. nor the vital particulars relating to theft of wheat from a 
railway wagon, such as the quantity of wheat stolen, the weapons and 
implements used by the thieves, the show of force by them and the 
magnitude and duration of the dislocation caused to the supplies and 
services. The court further found that "grounds" in article 22(5) coverer 
basic facts, which influenced the detaining authority in making the order 
of detention. They must, therefore, be communicated to the detenu 
unless their disclosure is considered by the public authority to be against 
public interest. The court said that whether or not this requirement was 
complied with was justifiable and that as sentinel of fundamental rights 
it was the duty of the court to see that no one was deprived of his liberty 
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except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The court 
therefore, allowed the petition and quashed the order of detention. 
In Union of India v. Bhanudas^ the Supreme Court allowed the Union 
Government's appeals against the judgments of some High Courts 
conceding the demands of detenus under the Maintenance of Internal 
Security Act. The following are some of the typical demands of the 
detenus conceded by the High Courts: 
(i) to have food from outside; 
(ii) to have periodic interviews with family members; 
(iii) to have an interview with the legal advisers 
(iv) to take the specially prescribed medicines; 
(v) to have the detenus taken to the site of the meeting of the 
municipal corporation to enable them to exercise their \ ote at 
the mayoral election; and 
(vi) release on parole to enable the detenu to write his LL.B. 
examination. 
Singh J. held: 
// is...for the State Governments who are in full 
possession of all material facts including the peculiar 
problems posed by foreign exchange and smuggling and 
not for the Courts who have neither the necessary-
knowledge of the facts nor the legal competence to 
regulate conditions of detention of persons including 
their maintenance, interviews or communications with 
others. 
The learned judge said that when a person was detained, he lost his 
freedom. A detenu could, therefore, exercise only the privileges 
conferred on him by law. He asserted that to allow a detenu to be 
removed to his home to attend a funeral ceremony or to take an 
examination or to undergo medical examination by a doctor of his 
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choice was to enforce his right to freedom through the process of the 
court. 
Singh J. held in Bhanudas: 
The High Courts also seem to have ignored the 
observations made by this court in state of Maharashtra 
V. Prabhakar Pandurang Sanzgiri...and in A.D.M. 
Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla...to the effect that when a 
person is detained, he loses his freedom. He is no longer 
a free man and, therefore, he can exercise only such 
privileges as are conferred on him by the order of 
detention or by the rules governing his detention. 
In Nandini v. P.L. Dani,^ Krishna Iyer J. drew attention to the recent 
refinement in the techniques of police torture and the zealous 
enforcement of the restraints on the police by the courts. He brought into 
sharp focus the techniques of in-custody interrogation commended to 
the system by the police manuals: 
Police sops and syrups...are prescribed to wheedle 
unwitting words of guilt from tough or gentle subjects. 
The end product is involuntary incrimination, subtly 
secured, not crudely traditional. Our police processes 
I O 
are less scholarly and sophisticated, but? 
Krishna Iyer J. observed: 
It is plausible to argue that, where realism prevails over 
formalism and probability over possibility, the enquiries 
under criminal statutes with quasi-criminal 
investigations are of an accusatory nature and are sure 
to end in prosecution, if the offence is grave and the 
evidence gathered good. And to deny the protection of a 
constitutional shield designed to defend a suspect 
because the enquiry is preliminary and may possibly not 
reach the court is to erode the substance while paying 
hollow homage to holy verbalism of the article.''^ 
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He said: 
We hold that any person supposed to be acquainted with 
the facts and circumstances of the case includes an 
accused person who fills that role because the police 
suppose him to have committed the crime and must, 
therefore, be familiar with the facts. The supposition may 
later prove to be a fiction but that does not repel that 
section. 
In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India the Supreme Court settled this 
cleavage of judicial opinions by affirming that the right to passport was 
a part of personal liberty and that the absolute discretion available to the 
passport authority violated articles 14 and 21. 
Bhagwati J. said that the process of judicial construction should "expand 
the reach and ambit of fundamental rights rather than attenuate their 
meaning and content". He also said that personal liberty was "of the 
widest amplitude and it covers a variety of rights which go to constitute 
the personal liberty of man and some of them have been raised to the 
status of distinct fiindamental rights and given additional protection 
under Article 19". 
He said that in Satwant Singh v. A.P.O, New Delhi' the court had read 
the right to passport into personal liberty in article 21. So to deny 
passport the executive must act in accordance with the procedure 
established by law; and law, according to Gopalan, meant state made 
law. Bhagwati J. found that three of the five judges in Gopalan had held 
that "procedure" in article 31 did not mean arbitrary procedure. Pursuing 
this line of thought the learned judge said: 
Is the prescription of some sort of procedure enough or 
must the procedure complying with any particular 
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requirements? Obviously, the procedure cannot be 
arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable...(W)e find that even 
on principle the concept of reasonableness must be 
projected in the procedure contemplated by Article 21 
having regard to the impact of Article 14 on Article 21. 
He further held that even if a law laid down a procedure and complied 
with the requirement of article 21, it should, in so far as it abridged the 
freedoms in article 19, satisfy the requirements of that article. 
Among the concurring opinions, the Iyer opinion merits special notice. 
Although he generally agrees with Bhagwati J., he goes far beyond the 
Bhagwati opinion on article 21. 
Krishna Iyer J. held: 
Procedural safeguards are the indispensable essence of 
liberty. In fact, the history of procedural safeguards and 
the right to a hearing has a human-right ring. In India, 
because of poverty- and illiteracy, the people are unable 
to protect and defend their rights: observance of 
fundamental rights is not regarded as good politics and 
their transgression as bad politics. 
Oft 
In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, Desai J., speaking for the 
majority, held that law in article 21 must be 'right, just and fair and not 
arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive' and that otherwise the procedure it laid 
down was no procedure at all. He further held that if the procedure was 
arbitrary, it would violate the right to equality in article 14. 
He pointed out that the petitioner had been sentences to death and not to 
rigorous imprisonment and that the jail authorities had no power to add 
to a punishment imposed on him by a court. Desai J. conceded that the 
fetters on the prisoner, kept day and night, not only hampered his 
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movement but made his life, "to put it mildly...intolerable." He 
observed: 
We cannot be oblivious to the fact that the treatment of a 
human being which offends human dignity, imposes 
avoidable torture and reduces the man to the level of a 
beast would certainly be arbitrary and can be questioned 
under Article 14. now, putting bar fetters for an 
unusually long period without due regard for the safety 
of the prisoner and the security of the prison would 
certainly be not justified under Section 56 of the Prisons 
Act, 1894.^^ 
Krishna Iyer J. held that a convict was not a temporary slave of the state 
denuded of all fundamental rights. He said that no punishment could be 
imposed on a prisoner in violation of the principles of natural justice. He 
held: 
If our law were to reflect a higher respect for life, 
restraint of the person is justified only if the potential 
harm is considerable... Management of dangerousness in 
the prison setting is often overkill and under scientific. 
The irrationality of bar fetters based on subjective 
judgment by men without psychiatric training makes 
every prisoner 'dangerous'...Liberal paroles, open jails, 
frequency of familial meetings, location of convicts in 
jails nearest their homes tend to relieve stress, relieve 
distress, and insure security better than flagellation and 
r 29 
jetters. 
He further observed: 
Hold that bar fetters are a barbarity generally and, like 
whipping, must vanish....We hold that solitary 
confinement, cellular segregation and marginally 
modified editions of the same process are inhuman and 
irrational. More dangerous are these expedients when 
imposed by the unturned and untrained power of a jail 
30 
superior... 
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In Charles Sobraj v. Superintendent, Central Jail; Krishna iyer J. 
asserted that prisoners, too, were entitled to the protection of articles 14, 
19 and 21, subject to certain limitations. So there should be correlation 
between deprivation of freedom and the legitimate functions of a 
correctional system highlighting the principle compassion whenever 
possible and cruelty only when inevitable. He held: 
If a whole atmosphere of constant fear of violence, 
frequent torture and denial of opportunity to improve 
oneself is created or if medical facilities and basic 
elements of care and comfort necessary to sustain life are 
refused, then also the humane jurisdiction of the court 
will become operational based on Article 19. Other forms 
of brutal unreasonableness and anti-rehabilitative 
attitude violative of constitutionality may be thought of in 
a penal system...The court is reluctant to intervene in the 
day-to- day operation of the State penal system; but 
undue harshness, and avoidable tantrums under the guise 
of discipline and security, gains no immunity from court 
.. 32 
writs. 
The essay of Bhagwati J. in Hussainara- f^ on poverty and justice has 
offered so much to so many: a Manga Carta to the 294 millions down 
the poverty line exposed to lawless law enforcement, much more than 
release from jail to the Bihari undertrials languishing for long years in 
the dark cells, hope and cheer to the 120,000 undertrials withering away 
in the country's jails without trial and a thunderbolt of judicial 
condemnation to the limbs of law and sentinels of justice for treating 
poverty as crime. 
Like so many good things in life Hussainara, too, was a product of 
accidents."^ "* A renowned police officer's discoveiy, a reputed 
newspaper's campaign and a solitary, socially motivated lawyer; 
lawyer's crusade, cumulatively, created an epic struggle for justice for 
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the undertrials. The respondent state's response to the writ petition filed 
at the instance of Kapila Hingorani brought to Hght the content and 
extent of the injustice suffered by the poor undertrials 
Bhagwati J. tried to identify the short comings in the administration of 
criminal justice responsible for this outrage. He found that an 
unsatisfactory bail system and delays in courts had frustrated the 
undertrials' quest for justice. In a passage bristling with indignation he 
exposed the impact of the poverty of these persons on the administration 
of justice. He observed:^^ 
Law has become for them an instrument of injustice and 
they are helpless and despairing victims of the legal and 
judicial system It is a crying shame on the judicial 
system which permits incarceration of men and women 
for such long periods of time with out trial [A] are we 
not denying human rights to these nameless persons who 
are languishing in jails for years for offences which 
perhaps they might ultimately be found not to have 
committed? 
He said that their poverty was their crime, and pointed out:^^ 
What faith can these lost souls have in the judicial system 
which denies them a bare trial for so many years and 
keeps them behind bars, not because they are guilty, but 
because they are too poor to afford bail and courts have 
no time to try them. 
He drew attention to the dynamic interpretation of Maneka and the 
travesty of justice involved in the continued imprisonment of these 
persons because of their poverty only and made the following fervent 
appeal. ^ ^ 
It is necessary, therefore, that the law as enacted bv the 
legislature and as administered by the courts must 
radically change its approach to pre-trial detention and 
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ensure reasonable, just and fair procedure which has 
creative connotation after Maneka Gandhi's case. 
In this shocking state of affairs Bhagwati J. with Koshal J. concumng, 
tried to make the bail system more compassionate to the poor in more 
ways than one. He also read into article 21 the right to speedy trial. 
Although he treated speedy trial as a part of procedure in that article, 
construed as fair and reasonable procedure in Maneka, Pathak J. entered 
a reservation on this issue. 
In Hussainara-Ilf^ Bhagwati J. with Desai J. concurring, reprimanded 
the respondent-state for keeping the under trials in jails for periods 
longer than the period of imprisonment prescribed for the offences they 
were charged with. It was observed:^^ 
This discloses a shocking state of affairs and betrays 
complete lack of concern for human values. It exposes 
the callousness of our legal and judicial system which 
can remain unmoved by such enormous misery and 
suffering resulting from totally unjustified deprivation of 
personal liberty. 
He held .40 
We do not think it is possible to reach the benefits of the 
legal process to the poor, to protect them against 
injustice and to secure to them their constitutional and 
statutory rights unless there is a nation-wide legal 
service programme to provide free legal services to 
them...Now, a procedure which does not make available 
legal services to an accused person who is too poor to 
afford a lawyer and who would, therefore, have to go 
through the trial without legal assistance, cannot 
possibly be regarded as 'reasonable, fair and just'. It is 
an essential ingredient of reasonable, fair and just 
procedure to a prisoner who is to seek his liberation 
through the court's process that he should have legal 
services available to him. 
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In Jolly Varghese v. Bank of Cochin ' The judgment debtors, wlio had 
failed to repay the huge amounts they had borrowed and whose 
properties had been attached for the purpose of sale in discharge of their 
decree debts, were confronted with a warrant for their arrest and 
detention in civil prison issued under section 51 and order 21, rule 37 of 
the Civil Procedure Code. The appellants questioned before the Supreme 
Court the validity of these statutory provisions under article 11 of the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights declaring that "No. one shall be 
imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfill a contractual 
obligation". 
Krishna Iyer. J. reiterated dualism and asserted as follows:^^ 
The positive commitment of the States parties ignites 
legislative action at home but does not automatically 
make the covenant and conforceable part of the corpus 
juris of India. 
Krishna Iyer J. transplanted article 11 of the covenant into the fair 
procedure in article 21 of the Constitution. He said: 
To be poor, in this land of Daridra Narayana (land of 
poverty) is no crime and to recover debts by the 
procedure of putting one in prison is too flagrantly 
violative of Article 21 unless there is proof of the minimal 
fairness of his willful failure to pay in spite of his 
sufficient means and absence of more terribly pressing 
claims on his means such as medical bills to treat cancer 
or other grave illness. Unreasonableness and unfairness 
in such a procedure is inferable from Article 11 of the 
Convenant. ' 
In Batra if Krishna Iyer J. observed: 
Of course, new legislation is the best solution, but when 
law-makers take far too long for social patience to suffer, 
as in this very case of prison-reform, courts have to 
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make-do with interpretation and carve on wood and 
sculpt on stone ready at hand and not wait for far away 
marble architecture. 
Batra II arose out of a letter written by a convict in Tihar Jail to one of 
the judges of the Supreme Court alleging that a warder had caused 
bleeding injury to a convict by name Prem Chand by forcing a stick into 
his anus. The contemporaneous entry in the jail hospital registei- made 
by the jail doctor testified to an injury in the anus of this convict. After 
treatment at Irwin Hospital, Prem Chand was lodged in a punishment 
cell, which according to his amicus curiae but not the jail administration, 
was similar to solitary confinement condemned in Batra I. The court 
found "traces of attempts to hush up the crime where the higher officers 
were not that innocent".'^^ 
Krishna Iyer J. treated Batra's letter as a petition for habeas corpus filed 
on behalf of Prem Chand though the letter had not, as it could noi have. 
sought his release from jail. He held: 
The content of our constitutional liberties being no less, 
the dynamics of habeas writs there developed help the 
judicial process here. Indeed the fidl potential of Article 
21, 19 & 14 after Maneka Gandhi", has been unfolded 
by this Court in Hoscot...and Batra...Today, human 
rights jurisprudence in India has a constitutional status 
and sweep, thanks to Article 21, so that this magna carta 
may well to the knell of human bondage beyond civilized 
limits. . 
He pointed out that the "court is not a distant abstraction omnipotent in 
the books but an activist institution, which is the cynosure of public 
hope" He said that "the sentencing court should be required to retain 
jurisdiction to ensure that the prison system responds to the purposes of 
the sentence"."*^. Krishna Iyer J. held: 
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It is, therefore, the court's concern, implicit in the power 
to deprive the sentence of his personal liberty, to ensure 
that no more and no less than is warranted by the 
sentence happens. If the prisoner breaks down because of 
mental torture, psychic pressure or physical infliction 
beyond the licit limits oflawfid imprisonment that Prison 
Administration shall be liable for the excess. On the 
contrary, if an influential convict is able to buy 
advantages and liberties to avoid or water down the 
deprivation implied in the sentence the Prison 
Establishment will be called to order for such 
adulteration or dilution of court sentences by executive 
palliation, if unwarranted by law. . 
In Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration, Krishna Iyer J. found 
that this case involved a conflict between considerations of escape and 
personhood of a prisoner. The judge drew attention to article 5 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights forbidding torture, cruel. 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and article 10 of the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights protecting the dignity and worth 
of a person deprived of his liberty and guaranteeing humane treatment 
for him. Krishna Iyer J. reiterated Maneka and Batra and held that article 
21, now "the sanctuary of human values prescribes fair procedure and 
forbids barbarities, punitive or processual". While conceding that 
prevention of escape of a prisoner was in public interest and reasonable. 
fair and just, he asserted that "insurance against escape does not 
compulsorily require handcuffing".^^ He found that the latest police 
regulations reflected such a view. He pointed out that unless there was 
no other reasonable way of preventing escape, handcuffing of a prisoner 
violated article 14 and 19. 
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Bhagwati J. in Icchu Devi v. Union of India,^^ pointed out that whenever 
a petitioner approached the court for habeas corpus, it almost invariably 
issued a rule requiring the detaining authority to justify the detention. 
He held: 
This practice marks a departure from that obtaining in 
England where observance of the strict rules of pleading 
is insisted upon even in case of an application for a writ 
of habeas corpus, but it has been adopted by this Court 
in view of the peculiar socio-economic conditions 
prevailing in this country. 
The second feature of the Bhagwati opinion deals with the 
court's attitude towards liberty: 
The courts should always lean in favour of upholding 
personal liberty, for it is one of the most cherished values 
of mankind. Without it life would not be worth living. It is 
one of the pillars of free democratic society-. Men have 
rightly laid down their lives at its alter in order to secure 
it, protect it and preserve it....This Court has...through 
its judicial pronouncements created various legal 
bulwarks and breakwaters into the vast powers conferred 
on the executive by the laws of preventive detention.^'. 
In Khatri v. Bihar^^ Bhagwati J. observed that the right to free legal 
services "was clearly an essential ingredient of reasonable, fair and just 
procedure for a person accused of an offence", the state governments 
had done little to provide such assistance.^'' The learned judge further 
pointed out that the right to free legal services would become illusory 
for an indigent accused unless the magistrate or the sessions judge 
before whom he was produced informed him of such right. Since more 
than 70 per cent of the people in the rural areas were illiterate and even 
more than that percentage of people were not aware of the ights 
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conferred upon them by law, it was essential to promote legal literacy as 
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part of the programme of legal aid. The judge said: 
It would make a mockery of legal aid if it were to be left 
to a poor ignorant and illiterate accused to ask for free 
legal services. Legal aid would become merely a paper 
promise and it would fail in its purpose. The Magistrate 
or the Sessions Judge before whom the accused appears 
must be held to be under an obligation to inform the 
accused that if he is unable to engage the services of a 
lawyer on account of poverty or indigence, he is entitled 
to obtain free legal services at the cost of the State. 
An important question that arose in this case was whether the state was 
liable to pay compensation to the prisoners if the blinding was done by 
the police authorities. Was "the Court helpless to grant relief to the 
person" who had suffered such deprivation? "Why should the Court not 
be prepared to forge new tools and devise new remedies for the 
purpose of vindicating the most precious of the fundamental right to 
life or personal liberty?'^^ Bhagwati J. asked the following very 
pertinent question: 
If an officer of the State acting in his ojficial capacity 
threatens to deprive a person of his life or personal 
liberty without the authority of law, can such person not 
approach the Court for injuncting the State from acting 
through such officer in violation of his fundamental right 
under article 22... Can the State urge in defence in such 
a case that it is not infringing the fundamental right of 
the petitioner under Article 21, because the officer who 
is threatening to do so is acting outside the law and 
therefore beyond the scope of his authority and hence the 
State is not responsible for his action.^'^ 
Such a plea if accepted would 'make a mockery of article 21 ' . If there 
is a threat of infringement of the fundamental rights due to action of an 
official, who might be exceeding or abusing his authority, the imured 
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person could certainly move the court either under article 226 or 32 of 
the Constitution to have such an action prevented. Why should he not 
be able to take recourse to court when the action taken by the stale had 
already resulted in breach of the fundamental right under article 2 ? 
In Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator'^ the Supreme Court held 
that the right of a detenue to consult his legal adviser could be regulated 
in a manner which was reasonable, fair and just. The court pointed out 
that the right to live under article 21 included the right to live with 
human dignity and a prisoner or detenue would be entitled to have 
interviews with members of his family and friends. Such a right was 
part of the "personal liberty" because article 21 included the right to 
socialize with members of the family and friends subject of course to 
regulations, which had to be fair and just. It was held that a provision of 
the prison rules, whereby a detenu under an order of preventive 
detention was allowed to meet his family and friends only once a month, 
was unreasonable. 
The court pointed out the distinction between punitive detention and 
preventive detention and observed that the facilities given to the detenu 
had to be better than those given to prisoners who had been adjudged 
guilty of an offence punishable by law. According to Bhagwati J, the 
power of preventive detention had been recognized as a "necessan evil" 
and was tolerated "in the larger interests of security of the State and 
maintenance of public order". While our Constitution recognized 
preventive detention it was hedged in by various safeguards set out in 
articles 21 and 22. The law of preventive detention had to pass the lest 
not only of article 22 but also of article 21 and the procedure had to 
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stand the test of justness and fairness as required under the new 
interpretation of article 21. 
A.K. Roy V. Union of India^^ was one of the most important decisions in 
which the court upheld the validity of the National Security Ordinance. 
1980. It was held that an ordinance was as much law as an Act of 
Parliament. Chandrachud C.J. rightly pointed out that "if an ordinance is 
not law within the meaning of article 21, it will stand released from the 
wholesome and salutary restraint imposed upon the legislative power by 
article 13 (2) of the Constitution".^^ Replying to an argument that the 
impugned Act must be struck down on the ground that it interfered with 
the liberties of the people, the Chief Justice observed :^ '^  
It is evident that the power of preventive detention was 
conferred by the Constitution in order to ensure that the 
security and safety of the country and the welfare of its 
people are not put in peril. So long as a law of preventive 
detention operates within the general scope of the 
affirmative words used in the respective entries of the 
union and concurrent lists which give that power and so 
long as it does not violate any condition or restriction 
placed upon that power by the Constitution, the Court 
cannot invalidate the law on the specious ground that it 
is calculated to interfere with the liberties of the people. 
65 The Chief Justice further observed: 
The power to judge the fairness and justness of 
procedure established by a law for the purposes of 
Article 21 is one thing: that power can be spelt out from 
the language of that article. The power to decide upon 
the justness of the law itself is quite another thing: that 
power springs from a 'due process' provision such as is 
to be found in the 5''' and 14''' Amendments of the 
American Constitution. 
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The Chief Justice then referred to the Constituent Assembly Debates 
which showed that the words 'due process of law" had been rejected by 
the Constituent Assembly after a good deal of consideration and, 
therefore, came to the conclusion that the power to judge the justJiess of 
the law of preventive detention was not possessed by the court. 
The Chief Justice rejected the contention that the right to be represented 
by a lawyer before the advisory board was implicit in articles 19, 21 and 
22 (5) and, therefore, was not excluded by article 22 (3) (b). The right 
guaranteed by article 22(5) did not carry with it the right to be 
represented by a legal practitioner before the advisory board. However, 
the Chief Justice observed:^'' 
Every person, whose interests are adversely affected as a 
result of the proceedings which have a serious import, is 
entitled to be heard in those proceeding and be assisted 
by a friend. A detenu, taken straight from his cell to the 
Board's room, may lack the ease and composure to 
present his point of view. 
Regarding the assertion that the detenu must get an opportunity of cross 
examination, the Chief Justice observed:*'^  
In proceedings before the Advisory Board, the question for 
consideration of the Board is not whether the detenu is guilty of any 
charge but whether there is deficient cause for the detention of the 
person concerned....The detention is based on the subjective satisfaction 
of the detaining authority that it is necessary to detain a particular person 
in order to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to certain 
stated objects. The proceeding of the Advisory Board has therefore to be 
structured differently from the proceeding of judicial or quasi-judicial 
tribunals, before which there is a lis to adjudicate upon. 
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The Chief Justice pointed out that the detenus should be permitted to 
wear their own clothes, eat their own food, have interviews with the 
members of their families at least once in a week and last but not the 
least, have reading and writing material according to their reasonable 
requirements. 
In Sheela Barse v. Maharashtra,^^ the Supreme Court (Bhagwati, 
Pathak, A.N. Sen, JJ.) elaborated the rights of prisoners and duties of the 
lawyers. This writ petition was based on a letter addressed by Sheela 
Barse, a journalist, complaining of custodial violence to women 
prisoners whilst they were confined in the police lock up in the city of 
Bombay. Bhagwati J. once again stressed the importance of providing 
legal services to prisoners The judge gave detailed directions with a 
view to providing adequate protection to women prisoners in particular. 
Some were (i) four or five police lock ups should be selected in 
reasonably good localities where only female suspects should be kept 
and they should be guarded by female guarded by female constables. 
Female suspects should not be kept in a police lock up in which male 
suspects were detained; (ii) interrogation of women should be carried 
out only in the presence of women police officers/constables; (iii) the 
arrested person must be immediately informed of the grounds of his 
arrest (iv) a city session judge to be nominated by the principal judge of 
the city civil court, preferably a lady judge, (v) as soon as a person was 
arrested, the police should obtain from him the name and address of his 
nearest relation or friend and should get in touch which such relative or 
friend and inform him about his arrest; and (vi) the magistrate, before 
whom an arrested person was produced, shall enquire from him whether 
he had any complaint of torture or maltreatment in police custody. 
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The Supreme Court showed its judicial activism and after noting the 
existing defects in the legal system indicated the following broad 
parameters in assisting the rape victims. 
1. The complainants of sexual assaults cases should be provided 
with legal representations. The victim's advocate will assisi her in 
police station and in court and will also provide guidance 
regarding mind counselling or medical assistance. 
2. Legal assistance will have to be provided at the police station 
since victim of the sexual assault might be in a distressed state 
upon arrival in the police station. 
3. The police should be under a duty to inform the victim of her 
right to representation before any questions were asked to her and 
that the police report should indicate that she was so informed. 
4. The list of advocates willing to act in these cases should be kept 
in police station. 
5. The advocate shall be appointed by the court, upon application by 
the police at the earliest convenient moment. The advocate v\ould 
be authorized to act at the police station before the leave of the 
court was sought or obtained. 
6. In all rape trials anonymity of the victims must be maintained, as 
far as necessary. 
7. In view of Article 38(1), it is necessai-y to set up Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Board. Rape victims frequently incur subsiantial 
financial loss. For example, some are too traumatized to continue 
in employment. 
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8. Compensation for victims shall be awarded by the (Zourt on 
conviction of the offender and by the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Board whether or not a conviction has taken place. 
The board will take into account pain, suffering and shocK as well 
as loss of earnings due to pregnancy and the expenses of child 
birth if this occurred as a result of the rape.'^' 
In Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Subhra Chakraborty,"^^ the complainant was 
a student in the Baptist College, Kohima and the accused was a lecturer 
in that college. According to the FIR lodged by the complainant, the 
accused not only induced the complainant and cohabited with her, 
giving her a false assurance of marriage but also fraudulently and 
dishonestly made the complainant to believe that she was a lawfully 
married wife of the accused. 
Saghir Ahmed J, while referring to the pitiable condition of women in 
society observed 103 
Unfortunately, a woman, in our country, belongs to a 
class or group of society who are in a disadvantaged 
position on account of several social barriers and 
impediments and have, therefore, been the victims of 
tyranny at the hands of men with whom they, fortunately, 
under the Constitution enjoy equal status. Women also 
have the right to life and liberty; they also have the right 
to be respected and treated as equal citizens. Their 
honour and dignity cannot be touched or violated. 
Rape is, therefore, the most hated crime. It is a crime against the basic 
human rights and is also violative of the victim's most cherished of the 
fundamental rights, namely, the right to life contained in article 21 of the 
Constitution. 
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State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga"^'* is a case in which the 
important question before the Supreme Court was whether right to 
reimbursement of medical expenses was absolute and no financial 
constraints could be pleaded or if it could be, to what extent? 
In this case the respondents were aggrieved by the change in policy 
effected by the appellant-government in regard to reimbursement of 
medical expenses to its serving and retired employees. The respondent 
challenged the change in policy. Misra J, speaking for the court, after 
considering the relevant case law'°^ on the point observed: "^ '^ 
No State of any country can have unlimited resources to 
spend on any of its projects. That is why it only approves 
its projects to the extent it is feasible. The same holds 
good for providing medical facilities to its citizens 
including its employees. Provision of facilities cannot be 
unlimited. It has to be to the extent finances permit. If no 
scale or rate is fixed then in case private clinics or 
hospitals increase their rate to exorbitant scales, the 
State would be bound to reimburse the same, Hence, we 
come to the conclusion that the principle of fixation of 
rate and scale under this new policy is justified and 
cannot be held to be violative of Article 21 or Article 47 
of the Constitution of India. 
The court further observed that no right could be absolute in a welfare 
state. Hence, every individual right has to give way to the right of public 
at large. However, the court expressed the hope that the government will 
give due consideration and priority to the health budget in fliture and 
render what is best possible.'^^ 
Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn. v. Nawab Khan Ghulab Khan,^^^^ the 
pavement-dwellers had unauthorized occupied the foot-paths of the 
main road in Ahmedabad city. The Supreme Court directed the appellant 
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to frame a scheme to accommodate them at the ahemative places so that 
the hutmen could shift their residence to such places provided by the 
corporation to have permanent residence. 
K. Ramaswamy J, speaking for the court, observed that, the Constitution 
does not put an absolute embargo on the deprivation of life or personal 
liberty but such deprivation must be according to just, fair and 
reasonable procedure which would depend upon the fact-situation of 
each case. He further observed that if immediate action was taken after 
the encroachment was made then the compliance with the principles of 
natural justice was not called for. But if the encroachers were allowed to 
settle for a long time, then necessarily a modicum of reasonable notice 
for removal, say two weeks or 10 days, and personal service on the 
encroachers or substituted service by fixing notice on the property was 
necessary."°In other words, there is no duty to give hearing in undoing 
an obvious wrong or illegal encroachment of recent origin. But if the 
wrong is allowed to perpetuate for a long time, then a semblance ot" right 
can be claimed by them and need for hearing arises. 
The court further held that right to shelter is a part of fundamental right 
under Article 21 of the Constitution. But no one has a right to encroach 
upon public footpaths, pavements or roads or other places reserved for 
public purposes. At the same time, the state has the constitutional duty 
to provide shelter to the poor and indigent weaker sections of society to 
make the right to life meaningful, effective and fruitful. For achieving 
this objective, the excess urban vacant land available under the Urban 
Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 could be utilized.'" Houever, 
the court made it clear that in all cases of ejectment of the encroachers, 
it was not obligatory on the part of the state to provide alternative 
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accommodation and no absolute principle of universal application could 
be laid down in this regard. It would depend upon the facts of each 
112 
case. 
In Raj Deo Sharma v. State ofBihar"^ the petitioner, by a writ petition 
before the Patna High Court sought the quashment of the entire 
prosecution on the ground of violation of right to speedy trial as there 
had been long delay since the institution of the FIR. Allowing the 
appeal, and without passing an order on merits of the case, the Supreme 
Court laid down the following propositions to ensure speedy trial: 
(1) Where the offence is punishable with imprisonment for 
a period not exceeding seven years, whether the accused 
is in jail or not, the court shall close the prosecution 
evidence on the completion of two years from the date of 
recording the plea of the accused on the charges framed, 
whether the prosecution has examined all the witnesses 
or not, and the court will proceed further to the next step 
for the trial of the case under the law. (2) In such cases, 
if the accused has been in jail for a period not less than 
one-half of the maximum period of punishment 
prescribed for the offence, the trial court shall release 
the accused on bail on such conditions as it deems fit. (3) 
If the offence under trial is punishable with imprisonment 
for a period exceeding seven years, the court shall close 
the evidence on the completion of three years, whether 
the prosecution has examined all the witnesses or not, 
and the court will proceed further to the next step for the 
trial of the case under the law. (4) But if the inability for 
completing the evidence of the prosecution within the 
above stipulated period is attributed to the conduct of the 
accused, then the said time-limit for closing the 
prosecution evidence will not apply. (5) Where the trial 
has been stayed by orders of the court or by operation of 
law, the period of such stay shall be excluded from the 
said period for closing the prosecution evidence. 
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Another important feature of this case is that the Supreme Court tootc 
cognizance of the fact that the delay in trial is also partly on account of 
the shortage of judges. Accordingly, the court directed the State of Bihar 
to constitute, within the period of three months, at least five special 
courts to try the cases involving offences under the Prevention of 
Corruption Act with or without other offences allied to them."^ 
The Supreme Court in, exercise of the epistolary jurisdiction decided 
important case of Rania Murthy v. State of Karnataka in which it 
discussed the question of rights of prisoners and approach to be adopted 
while dealing with them. Hansaria , speaking for the court, after 
scanning the whole case law on prison justice system, pointed out that 
our prison system is afflicted by nine major problems which need 
immediate attention. These are: (1) overcrowding; (2) delay in trial; (3) 
torture and ill-treatment; (4) neglect of health and hygiene; (5) 
insubstantial food and inadequate clothing; (6) prison vices; (7) 
deficiency in communication; (8) streamlining of jail visits; and (9) 
management of open-air prisons."^ 
In a judgment of far reaching importance, the Supreme Court in Mr. X' 
1 1 S 
v. Hospital 'Z' resolved the conflict between the fundamental rights 
of two parties, i.e., the right to privacy of one and the right to healthy 
life of the other. In this case the appellant's blood was tested at the 
respondent's hospital and he was found to be HIV (+). On account of 
disclosure of this fact the appellant's proposed marriage with Ms 'Y', 
which has been accepted, was called off Moreover, he was severely 
criticized and was also ostracized by the community. The appellant first 
approached the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission 
which dismissed the petition on the ground that the appellant could seek 
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the remedy in the Civil Court. Before the Supreme Court he contended 
that the principle of "duty of care" applicable to persons in medical 
profession included the duty to maintain confidentiality and that the said 
duty had a correlative right vested in the patient that what ever came to 
the knowledge of the doctor would not be divulged. The appellant 
claimed damages for violation of that duty as well as for violating the 
appellant's right to privacy. 
Saghir Ahmad J, rejecting the contentions of the appellant, held that it is 
the basic principle of jurisprudence that every right has a con-elative 
duty and every duty has a correlative right. But the rule is not absolute. 
It is subject to certain exceptions in the sense that a person may have a 
right but there may not be a correlative duty. The instant case falls 
within the exception."' 
Right to privacy has been culled out of the provisions of Article 21 and 
other provisions of the Constitution. The right to privacy may also arise 
out of a specific relationship. No doubt the doctor-patient relationship is 
such where the doctors are morally and ethically bound to maintain 
confidentiality. However, the right of confidentiality is not absolute and 
may be lawfully restricted for the prevention of crime, disorder or 
protection of health or morals or protection of rights and freedom of 
others. In this regard the court rightly observed: '^ ° 
Having regard to the fact that the appellant was found to 
be HIV (+), its disclosure would not be volatile of either 
the rule of confidentiality or the appellant's right of 
privacy as Ms 'Y', with whom the appellant was likely to 
be married was saved in time by such disclosure, or else, 
she too would have been infected with the dreadful 
disease if the marriage had taken place and 
consummated. 
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The court further observed: 
Where there is a clash of two Fundamental Rights, as in 
the instant case, namely, the appellant's right to privacy 
as a part of right to life and Ms 'Y's right to lead a 
healthy life which is her Fundamental Right under 
Article 21, the right which would advance the public 
morality or public interest, would alone be enforced 
through the process of Court... 
K. Ramaswamy J in Samatha v. State of A.P. relying on declaration of 
"Right to Development Convention" which has been adopted by the 
United Nations and ratified by India, held that right to developmesit is a 
fundamental right. Article 1 of the said declaration says that "right to 
development" became part of an inalienable human right. 
Article 3(1) further recognizes and enjoins that it is the state's primary 
responsibility to create conditions favourable to the realization of the 
right to development. Ramaswamy J held that India being an active 
participant in the successful declaration of the Convention on Right to 
Development and a party signatory thereto, it is its duty to formulate its 
policies, legislative or executive, to accord equal attention to the 
promotion, and to protect the right to social, economic, civil and cultural 
rights of the people, in particular, the poor, the dalit and tribes as 
enjoined in Article 46 read with Articles 38, 39 and right to life 
guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. 
In State of Gujarat v. Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat'"'* the Supreme 
Court held that it was lawful to employ the prisoners sentenced to 
rigorous imprisonment to do hard labour whether he consented to do it 
or not. It was also open to the jail authorities to permit other prisoners to 
do any work which they choose to do provided such prisoners made a 
request for that purpose. However, it is imperative that the prisoners 
should be paid equitable wages for the work done by them and it is to be 
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determined on the basis of recommendations of a wage fixation body to 
be constituted by each state.'^^ If the extraction of hard labour is without 
payment of wages or even with the payment of wages; below the 
minimum wages fixed under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, it would 
amount to forced labour and would be violative of Article 23(1). 
According to K.T. Thomas J, imposition of hard labour on the convicted 
prisoner would serve the public purpose. 
Another important aspect of this judgment is that the court has 
suggested that the state should make a law for diverting a portion of the 
wages earned by the prisoners for payment of compensation to 
deserving victims of the crime committed by the prisoners, either 
directly or through a common fund created for that purpose. The 
government can also deduct from the wages of the prisoners a 
reasonable percentage having regard to the average amount it is 
spending per prisoner for providing food, clothing and other 
amenities.'^^ 
In Ravneet Kaur v. Christian Medical College, Ludhiana^'^ the full 
bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that a private 
educational institution receiving aid from state hands may not be a 
"state" as defined in Article 12 but if a citizen is denied admission by 
such institution on any of the gourds mentioned in Article 29(2) then 
such institution is not immune form the judicial surveillance of the 
Supreme Court and the High Court. The aggrieved person can seek writ 
for the enforcement of his fiindamental right either under Article 32 or 
226 of the Constitution. 
Common Cause, a Registered Society v. Union of India,''^ case was a 
review petition of the eariier decision'^" of the Supreme Court in which 
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it had directed the CBI, inter alia, to investigate "any other offence'" 
against the respondent Capt. Satish Sharma. Holding such a direction to 
CBI as "wholly erroneous", the Supreme Court observed that direction 
for investigation can be given only if an offence is prima facie' found to 
have been committed or a person's involvement is prima facie 
established, but a direction to CBI to investigate whether any person has 
committed an offence or not cannot be legally given. Such a direction 
would be contrary to the concept and philosophy of "life" and "liberty" 
guaranteed to a person under Article 21 of the Constitution. "Right to 
life", set out in Article 21 means something more than mere survival or 
animal existence. A man has, therefore, to be left alone to enjoy "life" 
without fetters. He cannot be rounded up by the police or CBI merely to 
find out whether he has committed any offence or is living as a law 
abiding citizen. Saghir Ahmad, J, speaking for the court, further 
observed that even under Article 142 of the Constitution such a direction 
cannot be issued.'^' 
Saghir Ahmad J Speaking for the court upheld the earlier order setting 
aside 15 allotments of petroleum outlets and observed:'^ "^ 
We may say that we maintain the rule of accountability and labiality of 
the executive including public servants in administrative matters and 
confirm that here should be transparency in all what they do, specially 
where grant of largesse is concerned. 
In YusufKhan v. Manohar Joshi,'^^^ the petitions and applications arose 
out of the concern of many citizens as well as prominent persons in 
connection with acts of violence perpetrated against members of a 
minority community in Mumbai. It was alleged that some of the 
hoodlums involved acted under the protection of state police personnel. 
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A submission was made to the effect tliat the state is expected to 
preserve and protect the law and the Constitution and it cannot permit 
any violent acts which may negate the rule of law. The Supreme Court 
directed the State of Maharashtra to state on affidavit of a competent 
officer as to what action, if any, has been taken in connection with acts 
of violence referred to in the petition and whether any person/ persons 
have been brought to book in that behalf so far, The court also sought 
the information regarding the stage of the investigation, if any, being 
carried out in respect of acts of violence in Bombay. The Union of India 
was also directed to file an affidavit through the Attorney General with 
regard to the violence in Delhi within the previous four weeks It is 
submitted that the concern of the Supreme Court in protecting the life of 
the people is real and genuine. There must be transparenc> and 
accountability of the state action and its officials in discharge ot their 
public duties. If the guilty persons are brought to book, it will have 
deterrent effect for others who threaten the life of people. 
Maintenance of healthy environment falls within the purview of Article 
21 'Non-maintenance of it would adversely affect the life of the chizens 
by slow and insidious poisoning thereby reducing the very life span 
itself In K.Ramakrishnan v. State of Kerala,^ ^  the Kerala High Court 
took note of the fact that about one million Indians die every year from 
tobacco-related diseases which was more than the number of deaths due 
to motor accidents, AIDS, alcohol and drug abuse put together. The 
court, speaking through Narayana Kurup J, observed that exposing 
unsuspecting individuals to environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) with 
ominous consequences amounts to taking away their life, not by 
execution of death sentence but by a slow and gradual process which is 
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much more cruel than sendmg a man to gallows. The judge 
observed:'^ *' 
Smokers dig not only their own grave prematurely but 
also pose a serious threat to the lives of lakhs of innocent 
non-smokers who get themselves exposed to ETS thereby 
violating their right to life guaranteed under article 21 of 
the Constitution of India.... In a welfare State it is the 
obligation of the State to ensure the creation and 
sustaining of conditions congenial to good health. 
In view of these observations, the court, inter alia, declared and held that 
public smoking of tobacco whether in the form of cigarettes, cigars, 
beedies or otherwise is illegal, unconstitutional and violative of Article 
21. The court directed the district collectors of all the districts to 
promulgate an order under section 133 (a) of Cr PC prohibiting public 
smoking. 
Another important aspect of this case is that the court hoped that print 
and electronic media would take note of this judgment and caution the 
public about penal consequences of the ban of public smokmg. It is 
submitted that no doubt law is a regulator of human conduct but public 
awareness is more important to change the attitude of the people. 
In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Challa Ramkrishna Reddy, ' the 
Supreme Court dealt with the liability of the state for the negligence of 
its servants which resulted in the loss of life of a person. Challa 
Chinappa Reddy and his son Challa Ramkrishna Reddy were arrested 
because of their involvement in a criminal case. They were lodged in a 
jail. Both apprehended that there was danger to their life and asked the 
jail authorities to provide them adequate protection. Their apprehension 
proved be right and a bomb was hurled which killed the father and 
seriously injured the son. The son filed a petition for compensation for 
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the death of his father and injury to himself The respondent state 
pleaded that the suit had been barred by limitation. This contention was 
rejected by the high court and also by the Supreme Court. Another 
contention advanced on behalf of the state was that maintenance of 
prisons was a sovereign function and, therefore, the state could not be 
held liable for the negligence of its servants. The respondents relied 
upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Kasturilal Ralia Ram v. State 
of U.P.'^^ in which such distinction between the sovereign and non 
sovereign functions had been made. The Supreme Court's interpretation 
of Articles 21 since the decision in Maneka Gandhi's case'"**' and its 
decisions making the state liable for the violation of a person's 
fundamental right to life and liberty ' have already made the above 
decision obsolete so far as violations of fundamental rights are 
concerned. 
In this case it was obvious that the prison authorities did not take proper 
precautions to protect the lives of the two Reddys. While nine policemen 
ought to have been kept, only two policemen were provided. There was 
ample ground to believe that one of the police officers was a party to the 
conspiracy to kill these two persons. This was a fake accident just as the 
police arrange fake encounters. The court stated clearly that the right to 
life was a valuable right and a prisoner was not denuded of it. Even 
prisoners are entitled to fundamental rights and the state cannot plead 
sovereign immunity as a ground for disowning its responsibility in not 
providing adequate protection to the prisoners. With the emergence of 
the welfare state, the distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign 
functions has become obsolete. The court had awarded compensation in 
a number of cases where fundamental rights had been violated.'"*" 
Although most of these cases were decided under the public law domain 
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(under the writ jurisdiction) it would not make any difference lo the 
outcome just because a civil suit for damages or compensation was filed. 
The court affirmed the order of the high court for compensation. 
Under Article 21, the court has held that right to live includes right to 
have all those conditions essential for good living like fresh air, good 
water, etc. The entire environmental jurisprudence has grown out of 
such liberal interpretation of Article 21. In Church of God (Full Gospel) 
in India v. KSR Majestic Colony Welfare Assn.,^"^^ the court was asked to 
decide the validity of issuing directions to control the noise pollution 
where such noise resulted and was connected with the religious service 
and activities. The court held that such directions could be given. It is 
heartening that the court considered rights of human beings to live more 
important than the right of people to make noise in the exercise of their 
religious rituals. Religion is essentially a matter of one's faith and no 
religion really requires practices which are harmful to humanity. It is the 
selfish man who uses religion for oppressing others. A judicious 
balancing of freedom of religion with other fundamental rights is 
absolutely necessary. This decision gives us a hope that the court v\ ould 
strike such a balance between freedom of religion and other fundamental 
rights. 
The fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution 
of India, inter alia, provides that none shall be deprived of his life 
without procedure established by law. Then why should a non-smoker 
be afflicted by various diseases, including cancer of lungs or of heart, 
only because he is required to go to public places? Is it not indirectly 
depriving him of his life without any process of law? The Supreme 
Court considered this important question in Murli S. Deora v. Union of 
India. Answering the above question in the affirmative, the apex court 
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rightly observed that undoubtedly, smoking is injurious to health and 
may affect the health of smokers but there is no reason that the health of 
passive smokers should also be injuriously affected. In any case, there is 
no reason to compel non-smokers to be helpless victims of air 
pollution. "^ ^ 
Reading the gravity of the situation and considering the adverse effects 
of smoking on smokers and passive smokers, the court directed and 
prohibited smoking in public places and issued directions to the Union 
of India, state governments as well as the union territories to take 
effective steps to ensure prohibiting smoking in public places, namely, 
auditoriums, hospital buildings, health institutions, educational 
institutions, libraries, court buildings, public offices and public 
conveyances including railways. 
There is another dreadful disease, i.e., AIDS, and the patients suffering 
from it deserve full sympathy. But it is the power and duty of the state to 
identify HIV infected persons for the purpose of stopping further 
transmission of the virus. In M Vijaya v. Chairman and Managing 
Director, S.C.C. Ltd.,^"^^ the full bench of the Andhra Pradesh High 
Court rightly observed: 
There is an apparent conflict between the right to privacy 
of a person suspected of HIV not to submit himself 
forcibly for medical examination and the power and duty 
of the state to identify HIV infected persons for the 
purpose of stopping further transmission of the virus. In 
the interest of the general public, it is necessary for the 
state to identify HIV positive cases and any action taken 
in that regard cannot be termed as unconstitutional as 
under Article 47 of the Constitution, the state was under 
an obligation to take all steps for the improvement of the 
public health. A law designated to achieve this object, if 
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fair and reasonable, in our opinion, will not be in breach 
of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 
In this case, the petitioner alleged that she was infected with the dreadful 
disease of AIDS on account of negligence on the part of medical and 
paramedical staff of the hospital of the respondent company while 
conducting relevant precautionary blood tests before transfusion of 
blood into her body when she was operated upon at the hospital. The 
court rightly held that the petitioner is entitled to some reasonable 
amount of compensation to meet the costs incurred by her towards 
medical expenses. Accordingly, the court directed the respondent 
company to pay rupees one lakh to petitioner leaving open to the parties 
to seek appropriate remedies before the appropriate civil court for 
damages. The court also issued various directions to the government and 
the company and suggested measures for the control of this dreaded 
disease.'" '^^  
With a view to check rapid deterioration of air quality in Delhi, which 
was becoming a health hazard besides being an environmental enemy, 
certain directions were issued by the Supreme Court to convert the 
entire "city bus fleef to a single fuel mode of CNG by a specific date.'^" 
On behalf of the stage-carriage permit transport operators it was pleaded 
that all their existing buses were meeting emission norms for diesel 
vehicles as prescribed under the Motor Vehicles Act and, therefore, they 
could not be denied their right to ply their buses even if they did not 
conform to the directions issued by the court since they were not heard 
before fixing the time schedule as they were not parties to the writ 
petition. Rejecting this, the Supreme Court rightly observed that the 
order of the court was an order in rem and not an order in personam. 
All these private operators, who were operating their buses in Delhi, 
426 
were bound by the order of the court, which were made to safeguard the 
health of the citizens. Besides, directions given for safeguarding heaUh 
of the people, a right provided and protected by Article 21 of the 
Constitution, would override provisions of every statute including the 
Motor Vehicles Act, if they militate against the constitutional mandate 
of that Article.'^' It is distressing to note that the Delhi Administration 
did not take effective steps to meet the dead line provided by court for 
converting DTC fleet to CNG. In fact, certain reports that appeared in 
the electronic and print media, exhibited defiant attitude on the part of 
Delhi Administration to comply with the orders of the Supreme Court. It 
must be remembered that Article 144 of the Constitution requires all 
civil and judicial authorities to act in aid of the Supreme Court. "^^  
Personal liberty is one of the cherished goals of the Indian Constitution 
and the deprivation of the same can only be in accordance with law and 
in conformity with the provisions thereof, as stipulated under Article 21 
of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has settled the legal position'^^ 
that to have speedy justice is a fundamental right, which flows from 
Article 21 of the Constitution. Despite the clear pronouncements of the 
court on this point, cases involving delay in trial keep coming before the 
court. 
In Mahinder Lai Dasi v. State of Bihar J ^ '^ the sanction for prosecution 
of the appellant in a corruption case was not granted by the government 
despite the expiry of over 13 years after the registration of the FIR. R.P. 
Sethi. J, speaking for the court, rightly observed that "the right to speedy 
trial encompasses all the stages, namely, stage of investigation, enquiry, 
trial, appeal, revision and retrial.'^^ The speedy trial was considered also 
in public interest as it serves the social interest also. The judge rightly 
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pointed out that in cases of corruption the amount involved is not 
material but speedy justice is the mandate of the Constitution bemg in 
the interests of the accused as well as that of the society. Cases relating 
to corruption are to be dealt with swiftly, promptly and without delay. 
Another important aspect of this case is that the judge held that as and 
when delay is found to have been caused during investigation, inquiry or 
trial, the appropriate authorities concerned are under an obligation to 
find out and deal, with the persons responsible for such delay.''''' 
Justice should not only be done but should also appear to have been 
done. Similarly, justice delayed is justice denied, justice withheld is 
justice withdrawn. Once the entire process of participation in the justice 
delivery system is over and the only thing to be done is the 
pronouncment of the judgment, no excuse can be found to further delay 
for adjudication of the right of the parties, particularly when it affects 
any of their rights confered by part-III of the Constitution. In Anil Rai v. 
I en 
State of Bihar, the Supreme Court, in order to preserve and strengthen 
the behef of the people in the institution of judiciary and for the 
attainment of the rule of law, has laid down following guidelines 
regarding the pronouncement of judgments after the conclusion of the 
trial:'^^ 
(i) Criminal court of original jurisdiction, in view of section 353 (1) 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, should pronounce the 
judgment in open court immediately after the conclusion of the 
trial or on some subsequent time which can at the most be 
stretched to a period of six weeks and not beyond that in any case. 
(ii) The pronouncement of judgment in the civil case should not be 
permitted to go beyond two months. 
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Regarding the pronouncement of judgments by the high courts, 
following guidelines were laid down:' 
(i) The Chief Justices of the High Courts may issue appropriate 
directions to the Registry that in a case where the judgment is 
reserved and is pronounced later, a column be added in the 
judgment where, on the first page, after the cause title, date of 
reserving the judgment and date of pronouncing it be separately 
mentioned by the Court Officer concerned. 
(ii) That Chief Jusdces of the High Courts, on their administrative 
side, should direct the Court Officers /Readers of various Benches 
in the High Courts to furnish every month the list of cases in the 
matters where the judgments reserved are not pronounced within 
the period of that month. 
(iii) On noticing that after the conclusion of the arguments the 
judgment is not pronounced within a period of two months, the 
Chief Justice concerned shall draw the attention of the Bench 
concerned to the pending matter. The Chief Justice may also see 
the desirability of circulating the statement of such cases in which 
the judgments have not been pronounced within a period of six 
weeks from the date of conclusion of the arguments amongst the 
judges of the High Court for their infonnation. Such 
communication be conveyed as confidential and in a sealed cover. 
(iv) Where a judgment is not pronounced within three months from 
the date of reserving it, any of the parties in the case is permitted 
to file an application in the High Court with a prayer for early 
judgment. Such applications as and when filed shall be listed 
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before the Bench concerned within two days excluding the 
intervening hoHdays. 
(v) If the judgment for any reason, is not pronounced within a period 
of six months, any of the parties of the said Hst shall be entitled to 
move an application before the Chief Justice of the High Court 
with a prayer to withdraw the said ease and to make it over to any 
other Bench for fresh argument. It is open to the Chief Justice to 
grant the said prayer or to pass any other order as he deems fit in 
the circumstances. 
Thomas J, in his separate concurring judgment flirther supplemented 
that if the chief justice of a high court thinks that more effective 
measures can be evolved by him for cutting down the delay in delivering 
of judgment in that court, it is open to him to do so as a substitute for the 
measures suggested hereinbefore. These are interim measures intended 
to remain only till such time as Parliament would enact measures to deal 
with this problem.'^ *^ 
In R.D. Upadhyay v. State of A.P.,^^^ a lunatic undertrial prisoner was 
languishing in jail for over 30 years and the additional chief 
metropolitan magistrate and the jail authorities took no action to provide 
him medical treatment, which was provided to him only after the high 
court intervened. He also did not have any known relatives. The 
Supreme Court, as an interim measure, directed that a sum of Rs.2 lakhs 
should be paid by the state by way of donation to the Missionaries of 
Charity, where he was accommodated for the time being. The Supreme 
Court rightly expressed the inadequacy of remedy of granting 
compensation by observing: '^ ^ 
Money award cannot, however, renew physical frame 
that has been battered and shattered due to callous 
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before the Bench concerned within two days excluding the 
intervening holidays. 
(v) If the judgment for any reason, is not pronounced within a period 
of six months, any of the parties of the said list shall be entitled to 
move an application before the Chief Justice of the High Court 
with a prayer to withdraw the said ease and to make it over to any 
other Bench for fresh argument. It is open to the Chief Justice to 
grant the said prayer or to pass any other order as he deems fit in 
the circumstances. 
Thomas J, in his separate concurring judgment further supplemented 
that if the chief justice of a high court thinks that more effective 
measures can be evolved by him for cutting down the delay in delivering 
of judgment in that court, it is open to him to do so as a substitute for the 
measures suggested hereinbefore. These are interim measures intended 
to remain only till such time as Parliament would enact measures to deal 
with this problem.'^ *^ 
In R.D. Upadhyay v. State ofA.P.,^''^ a lunatic undertrial prisoner was 
languishing in jail for over 30 years and the additional chief 
metropolitan magistrate and the jail authorities took no action to provide 
him medical treatment, which was provided to him only after the high 
court intervened. He also did not have any known relatives. The 
Supreme Court, as an interim measure, directed that a sum of Rs.2 lakhs 
should be paid by the state by way of donation to the Missionaries of 
Charity, where he was accommodated for the time being. The Supreme 
Court rightly expressed the inadequacy of remedy of gianting 
compensation by observing: '^ ^ 
Money award cannot, however, renew physical frame 
that has been battered and shattered due to callous 
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attitude of others. All that the courts can do in such cases 
is to award such sums of money, which may appear to be 
giving some reasonable compensation assessed with 
moderation, to express the court's condemnation of the 
tortious act committed by the State. 
In Parents Forum for Meaningful Education v. Union of India. ' Anil 
Dev Singh J, speaking for the court rightly observed that imposition of 
corporal punishment on the child is not in consonance with his right to 
life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. The courts have 
construed right to life widely. On a larger canvass right to life includes 
all that which gives meaning to life and makes it wholesome and worth 
living. A child cannot be deprived of his meaningful right to life just 
because he is small. Being small does not make him a less human being 
than a grown up. Article 21 makes no distinction between a grown up 
person and a child. Corporal punishment is not in keeping with child's 
dignity and it is cruel to subject the child to physical violence in school 
in the name of discipline or education."''* The judge further observed:'^"^ 
Child being a precious national resource is to be 
nurtured and attended with tenderness and care and not 
with cruelty. Subjecting the child with corporal 
punishment for reforming him cannot be part of 
education. Any act of violence which traumatizes, 
terrorizes a child, or adversely affects his faculties fall 
foul of Article 21 of the Constitution. 
S.K. Mastan Bee v. General Manager, South Central Railway ^^ ' 
demonstrates the concern of the Supreme Court for the livelihood of a 
helpless, poor and illiterate widow of a petty employee. In this case a 
gangman under the railways died while in service. His widow being 
illiterate, was unaware of her right to family pension and the remedy to 
enforce the same. The Supreme Court held that it was obligatory for the 
railways to compute and pay the family pension payable even without 
her making a claim or initiate litigation. The court further observed that 
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the very denial of pension to her violated Article 21 of the 
Constitution 
The important feature of this case is that despite a single judge of the 
Andhra Pradesh High Court granting her arrears of pension from the 
date of death of her husband in 1969 the division bench restricted it to 
the period subsequent to the date on which the widow had given a legal 
notice to the railways (in the year 1992 in this case). The Supreme Court 
rightly held that the single judge was justified in granting the relief from 
the date when it became due and set aside the impugned order of the 
division bench. It is submitted that the single judge as well as the 
Supreme Court have shown pragmatic approach in this case. 
The Supreme Court in Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan v. Vasant Raghimath 
Dhoble,^^^ has shown deep concern with regard to the alarming increase 
in cases of torture, assault and death in police custody. Pasayat J, 
speaking for the court has tightly pointed out that the vulnerability of 
human rights assumes a traumatic torture when fiinctionaries of the state 
whose paramount duty is to protect the citizen and not to commit 
gruesome offences against them, in reality perpetrate them. He has 
fiirther pointed out that rarely, in cases of police torture or custodial 
death, is there any direct ocular evidence of the complicity of the police 
personnel. It results in miscarriage of justice and makes the justice 
delivery system suspect and vulnerable. In the ultimate analysis society 
suffers and the criminal gets encouraged. Therefore, courts must not lose 
sight of the fact that death in police custody is perhaps one of the worst 
kinds of crimes in a civilized society, governed by the lule of law. 
Torture in custody flouts the basic human rights of citizens recognized 
by the Indian Constitution and is an affront to human dignity. '^ "^  
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The courts must, therefore, deal with such cases in a realistic manner 
and with the sensitivity which they deserve, otherwise the common man 
may tend to gradually lose faith in the efficacy of the system of the 
judiciary itself, which if it happens, will be a sad day for anyone to 
reckon with. '^° The seriousness of the court in dealing with custodial 
crime is evident from the following observations:'^' 
The courts are also required to have a change in their 
outlook, approach, appreciation arid attitude, 
particularly in cases involving custodial crimes and they 
should exhibit more sensitivity and adopt a realistic 
rather than a narrow technical approach, while dealing 
with the cases of custodial crime so that as far as 
possible within their powers, the truth is found and the 
guilty should not escape so that the victim of the crime 
has the satisfaction that ultimately the majesty of law has 
prevailed. 
In the present case a person had died as a result of injuries in the police 
custody and the police officers although they were informed of the 
matter, did not register any FIR. One of the important aspects of this 
case is that the Supreme Court directed that an enquiry be conducted to 
find out as to who was the person responsible for the injuries on the 
body of the deceased. If on further inquiry it appeared that the accused 
had a role to play, it shall be open to the authorities to initiate 
proceedings for action and the same shall be taken notwithstanding the 
order of acquittal of the accused. The court further directed that action 
should also be taken against the officials who did not register the FIR'^^ 
In State of Punjab v. Ramdev Singh'^^ the Supreme Court rightly 
observed that sexual violence apart form being a dehumanizing act is an 
unlawful intrusion on the right to privacy and sanctity of a female. It is a 
crime against basic human rights and is also violative of the victim's 
most cherished of fiindamental rights, namely, the right to life contained 
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in Article 21 of the Constitution. The court are therefore, expected to 
deal with cases of sexual crime against women with utmost sensitivity. 
Such cases need to be dealt with sternly and severely. 
K. Anbazhagan v. Superintendent of police, is another important case, 
on the point of free and fair trial decided by the Supreme Court. In this 
case, Criminal cases were pending against the Chief Minister of 
Tamilnadu and her close relative/ associates. Petitions were filed for the 
transfer of the said cases to another state and alleged that there would be 
likelihood of bias in the conduct of prosecution during the trial and thus 
there would be no fair trail. Allowing the transfer of said cases to the 
State of Karnataka, the Supreme Court observed on the free and fair trial 
in the following words: 
Free and fair trial is sine qua non of Article 21 of the 
Constitution. It is trite law that justice should not only be 
done but it should be seen to have been done. If the 
criminal trial is not free and fair and not free from bias, 
judicial fairness and criminal justice system would be at 
stake shaking the confidence of the public in the system 
and woe would be the rule of law. It is important to note 
that in such a case the question is not whether the 
petitioner is actually biased but the question is whether 
the circumstances are such that there is a reasonable 
apprehension in the mind of the petitioner. 
In ND. Jayal v. Union of India^^^ (popularly known as Tehri Dam case) 
the Supreme Court rightly observed that right to health is a fiindamental 
right under Article 21 of the Constitution. Protection of this right is 
inextricably linked with clean environment. Thus, clean and healthy 
environment itself is a fundamental right.'^^ 
One of the most important aspect of this case is that the Supreme Court 
has not only re-stated various principles of sustainable development but 
also held that the concept of "sustainable development" is to be treated 
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as an integral part of 'life' under Article 21 of the Constitution.'^ Thus, 
right to clean environment and right to development are considered as 
integral parts of human rights covered by Article 21 of the Constitution. 
The court also took note of the ousted and displaced persons from the 
Tehri Dam Area and held that they have a right under Article 21 to lead 
a decent life and earn livelihood m rehabilitated locations. 
In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, the court held: 
The fundamental right of an undertrial prisoner under 
Article 21 of the Constitution is not absolute. His right of 
visitation as also other rights are provided in the Jail 
Manual. The respondent as an undertrial prisoner was 
bound to maintain the internal discipline of the jail. Such 
a fundamental right is circumscribed by the prison 
manual and other relevant status imposing reasonable 
restrictions on such right. The provisions of the Bihar 
Jail Manual or other relevant statutes having not been 
declared unconstitutional, the respondent was bound to 
abide by such statutory rules. 
In re Noise Pollution (V)'^' examined the effects of noise pollution on 
individuals' fundamental rights, particularly in respect of burning 
firecrackers during festivals. Previously, the court had passed interim 
orders in this regard, namely, that: 
1. The Union Government, Union Territories and State 
Governments shall strictly apply the amended Environment 
(Protection) Rules, 1986. In particular, they should conform to the 
amended Rule 89 of Schedule I, which specifies loudness limits 
for firecrackers. 
2. The use of firecrackers will be banned between 10pm and 6am. 
3. Firecrackers shall not be used at any time in silence zones. 
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4. Concerned departments shall take all appropriate steps to educate 
school students about the ill-effects of air and noise pollution and 
apprise them of the aforesaid directions. 
In the present judgment, the court held that a right to a peaceful life free 
of polluting elements was an aspect of the nght to life: " 
Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees life and 
personal liberty to all persons. It is well settled by 
repeated pronouncements of this Court as well as of the 
High Courts that the right to life enshrined in Article 21 
is not of mere survival or existence. It guarantees a right 
of persons to life with human dignity. Therein are 
included, all the aspects of life which go to make a 
person's life meaningful, complete and worth living.... 
Anyone who wishes to live in peace, comfort and quiet 
within his house has a right to prevent noise as pollutant 
reaching him. None can claim a right to create noise 
even in his own premises which would travel beyond his 
precincts and cause nuisance to neighbors or others. Any 
noise which has the effect of materially interfering with 
the ordinary comforts of life judged by the standard of a 
reasonable man is nuisance. How and when a nuisance 
created by noise becomes actionable has to be answered 
by reference to its degree and the surrounding 
circumstances, the place and the time. 
In People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, ' a two-judge 
bench of the Supreme Court addressed an issue that bears on Article 21 
in an indirect but tangible manner. Section 3(2)(d) of the Protection of 
Human Rights Act, 1995 provides for the appointment to the National 
Human Rights Commission (NHRC), inter alia, two members chosen 
from persons having knowledge or practical experience in matters 
relating to human rights. The question before the court was whether this 
covered senior police officers. 
Sabharwal J (as he then was) referred to various international 
agreements, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
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Rights and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 
1966.'^'* Further, he also referred to what are known as the 'Paris 
Principles'; these specify guidelines for, inter alia, the Constitution of 
domestic human rights bodies, and contemplate the involvement of 
government departments only in an advisory capacity. Holdmg that 
'The scheme of the Act is to protect and implement human rights 
including those envisaged in Article 21 of the Constitution and the 
International Covenants', he concluded that under the circumstances the 
appointment of a police officer ran against the very objectives and 
purposes of the Act and held that:'*' 
An individual police officer may be very good but his 
participation in decision-making as a member of the 
Commission is likely to give rise to a reasonable 
apprehension in the minds of the citizens that he may 
subconsciously influence the functioning of the 
Commission. Such reasonable perceptions of the affected 
parties are relevant considerations to ensure the 
continued public confidence in the credibility and 
impartiality in an institution like NHRC 
In Surinder Singh v. State of Punjab, reiterating the law laid down in a 
plethora of earlier decisions on the right to life and personal liberty 
conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution, BP Singh J, speaking for the 
court, held:'^^ 
If a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure 
which is not reasonable, fair, or just, such deprivation 
would be violative of his fundamental right under Article 
21 of the Constitution. It has also been emphasized bv 
this Court that the procedure so prescribed must ensure a 
speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. 
It is conceded that some amount of deprivation of 
personal liberty cannot be avoided, but if the period of 
deprivation pending trial becomes unduly long, the 
fairness assured by Article 21 would receive a jolt. 
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In Directorate of Revenue v. Mohammed Nisar Holia''''^ it was held that 
statutory power to make search and seizure by itself does not offend the 
right of privacy. However, where a statute confers such power to make 
search and seizure at all times, the same may be held ultra vires unless 
restrictions imposed are reasonable. According to the court, a person, if 
he does not break a law would be entitled to enjoy his life and liberty 
which would include the right not to be disturbed and a right to be let 
alone is recognized to be a right which would fall under Article 21. The 
court referred to Sharda v. Dharampal;^"^^ District Registrar and 
Collector, Hyderabad &Anr. v. Canara Bank &.Ors: 
1 Q^ • 
In Election Commission of India v. St. Mary's School, ' it was held that 
education is one of the most important functions of the state and holding 
of election is also of paramount importance but for the said purpose. 
education of children cannot be neglected. A balance, hence, has to be 
maintained between the two. The court directed that the services of 
teachers should not be requisitioned on days on which schools are open. 
The court relied on Election Commission of India v. State Bank of India 
Staff Association Local Head Office Unit, Patna and Others;''^ ^ Mohini 
Join V. State of Kamataka; Unni Krishnan, JP. & Others v. State of 
Andhra Pradesh & Others}"^^ and Brown v. Board of Education.'*^' 
The Court also referred to the Human Rights Conventions which have 
imposed a duty on the contracting states to set up institutions of higher 
education which would lead to the conclusion that the citizens thereof 
should be afforded an effective right of access to them. According to the 
court, in a democratic society, a right to education is indispensable in the 
interpretation of right to development as a human right. The court also 
took notice that the right to development is also considered to be a basic 
human right. 
438 
REFERENCES 
1. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 740. See also Jagannath v. State ofOrissa, A.l.R. 1966 
S.C. 1140. 
2. Id. at 746. 
3. A.l.R. 1966 S.C. 1910. 
4. A.l.R. 1968 S.C. 1509. 
5. A.l.R. 1969 S.C. 1014. 
6. A.l.R. 1974 S.C. 424. 
7. A.l.R. 1974 S.C. 2092. 
8. Id. at 2095-96. 
9. A.l.R. 1975 S.C. 1378. 
10. Kharak Singh v. State ofU.P., A.l.R. 1963 S.C. 1295. 
11. Supra note 9 at 1384. 
12. Id at 1385. 
13. A.l.R. 1976 S.C. 754. 
14. A.l.R. 1977 S.C. 1027. 
15. Id at 1047. 
16. Ibid. 
17. A.l.R. 1978 S.C. 1025. 
18. M a t 1037. 
19. Id. at 1042. 
20. Id at 1039. 
21. A.l.R. 1978 S.C. 597. 
22. SunilBatra v. Delhi Administration, A.l.R. 1978 S.C. 1727. 
23 A.l.R. 1967 S.C. 1836. 
24. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, A.I.R., 1978, S.C. 622. 
25. Id. at 658-59. 
26. A.l.R. 1978 S.C. 1675. 
27. M a t 1733. 
28. M a t 1735. 
29. M. at 1719-20. 
439 
30a. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
59. 
60. 
Ibid. 
A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1514. 
/(i. at 1517. 
Hussainara v. Bihar, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1360. 
Upendra Baxi, ''The Supreme Court under Trial: Undertr 
Supreme Courf, (1980) IS.C.C. 35 (Joum.). 
Supra note 33 at 1361. 
Ibid. 
Id. at 1362. 
A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1369. 
Id. at 1372. 
Ibid. 
A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 470. 
Id at 474. 
Id at 475. 
Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration A.I.R., 1980 S.C. 1535. 
Id. at 1594. 
M a t 1584. 
Ibid. 
Id at 1589. 
Id at 1590. 
M a t 1591. 
A.I.R. 1980 SC 1535. 
M. at 1542. 
A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1983. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 928, 1068. 
M. at 931. 
Ibid. 
Id at 930. 
A.I.R. 1981 SC 1068 at 1074. 
440 
61. A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 746. 
62. A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 710. 
63. Id.^Xlll. 
64. Id. at 726. 
65. Ibid. 
66. Id at 747. 
67. Id at 749. 
68. A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 378. 
69. (1987) 4 s e c 373. 
70. Id at 380. 
71. Ibid. 
72. A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1883. 
73. M a t 1897. 
74. A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 677. 
75. Id at 681. 
76. A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 2039. 
77. A.I.R. 1991 SC 207. 
78. A.I.R. 1992 SC 392. 
79. A.I.R. 1992 J&KI I. 
80. A.I.R. 1992 SC 767. 
81. (1993) I s e c 645. 
82. Id at 732, 733. 
83. Id at 735. 
84. Id at 737. 
85. (1996) 2 s e c 648. 
86. (1994) 3 s e c 394. 
87. Maruti Shripati Dubai v. State of Maharashtra, 1987 Cr Lj 743. 
88. The bench consisted of J.S. Verma, G.N. Ray, N.P. Singh Faizan Uddin and 
G.T.N. Nanavati JJ. 
89. Supra note 85 at 653. 
90. Id. at 660. 
91. Ibid. 
441 
92. 
93. 
94. 
95. 
96. 
97. 
98. 
99. 
100. 
101. 
102. 
103. 
104. 
Id. at 657. 
(1996) 4 s e c 37. 
M a t 44-45. 
Id. at 48. 
Id. at 49. 
(1996)1 s e c 753. 
Id. at 764-66. 
(1996)11 s e c 19. 
(1995) 1 s e c 14. 
Id. at 19-20. 
(1996) 1 s e e 490. 
Id. at 500 (Emphasis supplied). 
(1998) 4 s e e 117. 
105. Surjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (1996); SCC 336; Slate of Punjab v 
Mohinder Singh Chawla, (1997) 2 SCC 83 Vincent v. Union of India (1987) 
2 SCC 165; Kirloskar Bros. Ltd v. ESI Corpn. (1996) 2 SCC 682; Paschiw 
Bengal Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State ofW.B. (1996) 4 SCC 37 and Warvani 
Singh V. State of Punjab, (1996)4 SLR 177 (P&H.). 
106. Supra note 104 at 130 (Emphasis added). 
107. Id. at 132. 
108. (1997)11 SCC 121. 
109. Id. at 127-28. 
110. Id at 130. See also Sate of Maharashtra v Alka B. Hindge (1948) 4 S(T 315 
Wherein the interim order of the High Court directing the collector to 
remove the encroachment by slumdwellers within 72 hours was held to be 
unreasonable action. 
111. M a t 133. 
112. M a t 142-43. 
113. (1998) 7 SCC 507. See also Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of 
Gujarat, (1997) 7 SCC 622; Sunil K. Sinha v. State ofBhiar, (1998) 5 SCC 
607. 
114. M. at 516-17. 
115. M a t 517. 
116. (1997) 2 SCC 642. 
442 
117. Id. at 652-53 see also Watchdog International v. Union of [rdia {\99S) 8 
s e c 8 s e c 338. 
118. (1998) 8 s e c 296. 
119. M a t 303-04. 
120. M a t 307. 
121. M. at 309-10 (emphasis added). 
122. (1997) 8 s e c 191. 
123. Id at 245. see also Charan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1997) I SCC 151 and 
Air India Statutory Corporation v. United Labour Union, A.I.R. 1997 SC 
645 at 674. 
124. (1998) 7 s e e 392. 
125. Mat 412. 
126. M. at 409-10. 
127. M. at 410-13. 
128. A.I.R. 1998 P&H 1. 
129. (1999)6 s e e 667. 
130. Common Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of India, (1996) 6 SCC 593. 
131. Supra note 129 at 750-51. 
132. Id at 751 (Emphasis Added). 
133. (1999) SCC (Cri) 577. 
134. A.I.R. 1999 Ker 385. 
135. Id at 391. 
136. Id at 398 (Emphasis Added). 
137. Sahil Society for Welfare of the Aged Poor and Homeless v. Union of India. 
A.I.R. 1999 All 87. 
138. A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 2083. 
139. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1039. 
140. Supra note 24 at 597. 
141. Nilabati Behara v. State ofOrissa, A.I.R. 1993 SC I960. 
142. S.P. Sathe, Administrative Law. S.A. Venkatraman v. Union of India, yV.I.R. 
1954 S.C. 442. 
143. (2000) 7 s e e 282. 
144. (2001) 8 SCC 765. 
443 
145. Id. at 166-61. See also K. Ramakrishanan v. State of Kerala, A.l.R. 1999 
Kerala, A.l.R. 385; and Shankarbhai H Patel v. Union of India, A.l.R. 2000 
Guj 1. In the latter case the imposition of ban on sale, of bidi-cigarettes on 
trains and platforms was upheld by the court. 
146. M a t 768. 
147. A.l.R. 2001 AP 502 (FB). 
148. Id at 513-514, See also Mr. 'X' v. Hospital 'Z\ (1998) 8 SCC 296. 
149. Id. at 519. See also Haripadda Saha v. State ofTripiira, A.l.R. 2001 NOC 24 
Gau. In this ease the petitioners lost their eyes due to post operative 
infection. The government was directed to pay Rs.60,000/- as compensation 
and Rs.2000/- as cost of litigation to each of the petitioner. 
150. M. C.Mehta v. Union of India. (2001) 3 SCC 756. See also M. C.Mehta v. 
Union of India, (1998) 6 SCC 63; (2001) 3 SCC 763 and (2001) 3 SCC 
767and(2001)3SCC768. 
151. Id at 159. 
152. See M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (2001) 3 SCC 763 at 766. 
153. See Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S.Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; Common 
Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of India, (1996) 4 SCC 33; and (1996l 
6 SCC 775 and Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar, (1998) 7 SCC. 507 
154. (2001)1 SCC 149. 
155. M a t 152. 
156. Ibid. 
157. (2001) 7 SCC 318. 
158. M a t 330. 
159. M. at 331. 
160. M. at 345. 
161. (2001) I SCC 437. 
162. M. at 439. 
163. A.l.R. 2001 Del 212. 
164. M a t 217. 
165. M. at 218. 
166. (2003) 1 SCC 184. 
167. Id at 186-87. 
168. (2003) 7 SCC 749. 
169. M. at 757-58. 
444 
170. M a t 758. 
171. Ibid. 
172. Ibid. 
173. (2004) 1 s e c 421 at 424. See also Radha v. State ofU.P., A.I.R. 2004 NOC 
19 (All). In this case it was held that even prostitutes are also entitled to live 
a life of dignity. 
174. (2004) 3 s e c 767. 
175. (2004) 9 s e e 362. 
176. Id. at 393. See also M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (2004) 6 SeC 588 at 613-
14. 
177. Supra note 175 at 382. 
178. Id. at 417 (per Dharmadhikari J). 
179. (2005) 3 s e e 284. 
180. /J. at 292. 
181. (2005) 5 s e e 733. 
182. Id at 114-15. 
183. (2005) 2 s e e 436. 
184. /c/. at 444-45. 
185. W. at 446-47. 
186. M at 449-50. 
187. (2005) 7 s e e 387. 
188. W. at 390. 
189. (2007) 13SeALE744. 
190. (2003) 4. s e e 493. 
191. (2005) 1 s e e 496. 
192. (2007)13SeALE777. 
193. (1995)Supp2See 13. 
194. (1992) 3 s e e 666. 
195. (1993)1 s e e 645. 
196. 347 US 483 (1954). 
445 
CHAPlER-3 
MINORITY RIGHTS: 
Case Law based on: Article-29 and 
Article-30 of the Constitution 
The United Nations Declaration 1992 on the Rights of Minorities stated: 
"States shall protect the existence of the national or 
ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of 
minorities within their respective territories and shall 
encourage conditions for promotion of that identity. " 
For carrying out this mandate, the 1992 Declaration asked all the 
nations to take measures "to ensure that person belonging to minorities 
may exercise fully and effectively all their human rights and 
fundamental freedoms without any discrimination and in full equality 
before the law." 
So as it stands, today" minority rights" are enjoying a social status along 
with the human rights in general. Though in the beginning the United 
Nations did not offer very clear cut mandate for the protection of 
minorities, it created an instrument in the very beginning of its own 
inception in 1947, a Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities to look after the needs of minorities. 
The United Nations .made it absolutely clear that Rights of Minorities 
constitute an internationally accepted, legally recognized, logically 
sound, jurisprudently tenable and morally justified social norm. So 
violadon of the Rights of Minorities is a violation of internationally 
accepted legal, Jurisprudential, moral and social Code of the modern 
world. 
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Our country which has been always muhi-religious, multi linguistic, 
multi-cultural and multi-racial in nature had no objection to accept this 
reality right from the time of country's Independence. This is the reason 
our Constitution has accepted fully the principles of unity in 'diversity' 
or 'pluralism in togetherness. 
Our Constitution has already taken care much of what the United 
Nations Declaration, on the Right of Persons Belonging in National, or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, spelled out in detail. They 
are incorporated in Part III of the Constitution dealing with the 
fundamental rights of citizens. This part contains the specific rigiits of 
the Minorities in India. 
There are two different kinds of specific rights considered as 
fundamental rights of the minorities in India. The first such right is open 
to all the citizens who from minorities in different parts of the country. 
Their rights against injustice and cultural rights are protected in Article 
29, which states: 
(1) "Any section of the citizens residing in the territoiy of 
India or any part thereof, having distinct language, script 
or culture of its own shall have the right to consei-ve ihe 
same. 
(2) No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational 
institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of 
state funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, 
language or any of them." 
The next comes the specific right given to linguistic and religious 
minorities in the area of education under Article 30. II States: 
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(1) "All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shal 1 
have the, right to establish and administer educational 
institutions of their choice. 
(2) The State shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, 
discriminate against any educational institution on the 
ground that it is under the management of a minority, 
whether based on religion or language." 
The judicial decisions pertaining to Minority Rights are as under: 
In Azeez Basha v. Union of India,^ the validity of the Aligarh Muslim 
University (Amendment) Act, 1951 and the Aligarh Muslim University 
(Amendment) Act, 1965 was challenged. The contention of the 
petitioners was that the impugned Acts violated the rights guaranteed to 
them by article 30(1) of the Constitution. These Acts deprived the 
Muslim minority of the right to administer the Aligarh University which 
it was administering since its inception. 
In this case although initial efforts for its establishment were made by 
the Muslims, the actual establishment was made by an Act of the 
legislature. It was, therefore, established by the State and not b> the 
minority. Although it was set up for the promotion of oriental and 
Islamic-studies in Muslim theology and religion it was never 
contemplated to be a parochial institution. The bulk of the 
administrative power was no doubt in the hands of the Muslims. But this 
in itself hardly supported the conclusion that the institution was 
administered by the Muslim minority. However, even assuming that the 
institution was administered by the Muslim minority, the Court held that 
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since it was not established by the Muslim minority, the latter could not 
claim the right to administer it under article 30(1). 
In W. Proost v. State of Bihar,^ constitutes an important judicial 
pronouncement on article 30 by the, Supreme Court. The St. Xavier 
College, affiliated to the Patna University, had been established by the 
Jesuits of Ranchi. The Bihar legislature passed an Act establishing a 
university commission. Appointments, dismissals, removals, termination 
of service or reduction in rank of teachers of affiliated colleges were to 
be made by the governing body of the college concerned on the 
recommendation of the commission, subject to the approval of the 
university. For appointment of teachers, the commission was to suggest 
two names for every post and the governing body of the college was to 
select one of those. In no case could a college appoint a person outside 
the names recommended by the commission. As the college in question 
made some appointments by-passing the commission's 
recommendations, the university decided to withdraw its affiliation. The 
college challenged this under articles 29 and 30 on the ground that it 
was a college founded by a religious minority, and so the minority 
concerned had a right to administer the same as stipulated by article 30. 
The government's argument was that article 30 would protect only such 
institutions as were established to conserve "language, script or culture" 
of the minority as envisaged in article 29. The Supreme Court rejected 
the government's contention and upheld the view of the Christian 
minority. The Court refused to cut down the width of article 30( 1) by 
introducing in it considerations on which article 29 (1) was based. 
In State of Kerala v. Mother provincial^ the Court struck down certain 
provisions of the Kerala University Act, 1967 as, being ultra vims. The 
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Act imposed a number of curbs on private colleges. Chief Justice 
Hindayatullah observed that the founders had no say in the selection of 
the members of the governing council except those nominated by them. 
The administration of an institution "goes to a distinct body which is in 
no way answerable to" the founders."^ The minorities were, therefore, 
clearly deprived of their right to administer the institutions which they 
had "established". The Court held that the Act clearly violated article 30 
(1). The Chief Justice observed: 
"The claim of the majority community institutions to 
equality with minority institutions in the matters of 
establishment and administration of their institutions 
leads to the consideration wherethere the equality clause 
can at all give protection when the Constitution itself 
classifies the minority communities into a separate entity 
for special protection which is denied to the majority 
community . 
In St. Xaviers College v. State of Gujarat^ deal with important issues, 
which called for a review of the whole corpus of the decisional law on 
the Minority rights contained in Articles 29(1) and 30(1) of the 
Constitution. The approach of Beg, J. to the minority rights may be 
stated in his own words:^ 
The essence of the right guaranteed by article 30(1) of 
the Constitution is a free exercise of their choice by 
minority institutions of the pattern of education as well as 
of administration of their educational institutions. Both 
these, taken together, determine the kind or character of 
an educational institution which a minority has the right 
to choose, where these patterns are accepted voluntarily 
by a minority institution itself, even though the object 
may be to secure certain advantages for itself from their 
acceptance, the requirement to observe these patterns 
would not be a real violation of rights protected by 
article 30 (I). 
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The following observation is very clear and revealing: 
All that happens is that the statute exacts a price in 
general interest for conferring its benefits. It is open to 
the minority institution concerned to free itself from any-
statutory control or fetters if freedom from them is 
considered to be essential for the full exercise of its 
fundamental rights under article 30 (J) of the 
Constitution. 
In G.F. Shahjahanpur v. Agra University, Krishna Iyer J., who spoke 
for himself and Gupta J., that the tone and temper, the efficiency, 
reputation and discipline of an institution depended on the principal and 
the teachers. He then said: 
The right to determine to composition of the body "is the 
very essence of the right to administer guaranteed to the 
religious or linguistic minority. " 
He clearly said: 
The Principle, as I said, is that the minority community 
has the exclusive right to vest the administration of the 
college in a body of its own choice, and any compulsion 
from an outside authority to include any other person in 
that body is an abridgement of its fundamental right to 
administer the educational institution. 
In Bashir Ahmed v. State of West Bengal the court said that creation of 
an education fund under section 27 of west Bengal wakf Act, 1934 for 
the exclusive benefit of the Muslim boys and girls did not amount to 
levy of tax for the promotion of a particular religion, which was 
prohibited in article 27, it did not also amount to maintenance of that 
religion. 
The Supreme Court handed down an important judgment in Rev. 
Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh^^ on the right to propagate 
religion enshrined in article 25. 
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The Supreme Court, speaking through Ray C.J., agreed with the Madhya 
Pradesh High Court and reversed the Orissa High Court on both these 
issues. The opinion of the Supreme Court on the scope of the right to 
propagate religion merits notice. 
The court read into article 25 the dictionary meaning of propagate and 
held that the right to propagate religion did not include the right to 
convert another person to one's religion. This finding was supported by 
the following reasons: 
It has to be remembered that Article 25(1) guarantees 
"freedom of conscience " to every citizen, and not merely 
to the followers of one particular religion, and that, in 
turn, postulates that there is no fundamental right to 
convert another person to one's own religion because if a 
person purposely undertakes the conversion of another 
person to his religion, as distinguished from his effort to 
transmit or spread the tenets of his religion, that would 
impinge on "the freedom of conscience" guaranteed to 
all the citizens...alike. 
The court, therefore, held that the right in article 25 was limited to 
propagation of religion for the edification of other. This implies that the 
state is free to prohibit propagation of religion for the conversion of 
others even if this propagation is peaceful and proper. 
In All Saints High School v. Government ofAndhra Pradesh, '^  Fazal Ali 
J. carefiilly surveyed the decisional law on minority rights and extracted 
from it the following propositions. 
(i) Conferment of a right on a minority to administer a minority 
educational institution is in consonance with the secular nature 
of our democracy and direcdve principles. 
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(ii) Although, unlike article 19, article 30 (1) guarantees absolute 
rights, a minority has no right to maladminister its institution. 
(iii) Although the state has no power to interfere in the internal 
management of the minority institution, it has power to take 
regulatory measures to ensure the excellence of the institution 
and to issue guidelines to guarantee security of service to the 
teachers. 
(iv) The state cannot, however, destroy the right to administer or 
render it illusory. 
(v) Affiliation, though not provided for in article 30, cannot be 
denied to a minority institution without sufficient reasons. 
(vi) Introduction of an outsider into the governing body of the 
minority institution to conduct its affairs destroys the right to 
administer in article 30 (1). Though there may be no objection 
to introduction of high authorities like vice-chancellor or his 
nominee in the administration, especially that part of it which 
deals with conditions of service of teachers, still they must not 
be thrust on the management so as to have a controlling voice 
in the matter. 
Chandrachud C.J. identified the following principles from tlie high 
visibility cases: 
(i) Restrictions by way of regulation for ensuring excellent 
educational standards are valid. Insistence on appointment of 
competent and qualified teachers and regulations relating to 
their emoluments and other benefits and safeguards to be 
453 
observed before their termination of service or removal or 
dismissal from service are all permissible as they pertain to 
educational standards. 
(ii) Right to administer does not include right to maladminister. 
(iii) The minority rights are subject to reasonable restrictions in the 
interest of efficiency of instruction, discipline, health, 
sanitation, morality, public order and the like. 
(iv) Standards of education are not a part of management as such. 
And no minority institution can be expected to fall belou the 
standards expected of an educational institution. 
(v) Minority institutions, receiving aid from the state, cannot 
complain against conditions for granting aid if they do not 
discriminate against them on the ground of language or 
religion or deprive them of their right in article 30 (1). 
(vi) Though a minority institution has no right to recognition, it is 
entitled to recognition so long as it accepts conditions of 
recognition directed towards excellence of the institution and 
not destructive of minority rights. 
The Chief Justice said that though the minority institution should have 
disciplinary control over indisciplined teachers, no institution can be 
given the right to hire and fire a teacher.'^ 
In C. Samuel v. Dist. Educational Officer,^'' the Andhra Pradesh High 
Court held that article 30 was a right given to the minority as such and 
not to any individual member or members of the minority and that right 
was meant to benefit the minority by protecting and promoting its 
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interest. An educational institution established by members of a minority 
community does not by itself become a minority institution. There must 
be a nexus between the institution and the minority community in order 
to make it a minority institution for the purpose of article 30. 
He further stressed that the courts do not exist only for the rich and well 
to do but also for the poor, the down-trodden and the have-nots. It was 
only the moneyed who had, so far, the golden key to unlock the doors of 
justice. Now for the first time the doors of the courts were being thrown 
open to the poor and the downtrodden. 
The Bombay High court held in K.A. Hamid v. Moh. Haji Saboo Siddik 
Polytechnic that the right of the minorities under article 30(1) was not 
subject to any reasonable restrictions and, therefore, held that a 
restriction prescribing that a certain percentage of students belonging to 
the SCs or STs had to be admitted even by the non-government 
polytechnics could not be made applicable to the minority institutions. 
In Sheela Barse v. Secretary, Children Aid Society grievance was 
made of the working of the new observation home located at Mankhurd, 
which was maintained and managed by the children's Aid Society 
(CAS). The Court speaking through Bhagwati CJ observed."" 
We are not inclined to agree with the contention 
advanced by the appellant that for employment in 
children's home, children would be given remuneration. 
The court directed the government of Maharashtra to "strictly enforce 
the law, act up to the requirements of the constitutional obligations and 
proceed to implement the directions given by the High Court." 
. ^ 
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c)£> 
In Sheela Barse v. Union of India^' the Court observed." We are both 
concerned and surprised that a direction given by the apex court has not 
been properly carried out by the District Judges who are an effective 
instrumentality in the hierarchy of the judicial system. Failure to submit 
the report within the time set by the Court has required adjournment of 
the hearing of the writ petition on more than one occasion. We are 
equally surprised that the High Courts have remained aloof and 
indifferent and have never endeavored to ensure submission of the 
reports. 
The court strongly recommended that the states should take ste}")s to 
bring into force the children's Acts if they had already enacted one and 
to enact one if they had not so far enacted any. The court also directed 
that the district judges should visit the jails once in two months and 
particularly take care about child prisoners both convicts as we] I as 
under trials. The Court also pointed out that it was an obligation of the 
High Courts to ensure that all persons in judicial custody within their 
jurisdiction were assured of acceptable living conditions. 
The Court admired the pains taken by the petitioner for gathering 
relevant information in this regard. It recommended that the petitioner 
should be given access to information and should be permitted to visit 
jails, children's homes, remand homes, observation homes, borstal 
schools and all institutions connected with the housing of the delinquent 
children. The court pointed out that this was not an adversary litigation 
and the petitioner need not be looked upon as an adversary. She had in 
fact volunteered to do what the state should have done. 
In Upendra Baxi v. U.P" the Supreme Court entertained a letter from 
two legal academics as a writ petition which complained of the bad 
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living condition of inmates of Agra Protective Home. According to the 
petitioners, the conditions in which the girls lived in the government 
protective home at Agra were abominable and amounted to denial of 
their right to live with dignity. The court had issued various directions to 
improve the living conditions of those inmates. 
In Frank Anthony P.S.E. Association v. India^^, it was held that the 
regulatory measures designed toward making the minority educational 
institutions effective instruments for imparting education could not be 
considered to be impinging upon the right of the minorities to establish 
and administer educational institutions of their guaranteed by aiticle 
30(1). The court upheld section 10 of the Delhi schools education Act, 
1975, which required that the scales of pay and allowances etc. of 
employees of recognized schools shall not be less than those ot the 
employees of schools run by the government or semi-government 
bodies. Section 8(3) which provided for an appeal to a tribunal against 
the decision of the management of dismiss, remove or otherwise 
terminate the service of employees was also upheld. Section 8 (4) which 
required prior approval of the Direction of Education for the suspension 
of an employee was held valid. However, Section 8(1) which required 
prior approval of the director for the dismissal, removal or reduction in 
rank or termination of service of an employee was held to be violative of 
Article 30(1). The court upheld the contention of the petitioners and 
thereby admitted that the right guaranteed by article 30(1) could not be 
absolute and that it could be subjected to higher considerations of 
education. Education could not be good unless teachers were paid well 
and a minority educational institution could not impart good education if 
it did not pay to its teachers what their counterparts obtained in other 
institutions. This is a major departure from the position the court took on 
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Article 30(1) in the past. The court has now made that right not only 
subject to the interests of the minorities but also to the interests of 
education. 
7 i The threshold question in the Vellore Medical College" is whether the 
famous college and the famous hospital at Vellore are industries. The 
respondent's plea that sections 9(a), 10, 11-A, 12 and 33 violated 
minority rights might have been inspired by a very long line of Supreme 
Court decisions, deviating from the advisory opinion in Kerala 
Education Bill,'^ to maintain that subjection of a minority institution's 
disciplinary action against its teachers to state control or supervision was 
violative of the right to administer in article 30(1). 
Venkataramiah J (as he then was) found that Ray CJ, and Mathew J had 
held in St. Xaviers'^ that regulations serving the interest of the students 
and the teachers, tax measures, economic regulations, social welfare 
legislation, wages and hour legislation and the like, imposing a similar 
burden on minority as well as other institutions, were valid under article 
30(1). He then held:-^ 
The conditions of service of workmen in all institutions, 
including minority education institutions, have to be 
protected in the interest of the entire society and any 
unfair labour practice such a hiring and firing, 
termination or retrenchment of the service of a workman 
on irrational grounds will have to be checked. 
After an analysis of the procedure for settlement of disputes under ID 
Act the court held that the law was not enacted with the object of 
interfering with the minority rights. Applying the proposition of Mathew 
J that the minority rights were subject to the general law of the land, the 
court held that the challenged law dealing with prevention and 
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settlement of industrial disputes could not be construed as a law which 
directly interferes with the right of administration of the minority. 
In Andhra Kesari Educational Society v. A.P. The decision of Reddy J 
29 on the fundamental issue raised in this case any be noted first: 
When the society was formed and was given permission 
to establish a college of education, it was not and it never 
claimed to be minority educational institution. Only after 
obtaining the permission, and when the question of 
admission of students to the institution arose, did it claim 
the said status for the first time with a view to enable it to 
admit students of its own choice. 
Following the full Bench Decision in Hassan AH Khan v. Director of 
Higher Education^'^ Reddy J said that a recognized and aided minority 
college is state. And, as state it is bound by all the fundamental rights. 
In St. Stephen's College v. University of Delhi ' St. Stephen's College 
was a minority established and administered college and it had its own 
admission procedures. The University of Delhi to which St. Stephen's 
College was affiliated issued circulars regulating the admission 
procedures. The circular required the colleges affiliated to it to give 
admission strictly according to merit. St. Stephen's College was alleged 
to have been not acting in accordance with the above circular. A student 
had filed a writ petition in the Delhi High Court and the court had issued 
an order staying the announcement of the admissions by the college 
until the disposal of the writ petition. St. Stephen's College, thereafter, 
filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court under Article 32. The college 
contended that the university circular violated its fundamental right 
guaranteed under Article 30. 
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Jaganmohan Shetty J, on behalf of Kania J (as he then was), 1 atima 
Beevi and Yogeshwar Dayal JJ, and himself held that the minority 
educational institutions were entitled to prefer their community 
candidates to maintain the minority character of the institutions. The 
state might regulate the intake in this category with due regard to the 
needs of the community in the area which the institution was intended to 
serve. However, the court cautioned that "in no case such intake shall 
exceed 50 per cent of the annual admission." The mmority institutions 
shall make available at least 50 per cent of the annual admission to 
members of communities other than the minority community. Kasliwal 
J, dissenting, however, held that the right conferred on the minorities to 
establish and administer educational institutions under Article 30{ 1) was 
not absolute and was subject to reasonable regulations. If a minority had 
established and administered an educational institution without 
receiving any aid out of state funds, clause (2) of Article 29 would not 
come into play. However, if such educational institution received aid out 
of state funds, it would be subject to the rigour of clause (2) of Article 
29 and it could not deny admission on the ground of religion, race, caste, 
language or any of them the judge said:^^ 
The controversy involved in the cases in hand before us 
is between clause (2) of Article 29 and clause (I) of 
Article 30. The framers of the Constitution were fully 
knowing about the necessity of granting protection of 
interests of minorities but at the same time they wanted 
that if any educational institutions are run by receiving 
aid out of state funds then no citizen could be denied 
admission on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, 
language or any of them. The rights conferred on the 
minorities under Article 29 (1) or Article 30 (I) are 
enabling ones while clause (2) of Article 29 is a 
mandate...The right guaranteed under Article 29(2) is a 
special right which would prevail over the general right 
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guaranteed to the minorities under Article 50(1). It is a 
well known ride of construction that special law prevails 
over the general law... if the contention raised on behalf 
of the College is accepted then it would necessarily 
involve the importation of the words 'for their 
community" in Article 30(1). Clause (2) of Article 29 
does not make any exception to any educational 
institution established by the minorities and it clearly 
provides in unmistakable terms that it applies to any 
educational institution maintained by the State or 
receiving aid out of Stat funds whether run by a minority 
or majority. 
The Supreme Court held in Shahai H. Masaliar v. Kerala" that in a 
minority educational institution, which is a professional college, 50 
percent of the seats would be filled in by the government and the 
remaining 50 percent be filled in by the management of the Institute by 
admitdng candidates belonging to the particular religious or linguistic 
minority, to which that institution belongs, strictly on the basis of inter 
se merit. Out of the respective quotas of government and management 
seats, half would be 'free seats and the other half would be "payment 
seats'. Out of the payment seats, 5 percent of the seats would be filled in 
by the management from among NRI candidates. The court gave various 
other directions. It is submitted that there is absolutely no justification 
for reading Article 30(1) as autonomous and free of the control of other 
fundamental rights such as the right to equality in respect of control of 
other fundamental rights such as the right to equality in respect of 
admission to educational institudons given by Article 29(2). Article 30 
does not begin with a non-obstante clause. Wherever the Constitution 
required the subordination of one fundamental right to others or any 
other right, it has expressly said so. For example. Article 25 says that it 
is "subject to...other provisions of this Part." Where no such provision 
exists, the provisions must be construed harmoniously and the 
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harmonious construction of articles 29(2) and 30(1) would doubtless 
mean that the minorities have a right to establish and administer 
educational institutions of their choice but no one can be denied 
admission to such an institution on the ground of religion, race, caste, 
language or any of them. 
The creation of linguistic states was aimed at promoting the 
development of regional languages and facilitating access to people to 
knowledge as well as administration. Giving priority to the regional 
language in education is, therefore, a legitimate follow-up of the 
creation of a linguistic state. Kamatka made Kannada the nieaium of 
instruction in schools from 1 to 4 standards. Even the non-Kannada 
schools in the state were required to teach Kannada from standard 1 and 
at the secondary level, it was to be the first language. This was 
challenged in English Medium Students' Parents Association v. 
Kamataka on the ground that it violated the right of the minorities to 
establish and administer educational institutions of their choice 
guaranteed by article 30(1) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held 
that the above three-language formula of the Kamataka Government did 
not violate the right of the minorities. 
The right to freely administer educational institutions by minorities as 
provided for under Article 30 (1) does not permit the minorities to 
indulge in commercialization of education in the garb of this 
constitutional protection. If the government on the facts of each minority 
institution is able to show that these institutions are indulging in 
commercialization of education and maladministering the educational 
institutions, the government can issue order to regulate this evil and it 
would not be unconstitutional.^^ For example, the private recognized 
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unaided schools can generate higher revenue by levying higher fees and 
other charges but in the garb of that power they cannot le\y 
unreasonable and exorbitant amount towards fees and other charges. 
This can be regulated by the government to prevent commercialization 
and exploitation by private recognized unaided schools.' 
T O 
In All Kerala V.R. Schools Parents' Association v. Kerala, it was held 
that the protection given under Article 30 could not be availed if the 
institution was run by an individual merely because he belonged to a 
minority community. Such an institution would not come within the 
category of an institution established and administered by a minority 
within the meaning of Article 30 of the Constitution. 
In T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State ofKarnataka; eleven judge bench of 
the Supreme Court has considered the scope of the minority's right to 
establish and administer educational institutions of their own choice. 
When the hearing in the case of T.M.A. Pai commenced before the 
eleven judge bench on 3.4.2002, the court formulated 11 quesiions to 
cover the entire field. It may be mentioned that this eleven-judge bench 
has dealt with not only the rights of and permissible restrictions upon 
minority institutions, both aided and unaided, but as well as with rights 
in general of non-minorities to establish and administer educational 
institutions, both aided and unaided. The Supreme Court after re\'iewing 
the whole case law relating to the right of the minorities to establish and 
administer educational institutions of their own choice. The right to 
establish and administer educational institutions is guaranteed under the 
Constitution to all citizens under articles 19(l){g) and 26, and to 
minorities specifically under article 30. All citizens have a right to 
establish and administer educational institutions under articles 19(l)(g) 
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and26, but this right is subject to the provisions of articles 19(6) and 
26(a).However, minority in the manner as discussed in this judgment/" 
It would always be permissible to frame regulations so long as ihey do 
not restrict the right of administration of the minority community but 
facilitate and ensure better and effective exercise of that right for the 
benefit of the institution. But such a regulatory provision will cease to 
be a regulation where the power conferred upon the appropriate 
authority is uncanalyzed or unreasonable and unguided and does not 
indicate any guidelines under which the authority could exercise the said 
power. In such a case, the conferment of a blanket power on the 
educational authority would interfere with right of control of the 
employer minority institution in the matter of exercising disciplinary 
control over the employees of the institution. Accordingly, section 
169(3) (a) of the UP Intermediate Education Act, which conferred 
uncanalyzed power for approval or disapproval of termination order 
passed by the management and derogated from the management their 
power of disciplinary control over its employees, it was held not 
applicable to minority institutions."*' 
In Isha Mehta v. State of Maharashtra, the petition stemmed from a 
policy decision made by the Maharashtra State Government v* hereby 
study of Marathi language was made compulsory throughout the schools 
in that state. Consequently, the English-medium schools run by (lujarati 
linguistic minorities were compelled to teach four languages as against 
the accepted "three language formula". 
The Supreme Court held that the right of minorities to establish and 
administer educational institutions of "their choice" under Article 30(1) 
read with Article 29(1) of the Constitution would include the right to 
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have choice of medium of instruction. It is difficult to read Articles 29 
and 30 in such a way that they contain the negative right to exclude the 
learning of regional language. But this exercise of "choice" of 
instructive language in schools by the linguistic minorities is subject to 
the reasonable regulation imposed by the state concerned. Ihus, a 
particular state can validly take a policy decision to compulsorily teach 
its regional language. In other words, the state can impose reasonable 
regulation on institutions covered by Article 30 for protecting the larger 
interest of the state and the nation."*^  
Bal Patil v. Union of India!^^ related to the question whether the Jain 
community could be conferred with the 'minority' status. Rejecting this, 
the court, speaking through Dharmadhikari J traced the historical 
development of the conferment of minority status. It pointed out that the 
partition-related bloodshed led to considerable fear among minorities. 
particularly Muslims, which needed to be allayed:"*^  
It is with the above aim in view that the framer of the 
Constitution engrafted group of (sic) Articles 25 to 30 in 
the Constitution of India. The minorities initially 
recognized were based on religion and on a national 
level e.g. Muslims, Christians, Anglo-Indians and Parsis. 
The court held that the framers of the Constitution did not intend to 
expand this list of minorities."*^ Stating that Hinduism constituted a vast 
amalgamation of beliefs and group identities (based on both beliefs and 
caste), it also pointed out that if minority status were conferred on one 
such entity such as Jainism, others would demand similar status."*^ 
Bodies like Minorities Commission should work towards conditions 
where shielding or protecting minorities becomes unnecessary."*^ 
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In Secretary, Malankara Syrian catholic College v. T. Jose , the 
Supreme Court examined the right of the, minority educational 
institutions to have a person of its choice as principal in the context of 
the Kerala University Act, 1974. The freedom to choose the person to be 
appointed as principal has always been recognized as a vital facet of the 
right to administer the educational institution. This has not been, in any 
way, diluted or altered by TMA Pai. Having regard to the key role 
played by the principal in the management and administration of the 
educational institution, there can be no doubt that the right to choose the 
principal is an important part of the right of administration and even if 
the institution is aided, there can be no interference with the said right. 
The fact that the post of the principal headmaster is also covered by state 
aid, will make no difference. 
The Supreme Court while setting aside a judgment of the Kerala High 
Court demonstrated that the interpretation of minority rights by the 11 
judge bench decision in TMA Pai Foundation has not changed the 
prerogative right of the minority management to appoint a principal of 
their choice even in an aided educational institution. In spite of all the 
previous declarations by the Supreme Court, the controversy arose since 
there were some observations in the T.MA. Pai decision by the eleven 
judge bench regarding the lesser autonomy of minority institutions 
which receives governmental aid. Now the court has clarified that those 
observations in that case cannot mean to take away the right to select 
and appoint the principal of their choice even in aided institutions. 
While ruling so the Supreme Court also examined what are the 
additional controls the government or university can excise in view of 
the grant of aid to minority institutions. 
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CHAPlER-4 
RIGHT TO CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES: 
Case Law based on: Article-32 of the Constitution 
In case of violation of Fundamental Rights, there is a constitutional right 
to move the Supreme Court for Appropriate remedies which can issue 
writs for the enforcement of the rights (Article 32). Under Article 226, a 
High Court can issue writs also for the redress of any other injury or 
illegality owing to the contravention of the ordinary laws. There are 
various forms of writs. 
i) Habeas Corpus 
ii) Mandamus 
iii) Prohibition 
iv) Certiorari 
v) Quo Warranto 
Article 32 empowers the Supreme Court to issue directions or orders or 
writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights. While it is 
the duty of the Supreme Court to enforce fundamental rights, it is also 
the duty of the court to ensure that this weapon under Article 32 should 
not be misused or permitted to be misused creating a bottleneck in the 
superior court preventing other genuine violation of fundamental rights 
being considered by that court. It has been observed that the jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is quite often 
invoked by filing public interest litigation (PIL). The judicial decisions 
pertaining to Right to constitutional remedies are as under; 
In D.G. Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra,^ Bhagwati and Krishna Iyer J. 
Displayed concern for the programmes of planned development aimed 
at eradication of poverty. Krishna Iyer J. said: 
469 
Our Constitution is a tryst with destiny, preambled with 
hicent solemnity in the worlds "Justice - social, 
economic and political.' The three great branches of 
Government, as creatures of the Constitution, must 
remember this promise in their functional role and forget 
it at their peril, for to do so will be a betrayal of those 
high values and goals which the nation set for itself in its 
objectives resolution and whose elaborate summation is 
in Part IV of the paramount parchment. 
He was fully alive to the plight and the problem of the underdog, 
especially the Man with the Hoe. He said: 
The history of our country's struggle for independence 
was the story of a battle between the forces of socio-
economic exploitation and the masses of deprived people 
of varying degrees and the Constitution sets the new 
sights of the nation.... We must realize the vital role in 
Indian economic independence that the land question 
plays before approaching the constitutional issues urged 
before us. The caste system and religious bigotry seek 
sanctuary in the land system. Social status syndrome, 
resisting the egalitarian recipe of the Constitution, is the 
result of the hierarchical agrarian organization.' 
People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India while dealing 
with a writ petition brought by way of public interest litigation in order 
to ensure the observance of various labour laws in relation to workmen 
employed in the construction works of various projects connected with 
the Asian Games held in New Delhi in 1982. The matter was brought to 
the notice of the court by a letter written to Bhagwati J. by the People's 
Union for Democratic Rights, an organization formed for the protection 
of human rights. 
Bhagwati J. observed that although many of the Fundamental rights 
enacted in part III operated as limitations on the power of the state, there 
were "certain fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution which 
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are enforceable against the whole world and they are to be found, inter 
alia, in Articles 17, 23 and 24". The judge said:^ 
This Article [Article 23] strikes at forced labour in 
whatever form it may manifest itself, because it is 
violative of human dignity and is contrary to basic 
human values. 
The judge said: 
It is difficult to imagine that the Constitution makers 
should have intended to strike only at certain forms of 
forced labour leaving it open to the socially or 
economically powerful sections of the community to 
exploit the poor and weaker sections by resorting to 
other forms of forced labour. 
The judge further said: 
Every form of forced labour, 'begar' or otherwise, is 
within the inhibition of Article 23 and it makes no 
difference whether the person who is forced to give his 
labour or service to another is remunerated or not. Even 
if remuneration is paid, labour supplied by a person 
would be hit by this Article if it is forced labour, that is, 
labour supplied not willingly but as a result of forced or 
compulsion. 
The judge rightly said: 
[PJublic interest litigation which is a strategic arm of the 
legal aid movement and which is intended to bring justice 
within the reach of the poor masses, who constitute the 
low visibility area of humanity, is a totally different kind 
of litigation from the ordinary traditional litigation... 
In Veena Sethi v. Bihar, they had been arrested in connection with 
certain offences and had been declared insane at the time of their trail 
and were put in the central jail with directions to submit half-yearly 
medical reports. In some cases, half-yearly medical reports had not been 
submitted. The court (Bhagwati and Desai JJ.) held that since the 
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prisoners remained in jail for no fault of theirs and because of the 
callous and lethargic attitude of the authorities, even if they had been 
guilty, the period they had undergone would have exceeded the 
maximum imprisonment for their offence, and hence, they should be 
released forthwith. Replying to the criticism against entertaining letter 
g 
petitions, the court said. 
There are some people who are critical of the practice 
adopted by this court of taking judicial action on letters 
addressed by public spirited individuals and organization 
for enforcement of the basic human rights of the weaker 
sections of the community. This criticism is based on a 
highly elitist approach and proceeds from a blind 
obsession with the rites and rituals sanctified by cm 
outmoded Anglo-Saxon Jurisprudence. 
The court pointed out that but for the cognizance taken by the court of 
the letter written by the Free Legal Aid Committee, Hazaribagh, 
These forgotten specimens of humanity languishing in 
jail for years behind stone walls and iron bars, deprived 
of freedom and liberty which are the inalienable rights of 
a human being, would have continued to remain in Jail 
without any hope of ever walking out of its forbidding 
environment cmd breathing the fresh air offreedom. 
In Bandhua Mukti Morcha the court dealt with various objections 
against the aspects of the public interest litigation. In his landmark 
Judgment, Bhagwati J. pointed out that public interest litigation was not 
in the nature of adversary litigation but it was a challenge and an 
opportunity to the government and its officers to make basic human 
rights meaningful to the deprived and vulnerable sections of the 
community and to assure them social and economic justice. The judge 
observed that where fundamental rights of a person or class of persons 
were violated but they could not come to the court on account of their 
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poverty or disability or due to their socially and educaiionally 
disadvantaged position, the court could and must allow any member of 
the public acting bona fide to espouse the cause of such a person or class 
of persons and move the court for the enforcement of the fundamental 
rights of such persons. In the instant case, Bhagwati J. observed that the 
system of bonded labour in which a person was bound to provide labour 
to another for years and years until an alleged debt was supposed to be 
wiped out; which never seemed to happen during the lifetime of the 
bonded labourer was "totally incompatible with the new egalitarian 
socio-economic order which we have promised to build" and according 
to him was not "only an affront to basic human dignity" but also 
constituted "gross and revolting violation of constitutional values". " 
The government according to Bhagwati J. need not be shy of admitting 
that there were bonded labourers but it should take steps to implement 
the Act. "What is needed is determination, dynamism and a sense of 
social commitment on the part of the administration to free bonded 
labourers and rehabilitate them"". Explaining the court's role, 
Bhagwati. J observed: 
When the Court entertains public interest litigation, it 
does not do so in a cavilling spirit or in a confi-ontationcd 
mood or with a view to tilting at executive authority or 
seeking to usurp it, but its attempt is only to ensure 
observance of social and economic rescue programmes, 
legislative as well as executive, fi-amedfor the benefit of 
the have-nots and the handicapped and to protect them 
against violation of their basic human rights, which is 
also the constitutional obligation of the executive.'': 
Bhagwati J. said: 
This provision conferring on the Supreme Court power to 
enforce the fundamental rights in the widest possible 
terms shows the anxiety of the Constitution makers not to 
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allow any procedural technicalities to stand in the way of 
enforcement of fundamental rights. The Constitution 
makers clearly intended that the Supreme Court should 
have the amplest power to issue whatever direction, 
order or writ may be appropriate in a given case for 
enforcement of a fundamental right. 
One of the most significant judicial actions was the action involved in 
Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. U.P.''* In this case Bhagwati 
J (as he then was) speaking for the court, observed. 
This is the first case of its kind in the country involving 
issue relating to environment and ecological balance and 
the questions arising for consideration are of grave 
moment and significance not only to the people residing 
in the Mussorie Hill range forming part of the Himalayas 
but also in their implication to the welfare of the 
generality of people living in the country. It brings into 
sharp focus the conflict between development and 
conservation and serves to emphasize the need for 
reconciling the two in the larger interest of the country. 
The Supreme Court had appointed a committee called the Bhargava 
Committee to make a study of the effects of these limestone quarries on 
environment. In pursuance of its report and also the report of a 
committee appointed by the government, the court ordered permanent 
closure of certain limestone quarries. The court directed that licensees of 
those quarries be considered preferentially by the government in 
granting lease in respect of any other area thrown open for grant of 
limestone or dolomite quarrying. The court also gave a direction about 
providing employment to the workers of those quarries which had been 
ordered to be closed down. 
In Bihar Legal Support Society v. Chief Justice of India ^ the Supreme 
Court made it clear that the concern shown by it for the poor and the 
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disadvantaged was much greater than that for the rich and the well to do. 
In this case the petitioner which was a registered society set up with the 
aim of providing legal assistance to the poor, claimed that the poor 
people who had been denied bail should also be heard under the special 
leave jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Just the same way as the two 
industrialists, Lalit Thapar and Shyam Sunder Lai, had been heard and 
dealt with. The Court rightly observed that in a majority of the cases the 
High Courts should be the final authorities. Whatever the court might 
say, access to the court being unequal between the rich and the poor, the 
system is bound to appear more inhibiting to the poor. Nothing short of 
basic systemic changes would eliminate such a feeling among the 
people. 
In Rural litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. U.P. . Ranganath Misra J. 
observed:'^ 
It is for the government and the Nation and not for the 
Court to decide whether the deposits should be exploited 
at the cost of ecology and environmental considerations 
or the industrial requirement should be otherwise 
satisfied. 
Such balancing is bound to be influenced by the priorities of the 
balancing authority and the priorities are determined by a variety of 
factors the class interest being one most prominent. Even judicial 
balancing may not be free from class bias. This is obvious from the fact 
that at the next hearing of the case, court (Ranganath Misra and M.M. 
Dutt JJ) expressed the view that mining operation might be allowed to 
the extend it was necessary in the interests of the defence of country as 
also safeguarding the foreign exchange position.'^ 
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In M.C. Mehta v. India,^'^ the Supreme Court held that the scope of 
Article 32 was wide enough to consider even claims for compensation 
arising from violation of fundamental rights. The judgment is very 
significant because it contains seminal jurisprudential thoughts on civil 
liability of manufacturers using hazardous processes for the harms and 
injuries caused to the people in the surrounding areas. The matter was 
referred to the larger bench by the Division Bench.^' Because it involved 
questions of law relating to the interpretation of Articles 21 and 32. The 
court observed that the power of the court under Article 32 was not 
merely injunctive in ambit that is, preventing the infringements of 
fundamental rights, but was also remedial in scope and, therefore, must 
provide relief against the breach of ftmdamental right. The court, 
therefore, stated that "the power of the Court to grant such remedial 
relief may include the power to award compensation in appropriate 
cases." The Court clarified that it deliberately used the expression 
"appropriate cases" because it was not in very case that the court would 
award compensation. The criteria for awarding compensation would 
be:^^ 
The infringement of the fundamental right must be gross 
and patent, that is, incontrovertible and ex facie glaring 
and either such infringement should be on a large scale 
affecting the fundamental rights of a large number of 
persons or it should appear unjust or unduly harsh or 
oppressive on account of their poverty or disability or 
socially or economically disadvantaged position to 
require the person affected by such infringement to 
initiate and pursue actions in civil courts. 
M.C. Mehta "^^  case in which the court was requested to order the closure 
of some tanneries on the ground that the discharge of the trade effluents 
from the tanneries at Jajmau, Kanpur, into the river Ganga had been 
causing considerable damage to the lives of the people, who used the 
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waters of the Ganga, and also to the aquatic life in the river. The court 
noted that there were enough laws which gave power to the 
governments to take actions against the erring tanneries but that "no 
effective steps appear to have so far been taken to stop the grave public 
nuisance caused by the tanneries at Jajmau, Kanpur."^^ Why should the 
court, under such circumstance, not issue a writ of mandamus to the 
government to enforce the law? The court ordered these tanneries, 
which had not installed even primary treatment plants and which did not 
respond to the court's notices to be closed down. 
In M.C. Mehta v. Tamil NadiC^ the court directed that children should 
not be employed in match factories. They might be employed in packing 
processes. Such packing, however, must be done in an area away from 
the place of manufacture. The court fiirther held that child labour 
engaged in packing of matches must be given at least 60 per cent of the 
wages prescribed for adult employees doing the same job. The court 
further directed that facility of education in general and particularly job-
oriented education must be provided to such children. The state was 
directed to create a separate fund for that purpose. The state was fiirther 
directed to provide facilities for recreation and medical care and to 
provide that they be given basic diet during the working period. 
The closure of the Idgah Slaughter House in Delhi was ordered by the 
Delhi High Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union Territory of Delhi ^ ^^ The 
maximum number of animals that were permitted to be slaughtei ed per 
day was pegged at 2500 and even that only where the abattoir was able 
to maintain the minimum standard of hygiene and sanitation. Thereafter 
in an appeal by the Buffalo Traders Welfare Association, the Supreme 
Court appointed a committee to look into the related aspects of 
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requirements of meat, and livelihood of those employed in the trade, 
keeping in mind the environmental aspects and directed the reports of 
the committee to be placed before the High Court. 
The committee in its report observed that the abattoir had outlived its 
utility and that the only solution was the construction of a modem 
mechanized slaughter house. The high court after considering the report 
held^^ that it was not possible to increase the maximum number of 
animals to be slaughtered per day beyond 2500 without compromising 
on the minimum standard of cleanliness and hygiene. Although this was 
hardly adequate even for domestic consumption, the court felt that there 
should be no problem in getting supplies from other places. As regards 
those employed in the trade, the court reiterated its earlier order 
directing the government to frame a scheme for rehabilitating those 
rendered jobless on account of the abattoir's closure. The Union of India 
and the Delhi Government were directed to set up a modern mechanized 
abattoir and the Idgah Slaughter House was directed to be closed on or 
before 31.12.1995. 
The Supreme Court in Consumer Educational and Research Centre v. 
Union of India' declared that the right to health and medical care to 
protect health while in service or post-retirement is a fundamental right 
of a worker under Article 21 of the Constitution. The court's decision 
was given in a writ petition filed in public interest by CERC, an 
accredited organization, highlighting in particular the occupational 
health hazards and diseases of workmen employed in the asbestos 
industry. After an exhaustive survey of the medical literature and 
research studies on the topic, the court directed all industries to maintain 
and preserve health records of every workman up to a minimum of 40 
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years from the commencement of employment or 15 yeais after 
cessation of service whichever was later and to compulsorily provide 
insurance cover to every worker. 
In a PIL by 'Kalyani', a voluntary organization providing succour to 
women in distress, the Supreme Court held that a Hindu husband 
married under the Hindu law cannot by converting to Islam solemnize a 
second marriage. Such second marriage would amount to committing 
the offence of bigamy under the Indian Penal Code and would be void 
as such. The central government was directed to file an affidavit to 
indicate the steps taken by it to secure a uniform civil code.^" 
The Supreme Court in D.K. Basil v. State of West Bengal gave 
extensive directions as to the procedure to be followed by the police 
upon the arrest of a person and the minimum facilities to be afforded to 
such person consistent with the imperative need for the enforcement and 
protection of the fundamental right to life and liberty. Strongly 
disapproving of custodial deaths and the use of torture to extract 
confessions the court said: 
Police is, no doubt under a legal duty and has a 
legitimate right to arrest a criminal and to interrogate 
him during the investigation of an offence but the law 
does not permit use of third-degree methods or torture of 
the accused in custody during interrogation and 
investigation with a view to solve the crime. End cannot 
justify the means....No society can permit it. 
Among the mandatory procedureal requirements to be followed during 
arrest and detention, were that the police personnel carrying out an arrest 
should bear visible and clear identification and name tags with their 
designations; notification of the relative of the arrestee within eight to 
ten hours of the arrest; arrestee being permitted to meet his lawyer 
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during interrogation though not throughout the interrogation. Faikire to 
comply with the requirements would be punishable for contempt of 
court. The Supreme Court also reiterated that: 
Award of compensation for established infringement of 
the indefeasible rights guaranteed under Article 21 is a 
remedy available in public law since the purpose of 
public law is not only to civilize public power but also to 
assure the citizens that they live under a legal system 
wherein their rights and interests shall be protected and 
preserved. 
This case was an example of the synthesis of constitutional law and 
international principles governing protection and enforcement of human 
rights. 
In Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India, the court ensured 
that the over 900 tanneries operating in five districts of Tamilnadu were 
not permitted to function with out installation of effluent treaiment 
plants. 
The court held: 
Though the leather industry is of vital importance to the 
country as it generates foreign exchange and provides 
employment avenues, it has nor right to destroy the 
ecology, degrade the environment and pose a health 
hazard. It cannot be permitted to expand or even to 
continue with the present production unless it tackles by 
itself the problem of pollution created by the said 
industry. 
The court then drew on the principle of sustainable development and 
applied the 'precautionary principle' which required the state 
government and the statutory authorities to anticipate, prevent and attack 
the causes of environmental degradation. Lack of scientific certainty 
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should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent 
environmental degradation. Further, the onus of proof is on the actor or 
the developer or industrialist to show that his action is environmentally 
benign. 
M.C. Mehta v. State of T.N.^^ is a landmark ruling in which the 
Supreme Court has gone deep into the magnitude of the problem of 
child labour in India which continue to exist despite various 
constitutional mandates and international commitments for abolishing it. 
In this case the petitioner initially brought to the notice of the court the 
problem of child labour existing in Sivakasi. But the Supreme Court 
considered it fit to travel beyond the confines of Sivakasi to which place 
the present petition initially related and dealt with the issue in wider 
spectrum and broader perspective taking it as a national problem and not 
appertaining to any one region of the country. Hansaria J speaking for 
the court addressed the problem "as to how we can, and are required to, 
tackle the problem of child labour, soludon of which is necessary to 
build a better India."^^ The court held that in view the constitutional 
mandate of Article 24, children below the age of 14 years cannot be 
employed in any factory or mine or other hazardous work and that they 
must be given education as mandated by Article 45 of the Constitution 
and interpreted in Unni Krishnan.^^ The court stressed that employers 
must comply with the provisions of Child Labour (Prohibition and 
Regulation) Act, 1986 and in case they employ children in contravention 
of the provisions of the said Act, they would be liable to pay 
compensation of Rs. 20,000/- for every child employed. 
In Vishawa Jagriti Mission v. Central Govt./^ the public interest 
litigation highlighted the menace of ragging prevailing in the 
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educational institution of the country which in spite of efforts made by 
the central government, the University Grants Commission, state 
governments and some of the educational institutions is unfortunately 
showing an upwards trend. In this ease the petitioner sought directions 
from the Supreme Court to curb the menace of ragging. 
The Supreme Court rightly held that acts of ragging must be primarily 
dealt with by disciplinary authorities of the educational institutions and 
not by police unless it is otherwise inevitable. The Supreme Court in its 
order laid down detailed guidelines to curb the menace of ragging 
which, inter alia, included that awareness of the vice of ragging should 
be created amongst students, teachers, parents and the local community. 
The mode of punishment for ragging should be laid down and it should 
be brought to the notice of the students and their parents. Where 
individual raggers cannot be identified, collective punishment should be 
resorted to. The management, principal and the other authorities of the 
institution were directed to be held responsible in case of failure to 
prevent ragging in their institution. Positive and consti-uctive activities 
should be frequently arranged to enable the seniors and freshers to 
develop friendly relationship. The Supreme Court further directed that 
the UGC should stop the financial assistance and the university should 
disaffiliate the defaulfing institutions. The UGC was also directed to 
bring the said guidelines to the notice of all educational institutions. '^  
In Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra,^^ a question of seminal 
importance which arose out of a reference made to the constitution 
bench by a three judge bench of the Supreme Court was whether an 
aggrieved person is entitled to any relief against a final judgment/order 
of the Supreme Court after dismissal of review petition either under 
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Article 32 of the Constitution or otherwise."*' There are two competing 
principles, i.e. ensuring certainty and finality of the judgment of a court 
of last resort and dispensing justice on reconsideration of a judgment on 
the ground that it is vitiated by violation of the principles of natural 
justice or giving scope for apprehension of a bias due to a judge who 
participated in the decision making process and not disclosing his links 
with a party to the case, or on account of abuse of the process of the 
court. In such a case it would not only be proper but also obligatory 
both legally and morally to rectify the error. Thus, it is a duty to do 
justice in these rarest of rare cases, which shall have to prevail over the 
policy of finality of judgment.''^ This could be done through a curative 
petition. On the question of destroying the principle of finality enshrined 
in Article 141 of the Constitution, one must remember the following 
observations of Sahai J:"*^  
Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither 
the rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can stand 
in its way. The order of the court should not be 
prejudicicd to anyone. Rule of stare decisis is adhered for 
consistency but it is not as inflexible in administrative 
law as in public law. Even the law bends before justice. 
The Supreme Court while explaining the object of curative petition held 
that manifest injustice is curable in nature rather than incurable. If such 
injustice were not cured the Supreme Court would lose its sanctity and 
thus would belie the expectations of the founding further that justice is 
above all."*"* 
Banerjee J. has rightly explained the role of the court in the modern days 
by observing: 45 
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(I)t is now time that procedural justice system should 
give way to the conceptual justice system and efforts of 
the law counts ought to be so directed. Gone are the days 
when implementation of the draconian system of law or 
interpretation thereof were insisted upon-flexibility of 
law courts presently are its greatest virtue and as such 
justice-oriented approach is the need of the day to strive 
and forge ahead in the IT century. 
In BALCO Employees Union (Regd) v. Union oflndia^^ speaking for the 
court, B.N Kirpal J. remarked."^^ 
There is, in recent years, a feeling which is not without 
foundation that Public Interest Litigation is now tending 
to become publicity interest litigation or private interest 
litigation and has tendency to be counter-productive. PIL 
is not a pill or a panacea for all wrongs. It was 
essentially meant to protect basic human rights of the 
weak and the disadvantaged and was a procedure which 
was innovated where a public spirited person fdes a 
petition in effect on behalf of such persons who on 
account of poverty, helplessness or economic and social 
disabilities could not approach the Court for relief. There 
have been a recent times increasingly instances of abuse 
of PIL. Therefore, there is a need to re-emphasize the 
parameters within which PIL can be resorted to by a 
Petitioner and entertained by the Court. 
The Judge then added: "^^ 
Public Interest Litigation was not meant to challenge the 
financial or economic decisions which are taken by the 
Government in exercise of their administrative power. No 
doubt a person personally aggrieved by any such 
decision, which he regards as illegal, can impugn the 
same in a Court of law, but a Public Interest Litigation at 
the behest of a stranger ought not to be entertained. Such 
litigation cannot per se be on behalf of the poor and the 
downtrodden, unless the Court is satisfied that there has 
been a violation of Article 21 and the persons adversely 
affected are unable to approach the Court. 
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He further observed: 
Judicial interference by way ofPIL is available if there is 
injury to public because of dereliction of Constitutional 
or statutory obligation on the part of the Government.... 
Every matter of public interest or curiosity cannot be the 
subject matter of PIL. Courts are not intended to nor 
should they conduct the administration of the country. 
The court quoted the following observation: 
Public Interest Litigation.... entered the Indian judicial 
process in 1970. It will not be incorrect to say that it is 
primarily the Judges who have innovated this type of 
litigation as there was a dire need for it. At that stage it 
was to vindicate public interest where fundamental or 
other rights of the people who were poor, ignorant or in 
socially or economically disadvantageous position and 
were unable to seek legal redress were required to be 
espoused. PIL was not meant to be adversarial in nature 
and was to be a cooperative and collaborative effort of 
the parties and the Court so as to secure justice for the 
poor and the weaker sections of the community who were 
not in a position to protect their own interests. 
While PIL was'invoked mostly in cases connected with 
the relief to the people and the weaker sections of the 
society and in areas where there was a violation of 
human rights under Article 21, with the passage of time 
petitions have been entertained in other spheres. 
In People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union oflndia^" the petitioners 
sought a direction for the enforcement of famine code and for the 
immediate release of surplus food grains laying in the stocks of Union 
of India. Directions were also sought requiring the government to frame 
fresh schemes of public distribution for scientific and reasonable 
distribution of food grains. 
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The court observed. 
Article 21 of the Constitution of India protects for every 
citizen a right to live with human dignity. Would the very 
existence of life of those families which are below poverty 
line not come under danger for want of appropriate 
schemes and implementation thereof to provide requisite 
aid to such families? Reference an also be made to 
Article 47 which inter alia provides that the state shall 
regard the raising of level of nutrition and the standard 
of living of its people and the improvement of public 
health as among its primary duties. 
In this food petition the court issued various directions for providing 
food and work to the poor. The court directed that the famine code 
should be implemented as and when the situation may call for it. In its 
order of 17.01.2003^^ the NHRC expressed the view that right to food 
should be recognized as a guaranteed fundamental right.^' The 
commission has observed.^'^ 
In view of the Commission, the Right to Food is inherent 
to a life with dignity, and Article 21 should be read with 
Articles 39(a) and 47 to understand the nature of 
obligations of the State in order to, ensure the effective 
realization of this right ... The citizen's to be free from 
hunger enshrined in Article 21 is to be ensured by the 
fulfillment of the obligation of the State set out in Articles 
39(a) and 47. The reading of Article 21 together with 
Articles 39(a) and 47, places the issue of food security in 
the correct perspective, thus making the Right to Food a 
guaranteed fundamental right which is enforceable by 
virtue of the constitutional remedy under Article 32 of the 
Constitution. It follows, therefore, that there is a 
fundamental right to be free from hunger. Starvation 
constitutes a gross denial and violation of this right. 
In Kapila Hingorani v. State of Bihar^^ the court, on a perusal of the 
affidavit filed by the state and the records and the report of the amicus 
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curiae appointed by it was convinced that deaths had occurred due to 
starvation and malnutrition. The state government, however, com ended 
that these companies or undertakings were to be governed by the 
Companies Act, 1956 and their liability could not be passed on to the 
state. The petitioner, however, insisted that the Bihar government must 
be directed to pay the salaries to the employees. 
The court held:^^ 
The government companies /public sector undertakings 
being "State" would be constitutionally liable to respect 
the life and liberty of all persons in terms of Article 21 of 
the Constitution of India. They, therefore, must do so in 
cases of their own employees. The Government of the 
State of Bihar for all intent and purport is the sole 
shareholder. Although in law, its liability towards the 
debtors of the company may be confined to the shares 
held by it but having regard to the deep and pervasive 
control it exercises over the government companies, in 
the matter of enforcement of human rights and/or rights 
of the citizens to life and liberty, the State has also an 
additional duty to see that the rights of the employees of 
such corporations are not infringed. 
The court then proceeded to discuss the literature recognizing right to 
food as a basic human right. Hunger is violation of human rights and if 
"the State fails to respect, protect or fulfill this access, unless for lack of 
resources in a society, this must be termed a violation of the human right 
to food. 
The court stated:^^ 
State cannot escape its liability when a human right 
problems of such magnitude involving the starvation 
deaths and/or suicide by the employees has taken place 
by reason of non-payment of salary to the employees of 
public sector undertakings for such a long time. 
487 
In order to meet the ends of justice the court issued various interim 
directions of which the most important one was as follows:^' 
The State for the present shall deposit a sum of Rs. 50 
crores before the High Court for disbursement of salaries 
to the employees of the corporations. The amount of 50 
crores be deposited in two installments. Half of the 
amount shall be payable with in one month and the 
balance amount with in a month thereafter. 
Communal violence had gripped Gujarat in the aftermath of the killing 
of karsevaks aboard Sabarmati express at Godhra in 2002. A mob had 
set fire to Best Bakery at Vacodara on 1.03.2002 burning alive 14 
persons. In National Human Rights Commission v. Union of India^ a 
SLP was filed by the NHRC for setting aside the judgment and order 
dated 27.6.2003 passed by the additional sessions judge, fast track court 
No.l ,Vadodara acquitting all the 21 accused in the Best Bakery case. 
Referring to Malimath Committee Report on the Reform of Criminal 
Justice System, the court remarked that there were many faults in the 
criminal justice delivery system because of the apathy on the part of the 
police officers to record proper report, their general conduct toward 
victims, faulty investigafion, failure to take recourse to scientific 
investigation etc. The court observed:^' 
For successful prosecution of the criminal cases, 
protection to witnesses is necessary as the criminals have 
often access to the police and influential people. We may 
also place on record that the conviction rate in the 
country has gone down to 3 9.6% and trial in most of the 
sensational cases do not start till the witnesses are won 
over. 
The Supreme Court issued a direction to the Union of India to file a 
counter affidavit "as to the steps taken by it to implement the 
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recommendations of Justice Malimath Committee, the proposal, if any. 
to enact a law for grant of protection to witnesses, as is prevalent in 
several countries, and other steps sought to be taken for implementing 
the criminal justice delivery system/'^ 
On 26.12.2003 the High Court of Gujarat upheld the acquittal of all the 
21 accused. The high court rejected the appeal for re-trial of the case. It 
also imputed motives to the NHRC and some NGOs for highlighting the 
lackadaisical ways of prosecution. The key witness and the state 
government moved the Supreme Court for a direction to the high court 
to consider fresh evidence in the case. A bench of Doraiswamy Raju and 
Arijit Pasyat JJ reserved its verdict on the limited question whether the 
high court could be directed to consider fresh evidence claimed through 
affidavits by some witnesses.*"^  On 12.04.2004, the Supreme Court 
created history by ordering that the case be tried all over again—this 
time in Maharashtra. Making stinging remarks against the political 
executive Doraiswamy Raju and Arijit Pasayat J.J. observed that 
modern day Neros fiddled while the innocent children and helpless 
women were burning. They criticized the Gujarat High Court for 
making "irresponsible" remarks against those seeking retrial—social 
activist Teesta Setalvad, key witness Zahira Sheikh and the NHRC. The 
Gujarat Government was directed to appoint a new public prosecutor to 
assist the retrial. The court reasoned that the conditions in Gujarat were 
still not such that a fair trial could be expected as large number of 
accused in the post-Godhra cases were being acquitted as the witnesses 
were intimidated for turning hostile '^* It is for the first time that the 
Supreme Court passed such an order in a criminal case after a trial court 
and a high court had acquitted the accused. 
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In Sakshi v, Union of Indict^ a PIL urged the Supreme Court to give an 
expansive interpretation to the expression 'sexual intercourse' occurring 
in section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, I860 so as to include all forms 
of penetration such as penile/vaginal, penile/oral, penile/anal, 
finger/vaginal, and finger/anal penetration and object/vaginal 
penetration within its ambit. The crucial question before the court was 
whether by a process if judicial interpretation such a wide meaning 
could be ascribed to the expression "sexual intercourse" in section 375 
and unsettle a line of decisions of the court on the meaning of this 
expression. According to the petitioners the narrow meaning hitherto 
given to "rape" under sections 375/376 of the Code ran contraiy to the 
contemporary understanding of rape as an intent to humiliate, violate 
and degrade a woman or a child sexually and, therefore, adversely 
affects the sexual integrity and autonomy of women and children in 
violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. 
The Supreme Court referred the matter to the Law Commission of India 
for its opinion on the main issues raised in this PIL. The commission 
took the view that all forms of penetration as urged by the petitioners 
could not be brought within the ambit of section 375 as they were 
already covered under sections 377, 354 and 506 of the Code, Relying 
on judicial precedents and the doctrine of stare decisis, the Supreme 
Court held that only sexual intercourse, namely heterosexual intercourse 
involving the penetration of the vagina by the penis has been 
consistently held to come within the purview of section 375 dealing with 
rape. Court speaking through G.P. Mathur J. held:^ ^ 
Prosecution of an accused for an offence under section 
376 IPC on radically enlarged meaning of section 375 as 
suggested by the petitioner may violate the guarantee 
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enshrined in Article 20(1) of the Constitution which says 
that no person shall be convicted of any offence except 
for violation of law in force at the time of the commission 
of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a 
penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted 
under the law in force at the time of the commission of 
the act. 
The judge further observed:^^ 
The entire legal fraternity in India, lawyers, or judges, 
have the definition as contained in Section 375 engrained 
in their minds and the cases are decided on that basis. 
The first and foremost requirement in criminal law is that 
it shoidd be absolutely certain, and clear. An exercise to 
alter the definition of rape, as contained in Section 375 
IPC, by a process of judicial interpretation, and that too 
when there is no ambiguity in the provisions of the 
enactment, is bound to result in good deal of chaos and 
confusion, and will not be in the interest of the society. 
It was therefore held that it would be against public interest to alter the 
definition of rape in section 375 by a process of judicial interpretation. 
The other aspect highlighted by the petitioner for consideration of the 
court related to providing protection to a victim of sexual abuse at the 
time of recording her statement in court. The main suggestions made by 
the petitioner for incorporating special provisions in child sexual abuse 
were as follows: 
a) Permitting use of a video taped interview of the Child's statement 
by the judge (in presence of the child support person). 
b) Allow a child to testify via closed circuit television or from 
behind a screen to obtain a full and candid account of the acts 
complained of 
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c) The cross examination of a minor should only be carried out by 
the judge based on written questions submitted by the defense 
upon perusal of the testimony of the minor. 
d) Whenever a child is required to give testimony, sufficient breaks 
should be given as and when required by the child. 
The court observed : 
The mere sight of the accused may induce an element of 
extreme fear in the mind of the victim or the witness or 
can put them in a state of shock. In such a situation he or 
she may not be able to give full details of the incident 
which may result in the miscarriage of justice. Therefore, 
a screen or some such arrangement can be made where 
the victim or witnesses do not have to undergo the 
trauma of seeing the body or face of the accused. Often 
the questions put in cross examination are purposely 
designed to embarrass or confuse the victims of rape and 
child abuse. The object is that out of the feeling of shame 
or embarrassment, the victim may not speak out or give 
details of certain acts committed by the accused. It will 
therefore be better if the questions to be put by the 
accused are given in writing to the Presiding Officer of 
the Court, who may put the same to the victim or witness 
in a language which is not embarrassing. There cannot 
be any objection to the other suggestion given by the 
petitioner that whenever a child or victim of rape is 
required to give testimony, sufficient breaks should be 
given as and when required. The provisions of sub-
section (2) of section 327 Cr PC should also apply in 
inquiry or trial of offences under sections 354 and 377 
IPC. 
Zahia Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat^"^ dealt with the macabre 
killing arising out of communal frenzy, failure of state machinery to 
protect the life and liberty of citizens and investigation conducted in a 
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manner helpful to the accused persons. To the court preservation of rule 
of law crucial to the protection of human rights: 
The principle of rule of law and due process are closely 
linked with human rights protections. Such rights can be 
protected effectively when a citizen has recourse to the 
courts of law. Failure to record fair hearing either to the 
accused or the prosecution violates even minimum 
standards of due process, it may be vitiated and violated 
by an overhasty, state managed, tailored and partisan 
trail. 
Professor Yashpal v. State of Chhatisgarh^^ raised the issue of lalling 
educational standards by the creation of private universities by the State 
of Chhatisgrah. PIL was filed by an eminent scientist who was 
chairman, UGC under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the 
constitutional validity of Chhatisgarh Niji Kshetra Vishwavidyalaya 
(Sthapana and Viniyaman) Adhiniyam, 2002 and for quashing the 
notification issued by the state under this Act for establishing various 
self financed private universities. Declaring the impugned Act as 
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court held that the Act had rendered 
many provisions of UGC Act, 1956 unworkable and otiose. The 
judgment contains a very detailed discussion of the concept of a 
university and the necessary infrastructure required in a university. 
According to the court, the "university" as a legislative head must be 
understood in the same manner as it is generally and commonly 
understood, namely, with proper facilities for teaching at higher level 
and continuing research activity. 
The court observed .72 
The consistent and settled view of this Court therefore, is 
that in spite of incorporation of university as a legislative 
head being in the State list, the whole gamut of the 
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university which will include teaching, quality of 
education being imparted, curriculum, standard of 
examination and evaluation and also research activity 
being carried on will not come within the purview of 
State legislature on account of specific entry on co-
ordination and determination of standards in the 
institutions of higher education being in the Union list for 
which Parliament alone is competent. It is the 
responsibility of the Parliament to ensure that proper 
standards are maintained in institutions of higher 
education and also uniformity in standards is 
maintained. 
In a writ petition filed by an NGO by way of public interest litigation, 
it was alleged, inter alia, that the number of road accidents have been 
rising in the country due to various reasons, including, defects in the 
licensing procedure, training of drivers, negligent driving, driving under 
influence of alcohol, inadequate infrastructure relating to roads and 
inadequate provisions of traffic control devices including traffic signals, 
road sign, devices and other road safety measures. A two-judge bench of 
the Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition holding inter alia, that the 
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was a comprehensive enactment on the 
subject and that if there by any lacuna or defect in the Act, it was for the 
legislature to correct it by suitable amendments and not for the court by 
issuing directions to the legislatures or the executive. 
Katju, J expressed strong opinion observing that "the Courts of the 
country have sometimes clearly crossed the limits of the judicial 
function and have taken over functions which really belong either to the 
legislature or to the executive. This is unconstitutional. If there is a law, 
Judges can certainly enforce it. But Judges cannot create a law by 
judicial verdict and seek to enforce it.^ "^  Katju, J held that the petitioner 
desired the court to direct the Union of India to formulate a suitable 
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Road Traffic Safety Act, but it was well settled that the court could not 
direct either the legislature or the executive to legislate upon any 
subject, even if, there be a gap or lacuna in the existing law. He was of 
the view that "if there is a lacuna or defect in the Act, it is for the 
legislature to correct it by a suitable amendment and not by the Court7\ 
This Court cannot direct legislation. The court should not encroach into 
the sphere. . 
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PART-IV 
Selected area of Family Law wherein Expansion k 
taken place tkough Judicial Activism 
CHAPlER-1 
HINDU LAW 
Case Law based on: Marriage, Divorce and Maintenance 
The Hindu Personal Law was codified to some extent in the colonial 
period. After Independence some reforms were introduced that were 
passed in the form of four separate Acts. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 
provides the most extensive definition of the term Hindu. It means any 
person domiciled in the territories to which the Act extends who is not a 
Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion. 
Marriage: 
The Hindu Marriage Act was passed in 1955. Its major provision related 
to the abolition of the requirement that husband and wife be of the same 
caste as a necessary precondition for a valid marriage, the enforcement 
of monogamy and uniform provision for the dissolution of marriage for 
all the castes. In order to stop the practice of bigamy amongst Hindus 
the Supreme Court ruled in Sarla Mudgal Case of 1995 and the Lily 
Thomas case of 2000 that second marriage of convert Muslims 
(originally Hindu) men solemnized under Muslim law would be counted 
as a second marriage for the purpose of the offence of bigamy and such 
men will be liable to be punished for bigamy. 
Divorce and Maintenance: 
According to the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 either spouse can obtain 
divorce on similar grounds (voluntary intercourse with a person other 
than the spouse, cruelty, desertion, conversion to other religion, mental 
unsoundness, renunciation, missing for 7 years, non-cohabitation after 
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court order for restitution of conjugal rights under section 9). The wife is 
given four additional grounds (rape, sodomy and bestiality, another wife 
living before the commencement of the Act, marriage before the age of 
15 years) on which she can ask for divorce. The provision for divorce by 
mutual consent was also incorporated under the Act in 1976. The Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1955 makes both spouses liable to pay maintenance. The 
order of maintenance can be rescinded if the party obtaining 
maintenance remarries or has sexual intercourse with another person. A 
woman can normally claim a maximum of one third of the joint income 
of her husband and herself However all claims of maintenance are lost 
upon conversion to a non "Hindu" religion. 
The judicial decisions pertaining to Hindu Law related to family 
relations and rights of woman vis-a-vis her husband and other members 
of the family covering marriage, divorce and maintenance are as under: 
Gopal Rao v. Sitharamamma is an important case on maintenance. The 
illegitimate sons of a deceased Sudra and his Brahmin concubine who, 
though married to a husband still alive, had been in his exclusive 
keeping till his death and still preserved her sexual fidelity to him, 
claimed maintenance from his estate. The Supreme Court held that the 
concubine, though a Brahmin and a Swairini i.e. an adultress, could 
claim to be an avaruddha stree, and both she and the illegitimate sons 
were entitled to maintenance from the estate of the deceased. The Court 
observed: 
In terms, Ss. 21 and 22 are prospective. Where the Act is 
intended to be retrospective, it expressly says so... Now, 
before the Act came into force, rights of maintenance out 
of the estate of a Hindu were acquired and the 
corresponding liability to pay the maintenance was 
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incurred under the Hindu law in force at the time of his 
death 
The Court concluded that: 
We think that Ss. 21 and 22 read with S. 4 do not destroy 
or affect any right of maintenance out of the estate of a 
deceased Hindu vested on his death before the 
commencement of the Act under the Hindu law in force at 
the time of his death. 
In Jogindra Kaur v. Shivacharan Singh'' it was held that in a suit for 
restitution of conjugal rights, the petitioner has to establish a sincere 
desire for resumption of cohabitation. The petition would fail if he is not 
sincere in his request and there is some incompatible ulterior object. The 
wife is no doubt bound to live with the husband wherever he may 
choose to reside, but no law can direct her to live with any other person, 
e.g. the parents of the husband, especially when he does not live there. 
The decree was on this ground refused when the husband insisted that 
the wife should go and live with his parents because he could not 
provide suitable accommodation for her. 
The importance of the psychological factor in the concept of cruelty is 
being increasingly recognized by the Indian courts. Thus in Kusum Lata 
V. Kamta Prasad,^ while holding that reckless allegation of unchastity 
against the wife may amount to legal cruelty, the Court observed that the 
most crucial and decisive test was the psychological effect of the 
allegation on the wife. It further held that excessive sexual demands may 
also amount to cruelty. "Indeed," remarked the learned Judge, 
"according to matrimonial experts this sphere of conjugal life ought to 
be more sedulously guarded against psychological injuries than any 
other.^ He also hinted at the desirability of obtaining the assistance of 
competent psychiatrists in cases of this type. 
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Jagdish Lai v. Shyama was a husband's petition for restitution of 
conjugal rights. The wife averred that since her husband was impotent 
she had a reasonable excuse to withdraw from the society of the 
husband. The husband countered that he had sexual intercourse with her 
several times. It was established on evidence that the wife was virgo 
intacta. Two main arguments were addressed to the Court on behalf of 
the husband: (i) that medico-legal authorities did not exclude the 
possibility of sexual intercourse taking place without rupturing hymen, 
and that (ii) impotency within the meaning of section 12(1) had not been 
established and therefore under section 9(2) of the Hindu Man'iage Act, 
1955, it cannot be a valid defense to a petition of restitution. Rejecting 
the first argument, the Court said that sexual intercourse with a \'irgin 
without rupturing the hymen is not a normal phenomenon, that Modi^  
has stated that in such cases the distinctbility of the vaginal orifice is to 
be noted and if the vaginal orifice is big enough to admit the passage of 
two fingers, then there is a possibility of sexual intercourse taking place 
(it was established that vaginal orifice admitted only one figure) and that 
the statement of the husband of having several intercourses with the 
wife is quite inconsistent with the state of wife's organ. Therefore the 
Court drew the inevitable inference that the husband was impotent." Mr. 
justice Gangeshwar Prasad said that section 9(1) lays down three 
conditions'^ for the grant of the petition, viz., (i) withdrawal is without 
reasonable excuse, (ii) the court is satisfied of the truth of the statements 
made in the petition, and (iii) absence of any legal ground for the 
granting relief. Mr. Justice Prasad said: 
Reasonable excuse cannot, therefore, be equated to with 
legal ground, and the court cannot grant a decree for 
restitution of conjugal rights if there is reasonable excuse 
for the husband or the wife for withdrawing from the 
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society of the other even though a ground for judicial 
separation or for nullity or for divorce has not been 
made out... 
It was therefore held that the impotency of the husband and his 
consequent inabihty to consummate the marriage amounts to reasonable 
excuse for the withdrawal of the wife from the society of the petitioner. 
Lalithamma v. R. Kannan^ was the wife's petition for divorce on the 
ground that the husband took a second wife before 1955 and that the 
second wife was alive at the time of the presentation of the petition. Mr. 
Justice Pai, was of the view that: 
A bigamous marriage contracted after the 
commencement of the Act, the invalidity of the second 
marriage does not to any extent depend upon any 
conduct or disability on the part of the first wife. By 
parity of reasoning therefore, a husband who is the 
respondent in a wife's petition under S. 13(2) (i) cannot 
plead any conduct or disability on the part of the first 
wife as a bar to her claim for divorce on the ground of 
second marriage. 
In Krishna Chandra v. Daimati Kishani a wife was given a 
maintenance allowance of Rs. 20 per month for herself and Rs. 10 for 
her minor son in a compromise decree against the husband. When the 
husband failed to pay the said amount the wife applied for execution of 
the decree, wherein the husband pleaded that she cannot claim Rs. 10 as 
an allowance for the child as the child was not a party to the 
compromise. The executing court rejected the contention, but the first 
appellate court accepted it. On appeal, Mr. Justice Mishra of the Orissa 
High Court said that the first appellate court clearly misunderstood the 
provisions of section 23, Hindu Adopdon and Maintenance Act, 1956. 
The learned Judge observed: 
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It cannot be disputed that when a minor child lives with 
the mother, the necessities of the child constitute 
reasonable want of the mother. Even though the minor 
son is not a party to the suit, the compromise recognized 
the needs of the child as constituting the reasonable 
wants of the minor. 
The Gollins'^ and the Williams'^ cases changed the whole direction of 
the matrimonial law in regard to cruelty in England. The Indian Courts 
have not been far behind in following the new wave. In Bhagwat v. 
Bhagwat,^^ the husband had become insane though he did have lucid 
intervals. During his insanity the husband made an attempt to 
strangulate the wife's brother on one day and her own child on the next. 
On behalf of husband the contention was that he had no motive or 
intention to be cruel. In other words, the cruelty was not directed 
towards the wife. The court boldly laid down that the motive or 
intention to be cruel is not necessary if the conduct can otherwise be 
held to cruel. In the circumstances of the case the husband's conduct no 
doubt amounted to mental cruelty and was sufficient to cause grave 
apprehension in the wife's mind regarding danger to life to her child and 
herself. Laik, J.'s judgment in Nishit Kumar v. Anjali,^'^ is remarkable in 
many aspects. It rates high not only in the principles enunciated by it but 
also in point of literary merit. In that case a wife married on July 3, 
I960, gave birth to a full term child on December 16, 1960. The period 
from the date of marriage to the date of the birth of the child was 167 
days counting both days. The lower court insisted that the husband must 
prove positively that the child was illegitimate and as the burden could 
not be discharged by the husband he was out of court. On appeal, Laik, 
J., reminded that in such cases to put a burden entirely on the husband is 
to put "an increasing burden on him". The burden of proving negative 
cohabitation could be rather impossible to be discharged. If on the facts 
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of the case, circumstances appear which lead to a reasonable doubt they 
would then counter-balance the provisional presumption and leave the 
wife with the burden of proving that the husband is the father of the 
child. The Judge reminded that the problem should not be approached in 
a general way, however just and attractive it may seem. The Ninnoo 
case'^ involved the construction of Section 13(2) (i) of the Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1995 after nearly 25 year had passed from the date of 
marriage. Immediately after the marriage, the couple had lived together 
for four years and then the husband married again with the wife's 
consent. Eleven years after the Hindu Marriage Act came into force, she 
moved the court for obtaining a divorce on the ground of his remaniage. 
The husband pleaded that because she had consented she was stopped 
from complaining on the ground of remarriage and secondly that the 
period of eleven years amounts to culpable delay. The high Court 
decided that a person cannot consent against the statute, and so no 
estoppels would lie. It further held that the period of eleven years was 
not be itself enough to constitute stopple. The Gujarat High Court gave a 
liberal construction to section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act in 
Dharamshi Premji v. Bai Sakar Kanjf . The facts in that case were that 
Dharamshi and Bhai Sakar were married. Bai Sakar later on deserted 
Dharamshi. Dharamshi petitioned for restitution of conjugal rights and a 
decree was passed in his favour. Bai Sakar disobeyed the decree and 
after some time Dharamshi prayed for a decree for divorce. The Decree 
was given. Later on Bhai Sakar applied under section 2.'S for 
maintenance. Dharamshi contended that Bai Sakar was not his wife at 
the time of the application since the relation of husband and wife was 
served by divorce. Hence, he contended she is not competent to make an 
application under section 25 which provides remedy only to the husband 
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or the wife. The court rejecting the contentions held that section 25 is by 
way of incidental relief when the main relief is granted. It was by 
recourse to the position occupied by the parties in the main proceedings 
that the legislature has described them as husband and wife. The 
legislature would not have intended that they should be husband and 
wife on the date the application is presented. Section 25(1) is clear and 
even if there is any doubt it is set at rest by section 25(3). 
In Parsnasami v. Sornathammal/^ it was an established fact that the 
widow of Deiva Pandian's father was not a woman because she was 
sexless. As to the question whether the marriage between her and Deiva 
Pandian's father was valid, the Court agreed with the view of Mr. 
Justice Tandolkar in A. v. B. that such a marriage is null and void. But 
by applying the law as it obtains in England that a husband and not any 
person other than "the parties to the marriage" can obtain a decree of 
nullity, the plaintiff was held not to be entitled to raise the question of 
nullity of the marriage of the widow of Deiva Pandian's father with 
Deiva Pandian's faith. The approach of the Court in this case is sound, 
for it takes into account the fact that when the deceased husband had 
tolerated his "sexless" wife all through his life, it would not be in 
fairness to 'her' to deprive 'her' of 'her' status in the family by 
declaring the marriage a nullity at the instance of other persons. 
In Bawi v. Nath^^ where the appellant, at the age of seven years, married 
to the respondent who was then of eleven years of age. The allegation of 
the appellant that she had slept with her husband only once when she 
was of ten or eleven years of age and her husband was then not more 
than of fifteen years of age and that the marriage was not consummated 
was held as not sufficient to prove that the respondent was impotent at 
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the time of marriage and continued to be so till the institution of the suit. 
The medical evidence based on the examination of the respondent held 
on 9 December, 1967 had deposed that the husband was capable of 
begetting children. The Court rightly pointed out that section 12(i) (a) 
was not happily worded in that it does not provide for the annulment of 
marriage on the "loss of potency of the husband occurring any time after 
the marriage up to a certain age and its continuance thereafter for a 
reasonable period." 
In the Chandra Mohini Case}'^ the husband had married after a decree 
dissolving the marriage had been passed by the high Court and no 
appeal lay from the judgment of the High Court. The wife presented a 
petition for a special leave to the Supreme Court, which was granted. 
Meanwhile, the husband had remarried after the judgment of the high 
Court and a daughter was bom to him. The Supreme Court quashed the 
decree of the High Court dissolving the marriage and the effect of the 
judgement was that the first marriage was subsisting. The husband 
pleaded that as he had married after the decision of the high Court, the 
petition for special leave had become in fructuous and could not be 
granted. But the Supreme Court did not accept his plea and the effect of 
the judgment of the Supreme Court was that the second marriage was 
rendered null and void. In Kashinath Sahu v. Devi^^, the relatives of the 
husband treated the wife in an unbearable and insulting manner and the 
husband, to say the least, acquiesced in their conduct. When the wife 
brought a petition for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty, the 
husband pleaded that she was not physically tortured or assaulted by any 
member of the family. B.K. Patra, J. delivering the judgment held that in 
determining what constitutes cruelty, regard must be had to the 
circumstances of each particular case, keeping in view the physical and 
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mental condition of the parties and their character and social status. The 
harm apprehended by the wife may be mental suffering and not bodily 
harm. It can easily be imagined that mental agony may be much more 
unbearable than bodily pain. It is no answer to a charge of cruelty made 
by the wife, for her husband to answer that he himself was not guilty of 
any act of cruelty but it was his mother or some other relative who was 
so guilty. The principle is well-settled that a wife is entitled to insist that 
she should not be exposed to the unpleasantness of the relatives of her 
husband and that suitable provisions should be made for her to live with 
her husband in privacy. In B. Ansuya v. B. Rajaiah,' a decree for 
maintenance was obtained by the wife against her husband under the 
Hindu Marriage Act. When the wife sought enforcement of the decree, 
the husband pleaded in answer to the petition that after the decree the 
wife came to live with him and consequently the decree could not longer 
be deemed to be effective. So the court was called upon to decide the 
result of resumption of cohabitation after a decree had been passed. 
Parthasarthi, J. who delivered the judgment pointed out that it must not 
be permitted to the parties to make arrangements for themselves to hold 
good whenever they choose to live separately. A decree of maintenance 
would be deemed to have been set aside in case the parties resume 
cohabhation. The doctrine that cohabitation annuls the fact of the 
decree, is based on public policy. The law does everything to promote 
and preserve conjugal amity and discourages private arrangements 
between parties, the effect of which is to allow the spouses to live 
separately at their pleasure. If after a decree for maintenance is made, 
the parties come to live together with the intention that the decree would 
become operative again in case they decide to live separately, then the 
result would be to allow them to make private arrangements for 
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separation. It is this situation that the law would not allow. Therefore, 
the law has made a rule that, resumption of cohabitation puts an end 
finally to the decree for maintenance. The rule is based on sound 
commonsense and public policy. 
In Krishni Devi v. Tulsa Devi an important point of law came up in 
appeal. The point involved was whether under section 11 of the Hindu 
Marriage Act a petition for nullity of the marriage could be brought up 
after the death of either spouse, or not. The appeal had arisen out of the 
dismissal of the appellant's petition before the senior subordinate judge 
.of Kamal, to the effect that the nullity of her marriage with the deceased 
husband of the respondent under section 11 of the Act could noi be so 
declared after the death of the husband. The High Court of Punjab and 
Haryana, in the instant case took the right view that the observ ations 
made in Thulsi Ammal v. Gowri Ammal supported the appellant's 
contention that one of the spouses could obtain a declaration under 
section 11 about his/her status even after the death of the other spouse. 
In C. Jagannadham v. C. Savithramma Reddy J. rejected the argument 
that there could have been no marriage between the appellant and the 
defendant as the two belonged to two different castes between which, it 
was alleged, no marriage could take place. This argument was advanced 
by the appellant in his appeal against the decree for maintenance passed 
by the trial court on a petition by the respondent wife. The learned judge 
held: 
Admittedly, they have been living together as husband 
and wife for a very long time. The mere circumstance 
that they belong to different communities is not sufficient 
to hold that there was no marriage at all/^ 
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In R. Kapur v. Man Mohan Singh^^ the wife went up in appeal against 
the dismissal of her petition for the annulment of her marriage v* ith the 
respondent, inter alia, under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act. The appellant, 
an educated lady and a teacher, of 28 years of age, had married the 
respondent on 18 February 1968 after about three or four years of 
successftil courtship. Soon after the marriage in 1969 the said petition 
was filed. On a scrutiny of the evidence Suri J. of the Punjab and 
Haryana High Court found that from her letters written to the respondent 
the appellant appeared to be rather "passionate type" and the medical 
evidence put her in the category of "oversexed". On the other hand the 
other medical evidence showed that the respondent was not impotent. 
The learned judge, therefore, held that "The fact that one of the 
spouses is comparatively oversexed, would not necessary mean that the 
other spouse is impotent" "^ and dismissed the appeal.^ '^  Rohimi Kiimari 
V. Narendra Singh^^ the wife had left her matrimonial home in 1947 and 
did not return in spite of several persuasions by the husband. In 1953 the 
respondent when he was osted abroad in the Indian Foreign Service met 
Countess Rita and married her on 17 May 1955. These developments 
were although known to the appellant but she never referred these facts 
in her reply to her husband's correspondence with her, as factors which 
stood in her way to return to him. In August 1955 the respondent started 
proceedings for judicial separation. In 1959 he divorced Countress Rita, 
and in July 1964 the trial court granted him decree for judicial 
separation against the appellant. Division bench of the High Court 
directed to pay maintenance to the appellant. Referring to the 
observations of the Supreme Court on the above question in an earlier 
decision in Lachman Uttamchand Kripalani v. Meena^\ Grover J. in the 
instant appeal held: 
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The second marriage should have had such an impact on 
the mind of the wife so as to cause her to continue to live 
apart and continue desertion. If the conduct of the 
husband has had no such effect on her mind it cannot be 
said that the desertion on her part terminated by reason 
of the conduct of the husband: 
The learned judge held that "the desertion by the wife had been proved 
without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of 
the husband."^^ Grover J. held: 
The right to live separately given under section 18(2) (d) 
of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 is not 
same as a right of judicial separation under section 10(2) 
of the Act.'''^ 
The learned judge further observed that "section 10(2) of the Act deals 
with the matrimonial offences by either Spouse which would justify the 
grant of decree of judicial separation, "whereas Section 18 provides for 
grant of maintenance to wife alone."'*' The right to separate residence 
and maintenance on remarriage of husband, which is available 10 wife 
under any other enactment could not be utilized as a reason for coming 
to conclusion that the fact of the remarriage of the husband must 
necessarily afford a reasonable cause for desertion.'*'^  
In G. Sambireddy v. G. Jayamma!^^ the full bench of the /Vndhra 
Pradesh High Court rightly held that section 11 and 17 of the Hindu 
Marriage Act by providing against bigamy did not offend against Article 
14 or 15(1) of the Constitution, as these sought to achieve the object of 
social welfare and reform laid down by Article 25(2) and it is nol 
adherence to religion but subjection to certain personal law that fonns 
the basis of classification made by the Hindu Marriage Act."*^  Tlie Act 
applied not only to Hindus by religion but to others also, such as 
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Budhists, Sikhs, Jains and Brahmosamajis, etc. "Persons governed by 
the Hindu law were ripe for the social reform and in choosing them for 
the reform it cannot be said that Parliament was discriminating against 
them'l 
In Surinder Kaur v. Gurdeep Singh,^^ the wife left for her parental home 
and without the consent of her husband took up employment as a 
teacher. Despite the sincere efforts of her husband she refiised to return 
to the conjugal home. Verma J. observes: 
According to Hindu law, marriage is a holy union. The 
relationship between husband and wife imposes upon 
each of them certain marital duties and gives each of 
them certain legal marital rights. The marriage imposes 
a duty on the husband to protect his wife, to give her 
home, to provide her with comforts and necessities of life 
within his means and to treat her nicely. It enjoins on the 
wife the duty of attendance, obedience to and veneration 
for the husband and to live with hum wherever he may 
choose to reside . 
Nijhawan v. Nijhawan is a harrowing tale of a Hindu wife married to a 
person almost twice her age and trying her best to live with a husband 
who was sexually weak. The desperate wife after nearly twenty years of 
married life asked for a decree of nullity on the ground of impotency o{^ 
the husband and in the alternative sought a decree of judicial separation 
on the ground of cruelty. Sacher J. referring to various English cases laid 
down that: 
If either of the parties to a marriage having a healthy 
capacity refuses to have sexual intercourse the same 
would amount to cruelty entitling the other party to a 
decree. In our opinion it would not make any difference 
in law whether the denial of sexual intercourse is the 
result of sexual weakness of the respondent disabling him 
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from having a sexual union with the appellant or it is 
because of any willful refusal by the respondent; this is 
because in either case the result is the same namely 
frustration and misery to the appellant due to denial of 
normal sexual life and hence cruelty. 
The respondent tried to make out that even if it amounted to cruelty the 
appellant by keeping silent during such a long period has condoned it. 
The learned judge, however, rejected this contention by holding that: 
The cruelty that may be a matter of being condoned 
within Section 23 may be the acts of the physical cruelty 
which after their occurrence may be condoned by the 
parties living together from which an inference may be 
drawn that particular act of cruelty had been condoned... 
This kind of mental cruelty is a recurring and ever 
present one...(and that where) there is a no sex life 
between the parties no question of condonation can 
• 50 
arise. 
Kunhikannan v. Malu^^ raises a very interesting facet of section 25 of 
the Act. A Hindu husband in this case secured the decree of judicial 
separation under section 10 of the Act on the ground of adultery of his 
wife. However, on the application of the wife the court also awarded the 
wife monthly maintenance. The aggrieved husband assailed this order of 
maintenance on the ground that section 25(3) precluded the court from 
awarding maintenance to an adulterous wife. He also relied upon section 
18(3) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act which deprives an 
unchaste wife of her maintenance. The High Court, however, held that it 
has jurisdiction to grant maintenance under section 25 even when the 
concerned party is guilty of adultery. Deivasigamani v. Raja Rani^^ goes 
a long way in lending a supporting hand to the hapless wife in a 
maintenance suit. In this case the wife filed a suit claiming maintenance 
under section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act against 
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her husband who had eariier been convicted of bigamy. The madras 
High Court took a bold stand in laying down that: 
Whatever may be the ground urged by the plaintiff in 
support of her claim for maintenance the status of the 
parties being admitted the grant of maintenance 
ultimately is a matter of course. Bearing the general 
principles in view, namely the acts of court including its 
delays ought not to prejudice and cause hardship to any 
party, the power to make an interim order is implicit, 
ancillary and a necessary corollary of the power to 
entertain a suit and pass final orders therein". 
An important point relating to the jurisdiction under section 19 of the 
Hindu Marriage Act was dealt with in Madhvi Sirothia \. N.N. 
Sirothia.^^ In this case the husband filed a petition for restitution of 
conjugal rights under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act in Allahabad. 
According the averments in the petition the wife had withdrawn from 
the society of the husband from April 16, 1965 (para 4), that the 
respondent visited the petitioner intermittently from May 1966 to 
August 1966 and that she refused him access to the bed during these 
visits (para 7). The lower court giving weight to the fact of subsistence 
of marital relations according to para 4 as being material for residence 
held that the Allahabad High Court had jurisdiction. Hari Swarup J. 
pointed out that section 19 does not deal with the length of residence, 
and that even a short residence may be sufficient to give the coun 
jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The learned judge stated:^^ 
The Court below impliedly appears to have thought that 
residing together must refer to residing together for the 
purpose of enjoying marital relationship as husband and 
wife. Section 19 does not say any such thing. It only 
refers to their joint residence. If the husband and wife 
had lived together in the same residence then they must 
be deemed to have resided together. The enjoyment of 
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marital relationship is not a relevant factor in 
determining if the husband and wife resided together. It 
is the factum of residence and not the purpose of 
residence that is material. 
:>(> The judgment of Veeraswami C.J. in K.M. Adam v. Gopalakrishnan 
provides an example of creativity in dealing with a difficult aspect of 
interpersonal laws relating to the maintenance of an illegitimate. There 
the appellant-defendant was a Muslim and had an illegitimate child 
through a Hindu woman. By a decree the illegitimate was granted 
maintenance at Rs. 100/- per month. It was urged forcefully that neither 
according to the personal law of the parties nor according to the 
provisions of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act such a decree 
could be passed. The learned Chief Justice observed: 
Under sub-sec. (1) the obligation is thrown on a Hindu to 
maintain his or her legitimate or illegitimate child. Sub-
sec (2) confers a right upon the legitimate or illegitimate 
child to claim maintenance from his or her father or 
mother, so long as the child is a minor. The obligation 
under sub-sec. (1) arises by reason of the status of the 
person, whether the child is legitimate or not and 
whether a Hindu or not. But sub-sec. (2) looks at the 
matter from the point of view of the child itself, and if the 
child is a Hindu, irrespective of whether the father or the 
mother is a Hindu, it is entitled to claim maintenance 
against him or her....The object of the Act is to amend 
and codify the law relating to adoptions and maintenance 
among Hindus, and considering the various provisions it 
has made and the changes, it appears to us it could not 
be the intention of the Act that a Hindu minor child 
would be left without the right to maintenance against a 
Mohammedan father. 
In Pravina Ben v. S.T. Arya^^ the Gujarat high Court considered the 
issue whether the wife had withdrawn from the society of the husband. 
There the wife was living with the husband at Baroda. After the birth of 
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a daughter with the consent of her husband, she took her education for 
obtaining a primary teacher's certificate and later was serving as a 
teacher at a village school at Bamangam. Her husband used to visit her 
and another female child was bom. Around 1969 the husband alleged 
that the wife had deserted him. The wife stated that she was prepared to 
render him conjugal obligations while continuing in service. Shah J. 
held that the wife had not withdrawn from the society of her husband 
and that she had no intention to bring the cohabitation to an end. He 
pointed out that the location of a wife's work was also an important 
consideration to be borne in mind in selecting the matrimonial home, 
although in some cases the husband's business or vocation might be the 
predominant consideration. The Division Bench decision of the 
Rajasthan High Court in Chand Narain v. Saroj Devi' showed that the 
husband, a captain in the Army, insisted that the wife should take to 
non-vegetarian food and drinking habits. He also used to beat his wife, 
who was highly educated, and threatened to contract a second marriage. 
The court held that the wife had a reasonable excuse to withdraw from 
the society of the husband and the decree for restitution of conjugal 
rights could not be granted. 
The decision of the Supreme Court in Dastane v. Dastane'^" has a classic 
touch and an enduring quality. The parties in this case belonged to what 
might be termed as elitist class of society, as is not infrequently the case 
with matrimonial disputes adjudicated by the courts. The husband, 
petitioner in this case, was a Ph.D. in agronomy and the wife, a graduate 
at the time of marriage, had earned an M.A. after the breakdown of the 
marriage. An "important episode" in the life of the respondent, Sucheta, 
before her marriage was that she was mentally affected for some time 
which necessitated her undergoing treatment in the mental hos})ital at 
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Yervada. As per the version of her father, this mental illness was due to 
her having suffered a sun-stroke and also due to an attack of cerebral 
malaria. Apparently she was cured of the affliction. When the marriage 
was about to be settled Sucheta's father informed the appellant's father 
about this aspect with a view to not keeping them in the dark about it 
The marriage took place in 1956. Two daughter Subha and Vibha bom 
of the marriage in 1957 and 1959. Between May and October of 1960 
the marriage was under great strain. Her ideas about a husband are: 
He is a dog tied at doorstep who is supposed to come and 
go at her beck and call whenever ordered. She behaves 
with the relatives of her husband as if they were her 
servants. When I see her besides herself with fury, I feel 
afraid she may kill me at any moment. I have become 
weary of her nature of beating the daughters, scolding 
and nagging me every night uttering abuses and insults. 
The husband filed a petition in February 1962 for annulment of his 
maiTiage on the ground of fraud, for judicial separation on the ground of 
cruelty and for dissolution on the ground of insanity. The judgment of 
the Supreme Court contains certain observations of general interest 
which will serve to remove the misconceptions that have penneiited in 
the field. These relate to: 
(1) The approach to the facts - whether in view of the fact tliat the 
parties are Hindus, any special assumptions are required. 
(2) The standard of proof required in matrimonial causes. 
(3) The distinction between the concept of cruelty under the English 
law and under the Hindu Marriage Act. 
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On the first the court stated:''' 
The parties are Hindus, but we do not propose,...as is 
commonly done and as has been done in this case to 
describe the respondent as a "Hindu wife " in contrast to 
non-Hindu wives as if women professing this or that 
particular religion are exclusively privileged in the 
matter of good sense, loyalty and conjugal kindness. Nor 
shall we refer to the appellant as a "Hindu husband"... 
as if that species unfailingly projects the image of tyrant 
husbands. We propose to consider the evidence on its 
merits, remembering of course the peculiar habits, ideas, 
susceptibilities and expectations of persons belonging to 
the strata of society to which these two belong. All the 
circumstances which constitute the occasion or setting 
for the conduct complained of have relevance but we 
think that no assumption can be made that the respondent 
is the oppressed and appellant the oppressor. The 
evidence in any case ought to bear a secular examination 
(emphasis added). 
The court pointed out the distinction between the concept of 
cruehy under the English law and under the Hindu Marriage Act. The 
High Court relied upon the English decisions in coming to the 
conclusion that the acts of the wife did not amount to cruelty. The 
Supreme Court stressed that what constitutes cruelty must depend upon 
the terms of the statute.*'" After referring to the language of section 10(1) 
{b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Chandrachud J. observed: 
The inquiry therefore has to be whether the conduct 
charged as cruelty is of such character as to cause in the 
mind of the petitioner a reasonable apprehension that it 
will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the 
respondent. It is not necessary, as it is under the English 
law that the cruelty must be of such a character as to 
cause "danger" to life, limb or health or as to give rise 
to a reasonable apprehension of such a danger. Clearly, 
danger to life, limb or health or a reasonable 
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apprehension of it is a higher requirement than a 
reasonable apprehension that it is harmful or injurious 
for one spouse to live with the other. 
On the fact the court found that the conduct of the wife amounted to 
crueky. 
The Madras High Court in Chinnaperumal v. Mariyayee ' heard the 
husband's appeal against the decree for restitution of conjugal rights 
passed by the lower courts. It considered three grounds, namely, delay in 
filing a petifion for restitution of conjugal rights, "reckless allegations'' 
of unchastity leveled against the wife by the husband and the eifect of 
an agreement to live separately on the relief The learned single judge 
pointed out that woman in India is reluctant to go to the court and that 
the court should be guided by the "humanitarian principle" a term used 
by him for want of a better one. He held that the wife could not be non-
suited on this ground. The court held that the wife had sufficient reason 
to keep away from the husband, that by leveling reckless allegations of 
adultery and by his refusal to take her back he should be deemed to have 
deserted his wife. 
Sushil Kumari v. Prem Kumar contains some important observations. 
The husband obtained a decree for restitution of conjugal rights against 
his wife on January 30, 1974. He filed a petition for judicial separation 
on February 8, 1974. In the appeal of the wife against the decree for 
restitution of conjugal rights, it was contended that the husband in his 
petition alleged that she had illicit relations with a third person and, 
therefore, the wife had reasonable exuse to refuse to cohabit with him. 
Upholding the contendon of the wife, Rohatgi J. observed:^^ 
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The husband's claim is incongruous. He cannot claim 
that the wife must live with him when he suspects her 
fidelity. The two claims, namely, restitution as well as an 
accusation of adultery cannot stand side by side. They 
are incompatible. Whoever has heard of a man claiming 
restitution against his wife whom he charges with 
infidelity? 
The learned judge stated that the husband's petition for restitution of 
conjugal rights did not spring from a genuine desire to live together as 
man and wife but from a desire to use it as a device to obtain divorce. 
He pointed out that the second proceeding commenced by him, hardly 
seven days from the date when he obtained the first decree, was 
indicative of his mind. He stated: 
The remedy of restitution is not to be treated as a fiction, 
a halting place as it were on the onward journey to a 
dissolution of marriage. The legislature bids us to treat it 
as a reality, as an opportunity for the parties to allow 
their passions to cool down and return to the conjugal 
fold and rebuild the broken home, if they can. 
A socially significant decision was handed down by Modi J. of the 
Rajasthan High Court under secdon 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act/" A 
school teacher in Gujarat married a man having a job in Ajmer. After the 
marriage the spouses continued in their service in their respective places 
and joined each other only during vacations and holidays. Four years 
later the wife gave up her job and came to live with the husband. They 
failed to pull on and soon the wife took up another assignment in 
Gujarat. She had no intention of deserting her husband and wished that 
their marital life should continue as it did during the first four years of 
marriage. The husband insisted on her resigning the new job and living 
with him at Ajmer and, on her refusal to do so, instituted an action for 
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restitution of conjugal rights. As the trial court refused to oblige him, he 
came in appeal before the High Court. Modi J. was told, on behali of the 
husband, that under Hindu law a wife is bound to be "dutiful" to her 
husband and remain under his "protection". The judge agreed. He. 
however, explained: 
But the concepts of protection of the husband are not 
inelastic and rigid which cannot be moulded in the 
context of present day conditions and needs of the 
society. 
To the question: "Can a husband insist upon his wife to resign from her 
job"? - the point blank answer of Modi J. was: 
"The question arises whose voice should be decisive, 
whether that of the husband or that of the wife? in my 
opinion, where a wife feels that she should work, the 
decisive voice must be her own and if there is 
disagreement between her and her husband, the latter 
cannot compel her to leave the job ". 
In Dharmendra v. Usha, deserted by her husband, Dharmendra, Usha 
petitioned for restitution of conjugal rights under section 9 of the Hindu 
marriage Act and got a decree. Two years elapsed and then she sought a 
divorce under section 13(lA)(ii) of the Act. Contesting the petition for 
divorce, Dharmendra attributed non-restitution (following the decree 
therefore) to Usha who, he claimed, did not respond to his willingness to 
re-unite. Rejecting the plea, the court granted a divorce. Dharmendra. 
then, appealed and the case finally reached the Supreme Court. 
Dharmendra's chief argument was that Usha's failure to respond to his 
willingness for the resumption of relations was her "own wrong" of 
which she was now taking advantage and this could not be allowed in 
view of section 23(1 )(a) of the Act. The Supreme Court refused to 
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oblige Dharmendra. It held that in order to be a "wrong" under section 
23(1 )(a), the alleged conduct of the petitioner must be "misconduct 
serious enough to justify denial of the relief a mere "disinclination to 
agree to an offer of re-union" could not be regarded as such a "wrong". 
Tracing the history of section 13(1 A), the court concluded that a relief 
which is available even to the spouse against whom the decree of 
restitution has been passed should not be denied to the spouse in whose 
favour it was passed, but who does not now insist on compliance with 
the decree. 
In V.C. Dubey v. Smt. Diibey, Delhi a husband sought annulment of his 
marriage by a decree of nullity under section 12(l)(a) of the Act on the 
ground of his wife's impotency/° He was sent back by the lower court 
on account of nearly eight years' delay in bringing the action (despite 
the fact that the defendant-wife did not contest the suit). He appealed to 
the Delhi High Court where Rohatgi J. came to his rescue. The judge 
explained the rationale and true objects of the 'bar of delay' under 
section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act. "Delay, however, long" he 
warned - "is not in itself a bar in a nullity suit, it is merely a factor in 
considering any insincerity (on the part of the petitioner)". The key 
words (in the statutory provision) are, he asserted "improper" and 
"unreasonable"; delay itself does not amount to approbation. The test, in 
his opinion, is whether the delay is, in a particular case, "in the nature of 
a wrong"? Quoting from several foreign cases decided in recent years he 
pointed out the modern trend which favours exercise of a liberal 
discretion in the cases of delay, and he attributed it to the changing 
patterns of social behaviour. The final ruling was that the onus of 
proving that delay is inexcusable is on the respondent. The judgment is, 
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indeed, valuable - a welcome change from rigid conservatism to a 
judicious liberalism. 
In Swaraj Garg v. KM. Garg '^ the parties were married at Sunam in 
the Punjab. The wife at that time was aged 32 years and was working as 
a school teacher. The husband, though well-qualified, initially could not 
get a suitable job. In 1966 he got a job in Delhi on Rs. 50 p.m. He did 
not own any house at Delhi. The parties did not at any time either before 
or after the marriage discuss about their matrimonial home. The wife 
stayed with her husband at Delhi from 12-7-64 to 28-7-64 and again 
from October 1964 to February 1965. The husband filed a petition for 
institution of conjugal rights. The full Bench decision of the Punjab and 
Haryana High Court in Kailash Wati v. Ayodhia Prakash ' was cited at 
the bar in support of the petition of the husband. There the court 
specifically adverting to the position of a person who marries a ^^  oman 
already in service observed: 
The true position in law appears to be that any working 
woman entering into matrimony by necessary implication 
consents to the obvious and known marital duty of living 
with the husband as a necessary incident of marriage. 
Referring to the view of the Punjab and Haryana High Court that the 
husband alone had the right to set up the matrimonial home on the basis 
of custom, he stated that it reflected the conditions of the age in which 
the custom was practiced. He observed: 
// would be difficult to say now that there is any custom 
which obliges an earning wife to resign her job and join 
her husband even though on merits it is she who is better 
placed to choose the place of the matrimonial home 
rather than the husband...^'^ 
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Further, he pointed out that Article 14 guarantees equality before the law 
and equal protection of laws. Therefore, any law which gives exclusive 
rights to the husband to decide upon the place of the matrimonial home, 
without considering the claim of the wife would be contrary to law. A 
significant aspect of the decision is its reliance on Article 14 of the 
Constitution in the field of Hindu law. Although the family laws in India 
contain many discriminatory provisions against women, and although 
the enforcement of these provisions would constitute "state action", the 
courts ignored these aspects. Garg's case marks a departure in this res-
pect. 
In Lila Gupta v. Laxmi Narain one Rajendra Kumar married Sarla 
Gupta. The marriage was dissolved by a decree of divorce on April 8, 
1963. A month later, on May 25, 1963 Rajendra Kumar contracted a 
second marriage with Lila Gupta, the appellant in this case. Rajendra 
Kumar expired in May 1965. His brothers and brother's sons challenged 
the right of Lila Gupta to succeed to certain bhumidhari rights on the 
ground that his marriage with Lila Gupta was in contravention of 
proviso to section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. On appeal, the 
question before the Supreme Court was: Whether a marriage contracted 
in contravention of or violation of the proviso to section 15 of the Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1955, is void or merely invalid without affecting the core 
of the marriage and the parties are subject to a binding tie of wedlock 
flowing from the marriage. D.A. Desai J. delivering the judgment for 
himself and Chandrachud C. J. has pointed out that a comprehensive 
review of the provisions indicates that the legislative thrust is not to 
render every marriage solemnized in violation of one or other condition 
void. 
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Desai J. proceeded to say ,77 
These express provisions would show that Parliament 
was aware about treating any specific marriage void and 
only specific marriages punishable. This express 
provision prima facie would go a long way to negative 
any suggestion of a marriage being void though not 
covered by S.l 1 such as in breach of proviso to S. J 5 as 
being void by necessary implication. The net effect of it is 
that at any rate Parliament did not think fit to treat such 
marriage void or that it is so opposed to public policy as 
to make it punishable. 
After rejecting the arguments based on the interpretation of section 57 of 
the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, the court held that the marriage of 
Rajendra Kumar with Lila Gupta was not void and that she was entitled 
to succeed to his properties. The noteworthy aspect of the judgments is 
that the Supreme Court has emerged from the thicket of technical 
interpretation to the plain road of social policy. A less resolute court 
could have invalidated the marriage on grounds like precedents under 
the Indian Divorce Act; the courts will not supply causus omissus, etc. 
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In Preeti v. Ravind Kr. Sharma , the court rightly pointed out that 
equities between the parties should be adjusted. Again it unexceptionaliy 
stated that a court must take into account the necessary expenses of a 
party in the discharge of his duties. It observed: 
If a party has to pay insurance premium or provident 
fund or income-tax, these are necessary expenses, which 
must be deducted from the gross income to arrive at a net 
income. Similarly, the party would be requiring some 
amount to meet his or her daily needs. Such amount must 
also be considered as necessary expenses. It would, 
therefore, be seen that probably 50 or 60 per cent of the 
income of a person would go towards necessary 
expenses. ^ 
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As regards the other party, the court was of the following view; 
Even if she has no income but she has the support of her 
parents or such others, the Court may award a nominal 
monthly amount towards maintenance.... 
Rajeshbai v. Shantabai is an unusual judgment which needs to be 
followed by more judges in this country if we desire law to subserve the 
cause of justice. More often than not we find the higher courts throwing 
out genuine claims of parties on the ground of some technicality or the 
other even though they may be convinced of the justness of the cause 
and thereby putting the entire judicial system into calumny. It is true 
that dichotomy between law and justice is inevitable in the pattern of 
judicial system we have inherited, however, the courts should endeavour 
to make law the handmaid of justice and not the other way round. 
The case on hand involved the conflicting interests of the biganiously 
married wife with that of the first wife. When the respondent first wife 
attempted to enforce her claim regarding the property of her deceased 
husband, it was resisted by her husband's brothers and the bigamously 
married wife. The appellant defendant, namely, the second wife even 
went to the extent of disputing the status of the first wife on the ground 
that she had been earlier divorced under a custom prevalent in the 
community. The courts, however, disbelieved the divorce stoiy and 
upheld the status of the first wife and thereby declaring her the sole heir 
to the property of the deceased husband. Masodkar J. observed: 
Undoubtedly a female spouse united by marriage enters 
upon a status and is conferred with immediate as well as 
incohate rights attached to such status.... When that 
status is shaken and found to have no sanction it does not 
follow that even the incohate rights of such person are 
totally eclipsed. As distinct from succession or inherit-
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ance, the right of maintenance can be treated to be a 
separate one... always available during the lifetime and 
even depending upon the contingent conditions after the 
death of the husband. Maintenance, thus, is a personal 
right. In its character it can be treated to be a secular 
right recognised by almost all the systems of personal 
laws in various degrees and under varying conditions. 
Masodkar J, rightly emphasized: 
Though, therefore, for the purpose of the Succession Act, 
the terms "wife and widow" would have a restricted 
articulate legal meaning, that by itself would not be the 
position when the matter arises for the purpose of 
providing the measures of sustenance on considerations 
of justice and fairplay involved and basic to all human 
and social relations. 
While conceding the purely legal consequences under the existing 
situation, Masodkar J. raises an intensely human question: 
Is that such a person who has done everything and 
surrendered her prime of the youth to be at the mercy of 
the cold dictates of law and to remain ever unprovided 
and suffer the pangs of destitution? ^ 
Spelling out the implicit limitations of the statutory provisions in (his 
area and particularly section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the judge 
observed: 
Even apart from Sec. 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, I 
would think that in such matter the Court possesses the 
inherent power to make such orders in matters of 
maintenance as may be necessary so as to meet the ends 
of justice. The principles underlying Sec. 151 of the Civil 
P.C. 1908 are no more in doubt. Where the need and the 
circumstances to do justice require, the power to act ex 
debito justitiae exists and can be invoked.^^ 
While emphasizing the inadequacies of the statutory law 
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Masodkar J. observed : 
When law's terms are inadequate and lead to loose ends 
in unfair tracts, the Court can rely on its inherent power 
to do justice. With changing complexity of human 
relations and times, everything cannot be provided by 
enacted statutes and unfailing as well as just results can 
be left to be worked out by the Courts possessing such 
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power. 
Vinod Kumar v. State is an exceedingly significant decision in the 
context of the present spurt in dowry deaths and the social turmoil it 
has generated. The Parliament is also seized of this problem which, we 
are sure, cannot be tackled exclusively by enacting legal measures. The 
brilliant judgment of Sandhawalia C.J. has attempted to balance the 
delicate human relations in the family with the legal requirements of 
matrimonial law and criminal law. The case involved the giving of the 
dowry and other valuable gifts at the time of marriage. The parties did 
not have a smooth sailing in their matrimony and as usual the wife was 
driven out of the matrimonial home. But the wife in this case did not, 
like a typical Hindu wife, take the situation lying down. She involved 
her husband and the in-laws in the cobwebs of criminal law obviously 
by securing the "co-operation" of the local police, who not only 
arrested the husband and the in-laws but subjected them to torture while 
in their custody. The matter came up before the Punjab High Court 
under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 for quashing 
the proceeding against them as a blatant abuse of judicial process. We 
are not concerned in the present context with the principal question of 
jurisdiction of the court to quash the proceeding before a lower court or 
even before it had reached the forum of that court, namely, wher it is 
still in the stage of police enquiry.^^ But we are mainly interested in the 
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nature of ownership over dowry and its appurtenances given at the time 
of marriage and the dominion, exercisable by the spouses over them. It 
is significant that the wife, in this case, initiated a proceeding under 
section 405 of the Indian Penal Code, I860 for criminal breach of trust. 
Her contention was that the property gifted at the time of marriage 
constituted her stridhana and she had merely entrusted its-custody to 
her husband and the in-laws who, in spite of her demand to return those 
articles, have been misusing them, thereby committing an offence 
under section 405 of the Code. The judge has raised a very important 
presumption in favour of the wife by laying down : 
/ am inclined to the view that the normal presumption 
would be that the ownership in such like articles would 
vest in the Hindu wife unless it can be clearly established 
to (he contrary that these were given expressly for the 
joint ownership of the couple. 
While noticing the contention that dowry of this nature would be 
commonly used and enjoyed with the implied consent of the wife, the 
judge authoritatively laid down: 
Mere joint enjoyment thereof does not necessarily divest 
a Hindu wife of her exclusive ownership or to make it 
joint property by the mere factum of such user.... The 
break down of the marriage or the splitting up of the 
matrimonial home would inevitably involve the 
revocation of such leave and licence by the wife thus 
resuscitating her right to exclusive possession. 
Now, coming to the most important aspect of the property owned by the 
spouses individually, the judge raised the question: 
What indeed is the true legal relationship of the husband 
and wife qua the property individually owned by each 
within the four walls of the matrimonial home? Does the 
wife stand entrusted with the property belonging to her 
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husband individually and vice versa the husband stands 
(sic) entrusted with such property vesting in the exclusive 
ownership of the wife. 
Sandhawalia C.J. has strongly disapproved of any formal relationship 
between the spouses regarding the property of the individual spouse: 
Rather it appears to me that the conjugal relationship 
and existence of a matrimonial home automatically 
obviates any such hyper-technicalities of an entrustment 
or dominion over property. It 'seems inapt to conceive 
the relationship as a day-to-day entrustment of the 
property of the husband to the custody of the wife or vice-
versa of the property of the wife to the husband. ' 
The judge finally concluded: 
The matrimonial home so long as it subsists presumes a 
jointness of custody and possession by the spouses of 
their individual as also of their joint properties which 
cannot be divided by any metaphorical line. In a homely 
metaphor in the context of the modern commercialized 
world it has been said that the marriage relationship is 
not one of "I and You limited" but that of "We limited". 
Indu Gupta v. Rajeshwar Pershad^^ is a significant decision of the Delhi 
High Court which has given a traditional orientation to the concept of 
desertion which, we are sure, is not in conformity with the emerging 
values of the modem Indian society. The parties in this case belonged to 
the lower middle class and in an expensive city like Delhi, they had to 
be contented with a one room tenement in which were huddled together 
a dozen members of the family. The newly married wife whc had 
obviously dreamt of a romantic married life had to struggle with the 
accommodation provided under the "charpoy (cot) of the husband". 
There was, therefore, a total negation of privacy for the young wife and 
it was thus natural for any woman under those conditions to persuade 
her husband to establish a separate household. The husband was, 
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however, unwilling to leave the family in view of the fact he was the 
eldest son and therefore, saddled with traditional responsioilities. 
Thereafter, the wife deserted her husband, who under the amended 
provision of section 13(l)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act secured 
divorce. The High Court affirmed the decision of the lower court by 
upholding the divorce granted to the husband. 
Vilayat v. Sunilaf^ a decision of the Delhi High Court, raises a 
significant question to the applicability in the context of a Hindu spouse 
embracing Islam but seeking the matrimonial relief under the provisions 
of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The parties were Hindu married 
according to traditional rites. Though a child was born of the marriage, 
the spouses do not seem to have had a smooth sail in their matrimonial 
life. Some time later the husband embraced Islam and sought divorce 
not under his personal law at the time of filing the petition, namely, 
Muslim law, but under the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act. The 
wife, however, opposed the petition on the ground that since her 
husband was a Muslim at the time of filing the petition, he could not 
avail of the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act for sorting out his 
matrimonial differences. Whereas the lower court upheld this objection 
of the wife, the High Court reversed that finding by holding that even if 
one of the parties to a Hindu marriage has changed his or her religion, a 
petition for matrimonial relief is maintainable under the Hindu marriage 
Act. The solufion which Leila Seth J. has devised in this case''^has been 
labeled by B.N. Sampath over a decade ago as the "package dea '^'^ ^ 
Commendng on the efficacy of such a solution, this writer had observed: 
Some may suggest that marriage should be treated as a 
package deal" and that if two persons belonging to a 
particular religion marry under that personal law, they 
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should continue to be governed by that personal law 
irrespective of their change of religion. The "package 
deal" bristles with its own problems. For instance, let us 
assume that two Hindus married according to the 
Shastras embrace Islam and some time later, the husband 
becomes a Christian. In such circumstances the Muslim 
wife may argue that her marriage with her Christian 
husband is unsustainable and should therefore, be 
terminated. The "package deal" solution provides for the 
application of the personal law under which they were 
originally married. So, in this case Hindu law will have 
to be applied to disentangle the spouses one of whom is a 
Muslim and the other a Christian and we are sure that no 
court will relish such a situation. We have therefore, 
before us a problem in which Muslim law cannot be 
applied. Christian law may not be applied and Hindu law 
should not be applied, and we do not know which law to 
apply. Such a situation is not worth putting up with any 
longer in the present age. 
Without considering the issue of conflict of personal laws tnat is 
inherent in the situation, Leila Seth J. has relied upon the apparent 
distinction between the wording used in section 5 and section 13 o^ the 
Hindu Marriage Act in support of her conclusion. The judge says: 
It is also necessary to notice that in Section 5 it is 
mentioned that "a marriage may be solemnized between 
any two Hindus", if certain conditions are (sic) set out 
threin are fulfilled. But section 13 does not speak of 
Hindus. It speaks of "a petition presented by either the 
husband or the wife" for dissolution by a decree of 
divorce. Section 13B speaks of both the parties to the 
marriage and not of Hindus. This would further indicate 
that at the time of presentation of the petition, the parties 
need not be Hindus. ^. 
T. Sareetha v. T. Venkata Subbaiah'^' is a 'cause celebre' that has stiiTed 
up a controversy involving the constitutionality of section 9 o" the 
Hindu Marriage Act. An enthusiastic single judge P.A. Chaudary J has 
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struck down section 9 as unconstitutional and has thereby, deprived the 
Hindus of Andhra Pradesh, of the rehef of restitution of conjugal rights 
so long as the decision is not overruled by a bigger Bench of the same 
High Court or by the Supreme Court. It is surprising that Choudary J. 
has taken the drastic step of striking down the provisions of a central 
statute and particularly involving a constitutional issue without referring 
the issue to a bigger Bench, a practice that is generally adhered to, by 
single judges or smaller Benches. It may be recalled, here, that 
Choudary J. is not the first judge to take a radical view of the provisions 
of the Hindu Marriage Act; indeed, another judge of the same High 
Court had earlier declared the child marriages taking place in 
contravention of the provisions of section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act 
void thereby, generating a first rate socio-legal problem in the State of 
Andhra Pradesh . The main attack of the petitioner on section 9 was 
based on the theme that the restitution of conjugal rights in its plain 
form is nothing short of compelling an unwilling wife to forced sexual 
intercourse thereby, offending her right to freedom of person guaranteed 
under the Constitution. It is interesting to note that the fanciful 
arguments of the wife found favour with Choudary J. who struck down 
section 9 as unconstitutional. Choudary J. has attempted to spell out the 
purport of the relief of restitution: 
Conjugal rights cannot two ideas, (a) "the right which 
the husband and wife have to each other's society" and 
(b) "marital intercourse."...In other words sexual 
cohabitation is an inseparable ingredient of a decree for 
restitution of conjugal rights. 
The Supreme Court has set an example in humane approach in 
Nandarani Mazumdar v. Indian Air Lines"^^^ wherein justice is done 
ignoring the technicalities of law. The ill-advised wife (as pointed out by 
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the Supreme Court), who had earlier secured permanent alimony 
consequent to the dissolution of her marriage, had filed a suit against the 
heirs of her deceased husband for charging her maintenance against the 
property in the hands of the heirs. In fact, she should have taken up 
execution proceedings for enforcing her maintenance order The 
Supreme Court, instead of dismissing the suit on purely technical 
grounds, treated it as an execution proceeding and directed a settlement 
of adequate funds out of the estate of the deceased to meet her 
maintenance. Ranganath Misra j . observed: 
There is good authority for converting an execution 
application into a suit and there could, in our opinion, be 
no valid objection to the counter process of converting a 
suit into an execution proceeding, particularly when an 
ill-advised widow would on account of some procedural 
error be likely to be deprived of the fruits or an order of 
maintenance. 
In Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan Kumar,'^ the important question before the 
court was whether a consent decree for restitution of conjugal rights 
would bar a petition under section 13(A)(ii) on the ground th;it the 
consent decree was a collusive decree and therefore divorce could be 
granted in view of section 23(l)(c). In this case involving a wife's 
petition for restitution, a consent decree granting the relief was passed. 
Since there was no resumption of cohabitation for a period of one year, 
the husband sued for divorce under section 13(A)(/0. The trial court 
decined to pass the decree on the ground that consent decree being 
collusive, divorce was barred. On appeal, the Punjab and Haryana High 
Court, disagreeing with the trial court, passed a decree of divorce. The 
Supreme Court confirming the decree observed that the consent decrees 
per se in matrimonial matters were not collusive, where the parties had 
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agreed to the decree in pursuance of the attempt made by the court at 
reconciliation, and if that decree remained unsatisfied, the husband 
could not be denied divorce on the ground that this would amount to his 
taking advantage of his own wrong. Then the court added that for 
whatever be the reason the marriage had broken down irretrievably and 
the parties could not live as husband and wife, and thus in such a case, it 
was better to close the chapter. It is a well established rule of English 
matrimonial law followed in India'°^ that drunkenness per se does not 
amount to cruelty. But if drunkenness leads to harassment or mental 
torture of the other spouse, it may amount to cruelty. In Rita v. Brij 
Kishore,'^^ Jain J. observed: 
No doubt drinking is a constituent of culture all over the 
world, and is almost a cult in certain societies. Yet, even 
here as elsewhere a habit of excessive drinking is a vice 
and cannot be considered a reasonable wear and tear of 
married life. No reasonable person marries to bargain to 
endure habitual drunkenness, a disgusting conduct. And 
yet it is not an independent ground of any matrimonial 
relief in India. But it may constitute treatment with 
cruelty, if indulged in by a spouse and continued in spite 
of remonstrances by the other. It may cause great 
anguish and distress to the wife who never suspected 
what she was bargaining for and may sooner or later 
find living together not only miserable but unbearable. If 
it was so, she may leave him and may, ap&rtfrom cruelty, 
even complain of constructive desertion...'^^ 
In Udaivir Singh v. Vinod Kumari,'^^ it was stated in the wife's petition 
that she was a semi-literate lady, unable to get a job and that the 
financial position of the father was not sound enough to maintain tier for 
long. There was, however, no express statement that she was unable to 
maintain herself, though this fact was established on evidence. The plea 
taken by the other party that there was not averment by the petitioner 
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that she was unable to maintain herself was not accepted and she was 
awarded maintenance. So also, an omission to aver that the respondent 
has neglected or refused to maintain the applicant would also not affect 
the applicant's right. 
In G. Venkatanarayana v. Kurupati laxmi Devi, Rama Rao J 
observed: 
"The physician as an expert withness has become a 
common and welcome feature in Courts ranging from 
opinions on nature and degree of injuries to the 
proximate cause of death in criminal cases, assessment of 
insanity and several other situations. Where there is a 
dispute between the wife and husband about the potency 
of either of them, their evidence reflected by truth 
constitutes the cream of evidence and the marshalling of 
adventitious or extraneous circumstances afford a poor 
substitute. In the event of diametrically opposite and rival 
versions of the parties the recourse to medical test 
resolves the riddle and the medical opinion assumes the 
acceptable piece of evidence. " The court held that 
there was nothing in section 14, Evidence Act, which 
excluded examination of mental or bodily state of a 
person and there was no deprivation of personal liberty 
under Article 21 involved in the medical examination of 
human body is both a legally a legally correct and 
socially just decisions. 
False accusation of adultery on the part of one party against the other 
constitutes mental cruelty. This proposition was reiterated by the Gujarat 
High Court in A. v. 5 ."^ D.C. Gheewala J observed that to allege that 
the wife was unchaste by itself amounted to gravest of mental cruelty. 
After making wild and reckless allegations in the written statement 
regarding the chastity of the wife, trying to resile from the same in the 
oral statement would not change the situation. In this case the husband 
wanted to have perverted sex relations with his wife. The judge 
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observed that if one party desires to have perverted sexual relations, 
such as cunnilingus and fellatio, then the normal sex relations between 
the spouses which form the basis of marital life, would be floundered on 
the bed-rock of sexual aversion on the part of the normal spouse. This is 
worst cruelty. The judge added, some innocuous sado-masochistic 
practices might at times form an integral part of marital relations but if 
they degenerate into practices which may cause physical harm or 
psychological trauma to one of the partners, they would undoubtedly 
amount to physical and mental cruelty. In Kamini Gupta v. Miikesh 
Kumar Gupta"'^ the husband filed a petition for divorce on the ground 
of cruety as the wife had made false charges of adultery against him. 
The wife in her written statement averred that her charges were not 
false. In her oral testimony she repeated those charges and also named 
three girls with whom the husband was alleged to have had sexual 
relations but she failed to establish a single case of infidelity. While 
granting a decree of dissolution of marriage, Avadh Behari Rohatgi J. of 
the Delhi Court observed: 
There are no categories of cruel conduct. No 
compartments. The doctrine of danger of life and limb is 
no longer in the ascendant. Mental cruelty is now well 
recognized as ground for divorce. 
The judge added that the courts have also evolved a pragmatic test, 
namely, whether there is any practical possibility of the parties living 
together in connubial happiness, if not, marriage should be dissolved. 
Khanna J. of the Delhi High Court makes a distinction between educated 
and affluent people on the one side, and poor and illiterate on the other. 
According to him, in cases where the couples are educated, financially 
and socially independent or are well aware of the consequences of 
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break-up of marriages and are determined to proceed in that direciion, it 
can be said that to still hold them tied by matrimonial bond would be 
wholly unjustified. When marital relationship breaks down completely 
between the spouses, the uneducated, illiterate, socially and 
economically weak wife as well as the educated, affluent and forward 
wife, would feel much more hurt in matrimony than in divorce. When a 
marriage breaks down completely the only solution to the spouses is to 
get out of it. There cannot be greater hardship than to live in a broken 
home. Another important fact that was established in this case was that 
the wife had lived in the matrimonial home for some days though no 
sexual intercourse was resumed during this period. It was argued by the 
wife's counsel that this caused a break of the statutory period cif one 
year which was a mandatory requirement of section 13(1 A) (ii). 
Agreeing with this contention the court rightly held that it amounted to a 
break in the period and thus the husband was not entitled to the decree 
of divorce on that count. 
A Full Bench of the Kerala High Court has taken the view that when a 
wife sues her husband for maintenance on the ground of his desertion, 
she need not establish that he left her or abandoned her with an intention 
to desert."^ Bhaskaran CJ, after distinguishing the Supreme Court 
decisions in Bipinchander Shah v. Prabhavathi,"^ Rohini Kumari v. 
Narendra Singh," which are cases under the Bombay Hindu Divorce 
Act and section 13(1), Hindu Marriage Act (elaborating the concept of 
desertion in the context of divorce), observed that the provision of 
legislature aiming at the protection and welfare of women who were 
deserted or neglected have to be construed liberally bearing in mind the 
object sought to be achieved and the mischiefs intended to be curbed. 
The judge then said."^ 
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If we insist on the proof of animus on the part of the 
husband to desert his wife, as a requirement preceding to 
the claim for maintenance by the Hindu wife, deserted 
and neglected, that would not only run counter to the 
spirit and object of the provisions of a beneficent 
legislation, but also would amount to retracting from the 
path of social justice, which under the Constitution, the 
courts are bound to advance. 
Hanuman v. Chander Kala"^ reaffirms well established proposition of 
law that impotency, i.e., inability to have sexual intercourse, amounts to 
cruelty. The court observed that when medical evidence of male 
impotency is given the husband has to prove not only that he has well-
formed genital organs and thus capable of having sexual intercourse, but 
also that he is capable of having erection so as to be able to penetrate the 
female organ. If that is not done, the husband fails to discharge the 
burden and decree for dissolution of marriage could be made in lavour 
of the wife.'^^ 
In Harbhajan Singh Manga v. Amarjit Kaur, the wife not merely 
refused to do household work, but, in the presence of guests, also Ibrced 
the husband to clean the dining table, utensils, and crockery. She even 
slapped the husband. This Vansthali-educated graduate wife did not stop 
at these. She used to keep her husband waiting outside the house for half 
an hour or more on his return from the office. She would abuse him in 
the filthiest language and would constantly threaten him that she would 
commit suicide and would implicate him and his other relations in 
criminal cases. She would not allow him to enter the bedroom. She went 
to the extent of leveling false charges of embezzlement against him to 
the bank authorities, where he was employed. On these facts, rather on 
any single fact, no court will find any difficulty in holding that wife was 
guilty of cruelty towards her husband. 
539 
In Ashok Kumar v. Premi'^^ the parties were married on 13 November, 
1970 and a male child was bom to them on 23 August, 1971. Thereafter, 
they started making charges of immorality against each othei-. The 
husband alleged that prior to marriage the wife was leading an immoral 
life, was a call-girl and that she continued to lead that life even after the 
marriage. He also alleged that the parties also executed a divorce-deed 
by mutual consent, consequent on the wife's admission of her 
immorality. Thereafter, the wife left the matrimonial home leaving 
behind the minor son who was at that time five months old. In her 
written statement the wife denied these charges and averred that on 
account of his suspicion, the husband made her life miserable. She 
alleged that in fact it was the husband who was leading immoral life 
since he has had sex with many girls with whom he was staging dramas. 
On the appreciation of the evidence, the trial court found that the wife 
had deserted the husband. Undoubtedly she left the matrimonial home. 
The intention to desert was evident from several facts, such as her 
letters, her refusal to take care of the child when it was sick, her 
abandoning the child when it was only five months old. The court added 
that since the wife had not shown any reasonable cause for her 
withdrawal, the husband was entitled to divorce. 
In Krishna v. Satish Lai the parties entered into a compromise. 
Punchhi J. observing that formalities under secdon 13B(2) can be 
dispensed with pertinently observed.'^ '* 
The fact of fruitful years in human life being short and 
the possibility of the litigating parties rearranging their 
lives after the divorce by mutual consent, also seem to 
have been the pervasive factors when this court granted 
instant relief without letting the parties to go in for 
another bout of litigation in the processural mill. 
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Therefore, if the circumstances warrant.... The 
matrimonial court can dissolve a marriage by a decree of 
divorce between two Hindus on the basis of a 
compromise entered into between the parties during the 
pendency of the divorce petition without strictly following 
the procedure prescribed by section 13-B(2). 
The constitutional validity of section 24 was challenged before the 
Andhra Pradesh High Court in P.S. Krishna Murthy v. P. S, Umadevi" 
on the ground that it was discriminatory and violative of article 14 since 
under section 36, Indian Divorce Act; 1869 the maximum amount of 
interim maintenance that can be grantee to wife is only one-fifth of the 
husband's average net income for the three years next preceding the 
order while under section 24, HMA the liability is unspecified. The 
court held that section 24 was more reasonable and beneficial to the wife 
and thus there was no invidious discriminafion or undue disability to the 
wife or husband. 
Under section 125(4) a wife living separately from the husband by 
mutual consent is not entitled to maintenance. A wife who has obtained 
a divorce by mutual consent, however, has been held to be not 
disentitled to maintenance. In Sadasivan Filial v. Vijaya LaksJuni''^ 
there was a specific clause in the joint petition that neither the wiib nor 
the husband would have any claim or right in each other's person or 
property. In other words, the wife relinquished her right to claim any 
maintenance from the husband. The wife, however, filed a maintenance 
petition under section 125. The husband used that agreement as his 
defence. The court did not accept the husband's defence. It held: 
The purpose of section 125 is not to create or recognize a 
right as such in favour of the wife. It is intended to 
ameliorate a social problem which concerns destitution 
or vagrancy.... It is a basic principle of law that an 
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agreement which is opposed to public policy cannot be 
enforced in a court of law. Section 23 (of the Contract 
Act) renders such agreement void if its consideration or 
object is unlawful. Therefore, a clause in an agreement 
that the wife shall not be entitled to claim maintenance 
from the husband cannot be used as defence in 
proceedings under Section 125. 
Also it was argued that under the Code, a 'wife' includes a divorced 
wife and any divorced wife, irrespective of the mode in which divorce 
has been obtained, is entitled to maintenance. The wife does not cease to 
be a divorced woman simply because divorce has been obtained by 
mutual consent. 
In Sobha Rani v. M. Reddi which came on appeal to the Supreme 
Court, the husband and wife were both highly qualified. The> were 
happy for a short period after the maniage, but things changed and the 
relationship deteriorated after the husband's parents started demanding 
money and/or goods from the parents of the daughter-in-law. She was 
very reluctant to bring anything or even inform her parents about these 
demands. With the deterioration in the relationship of husband and wife, 
they discussed the question of divorce by mutual consent. However, that 
proved abortive and she finally petitioned for divorce on grounds of 
cruelty. 
When the case appeal to the Supreme Court, Shetty J referred to dowry 
as a 'deep rooted evil' and that in spite of the law and the amendments, 
the 'pernicious practice continued'. The judge then clarified the position 
that there was a difference between the quantum of proof required for a 
criminal case and that required for a matrimonial offence. He observed 
that "The High Court appears to have misconstrued the scope of cruelty 
in matrimonial affairs. The evidence as to harassment to the wife to 
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meet any unlawful demand for money is necessary to constitute ci-uelty 
in criminal law".'^^ Relief asked for in a matrimonial case cannot 
possibly be denied on the ground that there has been no deliberate or 
willful ill treatment. The judge concluded by very clearly stating, 
"Demand for dowry is prohibited under law. That by itself is bad 
enough. That, in our opinion, amounts to cruelty entitling the wife to get 
a decree for dissolution of marriage".'^^ It is a landmark judgment as it 
very clearly states that demanding dowry amounts to cruelty and nothing 
further needs to be proved. 
Can there be a law which does not violate the fundamental rights of 
equality and the right to life which punishes only a husband and/or his 
relatives for harassment and cruelty of the wife? This was raised by the 
husband in P. Satyanarayana v. P. Soundaryavalli. 
To extract the money, the poor woman was harassed, treated cruelly and 
physically tortured. Unable to bear the treatment any longer and 
apprehending danger to her life she filed a complaint against the 
husband and mother-in-law for cruel treatment under section 498A, IPC. 
The case was investigated and the husband alone was charge sheeted. 
The husband's reply to the charge-sheet was to challenge the 
constitutionality of the very section under which he was charged— 
section 498A and the section linked to it—section 133A of the Indian 
Evidence Act, 1872.The writ petition of the husband was dismissed by 
Quadri J. Undaunted the husband appealed. The first contention raised 
was that the very term 'cruelty' had not been defined and it was 
"delightfully vague and wide of the mark" and therefore arbitrar>. The 
section violated the fundamental right of equality, Article 14, because 
the husband and his relatives cannot be singled out from the general 
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body of offenders. Further it violated the right to life by the procedure of 
lugging the husband and the relatives of the husband. The judge came 
to the conclusion that the husband is the prime offender or abettor. Here 
there is nothing arbitrary nor is it vague or indefinite. 
A father, who is unable to maintain himself, may file an application for 
maintenance against his children. It is his choice to seek maintenance 
from whichever child he wants and the other children cannot raise 
objection on this account. In A. Ahathinamiligai v. Arumugham " a 
father filed an application for maintenance against one son. This was 
resisted on the ground that there were other siblings some of whom were 
earning, and that liability could not be fixed on him alone. It was argued 
that his liability was co-existent with the liability of his siblings who 
were equally bound and that picking up one child only was violative of 
the equality clause under Article 14 of the Constitufion. Negativing the 
arguments and decreeing the father's claim the court held: 
The object is merely to prevent the starvation of the 
person in whose favour the order is passed.... It cannot... 
be accepted as a position of law that unless all the 
children are made parties in a claim for maintenance by 
the parent the latter would not be entitled for an order of 
maintenance. 
S.V. Suhasini v. Padmanabhan Madhavan provides a bizarre 
situation. The husband obtained an ex parte decree of divorce against 
the wife on 8.2.1984. The wife did not file an appeal within 30 days. 
The husband remarried on 20.12.1985 and a male child was born to his 
second wife on 15.1.1.1986. Thereafter, wile filed an appeal on 
26.5.1986, i.e., more than two years after the decree of divorce. She also 
filed an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal The 
applicafion was granted. In the peculiar facts of this case, the husband 
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took the second wife at a time when there was no impediment for the 
second marriage. The period of appeal had expired. He had in fact 
married after one year and eight months of the decree dissolvmg the 
marriage. Thus his second marriage could not be faulted. It was a valid 
marriage in terms of section 15. If his first wife's appeal was granted, 
she would be his wife. It was not going to help matters to say that the 
period for filing the appeal did not expire if once the delay in filmg the 
appeal was condoned. After-all, how long should a spouse of dissolved 
marriage wait to remarry? It is submitted that in such situations the court 
should look at all the circumstances of the case and if a second marriage 
has taken place, the delay should not be condoned. 
In K. Narayanan v. K. Sreedevi,'^^ Varghese Kalliath J of the Kerala 
High Court, after reiterating the oft-repeated observation that concept of 
cruelty is not a static one but one which changes in accordance with the 
social and economic conditions, status of parties and multiple other 
considerations, said that in the present case the solitary instance of 
wife's not coming to matrimonial home on the demise of her mother-in-
law would not constitute cruelty. This is now a well established 
proposition of law that harassing a wife or person related to her with a 
view to coercing her to meet any unlawftjl demand, including demand 
for dowry, amounts to cruelty. Reiterating this position, a Division 
Bench of the Kerala High Court in Rajni v. Subramonica'^^ observed : 
The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of 
life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and 
social conditions, their culture and human values to 
which they attach importance. Judged by standards of 
modern civilization in the background of the cultural 
heritage and traditions of our society, a young educated 
woman is not expected to endure the harassment in 
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domestic life whether mental or physical, intentional or 
unintentional. Her sentiments have to be respected, her 
ambitions and aspirations taken into account, in making 
adjustments and her basic needs provided, though 
grievances arising from temperamental disharmony are 
irrelevant. If she resent unfair or unreasonable demand 
for dowry and decides to keep away from the husband on 
account of the persistent and dubious approach to 
compel her parents to yield, the wife cannot be found 
fault with. 
Alka Sharma v. Abhinesh Chandra Sharma ' is an interesting case from 
several points of view. First, a serious attempt has been made to 
understand the meaning of sub-clause (a) of clause (iii) of section 5, 
Hindu Marriage Act, 1995 in the context of section 12(l)(c). So far 
these clauses have not come for interpretation. Secondly, some 
innovative interpretation has been made keeping in view that a similar 
ground exists in section 13 for dissolution of marriage. Dharmadhikari J 
has tried to find out the meaning of expressions "unfit for mam age and 
unfit for procreation of children." the judge has also attempted to find 
out meaning of the expression, 'mental disorder' and 'schizophrenia.' 
The judge said aptly:'^^ 
Reading the provision in the manner aforesaid, it 
becomes more intelligible and practicable in the 
marriage situations obtaining in individual cases. To say 
that a marriage partner that is, the wife or the husband is 
fit for marriage although mentally unsound, only because 
he/she has capacity to produce children is to force one of 
the parties to the marriage to lead all his/her married life 
with a seriously abnormal or mentally unsound life 
partner. 'Procreation of children' is one of the principal 
aims for going through a marriage ceremony, but it is not 
all and the only aim of it. A married life may be 
successful where one or both the parties to the marriage 
are unable to procreate children, but mental fitness must 
be taken to be a principal precondition for a valid 
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marriage. The word 'and', therefore, cannot be read only 
conjunctively...It is true that 'and' can, under given 
circumstances, keeping in view the subject and intention 
of the legislature, be read as 'or' and vice versa, but I do 
not find any objection in reading 'and/or'. According to 
me, if 'and' is read only as 'or' the legislative intent 
cannot be fulfilled. If the word 'and' is read as 'or' a 
spouse suffering from such a mental disorder as would 
make her/him incapable of giving birth to children would 
be disqualified for marriage irrespective of the fact that 
he or she is otherwise fit for leading a life of a marriage 
partner with the other party. 
The judge then, in support of his construction on the clause, says that in 
section 13, mental disorder as a ground for divorce, the only 
requirement is that it is of such a kind and degree that the petitioner 
cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent. Furthering 
the argument, the judge said: 
Unfitness of the party suffering from mental disorder 
should be of such a type that the petitioner cannot 
reasonably be expected to run the risk of married life 
with the respondent ...Mental disorder merely disabling 
'procreation of children' may not be, in a given case, a 
good ground for nullifying the marriage. We can 
envisage a spouse marrying at late age or a mental 
disorder of such a type where he or she is unable to 
complete a sexual act or a man or woman having no 
sexual organ for procreation of children but he or she 
may be otherwise completely fit as a marriage partner 
irrespective of a mental disorder disabling her/him from 
procreating children, in such a case permitting 
dissolution or nullification of marriage would break the 
marriage tie on an unsubstantial ground. 
In Leela Mahadeo Joshi v. Mahadeo Sitaram Joshi,'^^^ the court has 
discussed the need and desirability of permitting legal representation. 
This was a case of divorce by mutual consent where the family court 
refused to grant a divorce despite the fact that all the ingredients of 
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section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Diorce by inutual 
consent) were satisfied. In appeal the High Court set aside that order and 
granted divorce. The court pointed out that various appeals came up to it 
from family courts in Pune and Bombay. The parties have strong 
grievances that advocates are not permitted due to which an avoidable 
situations have arisen. The cases have either gone by default or had to be 
either remanded by the High Court or entertained in appeal. The 
uneducated and poor are totally ignorant and are handicapped in the 
conduct of their cases in the absence of professional help. Even the 
educated persons are not competent to draft pleadings nor haxe the 
ability to conduct examination-in-chief or cross examination. This 
results in delays and miscarriage of justice. An appeal from the family 
court lies to the High Court and hence pleadings and examination have 
to be in order. Lay litigants are not expected to know all the intricacies 
of law and procedure. The court suggested: 
It would therefore, be a healthy practice for the family 
court at the scrutiny stage itself to ascertain as to 
whether the parties desire to be represented by their 
lawyers and if such a desire is expressed at this or any 
subsequent stage of the proceedings, then the permission 
be granted if the court is satisfied that the litigant 
requires such assistance and would be handicapped if the 
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case IS not permitted. 
In any case, it cannot be denied that after-all legal issues are involved in 
all litigations, and so none should be put in a position of "bartering away 
his or her legal rights for the perceived benefits of a quick and friendly 
divorce" 
In Golla Setharamuty v. Golla Rathanamma,''^^ the spouses were living 
separately for a long time. In the wife's claim for maintenance the 
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husband raised an objection that she could not ask for maintenance after 
a lapse of so many years and that she had waived her right. The court 
did not accept this plea. It held that when statute did not prohibit the 
wife to claim maintenance within any specified period, the husband 
could not raise such an objection. There was a change in her 
circumstances which prompted her to file the petition after a long gap. 
The Supreme Court decision in Sureshta Devi v. Om Parkash is 
interesting for more than one reason. There has been a controversy 
among our High Courts whether, after a petition for divorce by mutual 
consent has been presented to the court, a party to the proceedings can 
withdraw her or his consent unilaterally. But the Supreme Court has 
favoured the view that consent given for mutual divorce can be 
withdrawn unilaterally at any time. Secondly, the Supreme Court has 
clarified the meaning of the expression "living separately." The court 
said:'^' 
The expression ...connotes...not living like husband and 
wife. It has no reference to the place of living. The 
parties may live under the same roof by force of 
circumstances, and yet they may not be living as husband 
and wife. The parties may be living in different houses 
and yet they could live as husband and wife. What seems 
to be necessary is that they have no desire to perform 
marital obligations and with that mental attitude they 
have been living separately for a period of one year 
immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. 
Thirdly, the Supreme court observed that the expression "have not been 
able to live together" seems to indicate the concept of broken down 
marriage so much so that there is no possibility of any reconciliation. 
When this is so, it is submitted, one fails to understand what sense does 
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it make to hold that a party to a petition by mutual consent can withdraw 
it unilaterally? 
In Ranjit kaur v. Pavittar Singh''^^ the question for determination was 
whether a wife who had voluntarily surrendered her right to 
maintenance in divorce proceedings would be entitled to claim at a later 
stage maintenance under section 125. In a divorce by mutual consent the 
wife had made a statement relinquishing her right to child custody and 
maintenance. Later when she filed for maintenance, the husband 
contested it saying that she had voluntarily relinquished her right and so 
had no locus standi to ask for maintenance. The trial couit and 
additional sessions judge upheld this objection but in appeal by the wife, 
the High Court set aside the order. It was held:'"*^ 
This statutory right of wife cannot be bartered, done 
away with or negatived by the husband by setting up an 
agreement to the contrary. Such an agreement, in 
adoption to it being against public policy would also be 
against the clear intendment of this provision. 
And further'^' 
This right being a right to survival or livelihood 
essentially survives and lives every moment of life of the 
person entitled to be maintained. 
In Renganayaki v. Arunagiri/'^^ the husband had been ill-treating his 
wife so much so that he even took a mistress and was having sex with 
her in the presence of his wife. The mistress and husband both used to 
ill-treat her. Under these circumstances, wife was compelled to leave the 
matrimonial home. The husband filed a petition for divorce alleging that 
his wife had deserted him. The court found that wife was not in 
desertion as she did not leave the matrimonial home but was driven out 
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of it. It was the husband who was guilty of desertion on account of his 
exculpatory behaviour. 
The Supreme Court''*'^  has given a very significant judgment in a case 
where the father challenged the child's paternity and asked for blood 
group test to prove that it was not his child. The wife had claimed 
maintenance under section 125 for herself and her child. The same was 
decreed ex parte by the trial court. The husband then filed a revision 
before the High Court. Pending revision, he filed a criminal application 
before the trial court for blood group test of the child to determine the 
child's paternity. His contention was that he was not the father of the 
child and if this fact could be proved by the blood test, he would not be 
liable to pay maintenance. This application was dismissed. He filed an 
unsuccessful revision before the High Court which helped that under 
section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1987 the birth of a child during 
the continuance of the valid marriage is a conclusive proof of the child's 
legitimacy. Hence his appeal to the Supreme Court. The court referred 
to the American and English position on the point and also examined the 
case law on the issue.'^ *^ The husband's application was rejected since, 
according to the court, the whole purpose of the application was nothing 
else but to avoid payment of maintenance. The court clarified that courts 
cannot order blood test as a matter of course and wherever applications 
are made for such relief for roving enquiry, the same should not be 
entertained. In order to dispel the presumption of legitimacy arising 
under section 112 of the Evidence Act, there has to be a strong prima 
facie case and the husband must establish non-access to the wife when 
the child could have been conceived. 
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The judgment is bound to have a great impact on the maintenance 
claims on behalf of children. Hitherto, husbands had been using the 
argument of illegitimacy as a defence to wriggle out of their liability to 
give maintenance to their children. It was also used a weapon to 
pressurize a woman to barter away her claim because no woman would 
relish such fishing and roving enquiries about the paternity of their 
children. 
In K. Bhavani v. K. Lakshmana Swamy ^ a husband underwent 
sterilization before marriage and concealed this fact from his wife Thus 
the wife was forced to be barren. This was considered to be an act of 
"physical, mental and legal" cruelty entitling the wife to stay separate 
and ask for maintenance. It was argued on behalf of the husband that he 
had obtained a decree of restitution of conjugal rights and so the wife 
was debarred from claiming any maintenance. The court refused to 
accept this argument and held that it was not possible for the wife to 
contest the restitution case because of the long distance where she 
stayed. In any case, mere non-contest does not imply consent to live 
with him. Moreover, she had very valid and justified grounds to live 
separately and an ex parte restitution order could not defeat her right to 
seek maintenance. The court observed:' ^ ^ 
When non compliance of decree for restitution of 
conjugal rights is a ground for obtaining divorce and 
even after such divorce, the wife is entitled for 
maintenance under section J25 Cr. P.C., there is no 
reason to hold that mere passing of decree of restitution 
of conjugal rights debars wife from claiming 
maintenance. 
The judgment of the Supreme Court in Sarla Mudgal''^ caused tremors 
in certain quarters. The actual decision laid down by the case is 
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unexceptionable. But, as usual, the observations of Kuldip Singh and 
R.M. Sahai JJ, generated much heat in some quarters, as it touched 
upon an issue which the Muslim community considers as an anathema 
not only faithful with religious fervour but even "secularists" became 
jittery. The issues involved in the case, demonstrate although indirectly, 
the contradiction in the concept of secularism trumpeted by politicians 
as "equal respect for all religions". The judgment can be broadly 
considered in two aspects: First, holdings on legal issues emerging out 
of the case, and second, the observations of the Supreme Court and the 
directions issued by it to the government on the uniform civil code. 
Kuldip Singh J, in his opinion noted that interestingly in another writ 
petition (347/1990) Sunita alias Fatima had alleged that after their 
conversion to Islam and subsequent marriage, a son was bom; that later 
under the influence of his first wife Jitender reconverted to the Hindu 
fold and ceased to maintain her; that she continued to be a Muslim and 
was not being maintained under either of the personal laws. Kuldip 
Singh J adverted to the legal issues posed by these cases, viz: 
(i) Whether a Hindu husband married under the Hindu law, by 
embracing Islam, can solemnize second marriage? 
(ii) Whether such a marriage without having the first maiTiage 
dissolved under the law, would be a valid marriage qua the first 
wife who continues to be a Hindu? 
(iii) Whether the apostate husband would be guilty of the offence 
under section 494 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)? 
On the first question, Kuldip Singh J referred to the long catena of 
decisions starting from in re Ram Kumari'^'* relating to the effect of 
conversion to Islam on prior Hindu or Christian marriage. As regards 
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the Hindu personal law as it existed prior to the Hindu Marriage Act, 
1955 (HMA) the court held that a Hindu marriage continued to subsist 
even after one of the spouses converted to Islam and that there was no 
automatic dissolution of marriage. Dealing with the second question the 
court stated that after the enactment of HMA:'^ ^ 
A second marriage by an apostate under the shelter of 
conversion to Islam would nevertheless be a marriage in 
violation of the provisions of the Act by which he would 
be continued to be governed so far as his first marriage 
is concerned despite his conversion to Islam. The second 
marriage of an apostate would therefore be illegal 
marriage qua his wife who married him under the Act 
and continues to be a Hindu. 
Adverting to the third question whether the apostate husband 
contracting a second marriage under Muslim law would be guilty of 
the offence of bigamy, the court referred to the words "void" used in 
section 11 of the HMA and in section 494 of the IPC. It stated that 
HMA used the expression "void" in a limited sense while in section 
494 of the IPC it had been used in a wider sense. After analyzing the 
ingredients of section 494 of the IPC the Supreme Court 
concluded:'^^ "We therefore hold that the second marriage of a 
Hindu husband after his conversion to Islam is a void mamage in 
terms of Section 494 of the IPC." Consequently, it held that the 
apostate husband would be guilty of the offence of bigamy. 
The court then addressed itself to the need of a uniform civil code as 
envisaged by Article 44. Kuldip Singh J noted the previous observations 
of the Supreme Court to enact a uniform civil code in Shah Bano's 
case,'^^ and O. Chinnappa Reddi J's observations in Ms, Jordan 
Diengdeh v. S.S. Chopra'^^ and stated:'^'' 
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The present case is yet another which focusses....on the 
immediate and compulsive need of a Uniform Civil Code. 
Further, Kuldip Singh J wondered "how long will it take for the 
Government of the day to implement the mandate of the framers of the 
Constitution under Article 44 of the Constitution of India." The court 
pointed out:'^° 
The successive Governments till date have been wholly 
remiss in their duty of implementing the constitutional 
mandate under Article 44 of the Constitution of India. 
After stating their request to the Government of India through the Prime 
Minister to have a fresh Look at Article 44, the court stated: 161 
We further direct the Government of India through 
Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice to file an affidavit 
of a responsible officer in this Court in August, 1996 
indicating therein the steps taken and efforts made, by 
the Government of India towards securing a "Uniform 
Civil Code" for the citizens of India. 
In Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Zaveni^^^ a couple after several years of 
unhappy marriage, filed a petition for divorce by mutual consent. After 
eight months the husband pressed his application for divorce and notice 
was sent to the wife. The case stood adjourned on several dates and 
there were also unsuccessful attempts to bring about reconciliation. 
Within a year of the filing of the divorce petition the husband remarried. 
The wife filed criminal cases for declaring the marriage illegal and the 
child illegitimate. After 18 months the wife withdrew her consent and so 
the trial court dismissed the divorce petition. 
On appeal, a single judge of the Gujarat High Court set aside the order 
of the trial court and passed a decree of divorce from the date of the 
petition. ^^ The two judge bench order of the Supreme Court raises 
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several legal, ethical and social issues. The life of the petition under 
section 13B is 18 months and within a period of six months to 18 
months of the filing of the petition if the same has not been withdrawn 
the parties can jointly move the court again seeking a divorce, m this 
case the wife not having withdrawn the petition within 18 months (but a 
little later) the court presumed the wife's consent and the marriage was 
dissolved under section 13B on the ground of mutual consent. 
A very significant judgment has been given by the Bomba> High 
Court'^ in a case where the constitutional validity of section 11 '^' of the 
Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act was challenged. The validity of 
this section was challenged on the ground that it violated Articles 14 and 
21 of the Constitution. It was argued that, since it discriminated between 
(a) parents with unlimited number of children and parents without 
children, (b) between a child adopted and a child to be adopted, and (c) 
between parents with any number of children of same sex and parents 
prevented from taking any child of same sex in adoption, it was against 
the equality provision under Article 14. This argument, however, was 
dismissed and the court observed that "the classification as carved out 
has not been created by the impugned provisions."'^'^' As to the 
challenged under Article 21, it was argued that the courts have 
recognized the right to live with human dignity as a fundamental right 
and the right to have a size of family according to one's choice is a 
component of the concept of human dignity. The court conceded that 
while the right to life does have many facets and numerous dimensions 
have been added by judicial interpretation during the last few years, but 
held that it could not be stretched to accommodate every personal desire, 
howsoever laudable. Doing so, according to the court, would be 
"seriously wrong and totally inappropriate." It observed:"'^ 
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Article 21, even by stretching it to its farthest end, cannot 
embrace such right of having size of family according to 
one's own choice. A person could have any number of 
biological children, by Grace of God. That does not 
certainly render support to claim to have any number of 
children by adoption. 
The court consequently held: 
The Act with its mythological and secular mission has 
stood the test of time for around four decades and has 
conveniently withstood the assaults as attempted from 
time to time. We, therefore, refrain from examining 
validity of the impugned provisions on the touchstone of 
Article. 14 and 21. 
While it is a laudable idea to provide a home and family to abandoned 
children who are awaiting adoption but at the same time in view of 
rising pernicious social activities of child abuse, commercialization of 
children, and exploitation of both boys and girls, (girls in particular), the 
law makers might have feh that giving an unbridled right to take any 
number of children under the garb of adoption might not be without risk. 
Besides, when there are more than one children of the same gender, not 
one's own but adopted, discrimination is more likely to occur thereby 
having a very damaging effect on the development of the child. 
Mr. 'X' V. Hospital 'Z' is a signification judgment where the apex 
court has held that the right to marry is not an absolute right. The facts 
leading to the case were thus: The appellant, a surgeon in the Nagaland 
State Health Service was directed by the state government to accompany 
a patient to Madras for treatment. The patient required surgery and there 
was a shortage of blood. The appellant agreed to donate blood. His 
blood sample taken by the respondent hospital revealed that he was 
HIV+. This was in June 1995. In August the appellant proposed 
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marriage to Ms. Y and the marriage was scheduled to be held in 
December. The facts of these cases do not indicate whether the appellant 
was even aware of his HIV+ status when he proposed. The mamage, 
however, was called off because of the disclosure of the blood test 
performed at the respondent hospital. Why, when, how and to whom the 
disclosure was made is also not clear. Cancellation of the marriage and 
disclosure of his HIV+ condition obviously caused a lot of 
embarrassment and agony to the appellant. He was ostracized by the 
community and had to leave his home state and reside in another state. 
He approached the consumer disputes redressal commission claiming 
damages against the hospital for disclosing his blood test reports and 
breaching confidentiality. The same was dismissed. He then approached 
the Supreme Court. It was argued that "duty of care" in the medical 
profession includes duty to maintain confidentiality and since this was 
violated by the respondent hospital it was liable to pay damages. The 
court went into the details of the ethics of confidentiality based on 
Hippocratic oath and the national international and codes of medical 
ethics. It, however, held that the duty to maintain secrecy is not absolute 
and stated:'^" 
The argument that the respondents were under a duty to 
maintain confidentiality on account of the code of 
Medical Ethics formulated by the Indian Medical Council 
cannot be accepted as the proposed marriage carried 
with it the health risk to an identifiable person who had 
to be protected from being infected with the 
communicable disease from which the appellant suffered. 
The right to confidentiality, if any, vested in the appellant 
was not enforceable in the present situation. 
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The argument as regards right to privacy was also not accepted. The 
court observed: 
Having regard to the fact that the appellant was found to 
be HIV+, its disclosure would not be violative of either 
the rule of confidentiality or the appellant's Right to 
Privacy as Ms. "Y" with whom the appellant was likely 
to be married was saved in time by such disclosure, or 
else, she too would have been infected with the dreadful 
disease if marriage had taken place and consummated. 
In Pawan Kumar v. Chanchal Kumari , where the parties were 
admittedly staying separately for 13 years the court found that the 
marriage was completely dead and granted divorce. It observed. 
Undeniably, marriage is a human relationship. It must 
bring happiness to the parties. It must be a source of joy. 
It must give the parties a home. In the present case, it is 
the admitted position that both the appellant as well as 
the respondent have been totally unhappy... After 
consideration of the matter it appears to us that the 
marriage has been 'dead' for more than a decade. It has 
irretrievably broken. It is an "insoluble mess ". 
Chiranjeevi v. Lavanya was a case where there were allegations and 
counter allegations of all sorts against each other. The husband 
suspected the paternity of the child bom to the wife and the wife 
maligned him and got him beaten up. Granting divorce, the court 
remarked:'^'* 
Admittedly by both the parties lived together as husband 
and wife for sometime after marriage and when the 
misunderstandings arose between them, they made 
claims and counter claims and thus whatever love and 
affection existed between them was lost and even if there 
is reunion, there is no guarantee that they would 
continue as husband and wife. Under these 
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circumstances...it is proper to grant separation than to 
compel them to join together. 
Abboyolla M. Subba Reddy v. Padmamma'^^ is a harsh case where a 
woman was allegedly defrauded into a marriage with an already married 
man and was denied maintenance because her marriage was legally 
void. 
While a legislative enactment may be liberally construed 
the liberality cannot over stop the legislative limits of 
interpretation, putting to the legislation something which 
is not there. If it is felt that a particular enactment causes 
hardship or inconvenience, it is for the legislature to 
redress it, but it is not open to the court to ignore the 
legislative intention. 
And further the court remarked.'^^ 
If the bigamous relationship should be recognized for the 
purpose of maintenance of a woman, the very purpose of 
introducing the provision in the Hindu Marriage Act 
while introducing monogamy among the Hindus will be 
defeated. 
In Lily Thomas v. Union of India, the apex court clarified further that 
the status of the earlier marriage of a Hindu converted to Islam remains 
unaffected and the first wife can proceed against him under pro\ isions 
of the Hindu Marriage Act and the IPC, if he enters into another 
marriage. The court considered the effect of second marriage qua the 
first marriage which continued to subsist inspite of conversion of the 
husband to Islam for the limited purpose of ascertaining his criminal 
liability under section 17 of the HMA read with section 494 of the 
Indian Penal code. It held that if a husband marries a second wife under 
some other religion after converting to that religion, the offence of 
bigamy pleaded by the Hindu wife would have to be investigated and 
tried in accordance with the provisions of the HMA viz. the law under 
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which the first marriage was solemnized. Under the HMA a bigamous 
marriage is prohibited and constitutes an offence under section 17, 
hence any marriage solemnized by the husband during the subsistence of 
that marriage, notwithstanding his conversion, would be an offence 
triable under section 17 of the HMA read with section 494 of the IPC. 
In Rameshwari Devi v. State of Bihar'^^ the apex court acknowledged 
children bom of legally valid marriage and children of a void bigamous 
marriage on an equal status. The case concerned payment of family 
pension and death-cum-retirement gratuity to two wives and their sons. 
The deceased had entered into a second marriage while his first wife 
was alive. He had one son from the first marriage and four sons from the 
second bigamous and thus void marriage. The high court held that even 
sons from the second marriage were entitled to a share in the family 
pension and death-cum-retirement gratuity while the second wife was 
held not to be entitled to anything as the marriage was void. In appeal to 
the Supreme Court against this order by the first wife, it was argued that 
the second marriage being no marriage in the eyes of the law, the 
children bom of the relationship were not legitimate and, therefoie, had 
no rights. The court, however, held that though the second wife could 
not be termed as the widow of the deceased, the fact that she lived with 
him for 24 years as his wife and had four sons from him was 
established. While she would not be entitled to anything, her sons would 
get equal rights along with the first widow and her son. 
In R. Prakash v. Sneh Lata'^^ the court expressly emphasized the 
concept of the complete equality of spouses. The husband had filed a 
divorce petition on the ground of cruelty of the wife based on her refusal 
to leave her job. The conduct and behaviour of the husband was 
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indicative of his indifference towards his wife and child. The court held 
that it was he rather than the wife who was guilty of ciuelty and so he 
could not be entitled to a divorce. The following remarks of the court are 
pertinent:'^° 
The orthodox concept of the Hindu wife is that she is 
expected to be Dharampatni, Ardhangini, Bharya or 
Anugamini. The literal meaning is that she has to follow 
the husband. This orthodox concept of wife and 
expectations from her to subject herself to husband's 
wishes has undergone a revolutionary change with 
education and high literacy in women and with 
recognition of equal right in the Constitution and 
abolition of sex distinction in all walks of life. She is a 
partner in marriage with equal status and equal rights 
with the husband. 
The wife's insistence on her continuing with her employment and 
refusing to leave her job was thus held not to be constituting cruelty as 
to entitle the husband to a decree of divorce. 
In Rakesh Sharma v. Surbhi Sharma'^', apart from allegations of dowi"y 
demand, the wife also made scandalous allegations of his adulterous life. 
She deserted the husband and refused to come back. She had also filed a 
petition for judicial separation making the above allegations which were 
denied by the husband. Thereafter she got her application dismissed. In 
reply to husband's application for custody of their minor son she 
reiterated the allegations. She also made false complaints to his office as 
a result of which an enquiry was held against him causing great mental 
tension. The following remarks of the court are pertinent:''^~ 
Matrimonial matters are matters of delicate humane and 
emotional relationship. It demands mutual trust, regard, 
respect, love and affection but the wife [in this case] 
raised false allegations that her husband demanded 
dowry. She also made serious false and scandalous 
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allegations regarding adulterous life of her husband. 
Such false allegations constitute mental cruelty. 
There are various factors that have to be taken into consideration while 
fixing the quantum of maintenance. Status of the husband is one of 
them. In Meenu Chopra v. Depak Chopra, ' the following observations 
of the court are pertinent: 
The status of the parents of the plaintiff is totally-
irrelevant consideration. After the marriage it is the 
status to the husband, which is determinative of the 
quantum of maintenance to be given to the wife. After the 
marriage a girl adopts matrimonial home and gets 
attuned to the living standard of her husband. If she has 
to suffer his miseries, she has a right to enjoy his 
affluency also. Therefore if the husband is wealthy and 
leading opulent life, his wife also has a right to he the 
partner in his prosperity and live with same standard and 
equal dignity. It does not lie in the mouth of the husband, 
after separation of the spouses, to say that wife is no 
longer entitled to the standard on which she has been 
living with the husband and that she should re-adopt the 
standard of her parental home. 
Smt. Popri Bai v. Treeth Singh is a laudable judgment where the court 
defeated all attempts tricks by the husband to defeat the wife's claim for 
interim maintenance. The following remarks of the court are 
pertinent:'*^^ 
In these facts and circumstances of the case if the 
respondent husband is permitted to do injustice and play 
tricks with the poor petitioner wife, it will residt in failure 
of justice to her. Not only this, unscrupulous husbands, 
like the present one, will get success in their oblique 
motives and malafide intentions. 
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And further:'^' 
It is a case where if order of the trial court is allowed to 
stand, it will not only result in failure of justice to this 
poor wife but it will cause serious prejudice to her. Not 
only this it will encourage those unscrupulous litigants 
who make attempts to befool or play tricks with their 
wives. 
The court, in exercise of its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution 
to do complete justice, modified the order dated 11.4.2001 by awarding 
interim maintenance w.e.f the date of fining of application viz. 15-07-
1999. 
In Kakali Das (Ghosh) v. Dr. Ashish Kumar Das, the wife wanted to 
live separately with her husband but the husband refused. The problems 
between them aggravated because of that and the husband filed a 
divorce petition alleging that her demand for separate residence, inter 
alia, constituted mental cruelty. On the facts of the case, the husband's 
petition was rejected. As to the wife's demand for a separate 
matrimonial home the court observed that such desire of a wife is "not 
an unreasonable or illegal desire. It held:'^^ 
Husband cannot deny a demand or desire of wife on plea 
of his duty towards other members of the family. A wife is 
entitled to demand a separate exclusive residence for 
herself and the husband for justifiable reasons....but such 
right does not extend to whimsical or unreasonable 
demand or sheer obstinacy. 
Jagdish Mangatani v. Geeta Jagdish Mangtani'^^ is a significani case 
where the crucial issue involved was whether the wife's insistence on 
not leaving her job to join her husband's matrimonial home amounted to 
desertion thereby entitling the husband to a decree of divorce on the 
564 
ground of desertion. The trial court decreed divorce on ground of cruelty 
and desertion. On wife's appeal before the joint district judge the decree 
was set aside as being "improper and illegal". It held: 
"If a woman gets good designation or good job on the 
strength of her education and if a husband is not earning 
good income and is residing at another place after the 
marriage, wife cannot be compelled, according to 
orthodox Hindu mythology, to leave her good service or 
status and to stay at the husband's place. If a woman 
refused to do so, she cannot be called upon to be ready 
for divorce. If it is so acted upon, it would be an insult to 
the woman's pride and it would amount to denial of a 
woman 's right of equality ". 
Hence the husband's appeal before the high court where the issue 
involved was only as to whether the wife's conduct amounted to 
desertion. The following observations of the court are pertinent:''" 
The court has therefore no alternative but to pass the 
order for divorce to see that both people can be free to 
have their own houses in this behalf because to keep both 
husband and wife when one stays at Mumbai and another 
at Gandhidham, without intentin to stay together, would 
serve no purpose. Therefore, the marriage is completely 
broken down and no useful purpose would be served by 
dismissing the second appeal. 
It is the settled position of law that a wife whose maniage is void 
because of the subsistence of the husband's earlier marriage could not 
claim maintenance. Even though it appears to be harsh, specially in 
situations where the woman has been kept in dark about the husband's 
earlier marriage, the courts seem to be bound by the law. The following 
observations of the Madras High Court in A.P.K. Narayaswami Reddiar 
are pertinent in this context: 
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It is true that the medieval conservative approach in 
progressive times should be avoided with reference to 
laws which purport to make reforms and introduce 
innovations in personal laws in order that women folk 
particularly are vested with more rights and better 
freedom. But while a legislative enactment may be 
liberally construed, the liberality cannot overstep the 
legitimate limits of interpretation and put into the 
legislation something which is not there. 
In S. Thangavelu v. Kannammal'^^ the court refused a husband's 
application under section 45, Indian Evidence Act coupled with section 
151 of the CPC for a DNA test for establishing the paternity of the child. 
His contention was that the marriage with the respondent was never 
consummated and the respondent's minor son was not his offspring. The 
sub-judge found no bona fides in the claim and so dismissed the petition 
against which the husband filed an appeal. Support for his claim was 
drawn from Sharda v. Dherampal ' where it was held that the court has 
ample power to direct medical examination like DNA test and such 
order would not interfere with the personal liberty enshrined in \rticle 
21 of the Constitution. The husband, according to the court, has raised a 
defence disputing the paternity of the child only to get over the claim 
made in partition suit, "it is only a desperate attempt to harass the 
respondent", the court observed and dismissed the appeal. 
Societal approval to honour killings is looming large in the face of such 
parties to the marriage. The plight of the parties and the husband's 
relatives came to light in a case'*^ "* that involved a 21 year old girl, who 
after completing her graduation married on her own without the consent 
of her brothers with whom she was living after the death of her parents. 
The apex court took a very serious note of the entire situation and the 
conduct of the authorifies and noted'*^ ^ that the petitioner was not a 
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minor and was free to marry anyone she liked or live with anyone she 
liked. Since there is no bar to an inter-caste marriage under the Hindu 
Marriage Act or any other law, no offence was committed by her 
husband or any of his relatives. The court pointed out with distress that 
instead of taking action against the petitioner's brother for their unlawful 
and highhanded activities, the police had instead proceeded against the 
petitioner's husband and his relatives. Terming the caste system as 
divisive and a curse on the nation, the court hoped for its earliest 
destruction in the interests of the society. Inter-caste maniages 
according to the court are in fact in the national interest as they may 
eventually destroy the caste system. At the same time the court 
expressed deep concern over the threats and violence actually 
committed on young men and woman who undergo inter caste marriages 
and called for serious punishment to be given to the peipetrators of such 
violence and observed:'''^ 
Since several such incidents are coming to our 
knowledge of harassment, threats and violence against 
young men and woman who marry outside their caste, we 
feel it necessary to make some general comments on this 
matter. The nation is passing through a crucial transitant 
period in our history and this court cannot remain silent 
in matters of great public concern such as the present 
one. This is a free and democratic society and once a 
person becomes, a major he or she can marry whosoever 
he/she likes. If the parents of the boy or girl do not 
approve of such inter-caste or inter-religious marriage, 
the maximum they can do is that they can cut off social 
relations with the son or the daughter but they cannot 
give threats or commit or instigate acts of violence and 
cannot harass the person who undergoes such inter-caste 
or inter-religious marriage.'^^ We therefore direct that 
the administration/police authorities throughout the 
country will see to it that if any boy or girl who is a 
major marries the couple are not harassed nor subjected 
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to threats or acts of violence and anyone who gives such 
threats or harasses or commits acts of violence either 
himself or at his instigation is taken to task by instituting 
criminal proceedings by the police against such persons 
and further stern action is taken against such persons as 
provided by law. We sometimes hear of honour killings of 
such persons that undergo inter-caste or inter-religious 
marriages of their own free will. There is nothing 
honourable in such killings and in fact they are nothing 
but Barbaric and shameful acts of murder committed by 
brutal feudal minded persons who deserve harsh 
punishment. Only in this way can we stamp out such acts 
of barbarism. 
Court not only quashed proceedings against the husband and his 
relatives but directed action to be instituted by authorities against the 
wife's brothers and others involved. 
In asking for a decree of nullity in case of pregnancy of the wife at the 
time of marriage by a person other than the husband and without the 
knowledge of the husband, the burden of proof is upon the husband to 
come up with cogent evidence of the allegation. In this situation can he 
pray for the conducting of the DNA test on the baby and the mother to 
prove that the child bom is not his, and would this request amount to 
violation of the rights of privacy guaranteed to the wife and the child 
under the Constitution of India? In Vandana Kumari v. P Praveen 
Kumar the husband filed a petition under section 12(1) (d) of the 
Hindu Marriage Act, praying for a decree of nullity four months after 
the solemnization of his marriage on the ground that at the time of 
marriage his wife was pregnant by a person other than him and he was 
unaware of it. She thus was guilty of this extreme fraud and he should 
be granted a decree of nullity. He further contended that the marriage 
was not consummated, and as a proof of his allegation, he sought a 
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DNA test to be performed on the wife and the foetus. Though DNA tests 
are not to be ordered as of routine, where the party has to prove a 
particular fact that can be conclusively and accurately proved by the 
tests, such tests can be ordered. If the party, against whom the tests have 
been ordered, refuses to undergo such tests, there is no reason why 
inferences cannot be drawn against them. The court concluded that it 
had ample powers while deciding matrimonial matters to order a person 
to undergo medical tests which cannot be held to be in violation of the 
right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. 
Family laws have time and again being challenged on the ground of 
their constitutional validity on account of discrimination against women. 
However, the litigation this year saw a new twist then a man challenged 
section 13(2)(iv) on the ground of its constitutional invalidity. "^^  The 
question arose in connection with the maintenance claim filed by the 
wife who was married to the husband during her infancy. She was four 
years old and he was seven at the time of the marriage. The husband 
made two contentions, firstly, that under Hindu law a woman has been 
granted more grounds on which she can file a petition for divorce in 
comparison to a Hindu husband. He specifically cited section 13(2)(iv), 
which provides that a girl who was married before the age of 15 can 
repudiate her marriage on attaining 15 years of age, but before she 
became 18 but this provision was not available to a minor boy married 
under similar circumstances. This provision was, therefore, gender 
discriminatory and should not be sustained in the light of constitutional 
guarantee of gender equality. His second contention was that it was the 
state, which had totally failed to check child marriages, and as such the 
state should be made responsible to provide maintenance to the child 
bride. Had the state acted on time he would have been saved from being 
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a party to a child marriage when he was incapable to give his consent to 
it. Further, the state was not performing the obligations in the 
appropriate manner from time to time. Rejecting his first contention and 
upholding the constitutional validity of section 13(2)(iv), the court held 
that Article 15(3) of the Constitution permits the state to make special 
provision for women and children and therefore even if a woman has 
been granted more grounds on which she can proceed praying for a 
decree of divorce, it is permissible within the Constitution. On the 
second issue as to whether the state's inability to check child marriages 
has led to the circumstance leading to presentation of the petition in the 
present case, the court rejected the argument of the husband and held 
that he had failed to demonstrate any instance where despite any person 
approaching the state authorities, they willfully disobeying the law, 
denied redressal to him. 
The primary question accosting an Indian woman, in the event of a 
matrimonial dispute when she either leaves the matrimonial home on her 
own or is forced to leave it is where to go. As in majority of cases the 
house belongs either to the husband or to his parents. A question arises, 
if the matrimonial home stands in the name of not the husband but either 
of his parents, can an estranged wife, who claims to be a victim of 
domestic violence, claim a right of residence in such a house? In a case 
from Delhi,^ *^ *' owing to matrimonial dispute the wife left the 
matrimonial home and started living with her parents. The husband filed 
a petition claiming divorce and the wife as a counter to the divorce 
petifion filed criminal cases against him under sections 406/498-A/506 
and 34 of the IPC. The court held that as the premises in question 
belonged to the mother-in-law of the wife and not to her husband, the 
wife had no right whatsoever to claim any possession rights in such 
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house. Even if this was the house where she and her husband had lived 
together after getting married, it would not make this house as their 
matrimonial home in the sense that she could claim legitimately a right 
of residence in it against the wishes of its owners. 
In Narinder Pal Caur Chawla v. Manjit Singh Chawla,' the husband 
representing himself to be a bachelor married the appellant in 1997 
according to Sikh rites and ceremonies at Jallandhar. The parties lived 
together as husband and wife in Delhi for a period of 14 years and were 
blessed with two daughters. All through the married life the husband 
continued with the deception about his marital status without letting the 
wife know of the reality. 14 years later the wife went to Punjab to 
complete her studies that she had left in between for her marriage and 
upon her return was refused entry into the matrimonial home by her 
mother-in-law. It was only then that she came to know that the husband 
was already married to Wl and that her marriage was in fact a bigamous 
one. She got her husband convicted for an offence of bigamy and filed a 
case for maintenance and a right of residence in the matrimonial home 
under section 18 of the Hind Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. The 
husband contended that maintenance can be claimed only by a legally 
wedded wife and not the second wife, which was accepted by the trial 
court resulting in the dismissal of the wife's claim. She then preferred an 
appeal to the Delhi High Court. The court laid down two important 
propositions, firstly, that the interpretation and probable inclusion of 
second wife in the definition of a "wife" under the Hindu Adoption and 
Maintenance Act can be situation specific, and secondly, a distinction 
between a concubine and a second wife. The court also sought to protect 
the rights of the wife in the present case by looking at the spirit of the 
gender friendly or protective legislation enacted by the legislature and 
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noted that when to advance the purpose for which section 498 A and 
304 B IPC were introduced by the legislature in the IPC. The court 
noted further that even if it is presumed that the second wife could not 
be treated as a Hindu wife since she is not the legally wedded wife; such 
a wife is entitled to a lump sum amount in the form of damages or 
otherwise. The case was thus remanded to the trial court to be decided 
on merits. The second wife had applied for interim maintenance that was 
granted to her and was enhanced by the Supreme Court. 
In an important judgment a full bench of the Madhya Pradesh High 
Court has held that a decision of a state government to withhold all 
financial aid to a village and not to implement any of the scheme of the 
central or state government for the development of the village on the 
ground that some people in the village had abetted or committed the 
offence of Sati (which is punishable by law) is a arbitrary decision that 
10') 
can be struck down under Article 14 of the Constitution. " This is a 
welcome decision, particularly keeping in mind that modem 
jurisprudence requires the culpable individual alone to be punished, and 
does not subscribe to a theory of community guilt and, therefore, 
community punishment. There are provisions for collective fines that 
can be imposed under various laws in India. These are provisions that 
surely require reconsideration. It is a welcome sign that the High Court 
has held that the withholding of developmental schemes to a village as a 
punitive measure, is unconstitutional. There must surely be better and 
more imaginative ways to bring about a change in the thinking of the 
villagers, even if it could be assumed that they all collectively supported 
the act of sad, that depriving them of whatever chances they would have 
to progress and be connected with the world outside. 
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Another aspect of the right to privacy created under the Hindu Mauiage 
Act came up before a single judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Courts ' 
In this case the husband in an ongoing divorce petition against his wife, 
wished to bring on record a hard disk which contained her phone 
conversations that he had recorded, without her knowledge, as e\ idence 
in the matrimonial proceeding. The husband had moved the family court 
to prove the voice of the wife and for this reason wanted her voice to be 
recorded and compared by an expert. In revision the High Court held 
that the wife had a right to privacy guaranteed by Article 21 of the 
Constitution. It also stated that while the tapping of the telephones as 
was done in this case, was a violation of the India Telegraph Act 1885, 
the invasion of privacy by the husband by recording the conversation of 
his wife with other persons was illegal and therefore could not be 
admissible as evidence. As a result, it declined to order the wife to 
undergo a voice test or for an expert to examine the hard disk created by 
undergo a voice test or for an expert to examine the hard disk created b\ 
the husband in this case. 
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CHAPrER-2 
MUSLIM LAW 
Case Law based on: Marriage, Divorce and Maintenance 
The Shariat law popularly known as Muslim Personal Law in India is 
an Islamic term, which designates the rules and regulations governing 
the lives of Muslims derived mainly from Quran and Hadith. 
Marriage: 
According to Muslim Personal Law marriage is a civil and 
dissoluble contract. Stipulation of Mehr at the time of marriage is an 
important aspect of Muslim marriage. Under the Shariat the women has 
a charge over her husband's property for the payment of her mehr even 
after his death. The Shariat allows pre marriage agreements 
(kabeinama). These relate mainly to two aspects (1) regulation of 
matrimonial life, (2) Stipulation regarding dissolution of marriage. The 
women through this can demand that if husband enter into a second 
marriage, he should provide her with a separate residence. Monogamy is 
rule for women but men are permitted limited polygamy i.e. under 
certain conditions men can have four wives. 
Divorce and Maintenance: 
According to Muslim personal law a Muslim husband has an absolute 
right to repudiate the mamage at his will by pronouncing Talaq' thrice 
or pronouncing it during three 'Tuhrs' (period) on his wife. While 
Hanafi law recognizes divorce even if pronounced in the absence of 
witness or while intoxicated in anger or jest, Shia law requires divorce 
to be pronounced in front of two witnesses. Muslim women have also 
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got statutory right to divorce within their religious boundaries called 
Khula. Law also recognizes divorce by mutual consent called 
Mubaarat. Muslim law allows maintenance to wife after divorce for a 
period of iddat i.e. for 3 months following divorce. However as a result 
of the Shah Bano judgment (The case of Muslim woman seeking 
maintenance after iddat and the court judgment of giving maintenance 
to her under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1925 and 
comment on personal law which led to a lot of controversy), the 
Parliament enacted the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Act, 1986. After 1986 the provision of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure are not applicable to Muslims unless the parties to a marriage 
expressly agree to be governed by them. The Code of Criminal 
Procedure specifies the amount of maintenance to be paid to divorced 
wife and other persons (children and parents) mentioned under Sec 123. 
The Supreme Court has tried to clarify lot of ambiguities in the 1986 
Act. 
The judicial decisions pertaining to Muslim Law related to family 
relations and rights of woman vis-a-vis her husband and other members 
of the family covering mamage, divorce and maintenance are as under: 
Munnisa Begum v. Noore Mohd} reiterates the well setded rale of 
Muhammadan law that after the divorce, a wife is entitled to 
maintenance during the period oi iddat} To get the maintenance for this 
period, it is not essential that a suit must be instituted on the day the 
talak is pronounced and the iddat period starts for that would be 
practically impossible. In this case, the lower court had taken a wrong 
view of law in thinking that if a suit was instituted one month after the 
divorce, the wife would lose her right to maintenance for the month 
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which had already gone by. The court held that the wife was entitled to 
maintenance form the date of the pronouncement of the talak, and not 
only from the date of filing the suit. 
The question arose in a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Smt. 
Rabia Khatoon v. Mukhtar Ahmed/ whether a Muslim wife, can refuse 
consortium even after the consummation of marriage on the ground of 
failure of the husband to pay prompt dower. The divisional bench 
adopted the rule laid down by Mr. Justice Mahamood, and followmg the 
decision of Sir Suleiman in Smt. Anis Begam v. Mohammad Istafa," 
justified the rule on the grounds that the view of Mr. Justice Mahamood. 
has held the field for seventy-five years, that, to reject it as a bad law 
and to hold according to Hanafi law that a Muslim wife can refuse to go 
to her husband even after consummation of marriage with her consent, if 
her dower remains unpaid, would not only create uncertainty in the law 
but also disturb the domestic peace of Muslim families throughout India. 
It was observed that it would be dangerous to adopt this view, having 
regard to the prevalent practice and the modern conditions of life. It was 
further held that as the suit for restitution of conjugal rights is in the 
nature of a suit for specific performance, the court can, in its discretion, 
impose conditions on the husband, to ensure payment of her prompt 
dower. On the question of failure of the husband to provide maintenance 
to the wife, as a ground for her prayer for the dissolution of her 
marriage, the divisional bench held that there is no right in the wife to 
refuse to live with her husband after the marriage has been 
consummated with her consent. So long as she keeps herself away 
without the fault of the husband, she has no right to claim maintenance 
from the husband and the husband cannot be considered guilty of 
negligence in maintaining her. In support of this view, the cases of 
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Badnilnisa Bibi v. Mohammad Yusiif and Zaffar Hussain v. ikbari 
Begam,^ were relied. In the result, the appeals were dismissed. 
In Sukha v. NinniJ as a result of the union between Sukha and Ninni, a 
female child was bom. Ninni obtained an order against Sukha, upon her 
application under section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code, for the 
payment of Rs. 10 per month, for the maintenance of the illegitimate 
child. He executed an agreement with Ninni, to pay Rs. 8 per month, for 
the maintenance of the child till the child was married. Sukha failed to 
honour this agreement, whereupon Ninni sued him upon the agreement. 
Reliance was placed on a Bombay case, Roshan Bai v. Suleman Haji 
Ahmad Umar.^ This seems to be settled view of the leading authorities. 
The case-law on the subject was fully considered in a case from Kerala. 
Pavitri v. Katheesiimma,"^ wherein an illegitimate daughter's claim to 
maintenance was not judicially recognized, whatever may be the moral 
or ethical obligation of the putative father. After placing reliance on the 
high authority of Khwaja Mohammad Khan v. Hiissaini BegamJ and 
Yasaof Ali Chowdhary v. Mst. Fyzoonissa Khatoon, Mr. Justice Beri 
observed: 
An agreement to maintain an illegitimate child, for which 
the Mohammedan Law as such makes no provision, will in 
my opinion not have the effect of defeating the provisions 
of any law. As a matter of fact, maintenance of illegitimate 
children has been statutorily recognized under S. 488 oj 
the code of Criminal Procedure in our country and it is in 
consonance with this wholesome public policy that the 
offsprings born under such circumstances are to be 
provided for and should not be left to the misfortunes of 
vagrancy and its attendant social consequences'^ 
585 
In a landmark case Nizamul Hague v. Begam Noorjehan. ^ Begam 
Noorjehan who was formerly a Hindu, after her conversion to Muslim 
faith, married Nizamul Haque and got a child by him. Fearing that it 
would not be convenient to her to live with her husband's people under 
strict forms, she at the time of her marriage, made Nizamul Haque to 
execute a marriage agreement, Kabinama, providing that he would live 
with her in her parent's house even after marriage. He lived with her at 
her house for some time but latter their relations were strained and he 
began to reside with his people. Begam Noorjehan filed an application 
against her husband under section 488 Criminal Procedure Code and 
obtained an order for the payment of maintenance allowance of Rs. 70 
per month for herself and Rs. 30 per month for the child. The husband 
field a revision before the Calcutta High Court, challenging this order on 
two grounds, firstly, that it had not been proved that he had neglected or 
refused to maintain his wife and child and secondly, that the agreement 
is void as against public policy. Mr. Justice D.N. Das Gupta who heard 
the revision petition discussed the special circumstances in which the 
kabinama was executed in the case under review. Mr. Justice Das 
Gupta, held that under these special circumstances there is nothing in the 
agreement which is opposed to any law, the public policy or the 
Mohammedan law. He supported his view from the decided cases'^ in 
which agreements by the husband in favour of his wife allowing her to 
live at her parents' house under certain contingencies were held to be 
not invalid and nor opposed to public policy. The courts have adopted a 
pragmatic approach in considering the special contingencies safe-
guarding the interests of the wife in matrimonial matters as against a 
hostile, unkind and unfavourably disposed husband or his family and 
supported such agreements to ensure domestic happiness. Choice 
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making in such matters, is of course, a difficult tal^es for the courts, for 
in the worlds of an eminent scholar, 
Public policy is an unruly horse to ride. It is difficult to 
guide the animal on level ground, it is still more difficult to 
make him leap over a stile on which a master exponent of 
equity has affixed the device....'^ Public policy has, of late 
been recognized to play a dual role: enabling and the 
disabling one, in the former sense. It is another name for 
the fundamental, ethical, political and social principles 
which guide the legal evolution, whether in legislation or 
legal administration, at any given time. 
Muhammad Haji Kammu v. Ethiyumma'''^ was a case where a Shafn 
virgin girl had authorized a wall to give her in marriage and the 
marriage having taken place they lived for 7 years and had a child. The 
husband brought a suit for declaration that she was not his legally 
wedded wife and consequently, the child born in the union was not his 
child. This contention was upheld by the trial court on the ground that a 
Shafii virgin girl with no father, grandfather or agnate male relation 
alive, could be given in marriage only by the Kazi, which did not take 
place in this case. The first appellate court, however, disagreed with this 
view and held that the marriage was valid as it was contracted through a 
wall who need not necessarily be a kazi and that she having attained 
puberty was herself competent to contract marriage without the 
intervention of a guardian, and if she was not so competent, since 
consummation of marriage took place and she lived as wife for several 
years even after she attained majority, she ratified the marriage, which 
she could have repudiated when she attained majority. This view was 
upheld by the High Court per Raghavan, J. The appellants referred to 
sections 17B (2) (b), 64 and 67 of Tyabji's Muhammadan Law (3r(l edn.) 
which stated that under Shafii and Maliki law, a thayiba'^' is competent 
to contract a marriage but not a woman who is a virgin and that under 
587 
Shafii Law no person other than the father or father's father is entitled to 
act as guardian for marriage. But the court rightly pointed out that 
"These sections make it clear that in the case of a Shafii virgin girl her 
father or grandfather is to act as her guardian in marriage and such 
authority of the guardian ceases when the girl becomes competent to 
contract in marriage when she attains the age of discretion, i.e.. 
puberty." In Manoli Pathayi v. Moideen^^ and, on a reference the 
Division Bench of the Kerala High Court per Mr. Justice Narayan Pillai 
having observed, as Mr. Justice Shah of the Bombay High Court did in 
Chandbi v. Bandesha^^ that "at first blush it may appear that when the 
fact of previous divorce mentioned in a written statement is found to be 
false or not proved it would be against all rules to construe that at least 
from the date of the written statement divorce should be deemed to have 
been effected," went on to hold: 
But under Mohammedan law the husband is in a 
favoured position and the authorities are to the effect that 
if he states that he had on a previous occasion divorced 
his wife, that statement amounts to a declaration of 
divorce at least on the day the statement is made and 
whatever be the reason behind it, the same has to be 
given effect to as it forms part of that law.^' 
Hedaya stated the rule as well as the reason therefore in these worlds: 
If a man say to his wife, 'you are under divorce 
yesterday' ....[and] and he had married her before the 
times of which he speaks, divorce takes place at the time 
of his speaking because if a man signify a divorce in the 
preterit from it is an indication in the present, and hence 
the divorce takes place accordingly, this expression 
being an indication of what is now, and not a relation of 
what is past as it does not appear that he pronounced any 
divorce yesterday, so as that he should now give 
intelligence thereof. 
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In Ahmed Biix v. Smt. Nathoo^^ the following issues of law were 
involved: (1) the marriage tie between a Hindu couple does not stand 
dissolved automatically after conversion of the Hindu wife to Islam; (2) 
however the marriage is dissolved on the death of Hindu husband. (3) if 
after the marriage is dissolved the converted wife marries a Muslim 
husband and a child was bom of that union the child would be legitimate 
child.^ ^ In the case of Muslim women becoming an apostate the 
marriage was to be dissolved automatically. But according to Act VIII 
of 1939 the marriage is not dissolved even in this case. A woman 
married under Hindu law subsequently adopted Islam; the marriage was 
held to be governed by Hindu law and accordingly not dissolved by her 
9 7 
adoption of Islam. The second issue that after the death of the Hindu 
husband the marriage will be dissolved is again an accepted fact because 
death is the solid ground for the dissolution of marriage. In this 
particular case the woman had not given any notice to her former 
husband nor has she sought the intervention of the courts of justice. 
What might have done was that she could have obtained against her 
Hindu husband a declaratory decree that under the Mohammadan law, 
which was her personal law since her conversion, her former maiTiage 
was dissolved and that she was competent to marry again. There had 
been no such decree in this case and that India is not darul Islam where 
the Mohammadan law is administered, the dissolution of marriage could 
not have taken place in the case without the decree of court. According 
to Fatwa Alamgiri: 
If a person acknowledges another as his son it is valid 
provided the person who is acknowledged may be such 
that he could be the son of the acknowledger and his 
paternity with other person is not established and in case 
where the acknowledge can speak he must accept the 
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acknowledgement also. In the case of a wife being 
acknowledged she must also confirm the 
acknowledgement and at that time there should no other 
person as husband of the acknowledged wife. 
In Mst. Jani and others v. Mohd. Khan^^ a Division Bench of the Court 
had held that a khana damad was not entitled to bring a suit for 
restitution of conjugal rights as the custom of making a khana damad 
prevalent in the valley abrogated the Muslim law of marriage and 
imposed an obligation upon the husband to reside in the bride's father's 
house and not to compel his wife to leave it and reside with him 
elsewhere. On a reference the full Bench of that Court held that the 
husband was entitled to a decree for restitution of conjugal rights where 
his wife had refused to live with him in her father's house or to perform 
her marital obligation. The question before the Court was whether such 
an agreement by which the husband gives to his wife a right to divorce 
him on these conditions was invalid as being opposed to public policy. 
Jalaluddin, J. held that conditions were opposed to public policy as they 
were not wholesome and conducive to the best spirit underlying the 
marriage and a breach of it cannot operate as a dissolution of maniage 
between the couple. The reasons for taking this view were thus stated by 
the learned Judge: 
A Khana Damad is not to work as a servant in the house 
of his in-laws. He is not a serf that he has to remain at 
the beck and call on his father-in-law and mother-in-law. 
It is true that as a son he has to respect them and render 
services according to his capacity but at the same time if 
he fails to do that should not bring within its wake the 
dissolution of matrimonial ties with his wife.^^ 
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This decision protects the human dignity of a Khanci Damad husband 
and saves the marriage from being dissolved on a ground which has no 
relevance to the essence of the marriage. These factors cannot l^ ut be 
regarded as matters of public policy and overriding the considerations of 
sanctity of contract. 
With respect a new thinking is noticeable in the opinion of Mirza, J. in 
Imam Sahab v. Hajju Bee^^ wherein he disagreed with the view of the 
Hyderabad High Court in Wahab AH v. Qamro Bf that if the prev ious 
divorce is not established, the divorce 'will operate from the time which 
is mentioned in the written statement. The learned Judge referred to the 
three kinds of talaqs and took the view that a person who alleges that he 
has given divorce must establish what foiTn of talaq was pronounced and 
when it became irrevocable; and that unless a person complies with 
these conditions a divorce does not become effective and a mere 
mention in a written statement cannot be sufficient to have the eflect of 
a divorce unless it is pronounced in the presence of witnesses or the wife 
herself.' In substance the learned Judge insisted that talaq must be 
pronounced following the procedure and in the form recognized by 
Muslim law and that the statement or deposition as to that without proof 
cannot be a substitute for that recognized procedure and forms. This 
view is welcome and may be justified even on the basis of the passage in 
the Hidaya which is said to be the logical basis for the established rule. 
There is an apparent conflict between the provisions of Muslim law and 
the provisions of section 488(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
relating to wife's right to maintenance where the husband has married 
another wife. In view of this conflict the question whether or not the 
provisions of section 488(3) are applicable to Muslims came for 
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consideration before the Court in Shahulameedu v. Subaida Beevi.'" The 
same question was considered by various High Courts earlier. There is 
a difference of opinion amongst the High Courts on the question 
whether the proviso relates to clause (3) of section 488 or to clause (1) 
as well.^ '^  One view is that even if the wife is justified in refusing to live 
with her husband on the ground that he has married an another wife, if 
she fails to show that he had neglected or refused to maintain her, she 
would not be entitled to maintenance. The other view is that whether 
there is neglect or no neglect the husband is liable to pay maintenance 
on the sole ground that he has taken another wife.^ ^ The better view 
seems to be that where the husband offers to maintain his wife on 
condition of her living with him and she refuses to live with him on the 
ground of his marrying an another wife, the conditional offer by the 
husband itself amounts to refusal to maintain his wife. With regard to 
the applicability of proviso to section 488 three questions call for 
consideration: (1) Whether to marry more than one wife is a right 
protected by Article 25 of the Constitution; (2) whether section 488 
since is in conflict with Muslim law applies to Muslims; and (3) whether 
the order of maintenance under section 488 is open to interference in a 
suit by a civil court. With regard to the first question the courts have 
taken consistent view that it is not obligatory on the part of a Muslim to 
marry more than one wife and that section 488 does not violate Article, 
25 of the Constitution. In the Badruddin case,^^ Oak, J. took the view 
that to have more than one wife is not shown to be a part of religion nor 
it is obligatory upon a Muslim to have more than one wife and this 
being the case any provision of law requiring a Muslim not to have more 
than one wife does not amount to interference with the right to profess, 
practice and propagate religion. Taking the same view the Court in the 
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Shahillameedu case enjoyed that the Qur'anic injunction as to polygamy 
should be understood in the perspective of conditions prevailing in those 
days and the fact that the Prophet himself recognized the difficulty of 
treating two or more wives with equal justice and directed that an 
individual should have only one wife, suggests that the Qur'an enjoined 
monogamy upon Muslims and departure there from as an exception. In 
support of this view reference was made to the measures adopted in 
various Muslim countries (Syria, Tunisia, Morocco, Pakistan, Iran and 
the Islamic Republics of the Soviet Union) for prohibiting or severely 
restricting the practice of polygamy. 
In Shakila Banu v. Ghulam Mustafa, the Bombay High Court laid 
down the important principle that in a husband's suit for restitution of 
conjugal rights, the wife's evidence about cruelty would not require 
corroboration. Here the respondent had filed a suit for restitution of 
conjugal rights. The wife contended that her husband, after beating and 
ill-treating her, had sent her to reside in her father's house asking her not 
to return. The civil judge relied on her evidence and held that there was 
sufficient ground to infer ill-treatment; further that the circumstances 
were such as to make it unsafe for her return to the husband's place. 
Accordingly, the suit was dismissed. In the first appeal, the assistant 
judge, relying on the decision in Miranjan AH v. Maimuna Bibi/' took 
the view that in all matrimonial cases the uncorroborated testimony of 
one of the spouses was not sufficient to prove cruelty. Holding that the 
wife had not satisfied the court "that there was a reasonable 
apprehension that it would be unsafe for her to go and stay with her 
husband", he allowed the appeal and decreed the husband's suit. In the 
second appeal, the High Court described the approach of the assistant 
judge as "wholly wrong", and held that if the wife was beated inside the 
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husband's house, it would not be possible for the wife to produce 
witness. Following its earlier decision in Bai Jivi v. Narsing Lalhhai, 
the court further held that in the wife could not be compelled to live with 
the husband if she had a reasonable apprehension that this would be 
dangerous to her. The case of ^. Yusufv. Sowramma is a landmark in 
the notable pronouncements relating to Muslim law. Here, the facts 
were: the respondent, a girl of about 15 years, was married to the 
appellant who was twice her age. After having lived for a month in her 
husband's house she went back to her parents, and lived separately for 
over two years. The respondent sued her for dissolution of marriage 
under section 2(ii) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939. 
though the appellant justice Krishna Iyer rejected the husband's plea and 
upheld the decree for dissolution of marriage, holding that a Muslim 
woman can sue for dissolution, under section 2(/7) of the Act, on the 
score that she has not as a matter of fact been maintained, even if there 
is a good cause for it. "The voice of the law", he observed, "echoing 
public policy is often that of the realist, not that of the moralist.'' In this 
case. Justice Krishna Iyer examined at length the original texts, the 
opinions of some scholars of Islamic jurisprudence, and some judicial 
decisions, bringing forth the nature of Muslim marriage, its incidents 
and the conditions for its dissolution. Besides considering the question 
that came up in appeal, the learned judge also examined at length the 
propriety of unilateral divorce, and discussed the common 
misconception about it. On the authority of the Qur'an, the Sunna and 
the writings of some Muslim scholar, he indicated that a talaq emanating 
from the husband was really prohibited except in cases of necessity, 
when it could be pronounced with the sanction of the judge 
administering the Muslim law. He exploded the popular fallacy that a 
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Muslim male, under the Qur'anic law, enjoys an arbitrary and unilateral 
power to pronounce a divorce. Pointing out that such a view did not 
accord with Islamic injunctions, he observed: 
However, Muslim law, as applied in India, has taken a 
course contrary to the spirit of what the Prophet or the 
Holy Qur'an laid down, and the same misconception 
vitiates the law dealing with the wife's right to divorce. 
Another significant fact about the decision is that it has been handed 
down at a time when there is already a lot of thinking about reform in 
the Muslim law of divorce. The change, as pointed out by Justice Iyer, 
would accord with the Islamic injunctions and the ethos of the Muslim 
community and tally with the Islamic law of divorce as administered 
now in many Muslim countries."^^ 
An esteemable judgment enunciative of Muslim women's right to 
divorce was delivered in 1973 by the High Court of Kerala ir K.C. 
Moyin v. Nafeesa and others. 
The facts of the case were that Nafeesa, wife of one K.C. Moyin, 
deserted her husband and all his efforts to effect a reconciliation 
(including a suit for restitution of conjugal rights) failed. After the 
refusal of the Munsif s Court at Calicut to dissolve her marriage, she 
chose to take the law in her own hands and on the advice of a local mufti 
claimed to have unilaterally "repudiated" the marriage. Thereafter she 
contracted another marriage and was later prosecuted for bigamy under 
section 494 of the Indian Penal Code. The district magistrate's court 
held that a Muslim wife could pronounce on extrajudicial divorce and 
acquitted Nafesa. In appeal the case reached the High Court of Kerala. 
Overruling the lower court's decision, the High Court held that the 
charge of bigamy was established and that the lower court had made a 
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mistake in upholding the vaHdity of the extra-judicial divorce 
pronounced by Nafeesa. The High Court observed: 
With the passing of the Act it has become clear that the 
function of dissolving a marriage at the instance of a wife 
cannot be exercised by any person or body other than a 
civil court and in no other way than on a consideration of 
the evidence adduced in the case. 
In other words the court stressed that in India Muslim wife's right to 
divorce is confined to the provisions of the Dissolution of Marriage Act, 
1939. The disastrous consequences likely to ensue if wives were 
allowed to do away with the marital alliance by a unilateral action were 
aptly pointed out by the High Court. It was observed: 
If without the intervention of court a marriage could be 
dissolved by a unilateral repudiation by the wife, 
calamitous results will follow. There have been instances 
in the past when an unscrupulous father-in-law or other 
near relatives of the wife resorted to advice from men 
learned in theology to get rid of a recalcitrant or poor 
son-in-law even against the wife's wishes. It is the duty of 
the court to guard against any such encroachment in its 
domain.^^ 
During the course of the judgment a cautious observation was made by 
the High Court that: The only occasion when a wife can, perhaps, resort 
to repudiation without the intervention of the court is while pronouncing 
a talaq tafwid (delegated divorce) which is a divorce effected by wife on 
the strength of a delegation by the husband contingent on the happening 
of an event or subject to other reasonable principles of Muslim law/'' 
In Raj Mohammad v. Saeeda Amina Begum'^^ Venkatramiah I. Has 
rightly held that in a suit for restitution of conjugal rights by a husband 
against his wife there is no absolute right in the husband to claim to have 
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his wife reside with him. In the instant case, the wife had called upon 
her husband to pay her and her children maintenance and he had taken a 
second wife during the pedency of the suit. The court held that the 
husband has been guilty of such conduct which leads to the conclusion 
that he has disentitled himself to a decree for restitution of conjugal 
rights. Venkatramiah J. has rightly justified his decision on a 
consideration of the principles of Muslim law. These are, now, fortified 
by the provisions of section 2 sub-sections (//) and (viii) of the 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, which can, not doubt be 
looked at even in proceedings for restitution of conjugal rights initiated 
by the husband, and by the clause added to section 488 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure in 1949, that, "if a husband has contracted maniage 
with another wife or keeps a mistress it shall be considered to be just 
ground for his wife's refusal to live with him." 
In Nurjahan v. M Kazim Alif a Muslim wife sought divorce under the 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. In his defence the husband, 
inter alia, pleaded infidelity on her part. While the wife's suit was 
dismissed, in her first appeal she prayed for divorce, under section 2(ix) 
of the Act f 1939, claiming that her husband had made false allegations 
of adultery against her during her course of the proceeding in the lower 
court. 
Failing to get the desired relief in the first appellate court, she came in 
appeal before the Calcutta High Court where Bhattacharya J. hit hard at 
the contention of her lawyer that her husband's statement regarding her 
bad character-which he made in defence - could form a ground for a 
judicial divorce (faskh) on the ground of Han. He asserted that it is only 
a "voluntary and aggressive charge" of adultery made by the husband 
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which, if false, would make room for a divorce grounded on lian. where 
a wife makes allegations against the husband (which the court finds not 
proved) and, hurt by her behaviour, the husband hits back with an 
allegation of infidelity against her, what he says in defence cannot be 
used by the wife against him to fortify her demand for a divorce."*'^  
Unquestionably the most important judicial decision of the year and 
perhaps of several decades in the field of Muslim law is the judgment of 
the Supreme Court in Tahira Bai 's case^^ by Krishna Iyer, Tulzapurkar 
and Pathak, JJ. In this case the Supreme Court had to determine, so far 
as a Muslim Woman was concerned, the content of the expression "the 
sum, which under any.... personal law of the parties, was payable on 
divorce...." occurring in section 127 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
1973. It will be recalled that when an application for maintenance is 
made by a divorced woman to a magistrate, the husband is pennitted to 
plead that he has already paid such a sum. Only the payment of such a 
sum divests the woman of the right to claim maintenance under section 
125 of the same Code. 
In the present case Ali Hussain Fidalli had married Tahira as his second 
wife in 1956. By her he had a son. The jealousies of a triangular 
situation seem ultimately to have broken this marriage. In 1962. Ali 
divorced Tahira, A suit relating to the flat in which Ali had housed 
Tahira ended in a consent decree which recited that the husband had 
transferred the suit premises, namely a flat in Bombay to Tahira along 
with the shares of the Cooperative Housing Society which had built the 
flat. Mahr (Rs. 5,000) and iddat (Rs. 180) were stated to be adjusted by 
the compromise terms which concluded, "The plaintiff declares that she 
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has no claim or right whatsoever against the defendant or against the 
estate or properties of the defendant." 
Some years later, finding herself in financial straits, Tahira filed an 
applicafion under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 
for maintenance. The magistrate, while taking due note of the means of 
the husband and the fact that the cost of living in Bombay, where the 
parties lived, was high, as well as the fact that the husband had provided 
residential accommodation to Tahira, awarded a monthly maintenance 
of Rs. 300 for her son and Rs. 400 for Tahira. This order was challenged 
successftilly in the Bombay High Court by Fidalli but restored by the 
Supreme Court, on appeal by Tahira. 
In this case the Supreme Court unanimously held that irrespective of the 
amount named in the marriage contract as mahr, a reason able amount 
was due to the woman. Until this amount was discharged, the divorced 
woman would continue to be entitled to maintenance under section 125 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Although the verse of the Holy 
Quran is not cited in the judgment, the court seems, subconsciously, to 
have been inspired by it. 
In the words of the Supreme Court: 
Where the husband, by customary payment at the time of 
divorce, has adequately provided for the divorcee, a 
subsequent series of recurrent doles is contra-indicated 
and the husband liberated....The payment of ilhisoiy 
amounts by way of customary or personal law-
requirements will be considered in the reduction of the 
maintenance rate but cannot, annihilate that rate unless 
it is a reasonable substitute.... The purpose of payment 
under any customary or personal law must be to provide 
her with the wherewithal to maintain herself. There must 
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be a rational relation between the sum so paid and its 
potential as a provision for maintenance.' 
These words are entirely consistent with the verse of the Hol> Quran 
eariier set out. It is good that the Supreme Court, eminently led by 
Krishna Iyer J. has restored to the Muslim woman her Quranic rights, as 
set forth in this verse. It will, immeasurably, improve the status of all 
Muslim women, married or divorced, by giving them relief against an 
intolerably precarious existence. Everyone who is a votary of the Holy 
Quran should applaud it. 
In a very important decision, namely, Ibrahim Fathima v. Md. Saleem/' 
Balasubrahmanyam J. has made a creative restatement of the rules of 
classical Muslim law conformably to modern principles of justice, 
equity and good conscience, for securing the rights of minor children by 
a charge on their father's property. 
The learned judge observed: 
/ conceive that this court and other courts in this land 
must administer the personal law of the Muslims on this 
difficult question only on the basis of the ancient textual 
authorities whose validity as sources of law can hardly 
be questioned. Having regard to the tradition handed 
down from the Prophet himself in the two anecdotal 
references I have earlier cited there seems to me to be 
every judicial compulsion to follow the injunction which 
the Prophet administered to his followers as the only 
rule of law bearing on the subject of maintenance.... 
At the end of the discussion I am quite satisfied that 
under the Muslim law minor children are entitled to 
have a decree for this maintenance to be made a proper 
charge on the property of their father. I hold that the 
children's right to maintenance in a Muslim household 
always attaches to the father's property in such a way 
and in such measure that it is not affected by any 
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subsequent alienation by the father with notice of the 
charge or by an alienation which is gratuitous: .u 
In Khadija v. Muhammad^^ Narayana Pillai J. has brought judicial 
wisdom and compassion to bear upon a difficuh and sensitive rule of 
Muslim law. Under Muslim law once a divorce has taken effect 
irrevocably and finally by three pronouncements of talaq, the former 
spouses cannot remarry until the wife has contracted and consummated 
marriage with a third person and been divorced by him. This rule was 
evolved for the protection of women to prevent sadistic husbands 
successively divorcing and taking back their wives. It was conce ived at 
a time when women were more helpless than they are today. The rule 
that the intervening marriage must be not merely contracted but also 
consummated was evolved to prevent this exercise being merely a sham. 
The idea presumably was to jolt the male ego of the unsteady husband. 
The only relaxation permitted of this rule was in favour of the wife, viz., 
that the wife's statement that such intervening marriage had in fact been 
consummated was conclusive. However, in modern times this rule often 
works oddly—even grotesquely. In the present case, the husband had 
divorced his wife after five children were bom to them. Then, years 
later, he "remarried" her and took her to his house. Meanwhile, the wife 
had not married any one else. Again, after four and a half months they 
quarrelled and the husband divorced his wife again. During this short 
period of cohabitation another child was conceived and later born. The 
wife then claimed, under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; 
maintenance for the child and Rs. 30 per month was awarded by the trial 
magistrate. The husband attacked this award of maintenance on the 
ground that in the eyes of the law, the woman must be regarded as living 
in adultery with himself when the last child was conceived and, hence, 
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was disentitled to maintenance. This odd argument prevailed in revision 
before the session's judge. Fortunately, Narayana Piilai J. found good 
authority in Mulla's Mahomedan Law, following Baillie ' that a 
marriage without fulfillment of the above condition (intervening 
marriage with stranger) is irregular and not void". Thus, children born of 
such marriage are legitimate and if consummation has taken place, the 
wife is entitled to dower. 
Narayana Piilai J. rightly held that there was no justifiable reason 
whatsoever for the sessions judge to interfere in revision with the order 
passed by the trial magistrate granting maintenance to the child. There 
was certainly no warrant for the learned sessions judge to hold that the 
circumstances in this case amounted to the wife living in adultei'y within 
the meaning of sub-section (4) of section 125 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure. Obviously, the husband could not be permitted to take 
advantage of his own wrong. 
In Shamim Bano v. Union of India where the court had to determine 
the fate of four small children—the youngest, a baby boy aged only six 
months and the oldest, a girl 3 years and 9 months—waifs in that dire 
vale, wrecked by the discord of parents and the international conflicts 
of laws, whereon, alas, it appears that the angels of mercy do not dare to 
gaze. 
It is ironical that this judgment was delivered on 17th July, 1979 during 
the United Nation's International Year of the Child. 
The facts of the case are that the mother of these children, Shamim 
Bano, who was the petitioner before the High Court was an Indian 
citizen by birth and throughout held that citizenship. She took an 
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Indian passport and visited Mecca where her father was. Her Indian 
passport stood valid upto 1983. In January, 1975, Shamim Banc at 
Mecca married Mirza Afzal Beg, a Pakistani national. 
On 21st March, 1979 Shamim Bano, along with her four children and 
her husband, came to India. Soon afterwards, while still in India on 
20th May, 1979 the husband, Mirza Afzal Beg divorced Shamim Bano. 
Shamim Bano kept her four small children with her. Mirza Afzal Beg 
appeared before the court and urged that he be permitted to take the 
children away with him. He apparently did not desire to stay in India. 
Now, in the present case, Shamim Bano's children were bom outside 
India so they could not be citizens of India by birth under section 3 of 
the Citizenship Act. Under section 4 of the said Act express is verbis 
they could not also be termed citizens of India by descent because only 
such persons can be so termed whose father was a citizen of India at the 
time of their birth. Prima facie this provision of the Citizenship Act 
must be held to be void as offending Article 15 of the Constitution of 
India which prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sex. At this point 
it may be useful to consider the Muslim law on the mother's right to 
custody of her minor children. 
Again we may refer to the Hedaya which states: 
If a separation takes place between a husband and wife 
who are possessed of an infant child, the right of nursing 
and keeping it rests with the Mother because it is 
recorded that a woman once applied to the Prophet, 
saying "O Prophet of God this is my son the fruit of my 
womb cherished in my bosom and suckled at my breast: 
and his father is desirous of taking him away from me 
into his own care. To which the Prophet replied : 'thou 
has a right in the child prior to that of thy husband, so 
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long as thou does not marry with a stranger'—Moreover 
a mother is not only more tender but also better qualified 
to cherish a child during infancy, so that committing the 
care to her is of advantage to the child, and Siddeek (Abv 
Bakr Siddiq, the First Caliph, after the Prophet) alluded 
to this when he addressed Omar (the Second Caliph) on 
a similar occasion, saying 'the spittle of the mother, is 
better for thy child than honey O Omar.... 
In the circumstances there appears to have been no legal obligation on 
the State of Rajasthan to pass an order, as it did on 21.5.1979, to deport 
Shamim Bano's children from India. On the contrary, there was the 
strongest constitutional obligation upon the state, in accordance with 
article 39 (f) of the Constitution, viz: 
The State shall in particular direct its policy towards 
securing— that children are given opportunities and 
facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in 
conditions of freedom and dignity and that childhood and 
youth are protected against exploitation and against 
moral and material abandonment. 
CO 
The case of Fuzlunbi v. K. Khader Vali,' was decided by the Supi'eme 
Court. In his strongly worded judgment, Krishna Iyer J., admonished a 
Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala (against whose decision the 
case went in appeal to the Supreme Court) for not following his earlier 
ruling on the subject in Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain''^ In that case, by a 
remarkable process of "telelogical interpretation" and "sociological 
decoding" of section 127 (3) (b) of the Code, the learned judge had 
decided that the amount of mahr and maintenance of iddat paid by the 
divorcing husband—referred to in that provision—was justiciable for 
the purpose of granting relief to an ex-wife under the Code,''" Despite 
that ruling, the High Court of Kerala, seeking to confine it "only to the 
facts of that case," refused relief under the Code against a husband who 
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had paid to his divorced wife all her dues payable under the personal 
law of the parties. Sharply reacting to the Division Bench's decision, 
Krishna Iyer J, said : 
There is no warrant whatever for the High Court to reduce 
to a husk a decision of this Court by its doctrinal gloss. 
The decision which had, in the learned judge's opinion, been arrived at 
to his "bafflement" by the "fine art of skirting the real reasoning" in Bai 
Tahira^^ was according to him "surely a mischief, unintended l^ y the 
court may be, but embarrassing to the subordinate judiciary".' 
* 
The Supreme Court said : 
Another angle to the subject of mahr and its impact on 
liability for maintenance after divorce may be briefly 
considered. Khalid J. of the Kerala High Court two cases 
has taken the view that S. 125 and S. 127, Cr. P, C. an' 
conceptually unconnected with payment of mahr cmd cannot 
bail out a Muslim husband from his statutory obligation 
under S. 125. We are aware of the criticism of this 
conceptual divorce between mahr and post-divorce 
maintenance by Dr. Tahir Mahmood in his recent book on 
the Muslim Law of India (see p. 133) where the learned 
author prefers to retain the nexus between mahr and 
maintenance but has this to say : 
In a case the Supreme Court held that the sum paid under 
personal law—referred to in CI. (b) of Sec. 127 (3) of the 
Code—should be "more or less sufficient to do duty for 
maintenance allowance"; if it is not so it can be considered 
by the court for the reduction of the maintenance rate but 
cannot annihilate that rate. This, indeed, is a liberal ruling 
and conforms to the spirit of Islamic law on the subject.^^ 
The speedy remedy of maintenance-orders for neglected wives, 
fiimished by the law of criminal procedure since long, was extended to 
ex-wives as well by the new Criminal Procedure, 1979 Code of 1973. 
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The conflicts between this new law and the traditional Islamic law on 
divorced women's rights has generated a lot of litigation. Decisions of 
Krishna Iyer J. of the Supreme Court in Tahira Bi and Fuzluni, trying to 
solve this conflict in favour of the Criminal Procedure Code and in 
suppression of Islamic law, have become extremely controversial. \ a 
petition was filed before the Supreme Court for a reconsideration of the 
two rulings^^. It has not yet been taken up for hearing and the issue is, 
thus, sub judice. In the meanwhile another ruling on the subject, Zohra 
Khatoon v. Mohd. Ibrahim^^ was reported during 1981. In this case the 
point at issue was whether a Muslim wife who filed a petition for 
divorce against the husband under the Dissolution of Muslim Mamage 
Act, would be entitled to seek maintenance from him under the 
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. Arguing that the Code 
provision defining the term "wife" as one inclusive of ex-wives could 
not be confined to cases of extra-judicial divorces, the court decided the 
issue in the affirmative. In view of the matter being sub judice at the 
moment, we refrain from making any comment on this latest ruling. It is 
hoped that this ruling too, will be reconsidered by the Supreme Court 
when it pronounces a final verdict in the matter. The Criminal Procedure 
Code also allows passing of maintenance orders in favour of wives who 
are living separate from their husbands on "just grounds". The concept 
of "just grounds" is too wide and has been only illustrated in the Code, 
not exhaustively defined. In the case of Sirajmohamed Khan v. 
Hafizunnisa'^ two such "just grounds" were knocked out by the 
Supreme Court, viz: 
(a) Impotency of the husband (which, in the opinion of the court 
would amount to mental cruelty '^'^ ); and 
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(b) Reasonable apprehension of being physically harmed due to 
husband's demand of dowry 70 
In Ittoachalil Meethal Moosa v. Pachiparambath Meethal Fathima and 
pathumma' Balakrishna Menon J. rightly dismissed the second appeal 
of a husband whose wife claimed and obtained divorce from him 
because for two years, while she lived away from him, no doubt of her 
own free will, the husband had failed and neglected to maintain her. 
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Following Tyabji C.J.'s judgment, in Noor Bibi's case " and of Krishna 
Iyer J. in Yusuf Router v. Souramma ' that a husband's failure to provide 
maintenance for a period of two years mentioned in clause (ii) of section 
2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act entitles the wife to a 
decree for dissolution of marriage, whether or not the husband had 
reasonable cause for withholding such maintenance. In this connection 
the judge observed: 
The husband has absolute power to liquidate the marriage 
by pronouncement of 'Talak'. The wife's right for 
dissolution marriage is confined to these grounds 
enumerated in clauses (i) to (ix) of Section 2 [of the 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act]. If the husband 
wants the marriage relationship to continue, he should see 
that the wife does not get a ground under clause (ii) of 
Section 2 to approach the court for a decree dissolving the 
marriage. If the wife is of immoral character or she 
deliberately and against the wishes of her husband lives 
away from him without giving him her company, it is open 
to the husband on his own accord to pronounce 'talak' cmd 
divorce her. If however he wants to retain the relationship 
between the parties, he may have to provide for the wife's 
maintenance whether she deserves it or not. The duty to 
provide maintenance to the wife under these circumstance 
is only self-imposed to keep the relationship intact, and it is 
not a duty corresponding to the right of the wife to claim 
maintenance.... '^ 
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The case of Shah Bano^^ ultimately came before the Constitution Bench 
of the Supreme Court, comprising Y.V. Chandrachud CJ and D.A. 
Desai, E.S. Venkatramiah, Q, Chinnappa Reddy, and Ranganarh Misra 
JJ., was an appeal, by special leave under Article 136, sought by and 
granted to the husband Ahmad Khan, objecting to the continuance of a 
maintenance order, passed in favour of his former wife. Shah Bano 
Begum by a magistrate at Indore, in the State of Madhya. Pradesh, 
ordering him to pay to her an amount (as enhanced by the High Court) 
of Rs. 179.20/- per month by way of maintenance, under section 125 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 
Ahmad Khan had married Shah Bano in 1932, by nikah. A mahr of Rs. 
30,000/- was settled on the wife. Five children, three sons and two 
daughters, were bom of the mamage. In 1946 Ahmad Khan took a 
second wife who bore him six children. Apparently the husband 
favoured the second wife and neglected Shah Bano, who was, according 
to her, denied even needed clothes and medicines. The two women 
shared Ahmad Khan's roof for 29 years. In 1975 Ahmad Khan, allegedly 
drove Shah Bano out of the house. In dire want, as she alleged, in April 
1978, Shah Bano approached the judicial magistrate, first class, Indore, 
asking for maintenance at Rs. 500/- per month, the maximum amount 
allowable under the section. The husband, who was a leading advocate, 
was claimed to be earning more than Rs. 60,000/- per annum. The 
proceedings before the judicial magistrate (which are supposed to be 
summary proceedings) dragged on for a year and a half before he could 
persuade himself to pass an order. Unfortunately there was, meanwhile, 
no court order for interim relief in favour of Shah Bano. The Supreme 
Court has since held that in proceedings under section 125 interim 
reliefs can be ordered.^^ This was not unfortunately, the law as then 
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understood. In August 1979 the judicial magistrate granted Shah Banc 
maintenance at the "princely" rate of Rs. 25/- per month. Meanwhile on 
8th November, 1978, during the pendency of the case before the 
magistrate, Ahmad Khan played his trump card, "repudiating" Shah 
Bano by irrevocable "triple talaq", His defence to Shah Bano's petition 
for maintenance now was that she by reason of the divorce had ceased to 
be his wife and that he was under no obligation to provide further 
maintenance for her. This question, thereafter, became the main issue in 
the case. The court, in its judgment, examined the question whether 
apart from contractual mahr there is an obligation under personal law of 
a "Muslim husband to make provision for or to provide maintenance to 
the divorced wife".^'' The court held: 
There can be no greater authority on this question than 
the Holy Quran, "The Quran, the Sacred Book of Islam, 
comprises in its 114 Suras or chapters, the total of 
revelations believed to have been communicated to 
Prophet Muhammed, as a final expression of God's 
Will".... Verses (Aiyats) 241 and 242 of the Quran show 
that there is an obligation on Muslim husbands to 
provide for their divorced wives. 
After considering the various translations of the Holy Quran and other 
materials before them, the judges observed: 
These Aiyats leave no doubt that the Quran imposes an 
obligation on the Muslim husband to make provision for 
or to provide maintenance to the divorced wife. The 
contrary argument does less than justice to the teachings 
of the Quran. As observed by Mr. M. Hidayatullah in his 
Introduction to Mulla's Mahomedan law, the Qurun is 
Alfurqan, that is, one showing truth from falsehood and 
rightjrom wrong. 
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This decision of the Supreme Court has been widely acclaimed as giving 
much needed relief and security to women. It has also been criticized as 
an erroneous interpretation of the Quranic text and thus an interference 
with the Shariat law 
In para 1 of the judgment, the Chief justice writes: 
It is alleged that the 'fatal point in Islam is the 
degradation of women' (Edward William Lane). To the 
Prophet is ascribed the statement, hopefully wrongly, 
that 'Woman was made from a crooked rib, and if you try 
to bend it straight, it will break, therefore, treat your 
wives kindly. 
Zohara Khatoon v. Mohd. Ibrahim' is a judgment of two judges of the 
Supreme Court, D.P. Madon and G.L. Oza JJ., affirming a technically 
invalidated earlier ex parte judgment of Murtaza Fazl Ali, A.D. Koshal 
and Varadarajan JJ., allowing Zohara Khatoon's appeal in regard lo her 
claim for maintenance from her former husband under section 125 of Cr. 
PC. She had obtained dissolution of her marriage under the Dissolution 
of Muslim Marriage. Act, 1939. As such, the Supreme Court rightly held 
she was "a woman who has obtained a divorce from her husband" within 
the meaning of explanation (b) of sub-section (1) of the Code. She was 
thus a woman entitled to claim maintenance from her former husband 
under that section. The decision is straightforward and calls for no 
comment except that, unfortunately, the position may have been altered 
adversely for the wife by reason of the Muslim Women (Protection of 
Rights on Divorce) Act. The court also referred to and followed Ahmad 
Khan v. Shah Bano Begum. 
In Dilshada Masood' v. Gh. Mustaffa^^ Rizvi J has correctly applied .the 
undoubted and salutary rule of the Shiah (Safari) school of Muslim law, 
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which stipulates two mandatory requirements, that must be satisfied 
before any talaq can be effective, namely, (a) that a talaq can be 
pronounced only through the prescribed expression, unti taliqoon in the 
Arabic language; (b) this must be done in the presence of two "just" 
('adil') witnesses. 
This established rule of the Shiah law is a beneficial check on hasty 
divorces. It prevents impromptu talaqs by men transported by rage, or in 
a state of intoxication. A man in a disturbed state of mind may trip over 
the Arabic words. The requirement of presence of two "just" witnesses 
adds another dimension. Such just witnesses would be expected to 
intervene to dissuade the man from pronouncing an over-hasty divorce. 
Even by threatening to leave the place such a witness could at least 
delay the divorce. Without satisfying these conditions such a divorce 
would be void ab initio. It should also be noted that the infamous talaq 
bidai (triple talaq in one breath) is not recognized by any school of 
Shiah (Jafari) law. 
The strong case on facts, in favour of the appellant wife, rightly upheld 
by M.K. Chawla J of the Delhi High Court in Shahina Praveen. v. Mohd 
Skakeef^ illustrates the unsatisfactory approach on the part of some of 
our judicial officers (not at the lowest level) in matters relating to the 
rights of women in family law in general and the Muslim personal law 
in particular. 
The court had to deal with a second appeal by the wife against the 
appellate order of the Additional District Judge, Delhi, who had, on 
seemingly unsubstantial grounds, reversed the very proper order of the 
trial judge, dismissing the husband's suit for restitution of conjugal 
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rights claimed by the, husband from his wife. Chawla J. went so far as to 
hold, with respect, rightly: 
On the basis of the evidence on record and the law lead 
down, it can be safely said that the institution of criminal 
cases (by the husband against his wife) and their 
vigorous pursuit against the wife and her relations 
amounts to cruelty and raises a reasonable apprehension 
in the mind of the defendant (wife) that in case she is 
forced to live with her husband, her life will be in danger. 
In fact, she has reasonable and just cause to withdraw 
from the company of the plaintiff. 
The Supreme Court in Sabami alias Saira Banu v. A.M. Abdul Gafoor,' 
held that the explanation was of uniform application to all wives 
including Muslim wives whose husbands have either married another 
wife or taken a mistress. The husband's defence was that he was 
permitted by his law to take another wife and so the second maiTiage 
could not afford a legal ground to the wife to live separate and claim 
maintenance. An issue was raised whether a Muslim wife whose 
husband has married again is better off under law than a Muslim wife 
whose husband has taken a mistress, in the matter of claiming 
maintenance. The court held that the explanation contemplates two 
kinds of matrimonial injuries to the wife, viz., his marrying again, and 
his taking a mistress. The second wife and the mistress are placed on the 
same footing and no differentiation is made on the basis of their status 
under the matrimonial law. 
In Md. Tajuddin v. Quamarunnisa, Bhaskar Rao J of the Andhra 
Pradesh High Court expressed an opinion that the Muslim Women Act 
charged the husband of a divorced woman with maintenance and, 
additionally, a fair and reasonable provision for future—both to be paid 
"within" the 'iddat' period, but not confined in their extent and quantum 
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to the said period. Life-long maintenance (if the divorcee remained 
unmarried) or a one-time provision, reasonable and fair, would be 
payable under the Act and section 125 of the Cr PC read together; there 
being "no repugnancy" between the two laws. Extensively quoting 
from—and claiming continued applicability of—the Shah Bano ruling 
even after 1986, the judge said: 
The expression a reasonable and fair provision and 
maintenance to be made and paid to her within the 
"iddat period" intends to stress more for immediate and 
early compliance with the obligation and in no event 
beyond the 'iddatperiod'. 
The Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Usman Khan 
Bahmani v. Fatihmunnissa Begum decided, by a majority of two to 
one, an important question relating to the Act of 1986—alas, adversely 
to women. Sardar Ali Khan J, with whom Ramanuluju Naidu J 
concurred, held that a divorced Muslim woman, under the said Act is 
entitled to "reasonable provision" only to the extent that the same would 
avail her during the period of iddat. It was not in dispute that the other 
amount, viz. maintenance, also due to her from the divorcing husband, 
could be ordered to be paid only for the said period of iddat. 
The said judgment deserves notice because it is not only contrary to the 
trend of judicial decisions and renders the statutory provision 
challengeable as hit by Article 14 of the Constitution, but is contrary to 
established Muslim law as laid down in the Shah Bano case and not 
changed by the legislature. 
The dissenting judge, Bhaskar Rao J has correctly interpreted the word 
"provision" in the said Act in conformity with the definition in 
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Webster's New International Dictionary, which says it means: "a gift by 
will or deed to one as heir who would not be heir otherwise". He has 
also relied on the meaning of the said word "provision" given by the 
Supreme Court in the Metal Box Company case which is as follows: " 
An amount set aside out of profits and other surpluses, 
not designed to meet a liability, contingency, commitment 
or diminution in value of assets, known to exist at the 
date of the balance sheet is a reserve but an amount set 
aside out of profits and other surpluses to provide for any 
known liability to which the amount cannot be 
determined with substantial accuracy, is a provision. 
Bhaskar Rao J continued:*^^ 
The word 'provision', thus, means an amount set apart to 
meet a known liability, the amount of which cannot be 
decided with accuracy. The known, liability under section 
3(l)(a) of a husband is to provide for the future of the 
divorced Muslim woman. The amount is not capable of 
being decided with substantial accuracy. This provision, 
thus, is surely different and distinct from maintenance 
due to the Muslim divorced woman for the iddat period. 
The judge has rightly drawn a distinction between the expressions 
"reasonable and fair provision" and "maintenance" used in sections 3 
and 4. He has also, with respect, rightly scouted the argument based on 
alleged inconvenience of the view he is taking. He has pointed out:'"* 
It is also crucial to notice that the Legislature cannot be 
said to be not appreciative of this inconvenient situation 
not only in arriving at but also in making a reasonable 
and fair provision. Having been apprehensive only, it 
introduced section 5 in the statute to enable the parties to 
choose governance by sections J25 to 128 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure. 
In a lucid and erudite judgment Pareed Pillay J of the Kerala High 
Court, in Adam v. Mammad^' has set out the salient features of the 
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Muslim law of marriage. In the case before him, he held that where the 
girl's father had given his consent to the marriage although the daughter 
had withheld consent, no valid marriage had taken place. The judge 
cited Mahmood J's classic dicta in Abdul Qadir v. Salima where the 
judge said: ^ ^ 
Marriage among Muhammadans is not a sacrament but 
purely a civil contract; and though it is solemnized 
generally with recitation of certain verses from the 
Kuran, yet the Muhammadan Law does not positively 
prescribe any service peculiar to the occasion. That it is 
a civil contract is manifest from the various ways and 
circumstances in and under which marriages are 
contracted or presumed to have been contracted. And 
though a civil contract, it is not positively prescribed to 
be reduced to writing, but the validity and operation of 
the whole are made to depend upon the declaration or 
proposal of the one, and the acceptance and consent of 
the other, or of the contracting parties, or of their natural 
and legal guardians before competent and sufficient 
witnesses; as also upon the restrictions imposed, and 
certain of the conditions required to be abided by 
according to the peculiarity of the case. 
As Muslim mamages are basically contractual the judge continued, 
"there cannot be a valid marriage without the consent of the parties 
when they are capable of it." The judge flirther added:*^^ 
As Muslim law treats the marriage as a civil contract, 
presence of witnesses is necessary. The contract of 
marriage must be in the form of a declaration and 
acceptance expressed at one meeting and uttered bv the 
parties entering into the contract (either for themselves 
or as proxies or as guardians) in the presence and 
hearing of each other. Under Hanafi and Shafi Laws it 
must be in the hearing of two witnesses simultaneously 
present. The witnesses must be sane, of full age and 
professing the Islamic faith. Under Hanafi Law at least 
one of the two witnesses must be a male. Under Shaft 
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Law both witnesses must be males. A marriage is not 
valid unless consented to by an adult girl. Shafi and 
Malik schools hold that consent must be given through a 
Wall. (Wall must be either appointed by the father or the 
court and is required to advise the girl properly). In a 
case where there is no evidence of the adult girl giving 
her consent the marriage cannot be held to be valid even 
though her father had consented to it. The essential legal 
principle under Muslim Law is that as the marriage is a 
civil contract consent of the contracting parties must be 
there. 
The judge cited Hasan Kutty Beary v. Jainabha where a Division 
Bench of the Madras High Court held that a nikah performed without 
the knowledge and consent of a Shafi adult virgin was invalid. The 
judge further cited the Kerala case of K. Abubukker v. Marakkar'"" 
where the court held thus:'*^' 
Marriage among Muslims being a contract and the 
contracting parties being the husband and wife the 
consent contemplated in the Shaft sect is that of the wife 
and not of the father or grandfather or any other person 
who acts as Wall at the time of marriage. The Wall only 
communicates the consent of the wife to the Kani who 
conducted the marriage and the husband. 
The principle is that where the girl is an adult and discreet no one has 
the right to be her guardian to give consent to the marriage. Nevertheless 
it is always open to her to authorize her father or guardian to settle the 
term of the contract for her. 
The judge rightly rejected the alleged custom adduced enabling fathers 
to dispense with the bride's consent as repugnant to Muslim law. He 
might perhaps have cited section 3 of the Shariat Act, 1937 to fortify his 
conclusion. 
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Bishnu Charan Mohanty v. Union of India"'' gives rise to an important 
point relating to the constitutionality of section 5 of the Muslim 
Women's (Protection of rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (MWA). The 
constitutional validity of MWA is now before the Supreme Court and 
one would naturally expect a rigorous consideration of the issue to aid 
and assist the arguments before the Supreme Court, when that matter is 
heard. But with respect, it must be said that the opinion indulges in 
begging the question and lacks incisive analysis which the issue before 
the court demands. 
In this, writ petitions have been filed questioning the constitutional 
validity of section 5 of MWA on the ground that an order of 
maintenance can be passed against a Hindu husband under section 125 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (code) at the instance of an ex-
wife or divorced wife, but on the other hand, section 5 of MWA gives an 
option to a Muslim husband to be governed by the Act or not. It was 
argued that this was a discrimination based on religion, and therefore, 
violated Article 15(1) of the Constitution. 
Adverting to this argument the court stated that the two requirements to 
attract Article 15 are, (i) that there should be no discrimination and (ii) 
that too, only on grounds, inter alia, of religion. As to the first 
requirement, the court referred to the opinion of Patanjali Sastri J., in 
Kathi Raning v. State of Saurashtra ~ that discrimination involves an 
unfavourable bias and if that is based on any of the grounds mentioned 
in Article 15, then such provision shall stand condemned. 
The Division Bench of the Orissa High Court referred to Ajaib Singh 's 
case where the statute which applied to Muslim abducted persons was 
upheld on the ground that there existed historical, personal and other 
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reasons which support the classification though it ostensibly appears to 
be on the ground of religion. Upholding the validity of section 5 M WA 
the judge said:'°^ 
Let us see whether it can be said about section 5...that it is 
grounded only on the fact of a husband being a Muslim or 
there is any justification for the same; and whether a 
Muslim husband differs substantially in this regard from a 
Hindu husband. The difference as is known based on 
personal law of Muslims. Hindus do not have a personal 
law relating to the quantum of maintenance to be granted 
to their divorced wives, as what has been stated in the 
Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act to which alone Shri 
Mohanty has referred in this connection is generally about 
the maintenance of wives vide section 18...it has not stated 
anything in particular about the maintenance to be claimed 
by a Hindu wife after she has been divorced. 
The above statement involves begging the question. When Hansaria .1. 
says "the difference, as is known, is based on personal law of Muslims", 
is not a distinction made on the basis of personal law of Muslims a 
differentiation or discrimination on the basis of religion? Whatever may 
be the historical origins of the term 'personal law' does it not in current 
usage refer to "law applicable to a person on the basis of his religious 
faith?" for example, section 2 of the Shariat Act, 1937 says:"^^ 
Notwithstanding any custom or usage to the contrary, in all 
questions regarding intestate succession, special property 
of females, including personal property inherited or 
obtained under contract or gift or any other provision of 
personal law, marriage, dissolution of marriage... the rule 
of decision in cases where the parties are Muslims shall be 
the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat). 
What is the meaning of the phrase 'Muslim Personal Law' in the above 
section? Is it not based on religion.? Not only the decision in Mohanty 
fails to notice the linkage that exists between personal law and religion, 
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but also ignores the impact of Article 15(3) in protecting the 
constitutional validity of section 125 of the code against any legislative 
onslaughts. It is intriguing that the opinion does not refer to the 
decisions of the Supreme Court prior to MWA. It may be recalled that in 
Bai Tahira's case,"^^ referring to section 125'°^ and 127{3)(b)"" of the 
code Krishna Iyer J. stated:"^ 
Article 15(3) has compelling, compassionate relevance in 
the context of S. 125 and the benefit of doubt, if any, in 
statutory interpretation belongs to the ill-used wife and the 
derelict divorce...Surely, Parliament, in keeping with 
Article. 15(3) and deliberate by design, made a special 
provision to help women in distress cast away by divorce. 
A divorced Muslim woman living in adultery is not disentitled to 
maintenance under section 3. In M. Alavi v. T. V. Safia a wife applied 
for maintenance during the period of iddat and also for reasonable and 
fair provision for her future. The tiral court dismissed her application 
holding that she was living an adulterous life. On revision the sessions 
judge reversed the finding and remanded the matter to trial court for 
determination of quantum. Against this the husband filed the present 
revision arguing that the general principles of section 125 would apply 
to proceedings under secfion 3 and since under clause 4 of section 125 a 
wife living in adultery is not entitled to maintenance, this should also 
apply to a woman who has been divorced. This argument was not 
accepted and it was held that clause 4 would not apply to woman who 
was divorced because of the very definition"^ of the word 'adultery", 
Even if such woman lives a promiscuous life, she cannot be said to be 
committing adultery. The term 'wife' under secfion 125(4) would mean 
only a woman whose marriage relationship subsists. Besides, section 3 
nowhere says that a woman living in adultery after divorce would not be 
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entitled to maintenance. According to the court,"^ nothing is to be added 
or taken out from a statute unless there are strong grounds to justify the 
inference that legislature intended something which it omitted to state." 
In Allabuksh Karim Shaikh v. Noorjahan,"'* the court observed:"^ 
It is well-known that the Muslim Woman Act has been 
enacted solely to undo the effect of the well-known decision 
of the Supreme Court in Shah Bano. In this case the court 
was very emphatic in holding that a child's right to 
maintenance 4 independent and can not obviously he 
sequenced in within the expression matters connected 
therewith or incidental thereto as used in the long title. 
In that decision, the unanimous five Judges Bench 
observed that it is also a matter of regret that Article 44 of 
our Constitution has remained a dead letter. The 
Parliament has still chosen to proceed on the reverse gear 
and to enact separate provisions for the Muslim women 
ousting them from the ambit of the benevolent provisions of 
the General Code. 
In this case the court was very emphatic in holding that a child's right to 
maintenance is independent and can not obviously squeezed in within 
the expression 'matters connected therewith or incidental thereto' as 
used in the long title."'' 
The menace of child marriage has shown considerable decline in the 
recent years but it is far from being eliminated or reduced to the level of 
insignificance. A healthy approach has been adopted by the Jammu and 
Kashmir High Court in Abdul Ahad v. Mst. Shah Begum,"^ a case 
relating to the marriage of a minor girl. The court took due note of the 
possibilities of exploitation of the girl child in the existing social milieu. 
In the instant case a girl of 8"" class, aged 14 had been given in marriage 
without any guardian by winning over her mother. The court by holding 
the marriage as void ab initio, refused to grant a decree of restitution of 
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conjugal rights. The main issues which were settled in the case were: (a) 
No marriage is concluded where it takes place by force and by taking an 
undue advantage of the minority of a girl, (b) Mere assertions in the 
absence of proof (cogent proof), that the marriage was entered into the 
register of marriages and the husband resided as a Khanadamad in the 
house of the mother-in-law cohabiting with the girl during a period of 
time have no bearing on the status of the 'marriage', (c) Where a minor 
is given in marriage by a so called 'wall' (not an authorized guardian), 
no formal repudiation of the marriage is needed because of its being 
invalid in itself, (d) A girl given in marriage during minority even by a 
'wali jayaz' (lawful guardian), can repudiate the maniage on attaining 
puberty."*^ (e) A major girl cannot be given in marriage against her will 
by any one, not even by her father. As against the eariier contention, the 
husband during trial, contended that the girl at the time of maniage had 
attained puberty. According to the court that was not enough for the 
validity of the marriage because she being a major could not have been 
given in marriage by a guardian against her will. Besides, the giri being 
minor, the court concluded that there could be a presumption of 
marriage but the girl had every right to repudiate the marriage on 
attaining puberty. 
The question to be decided by the Supreme Court in Noor Saba Khatoon 
V. Mohd. Quasim'^^ was whether the children of Muslim parents were 
entitled to grant of maintenance under sectin 125 Cr. PC for the period 
till they attained majority or were able to maintain themselves, 
whichever date was earlier; or in the case of female children till they got 
married or was their right restricted to the grant of maintenance only for 
a period of two years prescribed under section 3(1) (b) of the Act of 
1986. The court rightly held that the Muslim children were entitled to 
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claim maintenance under section 125, till they attained majority or were 
able to maintain themselves. In case of females, the claim continued, til! 
they got married and that their right was not restricted, affected or 
controlled by section 3(1) (b) of the Act. It was immaterial whether the 
children were living with the divorced wife. The liability of the Muslim 
father regarding these matters was absolute. The Act of 1986 which was 
enacted as a sequel to Shah Bano''' was not to regulate the obligations 
of a Muslim father to maintain his minor children unable to maintain 
themselves. According to the court section 3(1) (b) of the Act of 1986 
provides for grant of maintenance to divorced wife beyond the period of 
iddat for the fosterage period of two years from the date of birth of the 
child from maintain that child during the fosterage. This is an amount 
due to the mother for her nourishment for nursing or taking care of the 
infant/infants upto a period of two years.'^^ It has nothing to do with the 
right of the child/children to claim maintenance under section 125. "The 
effect of the beneficial legislation like Section 125 cannot be allowed to 
be defeated except through clear provisions of a statute."'"^ A Muslim 
father may, however, claim custody of his children from his divorced 
wife to maintain them himself. If the court grants custody the question 
of maintenance order under section 125 does not arise. But where such 
custody has not been claimed he cannot refuse and neglect to maintain 
his minor children on the ground that he has divorced their mother. The 
right of the children to claim maintenance under section 125 Cr. PC is 
separate, distinct and independent of the right of their divorced mother 
to claim maintenance for herself and for maintaining the infant children 
upto the age of two years. The age of majority for the purpose of the Cr. 
PC is the same as under the Majority Act, 1875. Thus, ever> Muslim 
child below 18 years can invoke section 125. Under the established 
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Muslim law sons are entitled to maintenance till they attain bidugh or, if 
they are handicapped or indigent, as long as they need it. Daughters are 
entitled to maintenance till they get married or, if divorcee/widow, for 
life or till they get remarried. 
Some significant issues about the Muslim personal law were raised by 
the petitioners in Ahmedabad Women Group v. Union of India, ' a 
petition, filed as a public interest litigation which the Supreme Court 
disposed of with other two petitions filed by Lok Sevak Sang and 
Young Women Christian Association raising similar questions about 
laws applicable to Hindu and Christians, respectively. The petition, as 
regards the Muslim personal law urged upon the court: (a) to declare 
Muslim personal law which allows polygamy as void as offending 
Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution; (b) to declare Muslim personal 
law which enables a Muslim male to give unilateral talaq to his wife 
without her consent and without resort to judicial process of court, as 
void, offending Articles 13, 14 and 15 of the Constitution; (c) to declare 
that the mere fact that a Muslim husband takes more than one wife is an 
act of cruelty within the meaning of clause VIII (t) of section 2 of the 
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939; (d) to declare that the 
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, as void as 
infringing Articles 14 and 15; and (e) to declare the provisions of Sunni 
and Shia laws of inheritance which provide for lesser share for females 
as compared to the share of males, void as discriminating against 
females only on the ground of sex. 
The other two petitions prayed for similar relief regarding sections 2(2), 
5(ii) and (iii), 6 and explanation to section 30 of the Hindu Succession 
Act 1956 section 2 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; section 3 A (2), 6 
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and 9 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 read with 
section 6 of the Guardians and Ward Act, 1890, Hindu spouses 
unfettered right to make testamentary disposition; sections 10 and 34 of 
the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 and sections 43 to 46 of the Indian 
Succession Act. The court did not dispose of any of these petitions on 
merits because these issues involved state policies and according to the 
court they are best dealt with by that legislature. Referring to its 
opinions expressed about similar attempts earlier, the court held that the 
remedy might be sought somewhere else and not by knocking at the 
doors of the courts. One such earlier petition was Maharshi Avadhesh v. 
Union of India'^' seeking, a writ of mandamus regarding enactment of a 
uniform civil code, declaration of the Muslim Women (Protection of 
Rights on Divorce) Act as void and to restrict the state from enactmg 
"Shariat Act'. The court dismissed the petition saying that "these are all 
matters for legislature and the court cannot legislate in these matters. 
The court had, for the same reasons in Reynold Rajamani v. Union of 
India,'''^ refused to add any new grounds of divorce, like divorce by 
mutual consent, to those already specified in the Indian Divorce Act. It 
was emphasized that the court can give the fullest amplitude oj meaning 
to the existing provisions, but cannot extend or enlarge legislative policy 
by adding a provision to the statute which was never enacted there. The 
court further emphasized the previously established trends in different 
cases explaining the fact that making law or amendment to a law is a 
slow process and the legislature attempts to remedy where the need is 
felt most acute. It would be inexpedient and incoiTect to think that all 
laws have to be made uniformly applicable to all people in one go. The 
mischief or defect which is most acute can be remedied by process of 
law at stages.'^^ It is for the legislature to decide what constitutes social 
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reform and what legislation to put on the statute book in order to 
advance the welfare of the state.'^^ Part III of the Constitution does not 
touch upon the personal laws of the parties and in applying the personal 
laws, a judge may not introduce his own concepts of modern times but 
enforce the law as derived from recognized authoritative sources of that 
law.'^' 
Moreover, regarding the observation of the division bench in Sarla 
Mudgal V. Union of India ^^ that "Marriage, succession and like matters 
of a secular character cannot be brough within the guarantee enshrined 
under Article 25, 26 and 27," the Supreme Court in this case clarified 
that in that case none of the decisions referred to above were placed 
before the division bench as they found no mention in the separate 
judgments of Kuldip Singh and R.M. Sahai, JJ. The question regarding 
the desirability of enacting a uniform civil code did not directly arise in 
that case. The questions in that case mainly related to embracing of 
Islam by a Hindu husband and his solemnization of a second marriage, 
etc. Regarding uniform civil code, Sahai, J in his separate but concurring 
judgment, opined that while it was desirable to have a uniform civil 
code the time was yet not ripe for that. Accordingly, the decision in 
Sarla Mudgal ultimately centered around the main questions and the 
observations on the desirability of enacting the uniform civil code were 
only by way oi obiter dicta. 
Apart from these cases the court in Ahmedabad Women Action Group 
also referred to its opinions expressed in two more cases, Madhii 
Kishwar v. State of Bihar'^' and Anil Mahsi v. Union of India.''' In 
Madhu Kishwar the court gave a depiction of the customary diversity 
existing among different people and regions of the country and held the 
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view that enforcing of equality principle by judicial activism was a 
difficult and ardous task. An activist court is not fully equipped to cope 
with the details and intricacies of legislative subject. In Anil Kumar 
Mahsi the court, in an illustrative way, explained that the total 
uniformity between the spouses might not be probable and refused to 
declare section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act as violative of Article 14 of 
the Constitution. 
I T ? , 
Mumtaz Begum v. Yusuf Khan, " involved a very important question 
about maintenance rights of Muslim woman. The man issue before the 
Rajasthan High Court was the decision of the family court that the 
second marriage by a Muslim husband does not provide a just cause to 
the first wife to refuse to live with her husband and claim separate 
maintenance. The court, while perusing this question referred to the 
judgments of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano 
Begum ' and Begum Subanu alias Saira Banu v. A.M. Abdul Gafoor''^ 
and quoted many paras from the latter concluding that the question 
involved in the case "must be seen with reference to" section 125, 
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The explanation to second proviso of 
the said section confers upon the wife a right to refuse to live with her 
husband if he contracts another marriage. The court accordingly took the 
view that a Muslim husband contracting another maniage "may not be 
liable for offence of bigamy, but if such a behaviour proves to be irritant 
to his wife and if the same becomes a source of agony to her, he cannot 
take shelter under his personal law and say that he is not liable to pay 
maintenance to his wife living separately".'^^ 
In Ansari Mohd. Riyaz Abdul Latifv. State of Maharashtra,''^^ the court 
took a very serious view of the dilatory tactics adopted by the husband 
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to avoid payment of maintenance to his wife and daughter by tllmg 
various petitions in the court. An advocate by profession, the court 
noted, he was misusing the process of the court tai<ing full advantage of 
the delay in litigation. The court directed him to pay the cost of Rs. 
10,000/- to the wife and daughter in addition to the regular maintenance 
awarded by it. The object of maintenance order is to ensure that the 
neglected wife and children are not left destitute on the scrap heap of the 
society and thereby driven to a life of vagrancy, immorality and crime 
for their sustenance. Yet, the routine delays and delays due to specific 
circumstances create havoc in the lives of the economically dependent 
spouses and their minor children. 
A divorced wife's petition filed under section 125 of the Cr. PC was 
resisted by her former husband on the ground that since the passing of 
the Muslim Women Act the provisions of Cr. PC were no longer 
available to her. The Bombay High Court held:'^^ 
The law laid down by the apex court in Shah Bano case has 
given a right to a divorced Muslim woman to claim 
maintenance under Sec. 125 Cr. PC against her former 
husband and there is nothing in the MWA of 1986, which 
states that, the provisions of Sec. 125 are not available to 
such a woman as soon as the Act was brought into force. It 
cannot be inferred from the provisions of the Muslim 
Women Act that it was intended for the purpose of denying 
the benefit to claim under Sec. 125 to a divorced Muslim 
woman. The contentions raised by the petitioners that the 
remedy for the claim of maintenance against the former 
husband is not available to a divorced Muslim woman 
during her status as a divorced woman or other-wise the 
provisions of Sec. 125 are applicable to her for the rest of 
her life leads to violation of her constitutional rights 
guaranteed under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the 
Constitution of India. It cannot be accepted in law that the 
provisions of the general rule viz, Cr. PC are not 
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applicable to a female Muslim citizen of this country only 
for the period she is a divorced wife... Even if the claimant 
is a divorced wife she still has the right to claim 
maintenance under Sec. 125. The provisions of MWA do 
not come in her way to claim maintenance from her former 
husband. It must, therefore, be held that the provisions of 
MWA are available to a divorced Muslim woman for 
claiming maintenance from her former husband in addition 
to the provisions of Chap. IX of the Cr. PC and they are 
not in exclusion of each other. 
A five-judge constitution bench of the Supreme Court comprising G.B. 
pattanaik, S. Rajendra Babu, D.P. Mohapatra, D. Raju and S.V. Patil, JJ. 
decided the long pending case of Danial Latifi v. Union of India. ' The 
most contentious issues involved in this case were the constitutional 
validity of the Muslim women Act and the Muslim divorced women's 
right to claim maintenance from her former husband after the period of 
iddat. The court upheld the constitutional validity of the Act claiming 
that it's "provisions do not offend Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the 
Constitution of India",''**^ and "the Act actually and in reality codifies 
what was stated in Shah Bano's case".'"*' It observed that a Muslim 
husband is bound to make reasonable and fair provision for the future of 
the divorced wife which includes her maintenance and a reasonable and 
fair provision extending beyond the iddat period, to be made by the 
husband within the iddat period in terms of section 3(1 )(a) of the 1986 
Act. The court also held that a divorced Muslim woman who has not 
remarried after divorce and who is not able to maintain herself after 
iddat period can proceed as provided under section 4 of the Act against 
her relatives who are liable to maintain her in proportion to the 
properties which they would inherit on her death according to Muslim 
law. If the relatives are found unable to pay her maintenance, the 
628 
magistrate may direct the state wakf board established under the Walcf 
Act to pay such maintenance. 
The parties in the instant case had married in 1996 and had a baby boy 
in 1998.'"*^  The wife was forced to leave the matrimonial home with her 
son and she filed a case under the Dowry Prohibition Act at the local 
police station. Having no source of income of her own she filed a 
petition for maintenance for herself and her son as also for restitution of 
conjugal rights against the husband. The trial that court granted Rs. 
500/- each to her and the son. The husband opposed both these petitions 
contending that no provision for restitution of conjugal rights was 
available under the Muslim law and, therefore, it was not maintainable. 
On the question of maintenance he argued that since he had divorced 
her, he was under no obligation to maintain her. The court considered 
the ruling in Daniel Latifi^ wherein the constitutional bench had held 
that the Muslim husband was liable to make a reasonable provision for 
the future of a divorced wife which obviously included her maintenance 
also. Further, a divorced Muslim woman could seek maintenance from 
her husband even after the iddat period if she is unable to maintain 
herself The application filed by the wife for maintenance was 
considered maintainable. On the second question the trial court after 
assessing the entire material and hearing both the parties held that the 
husband had failed to substantiate his case that he had divorced his wife 
by producing authenticated documents. It also held that the dispute 
relating to whether there was in fact a divorce or not was to be decided 
by a through and detailed trial and till then the wife was entitled to 
maintenance as provided under section 278 of the Mohammedan law. !t 
observed:''*'* 
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It is significant to note that the trial court has given a 
specific finding that even otherwise under Section 317 of 
the Mohammedan law the wife is entitled for maintenance 
and as the son has been under the care and custody of the 
wife as such he is also entitled to maintenance. 
The issue whether or not a marriage under Muslim law with a pregnant 
woman is void has come up before the Supreme Court in an appeal 
against the decision of the High Court in Amina v. Hassan Koya. ' The 
High Court had affirmed the decision of additional session judge, who 
in the revision petition reversed the decision of the trial magistrate, 
granting maintenance under section 125 of the Cr. PC for the appellant 
wife. However, no maintenance was granted for the child, because it 
was believed to be not fathered by the respondent husband. The High 
Court approved the reversal of the decision by the additional session 
judge by holding the marriage void due to the concealment of the fact 
that the appellant was already pregnant at the time of mamage by a 
person other than the respondent. 
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the High Court by stating 
that the marriage amongst the Muslims, according to the "settled law"' is 
"a contract," and not a "sacrament" as is the belief amongst the 
Hindus.'"^^ The Supreme Court stated: 
// is very difficult to believe that a woman who is five 
months pregnant will be able to conceal the pregnancy 
from the husband. Such as advanced stage of pregnancy 
cannot be concealed as the pregnancy starts showing by 
that time. In any case, the pregnancy cannot be concealed 
from the husband 
On this count alone, that is, if the fact of pregnancy was known to the 
respondent, "the marriage cannot be said to be illegal or void."'''^ It is in 
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this context and to this limited extent the tacit approval of the Supreme 
Court is to be construed when it says: 
In our view, this decision, in fact, supports the view taken 
by us in the present judgment. As per our finding the facts 
on record shows that the husband was aware of the 
pregnancy of the wife at the time of the marriage. 
Therefore, as per this judgment such a marriage cannot be 
said to be invalid. 
In Mohd. Siddique AH v. Mustt Fatema Rahid,'^^ the High Court of 
Gauhati had to resolve the conflict regarding the applicability of the 
legal schemes as contained ehher in Cr PC or the Muslim Women. Act. 
It was the opinion of the court that ordinarily a divorced Muslim woman 
is not entitled to make or maintain an application under section 125 Cr. 
PC for maintenance against her former husband. The coutt also 
explained the scope of the limits of fair and reasonable provision in the 
elaborate discussion. It was of the view that the scheme envisaged under 
section 3 and 4 of the Muslim Women Act, has been designed to extend 
protection against destitution and vagrancy. The former husband is 
bound to give maintenance during the period of iddat and he is under an 
obligation to make fair and reasonable provision during the period of 
iddat and for her future maintenance as it would take care of her for the 
rest of her life. This reasonable and fair provision may include provision 
for her residence, food, clothing, etc. This, in turn, shows that at the time 
of divorce, a Mushm husband is required to contemplate the future 
needs of his wife and make suitable arrangements, in advance, for 
meeting those needs. The court further held that "the reasonable and fair 
provisions would mean that the former husband has to take into account 
the needs of his divorced wife, his own means, and the standard of life, 
which his wife was enjoying during the subsistence of marriage." 
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Saidali K.H. v. V. Saleena''^ is a case related to divorce initiated by the 
wife for dissolution of her marriage under section 2(ii),(iv) and 
(viii)(a)(d)«&(f) of Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. The 
dissolution was allowed by the family court. The husband, therefore, 
filed an appeal in the High Court of Kerala. On appeal the question 
before the Kerala High Court was whether the wife was entitled to a 
decree of divorce for the only reason that the husband had contracted a 
second marriage. If the reason stated by the family court was to be 
accepted, a Muslim man cannot marry more than once when his first 
marriage subsists. The court observed: 
Apart from the religious and legal aspects of marriage, 
there is a social aspect also under Islamic law. Islamic law-
gives a high social status to the women after marriage. 
Restrictions are placed upon the unlimited polygamy of pre 
Islamic times and a controlled Polygamy is allowed. 
Prophet Mohammed both by example and precept 
encouraged the status of marriage. The prophet restrained 
polygamy by limiting the maximum number of 
contemporaneous marriages and by making absolute 
equity towards all, obligatory on the man. It is worthy to 
note that the Clause in the Qur'an which contains the 
permission to contract four contemporaneous marriages is 
immediately followed by an injunction which puts the 
preceding passage to its normal and legitimate dimension. 
The former passage says that a man can marry two, three 
or four times, but not more. The subsequent lines declare 
that if the man cannot deal equitably and justly with all, he 
shall marry only one. 
The court quoted with approval the observations of V.R. Krishna Iyer, J 
in Shahulameedu v. Subaida Beevi''^^ made as early as in 1970: 
It follows from these passages that the Koranic injunction 
has to be understood in the perspective of prevalent 
unrestricted polygamy and in the context of the battle in 
which most males perished, leaving many females or 
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orphans and that the holy prophet himself recognized the 
difficulty or treating two or more wives with equal Justice 
and, in such a situation, directed that an individual should 
have only one wife. In short, the Koran enjoined 
monogamy upon Muslims and departure therefrom as cm 
exception. That is why, in the true spirit of the Koran, a 
number of Muslim countries have codified the personal law 
wherein the practice of polygamy has been either totally 
prohibited or severely restricted (Syria, Tunisia, Morocco, 
Pakistan, Iran, the Islamic Republics of the Soviet Union 
are some of the Muslim countries to be remembered in this 
context). A keen perception of the new frontiers of Indian 
law hinted at an Article 44 of the Constitution is now 
necessary on the part of Parliament and the Judicature. 
In Mohammad Yaseen v. Smt. Jareena Bano, " the court had to decide 
as to whether a woman who had sufficient means of livelihood could file 
an application under section 125 Cr PC The trial court gave relief to the 
woman and the same was not challenged in appeal. However, she filed 
another petition under section 3 of the Muslim Woman Act, 1986, 
claiming that her rights arising out of divorce which was allowed by the 
trial court was set aside by the revisional court. After 10 months of the 
finality of the revisional court's order, the divorcee again tiled an 
application under section 125 Cr PC for grant of maintenance beyond 
the period of iddat after she had already been granted on 31.10.02 
maintenance during the iddat period. The court held that it did not find 
any reasonable cause for filling of pefition under section 125 Cr PC and 
asserted that she could have obtained the relief under section 125 Cr. F^ C 
had she challenged the earlier order of 31.10.02 for getting maintenance 
beyond the iddat period.'^'* 
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CHAPTER-3 
CHRISTIAN LAW 
Case Law based on: Marriage, Divorce and Maintenance 
The Christian community is marked by its diversity, (1) The orthodox 
churches of West Asian traditions i.e. Syro Malabar, Syro Malankara, the 
Mar Thoma Church etc. (2) The Roman Cathohc Church of Latin rites. (3) 
Various reformist churches of Protestant traditions now considered into 
the churches of South India (CSI) and the Church of North India (CNI). 
There also exists a large population of Christians among various tribes 
particularly in northeast region. These tribes are not governed by the 
Christian personal law. 
Marriage: 
Christianity regarded marriage as indissoluble. The Roman Church 
became the supreme eclectic authority governing matrimonial matters. 
The ecclesiastic court recognized the right to separation but no spouse 
had the right to remarry during the life of the other spouse. 
The Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872 was enacted to consolidate and 
amend the law relating to the solemnization in India of the marriages of 
Christians. This Act was the product of consolidation of different small 
statutes of marriage of the Indian Christians. 
Divorce and Maintenance: 
Under the provisions of the Indian Divorce Act 1869, the husband could 
obtain divorce if his wife has committed adultery but wife has to prove 
two offences on the part of husband (i.e. incestuous, bigamy, marriage 
with another women, cruelty, desertion, conversion from Christianity 
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and rape, sodomy or bestiality with adultery) however after considerable 
demand by the community and the women's movement the law has been 
amended. Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act 2001 grants equal right to 
women. The Act incorporates adultery, conversion to another religion. 
unsound mind for a continuous period of not less than two years. 
suffering from incurable form of leprosy or any communicable disease, 
not heard of being alive for 7 years, marriage not being consummated, 
deserted the petitioner for at least 2 years immediately proceeding the 
presentation of the petition treated with cruelty as grounds of divorce. 
Rape, sodomy or bestiality are additional grounds of divorce given to 
wife. The Act also provides for dissolution of marriage by mutual 
consent. 
The court cannot grant maintenance worth more than one fifth of the 
husband's property if the divorce was obtained by the husband on the 
ground of his wife's adultery and wife is entitled to some property then 
the court has discretion to settle that property for the benefit of children 
or husband. 
The judicial decisions pertaining to Christian Law related to family 
relations and rights of woman vis-a-vis her husband and other members 
of the family covering marriage, divorce and maintenance are as under: 
In Nalini v. Issac, the husband had deserted his wife and was living in 
adultery with her sister. Tortured by this state of affairs, the wife was 
having an illegitimate "affair" with a friend of the husband. Adultery on 
the part of both spouses was known and established. The wife sought a 
divorce on the grounds of desertion and adultery, which the trial court 
granted. The decree was sought to be confirmed by a Full Bench of the 
Madhya Pradesh High Court. The Bench, which did accord the required 
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confirmation, was mainly concerned with that provision of the Act 
under which the court may refuse rehef to a petitioner who is himself or 
herself guilty of adultery. 
The Bench explained that the said provision created no bar against 
granting a relief in favour of an aduherous petitioner; it vested discretion 
in the court either to grant or refuse the desired relief The exercise of 
the discretion is, the Bench warned, not like putting "a rubber stamp"; it 
should depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. In this 
particular case, the Bench thought, two factors made it a desei-ving case 
for the exercise of the discretion-first that the petitioner's (i.e., the 
wife's) adultery had resulted mainly from that of the husband's conduct 
(i.e., deserting the wife and having adultery with her sister) and, second, 
that it would "not be proper to compel four persons to continue to live in 
adultery" (by refusing the decree of divorce) who may if the marriage is 
dissolved, become two lawfully married couples. "When the marriage 
has broken down and there are no prospects of reconciliation", asserted 
the Bench, "no purpose will be served by refusing the exercise of 
discretion".^ 
In Mary Kurian v. T.T. Josephf the Kerala High Court had to answer 
the question whether an Indian Christian employed in a foreign country 
could, while spending vacation in India, be regarded as a "resident of 
India" under section 2 of the Act, so as to be entitled to obtain from an 
Indian court a decree of nullity in respect of his marriage. Overruling 
the lower court's decision to the contrary, the High Court answered the 
question in the affirmative, arguing as follows: 
Any Indian Citizen when he goes out of India to earn his 
livelihood need not, as a rule, be taken to intend to settle 
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down permanently in the land where he earns his bread. 
Normally that would not be the case ... his stay at his 
home here in this country when he is on leave or on 
vacation cannot be said to be a casual stay or a tem-
porary residence... , 
The duration of such a visit to India is, the court held, immaterial since 
that must necessarily depend upon the availability of leave or vacation 
and other engagements of the person concerned." '' 
In LA. Jayraj v. I.M. Florence a Christian husband claimed that his 
consent for the marriage was obtained by fraud and, therefore, the 
marriage was null and void. He presented a petition for nullity before 
the district judge of Shimoga. The judge entertained the petition and 
held that fraud was proved. As such, he awarded a decree nisi of nullity 
of marriage, as prayed for. The decree came up for confirmation before 
the Kamataka High Court where a Special Bench decided on it. 
The bench quoted with approval the observations of the Andhra-Pradesh 
High Court in hs leading judgment on the subject given in 1966.^  It also 
referred to the 1973 ruling of the Karnataka High Court itself'^  Holding 
that the district court had no jurisdiction to pass a decree of the kind as 
was made by the district judge of Shimoga, the High Court refused to 
confirm the decree nisi passed by him and directed that the petition be 
returned to the petitioner for presentation to the proper court.'" 
In Thomas v. Tara one Thomas sought divorce on the ground of 
adultery alleging that his wife was leading the life of a prostitute. He did 
not make any of the alleged adulterers co-respondents to his petition, 
though he said in the plaint that as a prostitute his wife had committed 
adultery with several "known and unknown persons". Thus, having 
admitted that he knew at least some of the adulterers he made the 
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mistake of not making them co-respondents. Before the court could go 
into the merits of the case, the amicus curiae appointed by the court took 
a primary objection to the suit relating to the petitioner's failure to 
implead the adulterers known to him. In its judgment a Full Bench of 
the Madras High Court explained that the Act excused petitioner-
husband from impleading the adulterer not in all situations of 
prostitutions, but only where the husband known none of the alleged 
adulterers with whom his adulteress-wife has had illicit relations.'' 
The notable judicial decision relating to the Indian Divorce Act, is to be 
found in an order passed by Chawla J. in Pramilla v. Rajnish Kumar, 
which dealt with an application under order 7, rule 11 and section 151 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The order raises very pertinent 
questions affecting the entire gamut of the Indian matrimonial laws. 
Strained relations between a couple, admittedly mamed in 1972 
according to Arya Samaj rites, gave rise to this thought inspiring ruling. 
The wife, claiming to be a Christian, applied for judicial separation 
under the Indian Divorce Act. The husband's objection was that theirs 
being an Arya Samaj marriage, the petition was not maintainable under 
the Act which applied exclusively to Christian marriages. After a rather 
inconclusive discussion of the legal position the judge dismissed the 
application of the husband, holding as follows: 
Nowhere in the Act is it required that the marriage, in 
respect of which relief is sought, should have been 
solemnized in any particular form. It is sufficient that one 
of the parties is a Christian when the petition isfdedJ'' 
The observations made by the judge reflect the sad state of the family 
law of Indian Christians that is now more than a century old and needs a 
thorough revision. Both the Christian Marriage Act, 1872 and the Indian 
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Divorce Act 1869, claim application to cases where only one of the 
parties is a Christian (besides those where both are followers of 
Christianity). This was understandable in 1869-1872 when as a part of 
their missionary activities the British tried to keep the scope of these 
laws extremely wide. However, now when on the soil of independent 
India there are in force modem laws regulating Hindu, Muslim and civil 
marriages-all of which are much more progressive than those time-worn 
laws of the Christians-applicability of the latter to inter-religious 
marriages between Christians and non-Christians is quite unreasonable. 
If nothing else it, at least, creates plurality of laws. True, the remedy for 
this "lies in the hands of the Legislature" as the judge pointed out." But 
we strongly feel that the applicability of the Christian laws can, by a 
process of judicial interpretation be kept confined to those cases where 
at least one of the parties is a Christian at the time of marriage. It is true 
that the Indian Divorce Act does not refer to any particular form of 
marriage. But now this Act is no more than the divorce-supplement to 
the Christian Marriage Act. As such its application should be confined 
to marriages that took place under the latter Act {i.e., marriages at least 
one party to which was a Chrisdan at the fime of marriage). Keeping its 
door wide open for those marriages which took place under Hindu or 
Muslim law, where one party to which later unilaterally embraced 
Christianity, is bound to militate against the progressive laws oi^  these 
communities. 
The judge in the case under review referred to section 7 of the Act and 
its history.'^ This section directs the Indian courts to "act and give relief 
under the Act inconformity with the "principles and rules" followed by 
the English matrimonial courts.'^ Though, in fact, retention of this 
provision in the Act until now is indeed obnoxious its proviso (saying 
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that the directive of the section shall not deprive the courts of 
jurisdiction in cases where both parties are Christian at the time the 
cause of action arises)'^ can indeed be used to keep the scope of the Act 
limited. 
This is what the respondent-husband in the case wanted the judge to do. 
The judge, however, did not agree. He did remark that "the proviso does 
show that in a case to which it applied (i.e., where both parties are 
Christians at the time the cause of action arises) relief can be had under 
the Indian Divorce Act in respect of any kind of marriage" but stopped 
at that. A very natural interpretation of the proviso will be that where 
one party is a Christian at the time the cause of action arises (but was a 
non-Christian at the time of marriage) while the other party has all along 
been a non-Christian—the directive of section 7 will apply and may take 
a case like the one under review outside the jurisdiction of the coun 
acting under the Act. The judge, however, thought otherwise. 
In the Madhya Pradesh case, Lalit v. Lavina/^ the decision given by a 
Full Bench of the High Court confirmed the decree of divorce granted 
by the court of the district judge at Jabalpur to a Christian husband 
whose wife was found guilty of adultery. Pointing out in its judgment 
the latest trend in handling matrimonial cases, the bench observed: 
Previously the view was that the matrimonial offences 
have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt but recently 
the view has been modified and it has been held that 
petitioner is only required to prove his case bv 
preponderance of probabilities and the degree of 
probability depends on the gravity of the offence.'^' 
The bench also dwelt upon the nature of evidence in cases of aduhery." 
The most notable feature of this case was that the allegation of adultery 
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on the ground for the relief was brought in by the petitioner-husband by 
an amendment of the petition during its pendency and the High Court 
held that this was quite permissible if the ground (adultery) did in fact 
exist at the time of filing of the petition.^^ 
Manjula v. Suresh^^ an interesting decision unprecedented m this 
country has been handed down under the Indian Divorce Act by a 
Special Bench of the Delhi High Court. The said Act, though titled as 
"Divorce Act" includes also provisions relating to nullity of marriage."^ 
Under one of these provisions either party to a marriage may seek a 
decree of nullity in respect of the marriage on the ground, inter alia, that 
the other party was impotent "at the time of the marriage and at the time 
of the institution of the suit".^ ^ In the case under reference a Christian 
wife applied for a decree of nullity under this provision. The mamage 
had taken place on 19 October, 1972 and a child was born to her after 
the expiry of a few days over nine months. The wife claimed that 
because of physical deficiency the husband had never been, able to 
consummate the marriage, though she also asserted that he was the 
father of the child. As the husband did not defend the case, it was tried 
and decided exparte. On a review of the evidence the court ruled that the 
child was the result of "fecundation ab extra" and that the allegation of 
non-consummation due to husband's impotence was true."^ Authority for 
the proposition that this was possible was found by the court in three 
English cases^^ and in the celebrated works of Modi^ ^ and Tolstoy.'" The 
decree of nullity granted by the lower court, as desired by the petitioner-
wife, was eventually confirmed.^' 
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In Pulikottial Cheru v. Mary Zechariah" (a case under section 10, 
Indian Divorce Act) the High Court of Madhya Pradesh made the 
following brilliant summary of the law: 
(a) Adultery can rarely be proved by direct evidence; it has to be 
inferred from attending circumstances, inclination of the 
spouse and chances available; 
(b) Such evidence must be clear, cogent, convincing and leading 
only to one reference; 
(c) Onus of proof is on the party alleging adultery; 
(d) Uncorroborated evidence supported by circumstantial evidence 
may be enough. 
(e) Falsity of defence may be no substitute for evidence; 
(f) Standard of proof required is not that as insisted upon in a 
criminal case.^ ^ 
These points would be equally applicable to cases of adultery under 
other statutory and personal laws of matrimonial relations. 
In Gregory Joseph v. Melba Dolores Pais/'^ the husband's cruel 
treatment compelled his wife to go to the court for a decree for 
separation. The husband, who was a heavy alcoholic, assaulted and ill-
treated his wife, and had also lodged a false police complaint for which 
she had to face a criminal trial which was ultimately dismissed as 
baseless. The court granted the decree. The husband's appeal on ground, 
amongst other, of condonation was dismissed as, according to the High 
Court, even assuming that she had condoned his earlier acts of cruelt, 
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the same were revived by his subsequent behaviour. Moreover, the fact 
that he was ordered to pay her maintenance which he had not paid for 
years, was also, according to the court, an act of crueky. 
In C. Howell v. R.S. Howell/^ High Court refused to confirm a 
dissolution decree passed by the lower court on the wife's application 
alleging indecent and shamefiil acts of gratification by the husband with 
a girl of 11-12 years. The wife alleged that she saw everything with her 
own eyes. After going through various authorities^^ (Judgments and 
literature) defining adultery, it was held that mere attempt to commit 
adultery is not sufficient to prove the ground of adultery. 
Rosaline Rajan v. S.M. Joseph Xcivier Loiirdarajan was a case for 
annulment on the ground of wife's impotency. The husband's petition 
for annulment under section 19( 1) was granted as it was found that the 
wife was psychologically impotent and had no mental frame of mmd for 
sexual life. In Roiiben Isreal Pattar v. Mamta,' a suit for custody of 
minor children under section 43, an application for directing opposite 
party to produce minors below 12 for cross examination was decreed by 
the trial court. In revision, the High Court set aside that order and held 
that an application for directing party to produce children below 12 for 
cross examination was not maintainable. The cross-examination of the 
two minor children was sought on the ground that two affidavits given 
by them were filed in the proceedings. The court held that the affidavits 
of the minors were not admissible in evidence under section 4 of the 
Oaths Act, 1969, and therefore, should be excluded from evidence. The 
question of producing the children for cross examination thus, did not 
arise. 
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Very significant observations have been made by the Supreme Court in 
Ms. Jorden Deingdeh/^ The court has shown immense sensitivity to the 
hardships faced by many couples and spouses whose marriages do not 
work well. In this case, the wife filed a petition for a declaration of 
nullity of marriage on the ground of impotency of the husband. The 
same was turned down but judicial separation was granted on ground of 
cruelty by a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court. On appeal, the 
Division Bench affirmed the Single Judge's order. The wife then filed 
special leave appeal to the Supreme Court seeking nullity on ground of 
impotency. The court reviewed the matrimonial statutoiy laws of all 
communities and made a strong plea for a uniform civil code. It 
observed that the marriage had been irretrievably broken down but 
unfortunately there was no way out for the couple since neither 
irretrievable breakdown nor mutual consent were grounds for divorce 
under the Indian Divorce Act. The court sought legislative intervention 
to provide for a uniform divorce law and a way out of unhappy 
situations where couples cannot live happily together. A copy this order 
was also sent to the ministry of Law and Justice for proper action but 
one wonders to what effect. 
A wife who lives away from the husband and claims maintenance from 
him has to show that she has reasonable and sufficient grounds to 
withdraw from his society or that she is living separately by the consent 
of the husband. If she separates from him without reasonable grounds 
then she has no right to ask for maintenance. A wife withdrawing from 
her husband who doubts her chastity is quite justified to do so. The 
Allahabad High Court held that it is not possible for a wife to live with 
her husband in peace when he suspects her chastity. Such imputations 
justify her separate living and claim of maintenance. An important case 
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in this context is from madras."^ *^  This case reflects the modern tendency 
where soon after marriage, the couple, especially the brides, wish to set 
up their own homes away from the joint family. The wife filed a 
maintenance application. The husband resisted her claim on the ground 
that she had deserted the conjugal home on her own initiative and that, 
he was prepared to take her back and maintain her in the conjugal home. 
The wife agreed to come back but refused to live with the in-laws. The 
husband's argument was that his income was not enough to set up a 
separate establishment. The trial court, however, decreed the wife's 
claim. In appeal by the husband, the sessions judge set aside the order-
hence the wife's appeal. The High Court restored the trial court order 
and held that the wife has a right to insist on a conjugal life where she 
can live in peace without interference of the in-laws. The court relied on 
a judgment given as early as in 1957 where it was held that a wife has a 
right to ask her husband to live away from his parent.'^ ' 
In Anpian J. v. Zillaf^ an ex parte divorce was granted to the husband 
on a ground which does not even exist under the Act. In fact, under the 
Act, the only ground available to the husband to seek dissolution of the 
marriage is adultery of the wife. In this case divorce was given on the 
ground of non-cohabitation after a decree of restitution. The wife 
withdrew from the society of the husband without reasonable cause. The 
husband obtained a decree of restitution of conjugal rights. Even 'after: 
this decree, despite best efforts, the wife did not resume cohabitation. 
He, therefore, prayed that since the statutory period as required under 
the law had passed and there was no hope of the wife joining him, he be 
granted decree of divorce. The lower court made an exparte order 
dissolving the marriage and the same was confirmed in proceedings 
under section 17, on the ground that the wife withdrew from the society 
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of the husband without reasonable cause and that despite a decree for 
restitution she had not resumed cohabitation. Though it is desirable and 
correct that a marriage which has failed should not be made to continue 
in law alone but one fails to understand under what provision of the Act, 
the court in this case, passed the divorce decree. The only ground 
available to the husband was adultery, and withdrawal by wife or non-
cohabitation after restitution decree has no correlation with adultery so 
as to give a ground for divorce. 
The hardship caused to Christians whose marriage has failed and who 
wish to obtain a meaningful relief under the provisions of the Act is well 
known and has been debated upon and discussed from time to time. In 
Ka Amal Lyngdoh v. U. Jabin Pakem' the wife filed a suit for divorce 
on the ground of desertion and such cruelty as to cause reasonable 
apprehension that it would be harmful for her to live with him. The 
husband, she alleged, had made her life so miserable that she had to 
leave her village and reside elsewhere. Even here he threatened her not 
only with physical injury but also with burning of her house. Under 
these circumstances, the trial court held that it was not fair to compel her 
to live with the husband and accordingly granted a decree nisi dissolving 
the marriage. In confirmation proceedings under section 17, however, 
the court refused to confirm the decree. It was held that under section 10 
the only grounds available for divorce to the wife were adultery coupled 
with cruelty or desertion, etc. In the present case there was neither an 
allegation nor evidence of adultery but only of desertion and cruelty. 
The court accordingly held that the alleged grounds were not valid 
grounds for the grant of dissolution of the marriage. The husband had 
got a decree of dissolufion of marriage on the ground that the wife had 
not complied with a decree of restitution of conjugal rights obtained by 
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him against her. The lower court had made an ex-parte order and the 
same was confirmed by the High Court. 
In Best Morning v. Nirmalendii^'', the wife filed a petition under section 
19 for annulment of the marriage on the ground that the husband had 
undergone a vasectomy operation prior to the marriage, which fact he 
had not disclosed to her. She alleged that the marriage be declared null 
and void because of the husband's incompetence to enter into the 
pretended marriage by reason of his impotency and on the ground of 
cheating. In confirmation proceedings the quesfion was raised whether 
vasectomy on the male renders him impotent so as to provide a ground 
for a decree under section 19(1) declaring the marriage null and void. 
The court held that though no case for impotency can be made out there 
was fraud. It observed: 
[M]aternity is the natural inclination of a woman. C.A. 
Stoddard said, 'There can be no higher ambition for a 
Christian woman than to be a faithful wife and a happy 
and influential mother. It is the place which God has 
given woman, and she who fills it well is as honourable 
and honoured as the most illustrious man can be... ' 
Not that every barren marriage is to break down, but that 
there should be no deception or fraud perpetrated on the 
wife by the husband in this regard.^^ 
The decree of nullity was accordingly confirmed on the ground of fraud: 
In Ramish Francis Toppo v. Violet Francis Toppo,'*^ case from Calcutta, 
the futility of section 17 was expressed. It was observed that the 
provision is discriminatory under Article 15 of the Constitution and also 
violative of procedural due process since procedural reasonableness is 
denied to the Christians as compared to those governed by other 
matrimonial laws operating in the country. For instance, joinder of the 
adulterer as co-respondent is mandatory under the Christian Act which 
653 
amounts to discrimination and also imposes an additional procedural 
burden. No such provision exists in the Hindu Marriage Act or the 
Special Marriage Act (under the Parsi law the adulterer has to be joined 
in case of husband as well as wife). Another point of discrimination 
indicated in this case was that, while under the Parsi Marriage and 
Divorce Act, joinder of adulteror is necessary, whosoever may be the 
petitioner, section 11 of the Indian Divorce Act imposes such an 
obligation only when the husband is the petitioner. This, according to 
the court, is apparently discriminatory even though it may be saved by 
Article 15(3) of the Constitution, giving the state a free hand in making 
special provision for women. 
Ann Sarkar v. Anil Sarkar,^^ is a case which points out the hardships 
caused to spouses because of the technicalities in the law. A wife had 
filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on the ground of adultery 
coupled with cruelty. The husband filed a petition giving his consent for 
the dissolution stating that they have been living separately since a long 
time and have not been able to live together. He did not appear nor did 
he file any written statement, hence the decree was passed ex parte. The 
district judge held that the Act does not contain a provision similar to 
section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act which provides for divorce by 
mutual consent and therefore there can be no divorce on that ground. 
However, the ground of adultery coupled with cruelty having been 
established, the marriage was dissolved. In confirmation, the reference 
was rejected as according to the High Court, desertion, cruelty and 
adultery were not specifically alleged as grounds for dissolution. All that 
the wife alleged was that the husband was very friendly with other 
women, had affairs and lived in adultery without giving any particular 
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name or specific instances and this was not sufficient to entitle lier to a 
divorce. 
In Jose V. Alicef^ the husband filed an application before an 
ecclesiastical tribunal to declare his marriage as null and void on the 
ground that the wife was pregnant at the time of marriage. The tribunal 
passed the decree. Thereafter the wife filed a maintenance claim 
wherein the husband argued that the marriage had been declared void 
and so she had no right to claim maintenance. The magistrate did not 
accept this argument and ordered maintenance which order was 
confirmed by the session's judge. The husband thereupon filed an 
application under section 482 of the Code for having this order quashed. 
The court refused to interfere and held: "^^ 
A Christian marriage is a sacrament and it cannot be 
dissolved except by recourse to the procedure under 
section 18 on one or the other of the grounds mentioned 
in section 19 of the Indian Divorce Act. In the absence of 
a decree of nullity of marriage; the magistrate exercising 
the jurisdiction under section 125 Cr. P.C. is bound to 
accept the marriage as valid. The Code itself provides for 
cancellation of an order for maintenance where such 
cancellation is found necessary in consequence of any 
decision of a competent civil court (vide section 127(2) of 
the Cr. P.C). 
In P.J. Moore v. Valsa^^ Moore the fraud committed was of such a 
nature which went into the roots of the relationship. A widower, with 
children from first marriage, underwent a vasectomy and remarried 
without disclosing this fact to the second wife. Only when the wife did 
not conceive for a long period did he divulge the fact. The wife went to 
court for annulment of the marriage on the ground that consent for the 
marriage was obtained by fraud inasmuch as the fact of vasectomy was 
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concealed from her. Had she known it, she would not have given 
consent for the husband it was argued that mere concealment of fact 
unless it related to the identity of spouse of ceremony undergone, was 
not fraud, hence non-disclosure of this information was not a fraud of 
such nature as to vitiate consent. The court did not accept this argument. 
One of the sublime objects of marriage is to have children and if a 
person voluntarily, through a surgery, loses capacity to procreate, then it 
is his basic duty to disclose that fact to the spouse before marriage. The 
court relied on Best Morning v. Nirmalendu^ where facts were similar 
and the marriage was annulled. 
In Robert Sebastian v. Linet Stiba'^^ the district court granted divorce and 
also damages of Rs. 25,000/- to the petitioner-husband who had claimed 
it, against the co-adulteror. In confirmation proceedings, the co-
respondent objected to the award of damages. The court held that this 
award cannot be challenged in these proceedings under section 17. He 
can challenge it independently under section 55 which deals with 
enforcement of an appeal from orders and decrees. 
The need for amendment of the Act has been pointed out and 
emphasized in many cases by the various High Courts and the Supreme 
Court^ ^ during the past few years. The act is too antiquated and needs to 
be reformed to bring it in conformity with other personal law statutes 
and also to fit in with the needs of the present social set up. In one case"""* 
the Bombay High Court assailed the proviso to section 36 which 
imposes a limit of one-fifth of the husband's net income by way of 
maintenance for the wife. The court referred to the obsei-vations made 
by the Division Bench of its own court in Dinesh Gijuhhai Mehta v. 
Usha Dinesh Mehta^\ 
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We are unable to trace any rational basis, for this rule 
which prevents the wife from claiming more than 1/5 ' 
even when her needs and capacity of the husband, 
warrant awarding larger amount More than hundred 
years have fleeted by after the coming into force of the 
above enactment. The Indian social scene has witnessed 
passage of many enactments seeking to uplift the status 
and augment assets of the woman who still suffers from 
manifold handicaps. It may perhaps merit the attention of 
the supreme law makers of this country to ponder about 
the removal of all traces of obsolescence in this and 
other related laws dealing with women. 
In one case the court has given a welcome judgment though not strictly 
in consonance with the statutory provisions. As is well known, under 
section 10, a wife has to prove adultery along with another matrimonial 
offence, like cruelty, desertion or bigamy in order to obtain a decree of 
dissolution of marriage, whereas a husband has only to prove one 
ground and that is, adultery. In Urmila Ranf^ the wife had alleged 
cruelty and adultery but could not prove adultery. Though cruelty was 
established, under section 22 of the Act it is only a ground for 
separation. The additional district judge, however, granted a divorce to 
her under section 10 and the same was confirmed under section 17. The 
behaviour of the husband was extremely cruel and undoubtedly, a wife 
could not be expected to tolerate it and continue to live with him. 
Nonetheless the Act stands as it was over a century ago with its archaic 
and strict provisions, in spite of the recommendations of the court and 
jurists for reform. Whether the judge in Urmila Rani gave a divorce on 
ground of ciuelty by oversight or inadvertence or it was a deliberate 
order ignoring the harsh legal provisions, the fact is that it is a 
constructive order which brings meaningful relief to the parties. 
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The Kerala High Court has dehvered a bold and remarkable judgment in 
Ammini E.J. v. Union of India ^ where it has gone beyond merely 
recommending amendment in the statutes. The need for reform of the 
Christian divorce law has been pointed out innumerably times by jurists, 
the Law Commission, women's organizations and also by the judicial^, 
including the apex court.^ ^ The significance of Ammini E.J. lies in the 
fact that it has not only strongly attacked the discriminatory divorce 
provisions as laid down in section 10 of the Act, but has also struck 
down certain phrases in order to give meaningful relief to the petitioner 
wives. The facts of the case in brief are thus: Two Christian wives filed 
separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of section 10 of the 
Act in the following circumstances. Mary Sonia Zacharia' was deserted 
by her husband for several years. He neither cohabited with her nor 
cared to maintain her and their daughter. She also alleged that she was 
not even aware of his whereabouts. On the facts, she filed a petition for 
divorce under section 10 on the ground of cruelty and desertion and by 
another petition she challenged the constitutionality of this section. The 
court refused to grant divorce on these grounds but directed the Union of 
India to take note of the recommendations of the Law Commission 
contained in its 90th report and take a decision to amend the section 
within six months. However, nothing came out of it. Ammini E.J., the 
other petitioner, also alleged desertion and cruelty by the husband. She 
obtained a decree of judicial separation on these grounds under section 
22 of the Act. She, however, filed the present petition challenging 
section 10 under which, in spite of her husband's extreme, cruelty, 
desertion and 'not even an iota of chance of reconciliation', she was held 
not entitled to a divorce unless she alleged and proved adulter>' also. 
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Both these petitions were considered in great detail by the special bench 
in Ammini E.J. 
The contentions raised by the petitioners were that section 10 of the 
Act was ultra vires Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution. There 
was gender-based discrimination inasmuch as the husband needed to 
prove adultery simpliciter whereas the 'wife had to prove adulter^' with 
one or other aggravating ground in order to get a divorce. Thus, it was 
against Article 15 and denial of equality before law guaranteed under 
Article 14. 
Discrimination on the ground of religion was alleged as women who 
professed Christianity and were married under the Act were denied 
relief on grounds which would entitle wives belonging to other 
religions or communities to the relief. Infringement of Article 21 viz. 
protection of life and personal liberty was also alleged as section 10 
compelled a Christian wife to live without dignity with a man who had 
deserted her and treated her with cruelty. It was accordingly prayed 
that the words "incestuous" and "adultery coupled with" as used in 
section 10 be struck down and the remaining part of the section be 
retained. 
The relief claimed was opposed on the grounds that in spite of repeated 
recommendations by the Law Commission for amending the Act, the 
government had not been able to do so in view of strong opposition 
from the community itself. Besides, the judiciary including the Supreme 
Court had also so far upheld the constitutionality of the provisions 
contained in the Act. It was also contended that the Constituent 
Assembly Debates in respect of Article 35 of the draft Constitution 
corresponding to Article 44 of the Constitution clearly indicated that the 
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Constitution-makers envisaged the continuance of personal laws for 
different communities for quite sometime—though not indefinitely. 
Also, that the grounds for relief of dissolution of the marriage were 
specifically laid down in section 10 and no additional ground could be 
included simply by judicial construction of similar provisions in other 
statutes. It was also argued that personal laws of one community should 
not be compared with those of another since grounds for divorce do 
differ from community to community and there was in-built provision 
in the Constitution itself for treating different sections of the people 
differently. Hence there was no discrimination nor violation of 
fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15 and 21. The principle of 
estoppels was invoked by the defendant arguing that once a person got 
married under an Act, it was not longer open to him or her to contend 
that he/ she was bound by certain of its provisions. After considering 
the contentions of both the parties, the court found enough justification 
to grant the relief It observed: " 
We are of the view that life of a Christian wife who is 
compelled to live against her will...as the wife of a man 
who hates her, has cruelly treated her and deserted her 
putting an end to the marital relationship irreversibly 
will he a sub human life without dignity and personal 
liberty....It can only be treated as a depressed or 
oppressed life without the full liberty and freedom to 
enjoy life as one would desire to lead it in the way 
Constitution has ensured. 
The court agreed that the section was violative of the fundamental rights 
and held:" 
Whatever may be the conditions which existed in 1869 
when the Act was enacted and which might have justified 
the incorporation of such provisions in the Act, it will be 
difficult to find any justifiable reason in support of the 
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impugned provisions in the light of the provisions in 
Chapter III of the Constitution guaranteeing various 
fundamental rights especially Articles 14,15 and 
21....They can only be considered as antiquated laws 
resting on principles totally contrary to the constitutional 
philosophy underlying and the constitutional mandate 
contained in the provisions in Chapter III of the 
Constitution. 
The argument that under the modified provision wives would be 
entitled to seek dissolution on grounds of desertion and cruelty also 
alongwith adultery, whereas husband would be left with only the ground 
of adultery which would be discriminatory, was rejected. It was held 
that such a provision was justified in the light of provisions contained in 
Article 15(3) of the Constitution which permitted special provisions for 
the benefit of women. In the words of the court this course of action had 
been adopted "to remedy a palpable and inexcusable gender injustice 
shown by a law itself to particular group of women contraiy to the 
constitutional guarantees and the international conventions 
guaranteeing human rights to which free India is a party for the past so 
many years."^ "^  
The court, expressed a hope that the judgment would have a compelling 
effect on the central government in finalizing its proposal for a 
comprehensive reform in the marriage and divorce law among 
Christians in India. 
K. Kunhammed Haj v. K. Amina''^  is a significant judgment which 
expanded the scope of a divorced Muslim wife's right to maintenance 
under the Act. It was held that she was entitled to a fair and reasonable 
provision for her livelihood after the period of iddat apart from 
maintenance during the period of iddat. According to the court, the Shah 
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Bano,^^ ruling imposing liability on a Muslim husband to maintain his 
divorced wife during her life time or until she remarries has only been 
substituted by the Act. In the instant case, the divorced wife claimed 
maintenance during the period of iddat and a reasonable and fair 
provision for ftiture maintenance, apart from the amount equal to the 
sum of mahr. The magistrate rejected the mahr claim but allowed Rs. 
5.00/- as maintenance payable during iddat and Rs. 3.000/- as 
reasonable and fair provision for future livelihood. Against this, the 
husband filed a revision^^ before the sessions court which was 
dismissed. Hence the present criminal miscellaneous case invoking the 
jurisdiction of the High Court under section 482 of the Cr PC. It was 
contended that the grant of Rs. 30,000/- as future maintenance was 
illegal and unsustainable in law since under the provision of the Act, he 
was liable to make only reasonable and fair provision and pay 
maintenance only during period of iddat and not beyond it and secondly 
that the amount fixed was arbitrary and illegal and since there was no 
evidence on record to show the income of the husband the said amount 
was based solely on surmises and conjectures. It relied on the following 
observations made by it in an earlier case:^ ^ 
Under section 3, former husband is liable for the payment of 
maintenance for the iddat period and to make reasonable and fair 
provision for the post-iddat period. Quantification has to be made 
under sub-sec 3(b) having regard to the needs of the divorced woman, 
standard of living enjoyed by her during her marriage and the means 
of her former husband... If in spite of reasonable and fair provision 
made for the post-iddat period she faces destitufion, s. 4 comes to her 
rescue. We do not agree that the scheme of s. 4 casting on relatives of 
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the divorced woman liability for maintenance should lead to a narrow 
and technical interpretation of s. 3. 
In Molly Joseph v. George Sebastian,^'^ the Supreme Court had occasion 
to reiterate, so to say, the biblical saying "Render unto Caesar the things 
which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's.'"' The court 
reaffirmed the legal invalidity of an ecclesiastical tribunal's declaration 
when the matter is in the realm of lay courts and judges. 
In this case George Sebastian filed a petition for nullity of his marriage 
with Molly Joseph on the grounds: (i) that at the time when his marriage 
was solemnized, her marriage with one Prince Jacob was subsisting; and 
(ii) that she was insane. The wife, Molly Joseph, on the other hand 
contended that her marriage was declared void by an ecclesiastical 
tribunal and that the respondent before the Supreme Court was aware of 
her previous marriage. The district judge without conducting any inquir> 
on the basis of pleadings of the parties passed a decree of nullity ol' 
marriage. It was of the view that in the absence of a decree passed by a 
civil court under the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 the first marriage 
subsisted. When the matter came up before the high court for 
confirmation under section 20 of IDA the court observed:^' 
Canon Law (or personal law of Christians) can have 
theological or ecclesiastical implications to the parties. 
But after the Divorce Act came into force a dissolution or 
annulment granted under such personal law cannot have 
any legal impact as State has provided a different 
procedure and a different code for divorce or annulment. 
The high court directed the district judge to conduct an inquiry into the 
allegations relating to subsistence of the prior marriage and pass a 
decree accordingly. The wife filed an appeal before the Supreme Court 
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against the order of the high court. It was argued before the Supreme 
7 1 
Court relying on its decision in Lakshmi Sanyal v. Sachit Kumar Dhar ~ 
that an ecclesiastical tribunal can also dissolve a marriage. The apex 
court pointed out that Lakshmi Sanyal involved a case of marriage 
within prohibited degrees and as IDA does not give a definition of 
prohibited degree, for that limited purpose, a declaration given by a 
ecclesiastical tribunal could be looked into. The Supreme Court 
emphasized that Lakshmi Sanyal did not hold that an ecclesiastical 
court's declaration shall be binding on the district court or the high 
court. It pointed out:"^^' 
Such ecclesiastical tribunal cannot exercise a power 
parallel to the power vested in the District Court or the 
High Court by the provisions of the Divorce Act. Section 
18 provides that any husband or wife may present a 
petition to the District Court or to the High Court 
praying that his or her marriage may be declared null 
and void. In that event, it excludes the jurisdiction and 
authority of any other Tribunal including Ecclesiastical 
Tribunal (Church Court). 
The Supreme Court upheld the high court's order to the district judge for 
fresh decision in accordance with law and dismissed the appeal. 
The important aspect of Sarada Mani v. Alexander^'* is that it points out 
the existing anomalies imbedded in section 10 of the IDA. The obduracy 
of the legislature in not removing the discrimination against Christian 
women inherent in section 10 in spite of judicial urgings, forced the 
courts to virtually amend the section by deleting certain phrases to 
alleviate the sufferings of Christian wives in securing divorce. The 
Kerala High Court, after a patient and futile wait for parliament to act, 
did so in Ammini v. Union of India. The Bombay High Court in 
Pragati Varghese v. Cyril George Varghese and the Andhra Pradesh 
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High Court in Youth Welfare Federation v. Union of India" followed 
suit. 
The judicial legislation or amendments at the level of high courts, not 
unnaturally, has given rise to divergent readings of section 10 though the 
hardship to and discrimination against women have been largely 
corrected. In this case the husband and wife were living separately for 
eight years and the wife filed a petition for divorce alleging that the 
husband was living in adultery and treated her with ciTielty. The district 
judge found that she could not prove adultery, much less incestuous 
adultery. But considering that the marriage had been irretrievabK 
broken down, he thought that there was no justification to stand in the 
way of getting dissolution of marriage; and granted the dissolution of 
marriage in favour of the wife subject to confirmation by the high court. 
The special bench allowed the dissolution on the ground of desertion b\ 
the husband, but not on the ground of irretrievable incompatibilit> 
between the spouses. Ramakrishnam Raju J, delivering the opinion of 
the special bench pointed out the other anomaly that still exists under 
section 10 of the IDA, viz., while the wife can get divorce on the 
grounds of desertion and cruelty, the husband is not so entitled. He 
state:^^ 
Therefore we are of the opinion that the grounds which 
are available to the wife under section 10 should also be 
made available to the husband in a petition filed by him 
seeking divorce and the Parliament should immediately 
take note of the discrimination writ large between the 
grounds available to the husband and the wife in a 
petition for divorce. It is for the Parliament to take note 
of the anomaly and fill-in the void by suitable legislation. 
In Rama Kanta v. Mohinder Laxmidas BhandulaJ'' the court observed^" 
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Cruelty implies and means harsh conduct of such 
intensity and persistence which would make it impossible 
for the spouse to operate the marriage. Cruelty is not 
defined in the Act. It is to be determined on the basis of 
proved facts and circumstances of the case. No fixed 
formula can be had for cruelty. It is to be determined 
keeping in view the culture, temperament and status in 
life of the parties and many other factors. 
Q I 
In Sushila Viresh Chhadwa v. Viresh Nagshi Chhadva the Bombay 
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High Court observed: 
Wlien a fact of marriage is acknowledged or proved 
alimony follows subject of course to the discretion of the 
court in the matter having regard to the means of the 
parties and it would be no answer to the claim...that the 
marriage was void ipso Jure or was voidable. 
And further, it remarked: 
The direction for interim alimony and expenses of 
litigation under section 24 is one of urgency and it must 
be decided as soon as it is raised and then only the other 
matters in controversy can be gone into...and the law 
sees that nobody is disabled from prosecuting or 
defending the matrimonial case by starvation or lack of 
funds. It is true that the court exercises wide discretion in 
the matter of granting maintenance pendent elite, but the 
discretion is judicial and not arbitrary or capricious. 
The husband's appeal against the decision of the sessions court granting 
maintenance to his wife on the ground that she had committed aduhery 
11 years back was rejected by the Madras High Court. '^^  The husband 
stated that after the birth of their first child she developed relations with 
another man. Two more children were bom from the husband to the 
wife after that. The court explored the meaning of "living in adultery" 
under section 125(4) and concluded that it is indicative of a continuous 
adulterous or a course of guilty conduct. It does not mean friendship 
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with another man and should be understood in the light of social idea of 
community as being a serious breach of matrimonial tie. What needs to 
be shown is whether the wife was living in quasi-permanent union with 
a man with whom she was allegedly committing adultery, shortly before 
or after the petition for maintenance. It need not necessarily be at the 
time of filing of the petition but it can be shortly before that also. 
'Shortly' is to be interpreted in a reasonable manner. Even if there was 
an alleged adulterous conduct it was 11 years earlier. "Living in 
aduhery" cannot be substituted with an isolated incident of sexual 
intercourse as that would narrow down the scope of maintenance. The 
primary objective of section 125 is to prevent vagrancy and achieve 
social justice. This view of the court was in accordance with the 41" 
report of the Law Commission also wherein they had stated that to 
deprive a woman of maintenance for an occasional lapse of virtue might 
force her to live a sinful life and give her no chance to redeem herself 
Subsequent reports have recommended the abolition of section 125(4) 
itself as more often the husbands use it as a tool to embarrass and harass 
their wives. 
Constitutional validity of section 17, was challenged in Mathew v. 
Union of India, on the ground that as this legal formality applies onl> 
to Indian Christians and not to the members of other religious 
communities, it is discriminatory, arbitrary and violative of Articles 13. 
14, 15(1) and 21 of the Constitution of India. (Article 14 condemns 
discrimination not only of substantive law but also of the law ot 
procedure). Even if the parties are not interested in appeal, the 
mandatory waiting period further delays their right to get remarried and 
violates Article 21 also. It also leads to additional expenses and prolongs 
the agony of parties. The division bench comprising of A.R. 
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Lakshmanan and K. Narayana Kurup JJ, followed an earlier judgment of 
the Supreme Court^ ^ and held that personal laws do not fall within 
Article 13(1) of the Constitution. They are not "laws" as defined therein. 
The court accepted the contention that the confirmation procedure 
prescribed by section 17 prolong the agony of the affected parties even 
though none of them is desirous of filing an appeal and that there is no 
justification for its continuous specially when no such procedure is 
prescribed by other matrimonial legislations like Special Marriage Act, 
Hindu marriage Act, etc. The urgent need for making suitable 
amendments in the Act was pointed out by the court but it was 
concluded that the remedy does not lie with the courts but with the 
legislature. They themselves refrained from striking down section 17 as 
void but directed the Kerala government to bring in the necessary and 
appropriate amendment. 
In Rama Natrajan v. Alexender Xavier Nathan, the wife filed a suit for 
annulment after 11 years of marriage on grounds of husband's 
impotency. The couple even had a child. The wife admitted sexual 
contact but stated that her husband always left her dissatisfied as she felt 
that he was not able to perform full and complete intercourse. 
The court observed that the incapacity to consummate the marriage ma> 
be due to mental or physical condition of either spouse and as required 
under the statute such condition should have existed at the time to 
marriage and should have continued to be so until the insdtution of the 
proceedings. The mental or physical safisfaction of the petitioner may be 
a reason for making a ground of impotency, but the law does not sa> 
that it is the wife's mental or physical dissatisfaction, which decides the 
impotency of the husband. The court held that mere dissatisfaction of 
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the wife was insufficient to prove husband's impotency or non-
consummation of marriage. 
In Henry Fernades v. Succorinha'^ the husband filed a petition for 
divorce on wife's cruelty and the wife contended that this ground was 
not available to a Christian husband under the Indian Divorce Act. 
Relying on the earlier division bench judgment,^^ the husband took the 
plea that section 10 of the Divorce Act is constitutionally void as it 
violates Articles 14, 15 and 21. 
According to the modified section, if the husband is guilty of cruelty the 
wife can obtain divorce from him, but if the wife is guilty the husband 
has no remedy to obtain divorce, as the only ground available to him is 
wife's adultery. The husband contended that even in the modified form 
as per the division bench judgment, section 10 violates Article 14. as it 
provided only one ground to the husband and six independent grounds 
to the wife, which amounts to discrimination on grounds of sex. The 
court held that even assuming that there is some substance in the 
grievance that section 10 of the Act as it stands makes discrimination in 
the matter of grounds of divorce between a Christian husband and a 
wife, they (the court) had no power to introduce into the section a 
ground which the legislature did not contemplate. They observed:'" 
From 1869 till today, the only ground available to the 
husband under the Act is the ground of adultery. The 
second portions of Sec. 10 deals with "When wife may 
petition for dissolution " and contain several grounds, 
some of which were struck down. Even assuming that the 
remainder of Sec. 10 after the exercise carried out by a 
full bench is considered to be discriminative against the 
Christian husband, it is not open to us to read into Sec. 
10 any ground other than the ground provided by the 
Legislature. In view of the matter it is unnecessary to 
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contend that the section is discriminatory of rights 
between a Christian husband and wife. There may be 
several reasons why the law permits dissolution of the 
marriage at the instance of the Christian husband only 
on the solitary ground of adultery. Perhaps Christian 
women are never cruel to their husbands, for they are 
"Christians ". Assuming that there is any discrimination, 
the discrimination at all would be in favour of women, 
which is perfectly valid and permissible in view of 
Article. 15(3). 
In Augustina V. Kunjamma Kuriakose ^' the parents knowing that their 
son was impotent arranged his marriage and the same were suppressed 
from the wife. The husband after marriage distanced himself from the 
wife and even after living together for a period of 10 months and 2 days 
the marriage could not be consummated. The wife filed a petition for 
nullity of marriage and claimed exemplary damages worth Rs. 15 lakhs. 
Basing her claim on the mental agony that she suffered on account of a 
deliberate suppression of a material fact relating to the husband by him 
and his parents, she contended that she was cheated by them and they 
should therefore be asked to compensate her by paying damages. The 
trial court granted dissolution of marriage on ground of husband's 
impotency and awarded her damages of Rs. one lakh. The court held 
that both the defendant and his parents knew about the impotency of 
their son yet went ahead with his marriage and were therefore guilty and 
liable to pay damages. The wife contracted another marriage but this did 
not absolve the husband from paying damages to her for causing mental 
agony and cheating. 
A father and also a mother are under a legal obligation to maintain the 
child who is unable to maintain itself In a case involving a Christian 
couple a question arose whether a Christian father was under a legal 
obligation to maintain his child?'^ ^ The wife contended that a child has a 
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basic right to be looked after by his father and the courts and slate are 
the ultimate guardians of every person who is non siii juris. Court has 
the jurisdiction to ensure that the person and property of anyone who is 
not in a position to look after himself are duly protected. Secondly, the 
obligation of a parent to look after the child has been customarily 
accepted. Since father is the natural guardian of the child he is under a 
duty to maintain and protect him. The court explored what all is 
included in the expression "right to life" which means according to 
them, a right to lead an honourable life. 
Exploring the passages from the Holy Bible the court noted the verses 
contained therein indicating parental liability to maintain their child and 
said that even assuming that there is a custom that a father is not obliged 
to maintain his child and this custom is a law within the meaning of 
Article 13 it would nevertheless be void in the light of Article 21 which 
guarantees right to life. The court said:*^ ^ 
It may be true that there is no specific statutory provision 
mandating a Christian father or a Christian husband to 
maintain his children and his wife. Of course Indian 
Divorce Act provides for certain provisions for alimony 
and maintenance to the wife and children. Since there 
are no provisions in the Indian Divorce Act can it be said 
that only when a claim for separation initiated under that 
statute a decree can be granted for maintenance or 
alimony for the wife and children? 
Without referring to or looking into the provisions of the Cr. PC, the 
court held that a Christian father is under an obligation to maintain his 
child due to following reasons:'^'' 
The right to life is fundamental. The Constitution 
guarantees it. Every other provision of law personal, 
public or private has to conform to the constitutional 
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mandate. It must be interpreted in a manner that would 
fulfil and promote the constitutional promise. 
(i) The caste, faith or rehgion provides no rational basis for 
determining the parental duties of any person. No scripture 
says that a man shall not take care of his young one. Care and 
concern for the needy are the command of the creator. Man 
can ignore it at his own peril. 
(ii) The duty to take care of the children has now been duly 
recognized as an enforceable obligation in the entire civilized 
society. Even in UK the duty has been long recognized. 
(iii) The obligation of the father to maintain his child stems from 
his being the guardian as the right to custody carries a duty to 
care. 
(iv) In India the law does not permit cruelty to even animals. A 
civilized man cannot be cruel to his own child and neglect his 
needs. And that too in case of a minor. Man must treat his own 
progeny at least as well as his pets. He cannot have a different 
yardstick for his own offspring. 
(v) The moralist and the legislator may have a difference of 
opinion yet they are not strangers to each other. Broadly 
speaking what is morally wrong should not be legally right. A 
law that does not protect morality cannot last for long. 
(vi) The International conventions provide a good guidance in the 
examination of vexed questions of law. The need to extend 
particular care of the child has been stated in the Geneva 
Declaration and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
adopted by the General Assembly on November 20, 1959. 
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CHAPTER-4 
PARSI LAW 
Case Law based on: Marriage, Divorce and Maintenance 
The Parsis are a small and well knit community. It is through their close 
interaction with British, that the community evolved as an important 
economic and political force and thus could negotiate for themselves 
separate set of personal laws. The Parsis wanted to be protected from 
some of the principles of English laws. In 1864 the Parsi Law Commission 
was appointed and based on its report, the two bills were enacted i.e. Parsi 
Intestate Succession Act 1865 and the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act of 
1865. They secured legal recognition for their customary arbitration fomm 
of panchayat. In an important case decided in 1908 the courts ruled that 
there is no conversion among the Parsis because while Zoroastrianism is a 
religion, Parsis are a race and there cannot be conversion to a race. 
Marriage: 
The Parsis are a strictly monogamous and endogamous group. \t one 
time there was an avoidance of Marriage between priestly and 
nonpriestly families. Given these restrictions and the small size of the 
community, it is not surprising that close consanguineal and affinal 
relatives are potential mates. Cross-and parallel-cousin marriages are 
permitted, as well as intergenerational marriages (e.g. between uncle and 
niece), though the occurrence of the latter is rare-less than 1 percent of 
all marriages. The greatest problem faced by the community today is a 
decrease in the number of marriages and a decreasing fertility rate Since 
the 1950s deaths have consistently outnumbered births everv year 
among Parsis, producing an aging population. This Decline has two 
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causes. Since, independence in 1947 many younger Parsis have 
emigrated from India, thus strengthening the sense of crisis; and Parsi 
women who marry non-Parsis are strictly excluded along with their 
offspring from the community. The question of accepting children of 
such marriages, as well as converts to Zoroastrianism, is being 
vehemently debated among Parsis both in India and abroad. There 
appears to be a progressive attitude among the overseas Parsis that may 
in the future lead to a broadening of the definition of a Parsi. 
As per census of 2001 only 69601 parsis residing in India, with a 
concentration in and around the city of Mumbai. As per Post 
Independence Census data there were 111791 parsis in 1951. It reveals a 
decline in population of approximately 9% per decade. The ratio of 
males to females was 1000 males to 1050 females in 2001.Parsis have a 
high literacy rate as of 2001. The literacy rate is 97.9% the highest for 
any Indian community. In the Greater Mumbai area, where the density 
of Parsis is highest 10% of Parsi females and 20% of Parsi males do not 
marry. According to the National Commission for minorities, there are a 
variety of causes that are responsible for steady decline in the population 
of this community, the most significant of which were childlessness, not 
marrying and migration. 
Divorce: 
Husband and wife have similar grounds for divorce (if other party has 
not been heard of as being alive for a period of 7 years, willful refusal to 
consummate the marriage within one year, unsound mind at the time of 
marriage provided plainfiff ignorant of that fact at the time of maniage. 
pregnant before marriage by another male, sentence of seven years oi-
more, entering into another religion). However wife has additional 
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ground if her husband forces her into prostitution. By the Parsi Marriage 
& Divorce (Amendment) Act 1988 divorce by mutual consent was 
introduced. 
The Parsi chief matrimonial court is also the only court presided (n e^r by 
a high court judge. A bench is especially constituted at least twice a year 
to hear cases. Earlier, the court was set up only once a year when a 
sufficient number of cases had piled up. Needless to say, these once-in-
ablue-moon hearings create a stack of problems for would be divorcees. 
"Waiting for a bench to be constituted delays contested cases. The 
delegate system (members of the jury are called delegates under the 
Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act) would appear to be one stumbling 
block in the path of moving Parsi cases to regular family couns. The 
jury is first elected from the community under the aegis of the Mumbai 
Parsi Panchayat. Those chosen appear in court and five names are 
selected through a draw. The delegates decide only on factual points like 
the marriage date and whether desertion took place, while law points 
and maintenance pleas are decided by the judge. 
Parsi divorce rates are higher than those for other Indian communities 
because, when compared to Hindu Law, Parsi law has always made 
divorce easier. The education and economic emancipation of females 
also contributes to the high divorce rate. Remarriage after the death of a 
spouse is permitted for both sexes. Parsis tradhionally lived together as 
extended families. Owing to space constraints in the cities, however, 
nuclear families are common; and because of declining population, 
many elderly Parsis today live alone. 
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Maintenance: 
The wife has a right to maintenance but the amount cannot exceed one 
fifth of husband's income. The order of maintenance can be rescinded if 
the woman remarries or is unchaste. The community has maintained its 
hold over the matrimonial matters by retaining the jury system 
introduced in 1865. In the Bombay High Court, the Parsi Matrimonial 
Court is constituted twice a year and flinctions for about 9 weeks during 
each term. The Act empowers the court to settle wife's property for the 
benefit of children in case a ground of adulteiy is proved against her in a 
petition filed by her husband. 
Parsi can claim maintenance from the spouse through criminal 
proceedings or/and civil proceedings. Interested parties may pursue both 
criminal and civil proceedings, simultaneously as there is no legal bar to 
it. In the criminal proceedings the religion of the parties doesn't matter 
at all unlike the civil proceedings. If the Husband refuses to pay 
maintenance, wife can inform the court that the husband is refusing to 
pay maintenance even after the order of the court. The court can then 
sentence the husband to imprisonment unless he agrees to pay. The 
husband can be detained in the jail so long as he does not pay. The Parsi 
Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936 recognizes the right of wife to 
maintenance-both alimony pendent elite and permanent alimony. The 
maximum amount that can be decreed by court as alimony during the 
time a matrimonial suit is pending in court, is on-fifth of the husband's 
net income. In fixing the quantum as permanent maintenance, the court 
will determine what is just, bearing in mind the ability of husband to 
pay, wife's own assets and conduct of the parties. The order will remain 
in force as long as wife remains chaste and unmarried. 
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Permanent alimony and maintenance: 
(1) Any court exercising jurisdiction under this Act may, at the time 
of passing any decree or at any time subsequent therto, on an 
application made to it for the purpose by either the wife or the 
husband, order that the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff for her 
or his maintenance and support, such gross sum or such monthly 
or periodical sum, for a term not exceeding the life of the plaintiff 
as having regard to the defendant's own income and other 
property, if any, the income and other property of the plaimiff, the 
conduct of the parties and other circumstances of the case, it may 
seem to the court to be just, and any such payment may be 
secured, if necessary, by a charge on the movable or immovable 
property of the defendant. 
(2) The court if it is satisfied that there is change in the circumstances 
of either party at any time after it has made an order under sub-
section (1), it may, at the instance of either party, vary, modify or 
rescind any such order in such manner as the Court ma> deem 
just. 
(3) The Court if it is satisfied that the partly in whose favour, an order 
has been made under this section has remarried or, if such party is 
the wife, that she has not remained chaste, or, if such part> is the 
husband, that he had sexual intercourse with any woman outside 
wedlock, it may, at the instance of the other party, vary, modify or 
rescind any such order in such manner as the Court may deem 
just. 
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CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
Conclusion: 
Conclusively speaking the outcome of the study in the humble 
estimation of researcher provides that human rights are the rights which 
all human beings possess by virtue of human conditions. They are 
generally called 'Fundamental Rights' or 'Natural Rights' or 'The 
Rights of Man'. Human rights are not only rights rather they are the 
ideals based on the demand of humanity regarding dignity, respect, 
justice, freedom and protection. Thus they should be enjoyed by every 
member of human society without discrimination of caste, creed, race, 
gender, religion, nationality or other status. Human rights jurisprudence 
had occupied a place of prime importance in ancient India's rich legacy 
of historical tradition and culture. The political thinkers and 
philosophers have expressed concern over securing human rights and 
ftindamental freedoms for all human beings every where since the very 
early times of Vedic age. The "Rigveda," which is regarded as the oldest 
document, declares that all human beings are equal and they are all 
brothers. The "Atharvaveda" advocates equal rights of all human beings 
over natural resources like air, food and water, like wise right to 
happiness, right to education, right to practice any religion, right to 
social security, right to get fair treatment and protection etc have been 
accepted and emphasized in various Vedic and post Vedic ancient 
Indian literatures. It is revealed that society in Vedic period was well 
structured, highly organized and committed to human rights. In 
Buddhism the humanitarian feelings are equally present. Its tenets teach 
kindness to all creatures. The basic tenets of Buddhism are non-
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violence, non-hatred, and friendliness to all. The Bible gives Ten 
Commandments which enshrine human rights issues. Similarly, the 
Quran also shows equal concern for human beings as well as their 
rights. 
Magna Carta is often cited as one of the early documents upholding 
'human rights' in crude forms. North America adopted the declaration of 
Independence on July 4, 1776. This declaration consists of a number of 
human rights issues which contributed to the continuum of human right 
struggle. French Revolution was an epochal event. The National 
Assembly of France adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
Citizen on 26 August, 1789 as a preamble to the new constitution that it 
was framing for France. This Declaration was truly international in its 
appeal and inspired revolutionary and democratic movements in almost 
every country of Europe and in Central and South America and later, in 
Asia and Africa. Another important event which has a far reaching 
implication for human rights is the October Revolution which took place 
in 1917. The Declaration consists of a number of decrees pertaining to 
peace and rights of the people of the then Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republic (USSR). The United Nations has provided a fertile ground for 
the development and protection of human rights all over the world. 1 he 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the Creneral 
Assembly of the United Nations on lO"" December 1948 and the two 
International Covenants viz., the International Covenant on Ci\il and 
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and their Optional Protocols constitute the basic and 
authentic document of human rights known as the 'International bill ol 
Rights'. This study provides that human rights have been synthesized in 
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the Constitution of India by the preambular promises, the fundamental 
rights, the directive principles of state policy, the fundamental duties and 
other constitutional and institutional framework, though they are not 
referred to by that name. Most of the rights enumerated in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights have also found a place in the Indian Constitution. 
The Indian Constitution aims at the establishment of a welfare State. 
Part IV of the Constitution consists of a number of directives to the State 
in the form of the Directive Principles of State Policy. However these 
directive principles have been made, specifically unenforceable in a 
Court of law, even though they have been recognized as fundamental to 
the governance of the country. The Supreme Court of India has made 
immense contribution through its activism, in transforming many of the 
directive principles into fundamental rights, thus making them 
justiciable in a court of law. In a way, what the courts cannot do certain 
things directly, they have tried to get them done indirectly. The 
Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 and the constitution of the 
National Human Rights Commission under the Act advance the 
protection of human rights in India. It creates a sense of human rights 
awareness among the people of India, despite the fact that the National 
Human Rights Commission is a weak and powerless body, with only 
recommendatory powers. 
The outcome of this study reveals that the evolution of judicial activism 
in India delayed as Indian judiciary is a late-starter in that direction. A 
wide variety of factors have promoted the judiciary in the modern 
world, to deviate from their traditional role. The reasons for judicial 
activism include near collapse of a responsible government, pressure on 
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the judiciary to step in aid of the people, judicial enthusiasm to 
participate in social reform and change, legislative vacuum left open, the 
constitutional scheme, the final authority to make a binding declaration, 
the role of judiciary as the guardian of the Constitution and of the 
fundamental rights of the citizens and more importantly the trust and 
confidence of the people reposed in the judiciary. The judiciary is one of 
the major protectors of human rights in India. Through its \ arious 
historic pronouncements the Supreme Court of India has recognized the 
Tundamental Rights' as "Natural Rights or Human Rights". As regards 
the role of the judiciary in the Constitution, it has been found that the 
judiciary is playing an active role. The days of the judiciaiy mereK 
finding or declaring the law, have fast disappeared in our country. The 
judges of the day not only find or declare the law which is considered as 
the traditional function of the courts, but they also make the law. The 
judicial lawmaking has become an incontrovertible and undisputed 
reality. 
The study reveals that Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees equality 
before the law and equal protecfion under the law. It has been 
interpreted as a prohibition against unreasonable classification. The 
equality guarantee does not require that the law treat all individuals 
exactly the same. Rather, it allows the State to make classifications. 
However, this power of classification must be exercised on reasonable 
grounds. The Supreme Court has expressly adopted a similarly situated 
approach to equality rights under Article 14. Accordingly, the first step 
in determining whether Article 14 has been violated is a consideration 
of whether the persons between whom discrimination is alleged fall 
within the same class. If the persons are not deemed to be similarly 
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circumstanced, then no further consideration is required. The principles 
adoped by the court are premised on a formal model of equality. The 
focus of the analysis is on the question of sameness on determining 
whether the persons among whom the denial of equality is alleged are 
the same, or whether the classification is based on reasonable 
differences. In this approach, there is no interrogation of substantive 
inequalities of such social and economic disadvantages that may have 
produced differences between persons. The Supreme Court has 
emphasized a "new dimension" of Article 14, rarely "that it embodies a 
guarantee against arbitrariness". While the new doctrine has been 
harshly criticized as a significant shift away from the reasonable 
classification approach by some commentators. There has been little if 
any significant change in the underlying understanding of equality. The 
new judicial reasoning has incorporated the doctrine of classification 
into its folds and thus continues to be premised on a formal mc)del of 
equality. 
This study analysis that the substantive contribution of Indian judiciar> 
to human rights jurisprudence has been two fold: (a) The Expansion of 
Article 21 of the Constitution and (b) the procedural innovation of 
"Public Interest Litigation. The expression 'Life or Personal Liberty' in 
Article 21 has been given a broad and liberal interpretation by the 
Supreme Court of India. The term "personal liberty" covers a wide 
gamut of rights, which are contained in the International Covenant on 
Civil, and Political Rights, which are available to the citizens of India 
despite the fact that they are not specifically mentioned in the 
Constitution. The immense contribution the judicial activism of the 
Supreme Court of India has made to the specific areas in constitutional 
686 
law and for their development is almost unparalleled in any type of 
Constitution. The expansion of the scope of life and personal liberty 
under Article 21, the advent of Public Interest Litigation, and the 
changing facet of judicially unenforceable directive principles are a 
few examples in the said direction. The court has achieved its most 
fruitful and beneficial activism in personal liberty cases. Thanks to the 
judicial activism of the Supreme Court "life" today means "not merely 
animal existence or continued drudgery through life but the finer graces 
of human civilization which makes the life worth living". The Court's 
progressive attitude in interpretation of the 'life' and 'personal liberty" 
has led to the establishment of the principle that the right to equality 
including the right against arbitrariness and discrimination under Article 
14 and the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 are 
interrelated, intertwined with each other and that they cannot be applied 
in isolation with other rights. 
The study establishes that in the educational context under Article 29 
and 30 of the Indian Constitution the Court produced conllicting 
decisions, stemming from an internal debate between the pluralist 
approach emphasizing minorities right to administer their educational 
institutions and the assimilations approach emphasizing public interest 
in requiring educational institutions to conform to general educational 
standards. Additionally, the Court has often been concerned with false 
attempts by different educational institutions to unlawfully secure 
minority protection. The result was a collection of confused and 
contradictory decisions affording wide-ranging protections to minority 
religions to create and administer their educational institutions. While at 
the same time upholding strong regulatory state control over minority 
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education. The courts, however, seem to have been persuaded by 
practical compulsion rather than be swayed away by a feeling of 
faithfulness to the spirit. 
This research venture reveals that "Public Interest Litigation" is an 
institutional innovation of the Supreme Court of India. The Supreme 
Court has played a vital role in the institutionalization of this 'tool' by 
liberalizing the rigid rule of "locus standi" in affording constitutional 
remedies under Article 32 and Article 226 of the Constitution. This 
concept has been induced by a very concerned and willing judiciary in 
India in the early 1980's to help the socially and economically 
disadvantaged sections of the society, who could not approach a coun 
for justice, owing to their illiteracy, poverty or ignorance. The Supreme 
Court of India enjoys complete independence in its judicial functioning 
from the political branches of the State. It enjoys the power of judicial 
review over the administrative and legislative actions of the State. 
Article 32 of the Constitution which confers the writ jurisdiction on the 
Supreme Court, to enforce the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part 
III of the Constitution; is a unique provision in that, right to enforce the 
fundamental right of citizens itself has been recognized as a 
fundamental right under Article 32 of the Constitution. The changing 
needs of the society, the constitutional obligation of the Supreme Court, 
the high expectations the people have, from the apex court, and the 
willingness of the court to participate in the social reform and social 
building process, have compelled the court to become an active 
institution, particularly in the 1980's and thereafter. Therefore it would 
not be an exaggeration to state that the range of judicial review power 
exercised by the Indian Supreme Court is the widest in the entire world. 
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This study analyses that in the matters of family law in most of the cases 
generally the wife is assaulted abused or beaten by her husband. Mostly 
cases are filed on the fault ground of physical cruelty, mental cruelty or 
adultery. Either spouse move out physically generally files the petition 
for divorce but at certain age the attempt to reconciliation is made. The 
cases are adjourned in the final hearing in the family couns. The 
adjournments are open to the trial after many years. The role of 
professional interference including medical personnel and legal 
professionals also increases the problem of delayed justice. The 
marriage breakdowns to live separate vary from each circumstantial 
situadon. The affected relation between the husband and wife to live 
separate needs lot of attention and thinking before the two decide to 
separate. To live separate and apart from each other to annual the 
marriage without reasonable causes does not constitute the end of 
partnership between the two spouces. The two spouces under any and all 
circumstances are deemed to separate at any intentional and or 
consensual knowledge of each other. The welfare of the children 
however is considerable at any time iiTespective of their age. 
The constitutionality of section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act was 
considered by the Supreme Court in Saroj Rani v. Siidarshan Kumar^ 
The Court held that restitution of conjugal rights did not violate Article 
14, thus affirming the decision in Harvinder Kaur and overruling the 
decision in Sareetha. According to the Court. 
In India it must be borne in mind that conjugal rights is 
the right of the husband or the wife to the society of the 
other spouse is not merely a creature of the statute. Such 
a right is inherent in the very institution of marriage 
itself. 
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In the Court's view, there were sufficient procedural safeguards to 
prevent section 9 "from being a tyranny", and that the decree was only 
intended where the disobedience was willful. The Court further held 
that the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights "serves a social 
purpose as an aid to the prevention of the break-up of marriage", and 
thus concluded without any further equality analysis that it did not 
violate Article 14. While the Court implicitly adopts the approach of 
equality and gender of the Delhi High Court in Harvinder Kaiir, it does 
not expressly state or develop its own views in this regard. 
This study establishes that under the Hindu law in one set of cases, the 
courts have held that women are different than men; that women are 
weaker and in need of * protection. This difference is used to virtually 
disentitle women to any claim to equality. In upholding legislation, this 
approach cannot distinguish between differential treatment that 
disadvantages and differential treatment that advantages. It can not, in 
other words, distinguish between legislation that further contributes to 
women's subordination, and legislation that attempts of conect or 
compensate for that subordination. Rather, any and all differential 
treatment can be justified on the basis that women are essentially and 
biologically different. In the second set of cases, the courts have held 
that for the purposes of legislation, women and men are the same, and 
therefore must be treated the same in law. The sameness approach has 
been used to uphold legislation that treats women and men the same, 
and to strike down legislation that treats women differently. Ho\vever, 
in striking down the legislation, this approach cannot distinguish as 
between differential treatment that disadvantages and differential 
treatment that advantages. Like the protectionist approach, there is no 
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distinction between protectionist legislation that discriminates against 
women, and corrective legislation that attempts to compensate for past 
discrimination. In comparison to the protectionist approach, the 
sameness approach would strike down both protectionist and coirective 
legislation. 
This study reveals that under the Muslim Law full equality of sexes can 
hardly be possible in a legal system which permits polygamy and a 
social system which tolerates it. The only personal law, which has 
remained impervious to the changing trend from polygamy to 
monogamy, is Muslim law. The solution of standard contracts fails to 
provide a substantive relief to the first wife with children. As the second 
marriage is not invalidated, the position of the husband is not 
prejudicially affected but for the financial implications arising out of the 
step. The deten^ence of the criminal sanction when a person intends to 
contract a second marriage is absent. While the desirability of reform in 
Muslim Law is generally acknowledged, the government has taken no 
steps towards changing the law on the view that public opinion in the 
Muslim community did not favour a change. This view can not be 
reconciled with the declaration of ignoring the interest of Muslim 
women is a denial of social justice. The right of equality, like the right 
of free speech, is an individual right. 
This study reveals that The Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001 has 
completely transformed the original Act, and the grounds for 
matrimonial relief have been brought almost at par with the Special 
Marriage Act and the Hindu Marriage Act. The statutory position now 
as regards cruelty is that a marriage may be dissolved if the respondent 
'has treated the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable 
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apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it would be harmful or 
injurious for the petitioner to live with the respondent. The Indian 
Divorce Act, 1869, which was so antiquated and not in tune with 
changing times, has now undergone revolutionary changes with the 
enactment the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001. It has removed 
the gender based discrimination within the Act, as also the harsh 
provisions for matrimonial reliefs. The grounds for dissolution of 
marriage for the husband and wife have been brought almost at par. 
Besides, the grounds have been liberalized. Thus conversion of the 
defendant to another religion, inter alia, has also been incoiporated as a 
ground for dissolution of marriage. This ground is available to both the 
spouses. Under this Act, prior to the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act 
2001, there was no provision for divorce by mutual consent The 
amended Act has brought about significant changes in the Christian 
divorce law. Divorce by mutual consent has also been introduced by 
inserting a new section lOA. It is pertinent to note that under this 
provision, the minimum period of separate living prescribed is two 
years, as against one year in other personal laws. 
This study provides that under the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 
1936, prior to 1988, cruelty was only a ground for judicial separation, 
and cruelty was explained as such behaviour 'as to render it in the 
judgment of the court improper to compel him or her to live with the 
respondent'. After the amendment of 1988, cruelty has been incorporated 
as a ground for judicial separation as well as for divorce, provided that in 
every suit for divorce on this ground, it would be the court's discretion 
whether to grant divorce or judicial separation. Under the Parsi law, a 
divorce can be obtained on the ground, inter alia, that the defendant has 
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ceased to be a Parsi by conversion to another religion, provided that 
the divorce petition is filed within two years after the plaintiff came of 
know of the fact. It is significant to note that prior to the 1988 
amendment, the provision was simpliciter that the 'defendant has ceased 
to be a Parsi'. The words 'by conversion to another religion' have been 
added in 1988. Thus, it is not enough that the defendant should have 
given up his faith; it is also required that he should have acquired 
another faith. Divorce by mutual consent was also incorporated in the 
Act by this amendment. It is significant to note that the Parsi Act does 
not provide for any interregnum between the filing of the petition and 
the second motion. Thus, without any time lag, the court may grant the 
decree after verifying the averments in the petition, and also that the 
consent of either parties was not obtained by force or fraud. Thus, it 
would imply that if there was no force or fraud when the petition was 
jointly filed, there cannot be any withdrawal unilaterally 
It is pinpointed by the researcher that constitutional challenges to family 
laws on the ground of sex discrimination have met with veiy-mixed 
results. In some cases, the Courts have held that laws which treat women 
differently than men are discriminatory and thus, in violation of the 
equality guarantees. Indeed, some cases recognize that the 
discriminatory treatment is based on sexist attitudes and practices which 
reinforce women's subordination. The approach adopted by those courts 
is one of formal equality and sameness-women and men are the same, 
and thus ought to be treating the same in law. However, other cases have 
rejected the challenges to family laws. These cases, though also 
adopting a formal model of equality, emphasize the differences between 
women and men, and thus, preclude interrogation of substantive 
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inequalities. 
This research venture establishes that in our society Htigation in respect 
of any matter concerning the family, whether divorce, maintenance and 
alimony or custody, trial of juvenile offenders or any other 
matrimonial cause are viewed in terms of failure or success of legal 
action but as a social therapeutic problem, it should not be viewed as 
a prestigious dispute in which parties and their counsels are engaged 
in winning or defeating, but as a societal problem needing resolution. 
The amicable settlement of family conflict requires special 
procedures designed to help people in conflict and in trouble, to 
reconcile their differences, and where necessary to obtain 
professional assistance. Family disputes need to be seen with a 
humanitarian approach and hence attempts should be made to reconcile 
the differences so as to not disrupt the family structure. The Supreme 
Court has also made an observation regarding the disturbing 
phenomena of the large number of court case filings pertaining to divorce 
or judicial separation. Very recently, in Gaurav Nagpal v. Swnedha 
Nagpal', the Supreme Court observed: 
It is a very disturbing phenomenon that large numbers of 
cases are flooding the courts relating to divorce or 
judicial separation. An apprehension is gaining ground 
that the provisions relating to divorce in the Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1955 (in short the 'Marriage Act') have led 
to such a situation. In other words, the feeling is that the 
statute is facilitating breaking of homes rather than 
saving them, this may be too wide a view because 
actions are suspect. But that does not make the section 
invalid. Actions may be bad, but not the Section. The 
provisions relating to divorce categorize situations in 
which a decree for divorce can be sought for. Merely 
AIR 2009 SC 557. 
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because such a course is available to be adopted, should 
not normally provide incentive to persons to seek divorce, 
unless the marriage has irretrievably broken. Efforts 
should be to bring about conciliation to bridge the 
communication gap which lead to such undesirable 
proceedings. People rushing to courts for breaking up 
of marriages should come as a last resort, and unless it 
has an inevitable result, courts should try to bring about 
conciliation. The emphasis should be on saving of 
marriage and not breaking it. As noted above it is more 
important in cases where the children bear the brunt of 
dissolution of marriage. 
The study reveals that for the Indian Judiciary, deahng with the cases of 
divorce is a big challenge because of the social and economic issues 
involved and the need to render social justice through timely 
dispensation of court cases, so that people can return to nonnalcy and 
leave behind their past, in a country where usually nothing is so easily 
forgotten, especially if it is something as important as mamage. Men and 
women without any limitations due to race, colour, caste or religion have 
the right to maiTy and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights 
as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. Therefore it may 
be concluded that the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of 
society and is entitled to protection by society and the state. 
Suggestions: 
1. The courts should only create rights where they are certain 
that the right so created can be vindicated and the order of the 
court can be enforced. The danger of the judiciary creating a 
multiplicity of rights without possibility of adequate 
enforcement is a real one. It must be guarded against. The 
judiciary should not become an institution of mere form bereft 
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of substance. The decisions of the courts should be within the 
zone of juridical legitimacy. The judiciary cannot give 
decisions that ignore authoritative sources and are inconsistent 
or incoherent with the larger body of law. 
2. The judiciary can act only as an alarm-clock and not as a 
time-keeper. The courts can neither take over the functions of 
the Government nor allow the Administration to get away 
with its omissions and commissions. Every judge remains 
conscious of the limits of his jurisdiction and remembers that 
his role is to uphold the majesty of the Rule of Law and his 
power is meant to be harnessed in public interest. There are 
certain tasks which it is not possible for the judiciaiy to 
perform. Complex problems of policy cannot be resolved with 
the limited data available within the confines of the judicial 
process. These kinds of problems are incapable of resolution 
by "judicially manageable standards" and the courts must 
tread carefully when confronted by them. The judiciary must 
for ever remember the well-known saying that "absolute 
power corrupts absolutely". It is, therefore, the duty of the 
courts to ensure that while exercising their powers, they do 
not overstep their permissible limits and act within the bounds 
of the Constitution and the law. The greater the power, the 
greater is the need for restraint. No civilized system of justice 
can permit judicial authoritarianism and, therefore, judges at 
all levels, are expected to be circumspect and self-disciplined 
in the discharge of their judicial functions. The function of 
judge is divine but the problem arises when the judge starts 
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thinking that he himself has become Divine. 
3. With a view to retain legitimacy and its efficacy, the potent 
weapon ofPIL, which is for the benefit of the weaker sections 
of society and those who, as a class, cannot agitate their legal 
problems by themselves, has to be used carefully so that it 
may not get blunted by misuse or overuse. It is necessary and 
essential that PIL should develop on a consistent and firm 
path. Care has to be taken to see that PIL essentially remains 
Public Interest Litigation and does not become either Political 
Interest Litigation or Personal Interest Litigation or Publicit}' 
Interest Litigation or used for Persecution. If that happens, it 
would be unfortunate. PIL would loose its legitimacy and the 
credibility of the courts would suffer. 
4. It is well-known that Rule of Law sustains democracy and it is 
equally true that to a bold and independent judiciary is 
assigned the task of maintaining Rule of Law. Impailialit> 
and independence of judiciaiy depends on high standards of 
conduct followed by judges. Only if the highest possible 
standards are adhered to will the faith of the common in the 
judiciary be maintained. It is, therefore, imperative that the 
actions of judges are transparent and constitutionally sound. 
The judiciary cannot afford to adopt an uncritical attitude 
towards itself The judges, at all levels, must make themselves 
accountable and ensure that their actions are transparent and 
are within the parameters set by the Constitution The 
judiciary must follow the standards of morality and behaviour 
which it sets for others, and as a matter of fact before laying 
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down standards of behaviour for others the judiciary must 
demonstrate that the same standards apply to it and arc being 
followed by it. Constant evaluation of the functioning of the 
institution needs, therefore, to be encouraged if the high 
esteem conferred on the judiciary is to be justified. 
The societal perception of judges as being detached and 
impartial referees is the greatest strength of the judiciary and 
every judge must ensure that this perception does not receive 
a setback on any account. The courts act for the people who 
have reposed confidence in them and therefore the greatest 
threat to the independence of judiciary is the erosion of 
credibility of the judiciary in public mind, for whatever 
reasons. The person who don the robes of judges, should be, 
as far as practicable, fair, just, unbiased and impartial, while 
engaged in the administration of justice. If a judge decides 
wrongly, out of motives of self-promotion, he is no less 
corrupt than a judge who decides wrongly out of motives of 
financial gain. In either case, incumbent of the office is not 
worthy of being a judge. His actions erode the credibility of 
the institution in public mind and that is the greatest threat to 
the independence of judiciary. Eternal vigilance by the judges 
to guard against such latent dangers is, therefore, necessary. 
One of the greatest challenges that stares us in the face as we 
approach the 21st Century is the failure of judiciary to deliver 
justice expeditiously, which has brought about a sense of 
frustration amongst the litigants. Human hope has its limits 
and waiting endlessly is not possible in the current life style. 
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This cannot be possible without the full and unstinted 
cooperation of the members of the Bar and the presiding 
judges as partners in the great task of administration of 
justice. The consumer of justice wants unpolluted, expeditious 
and inexpensive justice. In the absence of it, instead of taking 
recourse to law, he may be tempted to take law in his own 
hands. This is what the judicial system must guard agamst so 
that people do not take recourse to extra judicial methods to 
settle scores and seek redress of their grievances. This is 
nothing else but resorting to the rule of the jungle. If this 
tendency proliferates, it would be a sad day for the 
constitutional democracy to which we are all wedded. The Bar 
and the Bench, have to together resolve to remedy these ills to 
preserve people's faith in the Rule of Law. 
7. The problem of delay on account of arrears has been a topic of 
discussion for decades. Many attempts at improvement of the 
situation have been made but there is no denying the fact that 
this continues to remain the central challenge facing the 
Indian judiciary. The lack of speedy dispute resolution system 
has a direct impact on the level of lawlessness in our society. 
A peaceful society is a necessary precondition for any kind of 
development. It is rather unfortunate that in the last 60 years, 
no scientific study has been undertaken to assess the needs of 
the judge-strength, more particularly in the subordinate 
judiciary. A proper study is needed to be undertaken to work 
out proper requirement of the infrastructure and the number of 
judges in the country on the basis of the pendency, rate of 
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inflow of legal matters into the courts and the estimated 
growth of litigation in the future. The ratio of judges per 
million populations in this country is the lowest in the world. 
The delay in the disposal of cases is also "Judge made'. Lack 
of punctuality, laxity and lack of control over the case file and 
court proceeding contributes in no small measure to the delay 
in disposal of cases. The grant of unnecessary adjournments 
on the mere asking or on account of "Strike call" adds to the 
problem. Court time is sacrosanct and no judge has any right 
to waste it. The judges at all levels must, therefore, respect the 
court time and remain punctual. No laxity in that behalf is 
permissible. Not adhering strictly to court timings is a serious 
aberration. It must be avoided at all costs. The delay in 
pronouncing judgments is yet another aspect on which the 
judges at all levels must address themselves. Both Bench and 
the Bar, as partners in the great task of administration of 
justice, must resolve not to become parties to slow motion 
justice. To meet the challenge of delay in dispensation of 
justice, all the three wings of the State must act without any 
further delay. 
The edifice of the administration of justice rests on the 
shoulder of district judiciary, as the majority of the litigants 
go only upto district level. The High Courts have power of 
superintendence over the State judiciary but they do not have 
any financial or administrative powers to create even one post 
of subordinate judge or of the subordinate staff, acquire or 
purchase any land or building for courts, decide and 
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implement any plan for modernization of court working. 
Chief Justices and their companion judges of the High Coun 
are best suited to know the requirements of the judiciary in 
their respective States. Their assessment and demand should 
receive proper consideration and not be "rejected" on account 
of merely financial constraints. The Chief Justices of the High 
Courts, who are high constitutional functionaries, know the 
needs of the judiciary of the State. They need to be given 
financial and administrative power vis-a-vis State judiciary, 
by transfer of financial as well as administrative powers, from 
the executive to enable them to function effectively. One of 
the essential elements of the Rule of Law is judicial 
independence and every society has seen the need for it. 
Financial dependence on the executive, to an extent, impinges 
upon the independence of the judiciary when it is required to 
'negotiate' every time with the largest litigant—the State. 
Should that not be avoided to make the judiciary truly 
independent, vibrant and effective? 
9. The high cost of litigation is yet another challenge which must 
be squarely met by the Bar and the Bench. We must admit 
that even after 60 years of independence the poor, backward 
and weaker sections of the society do not feel that they have 
equal opportunities for securing justice because of their socio-
economic conditions. The Government has demonstrated its 
bonafides and resolve in that behalf by enforcing and 
supporting the Legal Services Authorities Act, which aims at 
providing a protective umbrella to the weaker sections of the 
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society, against all injustices and giving it adequate funds. 
National Legal Services Authority is introducing various 
schemes to ensure speedy and inexpensive justice to the poor 
and downtrodden of this country. The National Legal Services 
authority had introduced a scheme for deputing Legal Aid 
Counsel in every court of Magistrate in the country so that the 
poor prisoners in custody get immediate and free of cost legal 
assistance. The National Legal Services Authority has also 
initiated steps for establishing permanent and continuous Lok 
Adalats in all the districts in the country for providing a 
statutory forum to the litigants for amicable settlements of 
their disputes. Efforts should be to establish such Lok /\da/ats 
in different government departments, statutory authorities and 
autonomous bodies so that the citizens' problems vis-a-vis 
these departments are settled through negotiations in the 
presence of Lok Adalat judges. 
10. Administration of criminal justice in our country appears to be 
at cross roads. Large-scale acquittals are eroding people's 
confidence in the effectiveness of criminal justice system. It is 
natural also because when people see persons accused of 
heinous and ghastly offences getting acquitted, they believe 
that either the courts are too liberal or pro-criminal or are not 
functioning the way they ought to function. Unfortunately, 
they do not know nor do they try to know the reasons for such 
acquittals. Most of the acquittals are on account of the fact 
that the witnesses produced by the prosecuting agencies do 
not support the prosecution cases. A very large number of 
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acquittals are also on account of faulty, non-scientit'ic and 
disoriented investigation. Some acquittals also take place 
because the judicial officers, rather than carefully and 
properly sifting the evidence, take to the easy course of 
throwing out the prosecution case on account of insignificant 
discrepancies and narrow technicalities. They ignore human 
psychology and behavioural probability when assessing the 
testimonial potency of the evidence. It is, often, overlooked 
that justice cannot be made sterile on the spacious plea that no 
innocent should be punished even if many guilty escape. 
Indeed, the innocent should not be punished but why should 
the guilty escape? The courts must respond to the society's cry 
for justice and punish the guilty by a proper and judicious 
approach to assess the evidence. 
11. The rule of law must run close to the rule of life, it is, 
therefore, necessary that a judge must have the basic 
sensibility to know human suffering, poverty, inequality and 
exploitation. It is not enough if he has good knowledge of 
law, but he should have broad perspective of the historical 
process that led to the deprivation of freedom and equality to 
large numbers of people. He should know that, by and large. 
State is an instrument of oppression and that the struggle of 
the people is essentially and universally for basic human 
rights... So, justice is a struggle, as between law and liberty, 
law and conscience, values based on human dignity and all 
that goes with it. One of our aims, at least in the new 
millennium, must be to make justice available to the common 
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man at affordable cost. 
12. Perhaps the most important practical reform would be 
constitution of rural courts for speedy justice. As already 
stated, the number of judges in our society is slightly over 10 
per million populations. This density is roughly ten per cent of 
the density of judges (per unit population) in more advanced 
and law-abiding societies. Even this low number is highly 
skewed with pitiful shortages in subordinate judiciary and 
ridiculously large number in higher courts. There could be 
several models like the 'Gram Nyayalaya' advocated by the 
Law Commission in its 114th report. Essentially, there should 
be such rural courts with special magistrates with jurisdiction 
over a town, or a part of a town or a group of villages. These 
special magistrates should be appointed by district judge for a 
term of three years. They should have exclusive civil and 
criminal jurisdiction of say all civil disputes up to Rs. 1 lakh 
in civil cases and up to an imprisonment of one year in 
criminal cases. In addition, certain civil disputes arising out of 
implementation of agrarian reforms and allied statutes, 
property disputes, family disputes and other disputes as 
recommended by the Law Commission could be entrusted to 
these rural courts. In civil cases, there should be only a 
provision for revision by the District Judge on grounds of 
improper application of law and on no other ground. In 
criminal cases, where imprisonment is awarded, there could 
be a provision for appeal to the Sessions Judge. The 
procedures must be simplified and these courts should be duty 
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bound to deliver a verdict within 90 days from the date of 
complaint. 
13. Under section 12 of Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 the 
Commission has been authorized to inquire suo-motu, or on a 
petition presented to it by a victim or any person on his behalf. 
into complaint of violation of human rights or abetment 
thereof or negligence in prevention of such violation by a 
public servant. It would have been better if the commission 
had been given power to entertain violation of human rights by 
private persons. 
14. Women, children, bonded labours, slum dwellers, displayed 
tribal, undertrials, tortured prisoners, etc are the examples of 
victims of injustice and exploitation and they need to be 
rehabilitated with the help of the government machinery. The 
task of their rehabilitation is often left on government officials 
and the government machinery is often indifferent to this task. 
This issue also has certain legal implications that need to be 
clarified by the courts. Therefore, a Social Justice Cell can 
play a vital role by making a representation to the government 
on behalf of the victims and if it fails to respond positi\ely, to 
take up the matter in the court of law. The courts often give 
excellent judgments in favour of the poor but they are rarely 
implemented due to the apathy of the government officials 
responsible for their implementation. In this situation the 
Social Justice Cell must assume the function of a watchdog 
and follow-up the task of implementation and report the matter 
to the courts when they are not executed. This Cell can also 
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plead with the court to appoint its officials as members of the 
implementing team so that it can play an effective role in the 
rehabilitation of the victims of exploitation. 
15. In the process of handling PIL cases a panel of socially 
committed lawyers at different cadres of judiciary is a 
necessity. Collaboration with ideologically committed lawyers 
is very important with use of the legal system as a tool of 
injustice for the poor. Individual or group cases of injustice 
and exploitation can be taken up in every court, depending 
upon the nature of the case, with the help of legal activists. 
16. Ignorance, apathy, fear and lack of legal consciousness of the 
people also contribute to the gross violation of human rights 
therefore, there is a greater need to educate the people about 
their basic rights and to create awareness among them in order 
to build a healthy public opinion against injustice and 
exploitation. Human rights awareness education may be given 
to all civil servants including Police. 'Human rights may be 
included in the school syllabi from the 6* standard. 
17. For the better protection of human rights a separate 'Human 
Rights Department' with independent charge of a Minister 
may be created by the Government of India. Human rights 
standing committees may be constituted in all Panchayats, 
Municipalities and corporations. The chairperson may be the 
leader of the opposition. 
18. Though it is a very well established fact that the judicial 
activism of the Supreme Court has helped in enforcmg the 
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rights and interests of the citizens, and also in Iceeping the 
other branches of the government within their Constitutional 
boundaries, the judiciary should constantly remind itself that 
the need of the hour is the Supremacy of the Constitution and 
not the supremacy of the judiciary. As the judiciary has 
invariably to rely upon the other institutions for 
implementation of their orders and directions, unless there is 
an equal public faith and confidence in all the three organs of 
the State, the principle of Constitutionalism cannot prevail. 
Therefore the judiciary has to be active for noble causes but 
not at the cost of degrading the other organs of the state. 
Eventhough, the judicial activism in constitutional 
interpretation and in expansion of 'personal liberty' is a most 
healthy trend, the courts should realize that in a system of 
limited government like India, the delicate balance between 
the three organs of the State should not be overloaded in 
favour of any one of them beyond tolerable limits. The 
judiciary should not be tin exception to this cardinal principle 
of constitutionalism. 
19. There must be greater judicial accountability of the judges. 
While ensuring that the Legislature and the Executive are 
accountable to the Constitution, the judges should remember 
that they are also equally accountable to the Constitution and 
ultimately to the people. The courts must respond and be 
responsive. 
20. The dire pressing need of the day in the current social milieu 
is to create a law and infrastructural machinery for Alternative 
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Dispute Resolution (ADR), mechanisms in resolving 
marriage, divorce and maintenance disputes. Alternative 
Dispute Resolution cannot see the light of the day unless 
citizens also "participate" in that movement. The citizens can 
help in the achievements of these benign objectives by 
restraining themselves while invoking jurisdictions of the 
"traditional courts" v^here the matter in dispute can be 
conveniently and economically taken care of by ADR 
mechanisms. The right to speedy trial is not a fact or fiction 
but a "Constitutional reality" and it has to be given its due 
respect. The courts and the legislature have already accepted it 
as one of the medium of reducing the increasing workloads on 
the courts. The same is also gaining popularity among the 
masses due to its advantages. We need "private initiatives" for 
not only establishment of ADR facilities in India but equally a 
"liberal use" of the same by the citizens and netizens This 
initiative needs awakening by self consciousness and not by 
implementation of laws. Spouses, parents and couples need to 
realize the advantages of reconciliation, mediation and 
alternative dispute resolution methods in the family 
structure. Matrimonial reliefs carved out by settlement will 
serve better than results obtained by adversaiy litigation 
involving time, efforts, finances and above all by breaking a 
family. 
21. Family matters should not be litigated in any court unless of 
an extraordinary grave nature; they should be amicably 
resolved. Family disputes such as divorce, matrimonial 
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property division, custody of children and maintenance should 
not come into the higher courts and they should be resolved 
mutually and conclusively in the family court itself. It would 
save the time of the superior courts where other matters could 
be resolved in the time which would have been consumed 
for settling matrimonial disputes. Family disputes are such 
disputes that can be resolved even in the home itself by a 
unanimous consensus. Mandatory reconciliatory procedures 
should assume finality so that matters can be put to rest 
conclusively without any further challenge. 
22. The necessity and urgency of creating more Family Courts 
under the Family Courts Act, 1984 in India is a very important 
factor which will contribute to the resolution of family law 
disputes by ADR. The current handling of matrimonial 
litigation by conventional courts in jurisdictions where there 
are no family Courts is a poignant reminder of the situation 
created by lack of family courts in such jurisdictions. The 
availability of trained counselors, mediators, professionally 
trained persons and above all specialist family law judges 
would all form part of a well organized team in a family court 
which in turn would itself create a mechanism and structure 
for alternative disputes resolution of family law disputes. This 
would therefore, give a new dimension to the existing 
matrimonial scenario in the Indian jurisdiction. 
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